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2755042 '.WARRANTY. DEED 
Flcr.-7*ch Corp.--/-
-~~*'Salt Lzks City '*•. 
DNV2Y xzd WARRANT 
, Coti2t7 of 
- j raaccr .-V: 
r'i/V.'j^ ..,.1;-.^  £ / _ ;;; 
Hin3cr.'F.alan£sr'A A \!tzh Ccrscrction V^<\ "S*A' 
.:•&£{.;* &*tti? 
*Ki:5^**!; 
:*•• 
:
.^&&<?* 
w^- ^ • W 
& r : ^c>-a Ci UtCA 
•jllcrs ckd oir.zr good end vclucbla ccr^idarcticn 
\ j r an >.«.•••:. 
the aum of: 
DOLLARS, f,-; 
Lie folIoTrlmr described hnc t of 'asd In 5<zli Lika ?•;' . •-.'*; 
State of U tah : . .!;•., 
3 E C I N N I N C AT A POINT ON THE NORTH LIN'S C? 2 ^ 0 0 SOUTH STREET 
S A I D POINT BEING N 00* 0 2 ' 3 5 " E 1 0 3 3 . 0 0 * AND VfEST 2 5 5 6 . 3 1 2 
FROM THE SALT LAKE COUNTY MC;: /MENT AT THE CENTER 0 ? SECTION 
2 2 , T . 1 S . , ? 
NORTH 
i? 0 ? ' 
S A I D SOUTH L 
TKENCE 
"?" RA:-
l w . 
8 5 1 . 0 5 ' TO 
LA?:E BASE AND :<ERIDIAN AND HI 
-:E SC-TH RIGHT-OF-WAY 
Count/, 
NG 
rKE PROPOSED I - 2 1 5 1 THENCE SOUTHWESTERLY ALONG-
[NE AROUND A 1 1 ^ . 2 3 ' RADIUS CURVE TC 
(CHORD 3SARS S 5 3 ' h'*' 1 3 " W 7 0 . 9 0 7 ' ) r TKENCE S 5 3 * 1 9 ' . 0 2 " 
W 1 9 ^ . 0 9 3 ' ALONG SAID SOUTH L I N E i TKENCE S 0 2 * 
7 1 2 . 7 6 1 ' TO THE NCR: 
0 1 ' 
OF S A I D 2 3 0 0 SOUTH STREET 
^3T 2 0 0 . 5 0 V TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
CONTAINS! 3 . 8 ^ 6 ACRES 
WITNESS, the hand of a*Id zrantor , this Fovrtaar.ih 
Gctcber , A. D. 1975 > 
Vlar.rlecyfor^ ^V-/Frad^iih 
Signed !n the Presence of 
diy of *'•:. 
'F.hX*r 
'tit 
'
:M; 
o < • 
o <^  
O •/, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Count7 of Salt Laka 
October* 19?S 
Srrith *zd Feb 
f A . D . Cn the ?ourt**ntn day of 
p^rjonjLU/ appeared before 2 « i? 
^ h o beicx by me d u l / n r o m did ».;/, eAch for himself, t h i t he, the wid ,?. Fred S^riih • 
U the preiideat , rnd he, Lhe xxid Fcbert S. HaUzrdsr >* -he lecrtUry 
of PlcTt-r ic / r Corpcnztian CompAn/, ind t h i t the "»ithia ir.d forejoin^ 
inst rument "^x* xijned in behxif of uld corpont loa by authority of a resolution oti^i beard of dir?c-
t o n and i±ld R, Frsd &niih and Rcber^S^, -Sa'zzr^ar ." 
!a the K * J of axid corpont loa . 
each duly xclcaowledsred to me that said corpont ion executed the xame ari'd Ofit--,rr»#>e>Lxffusd . 
My CooimLiilon «xpfni...-.l'?Z?Z /7i.... 3 £ y ruid«nc« L a . . . ^ / h l . ^ / l r ^ ' ^ V ' ^ ^ ''. 
is 
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4441ft 
Dip. Book. 
Kill Ux notlct to. -Addrin. 
-P*r« Rtf.:. 
3J161U5 WARRANTY DEED 
on -« 
r.'-i 
HINSON-HALANDER, INC. 
Ci * S*lc Lakt 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
.County or Salt Lake 
grantor 
, StaU ot Utah, h«raby 
Of 
WESTERN MANAGEMENT - A Partnership 
Salt Lnke 
grantee 
for the «um of 
DOLLARS. 
County, the following' deicribed trtct of land In 
S u t t o t Utah: 
BECINNINC t t ft 'point North (WCtt^S" East 1,083.00 feet and Weat 2556.812 feet 
and North 3»'»0.00 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument nt the center 
of S o c i e n 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running ther.oc North 508.434 feet to the. South right of way l i n e of the 1-215 "F" 
ramp e x i t ; thence Southwesterly 68.833 feet along said r ight of way around 1146.23 
fee t radius curve Co the l e f t chord bears South 59*46'53" We«t 69.822 f ee t ; thence 
South 58 # 19'2 K West 227.053 feet along arid right-of-way; thence South 16w2'36" 
Eaac 3 6 7.9 .c- i. f e e t ; thence East 152.542 t'jet to the point of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO AND TOCETHER WITH A R'CCHT-OF-WAY: Beginning at c point on the North lin«{ 
of 2300 South Stree t ; said poinc being North 00*03'48" East 1086.539 feet and West 
35.84 fcot froai the West quarter comer of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 
West, Sa l t Lake Base tnd Meridian, and running cbcn:e North 104.00 f ee t ; thence 
Sorlh 16*02'36" Vest 67.00 f ee t ; thence North 73°57'24M Enst 82.00 f ee t ; thence 
North 16BG2 ,36" West 414.161 f ee t , more or l e s s to the East boundary l ine of 
property conveyed MARCON Investment by Chat certain Warranty Deed dated October 
14, 1975, recorded Nov^nrer 18, 1975, as Entry No. 2761314 in Book 4029 at page 
329; and running ther.ee North 02'30'00" West 122.157 feat to the South l i n e of the 
1-215 Interchange and running thence South 58#19'02" Weat 225.832 feet along said 
South l i n e ; thence South 53"28'29M Wr-»c 159.555 feet along: said South l i n e ; thence 
South 16'02 f 36" East 526.012 feet to ;.ie North l i n e of LLIA 2300 South Street ; 
thence Northeasterly along said North l ine of 61.922 f ee t around a 22.1143 feet 
WITNESS, the hand of laid grtntor , thia 
, A. X). 19 
(CONTINUED ON 3ACK) day of 
filmed In the Preienca of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of 
On tho 3 - ixi of 
personally appeartd bafora mi 
— - — " J 1^ > \ 
3*. 
y. •••,.;:;-T^>--' 
,'A. D. 10? f 
thi ilm«r of tht within lnatrum«nt, who duly acknowUdgad to ma that ha •xtcuttd tht 
iim*. C ^ X -j 
/ i I \ r \ ^ ^ / W / P u b i i c . . 
My commlsilon txplraii. __ RWdln* In jC (/<*r ^f^^t * j . ^ ^ 
ir-~?i, — yrgr ^ ^ rl~—*=*--3s*i=-,=z^ • U T T r i M I ll"W • liHIMIJufe ^ f i 
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ridtviA curve to the right (chord b e e n North fii'ia'fF EciVc 61.720 f e e t ) ; 
thence Kent 169.16 feet to the point of BZCINNING. 
BEGINNING i t t point on the North, eide of 2300 South S t r e e t , i t i d pointbeing 
North 0'02'33" EASU 1033.00 feet and Wait 2356.812 feet fron tht Uilt Ulce 
City Survey Monument *t tho center nf Section 22, Tovmhlp 1 South, Renge 1 
Weet, S i l t Like Been end Huriditn tnd running thencti North 340.00 feat; chtnce 
Weet 132..U2 f e e t | thence South 15<%02,36M E*et 134.984 f t t t ; ehence South 73* 
37'2AM Veat 82.00 f#Qtj thence South 16*02 !36" E n t 67.00 f e e t ; thence South 
104.00 feet to iii.d North l ine of Street ; thence Eeat 170.00 feat to ch* point 
of beginning. 
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3 S Recorded at Request of 
at M. Fee Paid 5 _ _ 
by Dcp. Book Pigc Ref.: _ _ 
Mai! tax notice to .Address 
WARRANTY DEED 
[CORPORATE F O R M ] 
MIIGCI . ' -HALMDL'R , I.VC. 
, a co.-f.-Tration 
organized ind existing under the lawi of the State of U tah , with icj principal •«>•.:ice at 
S a l t :^'K<: Cit.y , of County of ^ A l t Lake , State cf Utah, 
grantor, hereby C O N V E Y S A N D W A R R A N T S to 
WEST-?.:: MA;iAG2'fHi7 - a P a r t n e r s h i p 
gr.intcc 
Cu l t Lake C i t y , S a l t Lake County , f t a t c oC Utah for the s u n of 
Ten d o l l a r - and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n DOLL/i RS. 
the following described trace of land in g a 1 l Lnks Cou" ty . 
State of Utah : 
Sec E x h i b i t "A" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o , and by t h i s reference made a p a r t h e r e o f . 
$ \ 
a: 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed ,md Yne transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor t a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a q u o r u m . 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name ami 
by its duly authodzrd of/ iccn this <J/±J-— day of / ^ b . / v f ^ C ^ 
seal to be hereunto affixed 
, A. D. V) V? 
AtCic: 
'{JM^[^ MINSQ/I-HAkANDSR, P C . . .om pany 
President. 
'J.' 
Secretary. 
• • * - • ' « ; . ' , 
"".{•oaSl'O/.^TK SEAL 
''ca Vv ; 
< <r* '. t : r„. 
'STrttCOJ1 UTAH, 
C " " - • ' • -
."C-o^/.uf 
-rdbi'the Zl* day of O^*•£«-' 
personally appeared before me R ^ • ft.\/t«t/tr-~
 a n cJ /"*>>/« 
who bein.j by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, rhe said O W * . / ^ * ^ i r>rV^ "*••'* 
Is the president, and lie, the said R. £ AJM/U«I /*» - ' / if the %cctltl&\ ° 
Of rT\ ,A tjC'M . ^J«WM i . c / f , I AC 
 M{t ity'\ 
Company , ind that thz withirr aod, foregoing ' 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by author i ty of x resplution'of \U\(^T^pf-
directors and said ^«\U ^- p \ . . \ ^ . . ^ md fC o p*« ( u ' r» "'>.*."" 
each duly acknowledged to rrte that said corpo;ation executed the .umc and tha t ' the .teaUaYfiA-c! 
is the seal of said corporation. ( 
LUJL^JZ: 
\j~\ • NpUrjcPuWic 
My commission expiree.S//.£.//..tfJ2- _\\y residence is (Citd.^teftl*! J^fffr.l) 
J 
UTAH T u n AH* ABSTRACT COMPANY 
Si/t Lake 355-7533 Too«!t 832-3511 -~* Davis 867-2273 773-1653 534-042? Wtb«r 621-754 
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UT:AI. DESCRIPTION 
EXHIBIT "A" 
BEGINNING at 
fll-'o be ing Nor 
t h ?! n £ 11 quart 
S i l f U l £ Base 
Soiit.1" Right of 
a I 1 4 6 . I ? foot 
Went 63 .80* f* 
Right of U'av I 
South 16" 02 ' 
f e e t ; thence S 
t o the North I 
North l i n e Co 
point 
th 00* 
er corn 
and Me 
Way l i 
rodiua 
f t ) ; th 
11.?; th 
3 6 ' E..-
ou c.*. * 6 
inc of 
the poi 
on the North l i n e of 2300 South S t r e e t , »»{d point 
03 ' 48" East 1086.539 f ee t i-id Eas t 8 4 . 1 6 feet from 
er of Sec t ion 2 1 , Tovnship I S o u t h , Range I West, 
r i d i a n , and running thence North 8 5 1 . 0 5 feet to the 
n* of 1-215, Chen-? Southwes ter ly 6 3 . 8 1 2 feet along 
curve to the l e f t (Chord beara South 59* 37' 52" 
uncc South 58* 19» 02" We»t 2 0 5 . 0 0 f e e t along aid 
ence South 02* 30" 00" East 122 .157 f e e t ; thenca 
- 414 .161 f e e t , thence South 73* 57 ' 24" West 82.00 
* C " 36" Eaat 67 .00 f e e t ; thenct South 104.00 feet 
sa id i t r - e t ; thence Eaat 170.00 f e e t Along aaid 
(ll of BEGINS INC. 
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Recorded it Requett of
 v-
IL M. FeePiJdJ 
by Dtp, BccL Pift M.u 
Mtil nx nodce to, Addmi 
3645188 
:f WARRANTY DEEP 
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a P a r t n e r s h i p 
of S a l t Lake Ci ty County of S a l t Lake 
CONVEY andWAR&ANT to 
frxncor 
Stttt of Utth, hereby 
WILLIAM .!. LOWENBERC, * . m a r r i e d man, as h i a s o l e and sepa ra t e proper ty 
frtntee 
C a l i f o r n i a 
of 44 Montgomery S t r e e t County , Sate of UM/ 
San F r a n c i s c o , C a l i f o r n i a 94104 
forthexutnof TEN DOLLARS and o t h e r gbnd and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s &DUJX3i$ 
the followinf dacribed met of Und In 
Scire of Ucih, to-wit: 
S a l t Lake County, 
SEE LEGAL DESCRIPTION M REVERSE SIDE HEREOF. 
.1 
If51 
C3 
•~*J 
u> 
CO 
O 
— O/ O \ -
c:.«j^ 
WITNESS the hand of stid jrantor , this 2 7 th day of 
WES 
Signed In the presence of 
7 . A. D. 19 82 
NT, a P a r t n e r s h i p 
/ v..--' --A 
STATE gSIHtty ••>: 
I 'CCtoHTY OF-Sclt Lako 
4 ^ d a y of 
DALE 
AA^S , 1982, pe 
N. MINSON and ROBERT 
r s o n a l l y appeared be fo re me 
S. HALANDER, who be ing by V H . pfeO.^ SMf-TH, "RONALD W. SMII 
me- d u i y - s ^ o r i / d i d say t h a t they a rc the P a r t n e r s of WESTER*. MANAGEMENT, a P a r t n e r s h i p 
and Lhat the foregoing ins t rument was s igned in beha l f of r a id P n r t n e r s h l p , and a a ' . 
H. FKF.D SMITH, RONALD W. SMITH, DALE N. MINSON and ROBERT S. HAUyNDER acknowledged 
to me t h a t sa id P a r t n e r s h i p executed the same. 
Notary Public 
My CommUrion Expdtit 
T S. HALAN! 
o li  / » 
Co 
CD 
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
.
uEClh"NZNC a: a p o i n t on the North a ide of 2200 Sou:h S t r e e t , j a i d p o i n t 
being North 0* 02 ' 35" £ a s : 1033.00 f a - : and Veac 25:5.312 f e e : f r U :hc 
S a l : Laki Count/ Survey Mcnu^n : a : :he c e n t e r of S c : : i c n 22, Tc~-T.3hip 1 
South, Range 1 W C J : , S a l : Lake Base and Mer id ian , s a i d seine* nl*3 b e i o j 
North 0 ' 02 ' 14" W2 3: along tha s e c t i o n l i n e 1025.91 feet '(byde<-d North 
CO* 0 3 ' 43" r . i a : 1035.539 f ee t ) and Eaj t 36.73 f e e : (by Deed East 34.15 f e - : ) 
f roa :h« W*jt q u a r t e r corner of Sec t ion 22, Tcvr.ship 1 South, Ran;? 1 West, 
S a l : Laka Bar.e and Mer id ian , and running thence L'T-r. 3:1.05 feet to the 
Scu:h Right of Way l i n e of 1-215, ther.es Seuthvea te r l y 52.312 f e e : a i m ; 
a 1146.22 foot r ad iu s cur /a :o the I s : : (Chord bear3 South 59* 27 ' 52" Wen: 
62.304 f « < : ) ; thence South 53* 19 ' 02" W2 3 : 205.00 f e e : along aaid.Rl .3h: 0: 
Way l i n e ; th.tnca South 02* 20 ' 00" East 122.157 f a - : ; -ther.ca South IS* 02 ' 25 
East 414.151 f e e : , thence Scu:h 72* 57 ' 24" Weat 32.20 f e e : ; ther.ce South 
16* 0 2 ' 36" East 57.00 f e e : ; thence Scu:h 104.00 f e e : :o :he North l i n e of 
sa id s t r e e t ; thence Eaa : 170.00 f e e t along s a i d North l i n e to the p o i n t 
of 3SCINNING. 
SL3JECT TO A:;0 TGCE~tER WITH A RIGHT Or WAV: Beginning a t a po in t on the 
North l i n e of- 2300 South S t r e e t ; s a id p c i n : be ing North 00 s 0 3 ' 43" East 
1036.539 f e e t ar.d West 35.34 f e e t frcrs the West q u a r t e r corner of Sec t ion 22 
Township 1 South, Range 1 We**:, S a l t Lake 3a3e and Meridian, and running then 
North 104.00 f e e t ; theno* North I 6 a 02 ' 36" West 67.20 :az; thence North 
73* 57 ' 24" East 32.00 f e e t ; thence North 15 ' 0 2 ' 3'V West, 414.151 f e e t , more 
or l e s s tr» Che East boundary l i n e of p r o p e r : / conveyed to MARCCN INVESTMENT 
by t h a t c e r t a i n Warranty Deed da ted October 14, 19 75, recorded November 13, 
1975 a* Entry No. 2761314 in Book 4029 a t page 329; and running thence 
North 02* 20 ' 00" West 122.157 f e e t to the South l i n e 0 : the 1-215 i n t e r -
change and -running thence North 53* 19 ' 02" East 225.322 f e e t along sa id 
South l i n e ; thence South 53* 2 3 ' 29" West 159.555 f e e t along sa id South l i n e ; 
thence South 16* C2' 26" East 525.912 fee t to the North l i n e of sa id 2300 
South S t r e e t ; thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y along s a i d North l i n e of 61.922 f e e t aroun 
a 22.1143 f e e t r a d i u s curve to the r i g h t (cr.otd bea r s North 31° 53 ' 42" East 
61.720 f e e t ) ; thence East 169.15 f e e t to the po in t of BEGINNING. 
Thi3 conveyance i s ruade and accepted sub jec t to a Deed of Trus t in favor c : 
3ETTILT0N MORTGAGE LOAN GO. recorded December 19, 19 79, in 3cok 5009 a t 
page 1061 of O f f i c i a l R. :ords and amended by Aner.drr.er.: recorded J u l y 6, 
1931 in 3ook 526 7 a : pa; r 311 of O f f i c i a l Records, and subsequent ly ass igned 
to OLD STCNE 3ANK, by Af- igr . -ent 01 deed of Trus t recorded A p r i l 9, 1930 
in Book 5035 a t page 117 of O f f i c i a l Records having an unpaid p r i n c i p a l 
ba lance of 3 697,059.10 as of Jar.V-rr- 27 , 19?I which Deed of 
Trus t and the debt s^c-jj:^d thereby the Grantees h e r e i n hereby assume and 
aftre.e to pay. 
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« 
0 4 W^n fttcordfirt Return tot \ *b 
/ 
Will iam J . Lovenber 
44 Stontgca-orj St.ro 
SEJI Frsnc iaco , C a l i f o r n i a 941C4 
e t 
CQBiwcnvg ^JtR^jmr &CTP 
?>';.,( 
II 
HHSREA5, Western Management, a Partnership, of Salt 
Lake City# County of Salt Lake, ^tat* of Utah, as grantor, 
CC«YJY2D and WAJUIAHT3D to WILLIAM J. LOHStfBSKG; !;a »arried man, as 
hiavaola-and ^aiparata property of 44 Montgcaary Strait. San 
?rancisco, California, 94104 aa granted for valuable consider-
ation received tlm ;./r<ial property described in that certain 
Warranty Deed dat*d January 27, 1S82 awl recorded in the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's Office February 3, 1982, in Book 5337, 
: • • • • : * ; • ' . - • • • • : . • • . - • ; , , . . r i ' , . ; . * , • • • : • 
cxm»*ncing at Page 1149, a# Entry Xo. 3645180 {'Warranty Died"). 
i ' . ! - • ' • ; ! : . ' • * • ' , ; ;'. • ; r ' ' ' • ' i : •"*'$%•» 
KH35U2AJB, the parties tOj thia Corrective Warranty Deed 
5 Q 1 3 2 D 2 
23 JHW&1 ?J 04J17 PT1 
K A T I E L . . D I X O K 
KSCSflfcO^ SALT UC£ CXWTYr UTAH 
FIRST tfSSIUM TirU 
fc£C BTl SJttfcCH VCST r DCPUTT 
; Iwa: disport rid va«^ the Warranty 
>;j E^Mki vhich thay, dasira' to corract. '• <••.- .:/: -;«;^£.-v '#l.[.' Ml 
,*;:. - • • ^  • .*•;••.:'*
 :
 •"• -.-.•• -t-r.^ £ j - * « V ; - > 1 ^ ' :^ 
NSSXSAS#'"tK# partiom to' this CorrectiVe Warranty Died 
• =••.-•,•••.•':•' i
 :.v\'.:- •• ":•:)$• V r . f - ' • s •'^ •.•.p;': 
htva discovered irrora:;;in tha rnairvction-cnd grant of the right-
o£-v*y .dsscrilxtd -in v the Warranty Dead which *jva* intended to 
convey a right-of-vay for ingraaa and agr^aa; aa necessary and 
appropriate for the convenient use of Ga*ntei*a property over the 
.adjoining prx^party - conveyed to
 r; tfaw Grantor;-; hovever, such 
deacription, by mutual. ,miataJia of thft pvartita, /failed to limit 
auch eaa«m«nt to appropriate ingreaa and agress^cver the acceac 
vays ax tha *&m*. a*ist;»3 or may be improved or ^odifiid. 
irrnjt uofam 
inaa^isi 
^ •• • m 
. I ' t - . - C 1 ' 1 ' 
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VfliZRX^S, >*astern> Managaia*nt, formerly a general part-
nership cormistJng of H, 7r*d S^ith, Ronald *W. £**ith, Dale }i. 
Xinson, and Robert S. Halander; and Saith, Halandftr, feith and 
AjiaociaU/a, a partnership, consisting of H. Fred Siaith, Ronald W. 
Gnith ar\d Rcbort 2. Halander (successor in interest to a portion 
of the property described in the amended legal description vhich 
is presently titled in the na»* of Saith, lUiandor, Saiith ^nd 
Associates) herein collectively art acting as grantors of their 
riisjpflctivo interests^ -1'"-,. 
WHZPSA3, Wllll&n J. Lovenberg, ir»di v idu/*\ ly, h^i bean 
designated arxl is acting in the capacity as a grantee herein, but 
vith respect: to tho corrections of the description of the riqht-
of-vay for ingress and egress, Loventxrg shall also net as 
grantor for thu purpose cf partially releasing and raconveying to 
granv.ors naaad hereinabove or their successors in interact, the 
burdin, encumbrance or restrictions of ! the right-of-vay a/j 
necessary tc accomplish the purpose oi the parties in correcting 
the aistaXa in the description of the right-of-vay. 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto intend that the corrections 
shall relate back to the date of the pi ior conveyance by the 
w:-?ujrranty D**£m, so that the estate of Willie J. U3venbtjrg, 
. gr.ytnt»a, vill be as intended by the parties. The parties do not 
lnt//.nd land do not hereby create any nev 1 i»i'vat'ion p^ricxls on 
action* or extend the sasae by virtue of this D^*d. 
T>IXRZrOR2# to correct such aiatakes, tht partits to 
this !><i*il hereby aj**nd the legal descript ion on. the Warranty D*L<1 
CD 
en 
CO 
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*#£i&>2^^ i^3L2£S£Stf^ . ..JE^§&£mWJB2g%iMi 
t o t h e l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n s as s e t f o r t h on E x h i b i t *A* a t t a c h e d 
h e r e t o . 
IH WITNESS ymZPJZQT, t h i s C o r r e c t e d Warranty Deed has 
b e e n made and a g r e e d t.o aaong the f o l l o v i n g p a r t i e s d a t e d t h i s 
2 Zr day of ~J /\<7]x.>4fl-r . 1 9 9 1 . 
y-lXLIAX J . L0*r2.MBSR<V 
,* • 
'WBSTZRM MANAGEMENT, A PARTNERSHIP 
/ 
FAXU *HTTR% G*ntr*T P a r t n e r 
/fo<tdj&j£J>?* l#ai,// 
'JfcGHALD W, SttlTH, G e n e r a l P a r t n e r 
U>2 H. K A ^ S C N , / G e n e r a l Partn er 
^li^^klz^ 
ROBLRt $• HALAND&R, General Partner 
(/ 
SMITH, HAUUfDRR, S>II TH and 
ASSOCIATES, A PARTNERSHIP 
^ 
/ • 
H. F,^!)" SMITH, Genera l P a r t n e r 
-3-
CX7 
CO 
CO 
en 
CO 
~\^a 
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/Rt**A LD W. SftlTli, GeA*ral P a r t n e r 
'JfOB5B??y3. IIA^ANDXH, General P a r t n e r 
57AT3 OV CAI.I70«MIA ) 
. . . „ • : : s . • • : . 
f\^r^..^kV ) '•• • •,-..L ....•• 
On fch* l^^ V)r da? of ^r^vo^^N-r-V, 1991, personally 
'..«Fpfi«r-wl' bafor.* ra<s W.TU. ^ J. LCWENBSWG, th* signer of the above 
instrument, yhu duly acknowledged before zvc that he executed the 
1 ytSSS-X c r f o 
1 Sga* >*y Ccraaiasion Empires: Vs^  \3^lCU>^>(g^ NOTARY PU.II.IC R e s i d i n g a t : ^ c<v 
/ 
STATS 0 ? iJTA2i 
CCUXTT OF SALT LAK2 
3 2 . 
/ ^ l 
FFLSD S^rtH; RGHAL^ W. SHI' 
<^ *h* x ' da*/ vCz>~z*fr-£{(&-t~s1 .-^ 1991 _ p e r s o n a l l y 
a p p e a r e d
 ; fca£ore a a It.  ^VVA) Ctf I^ . M TH, 0AL2 N. 
MIMSOtf, and K002RT S. IlALAHDEfl, vho b«irKJ d u l y s v o r n , d i d j a y 
th&t t h e y a r * the g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s of W^STSJltf MAHAGZXEirr, n 
p a r t n e r s h i p , *nd.-! ;that t h * f o r e g o i n g i a s t r u a e n t vas s itj r,*d in 
b u h a l f oiT s a i d p i r t n e r s h i p and s a i d H. FR2D SXIT74, RCWAU) W. 
SXITH, DAJL3 H. WINSGH, and ROBERT 3 . HAUOfDEJ* acknowledged to »e 
t h a t * a i d p a r t n e r s h i p e x e c u t e d t h e ' s a o * . 
"c: 
My Cccmixjaion Expires: 
* * » « » A ^ _ ^ ^ ^ 
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STAT2 0? UTAH 
CCUKTT 0? SALT LAitP. ) 
,13 , 
spp*nra<i 
HALADDER, 
p a r t n e r s 
and t h . i t 
On t h« id 
H. 
day ti\?*&<<*2&£LLC£* 1 9 5 1 ' p e r s o n a l l y 
7R2D ^©IJlT?^ RCtJALD/Wi SMITH, PODZKT S. 
Yho b e i n g du ly s v o r n , dicf zn1/ t h a t th*y art t h * g * n * r a l 
of SMITH, HAL*>iD2ft, 5XITH ar\d" ASSCCIATZS, a p a r t n e r s h i p , 
t h * f o r e g o i n g 
p a r t n e r s h i p and s^ id H 
IULAMD2R aci inov 1 *dc? ed 
s a n e . 
My Ccrtaaission S z p i r e s , 
in b e h a l f of s a i d 
SMITH, ?,CHALD S. 
to »* thAt s a i d p a r t n e r s h i p e x e c u t e d the 
i a s t r u » < n t v&£ s i g n e d 
FHZO S^ITH, RONALD V. 
*' Sss^ -
3 8 4 / 1 1 0 3 S 0 A 
: 12<s L*+**+ (VUG- : 
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."^CU^-'i-C-SCl—%LJ*-»« w - » » 
SXHI3IT "A* 
3EG1N3SIMG at 3 po::nt on the Horth l i n e of 
2200 South S t r e e t , s a i d p o i n t b e i n g Hcrth 
0 * 0 2 ' 3 5 * Sarit 1 0 8 3 . 0 0 f e e t end W*st 2 5 5 6 . 5 1 2 
f e e t f r c a the S a l t Lake County S u r v e y Mcrvj-
» c n t a t th<f c e n t e r of S e c t i o n 2 2 , Township 1 
S o u t h , Psange 2 W i s t , S a l t L^Xe Ba3e aul 
M e r i d i a n , and running t h e n c e Horth 8 4 3 . 4 3 A 
f e ^ t to the South r i g h t - o f - w a y l i n e of the 
1 - 2 1 5 •/ '• ranp e i i t ; t h e n c e S o u t h w e s t e r l y 
6 9 . 8 3 3 f e e t , a long s a i d South r i g h t - o f - w a y 
l i n e , around a 1J.46.23 f o o t radium c u r v « to 
t h e l e f t (Chord b e a r * South 5 3 * * 6 , 5 3 " Vest 
6 9 . 8 2 2 f * * t ) ; thewce South 5 8 * 1 9 , 0 2 - West 
a l o n g »-ai^ 2 . South r ight -o f '^vay l i n e 2 2 7 . 8 5 3 
f e e t ; t h e n c e South 16%0i§."3b" E a s t 
f e e t ; t h e n c e South 7 3 * 5 7 ' 2 4 * West 8 2 . 0 f e e 
t h s n e a South 1 6 * 0 2 e 3 6 * ZWC':61.0 f e e t ; t h e n c e 
S o u t h 1 0 4 . 0 0 f e e t t o the North l i n e of s a i d 
2 300 South S t r e e t ; then;:*;:; Zas t a l o n g s a i d 
5 2 2 . 9 3 5 
Horth l i n e 1 7 0 . 0 0 fextt . to the 
B;;G1HHIKG. C o n t a i n s 3 .304 ^c/ . 'es . 
poim o? 
ttUDJSCT TO AhU TOGETHER WITK A RIGHT. OF WAY 
for the convenience of ingrus& ap.c1. egress 
ov-^ r the following described property for the 
b-enelit of the above-described property 
excepting thsrefrcta existing buildings, 
landscaping areas, and othtr improved areas 
not necessary or suitable for or" iincidentcl 
to Grantea's use for access to his adjoining 
property da-scribed abovu.'4 The Grantee is 
granted the right over tti<} existing access 
vays for convenient ingrea's and egress to 
Grantee's adjoining property as the sajae 
exists or as X.)MI saiae Piaj subsequently be 
jvadifiedf provided, however, access will 
always b<s conver, ient and) Grantor or its 
successors and sssigns shnll not prevent 
Grantoe or his successors:_ iti*n-d Assigns f :oa 
convenient: access to the >djoining property 
described nboye. The property, subject to 
i.h* right: of way i.s described as follows: 
IW&GXHHJHG at a point on 
2300 South Street, said 
00#02'35- S w t , 1083.00 
272S.812 t'a*t fro* the 
Suivey Monure-ent at 
TcvnsMp 1 South, 
Base and Meridian, 
th<? North 1: 
point being 
• f«et and 
,£a,lt Lelic 
if 
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104.00 feet; tnence North 14*02* 36^ West 
67.03 feet; therYce North 73 057\24" ?.d^. 82.00 
fee'.; thence North 16*02'36- West 5*2.935 
fe'.'t to the South lin^ of the *?m rrmp of 
1-^15; thcnc* South 58*19'02" We.st l*-2.072 
J**t along Skid South line; thence South 
!5J#28'29" V.23t 159.555 feet, alon^ said itouth 
U n a ; ther.c* South 16*02,36,< R^st 520.312 
i :r**t to t."i<: Worth line of said 2300 South 
J S'trssL, thrnc* Northeasterly 61.322 feet 
, d round * 221.143 foot radius curve to the 
rlyht (chord bears North 81'58'42 % £ast 61.72 
fw e t ) ; thunce Zast 169.16 feet to the point 
---•' --.•*: --' • . ...oi* S2G12CHXHG. •• •••- ^ • 
'•':. \s conveyance is made and accepted subject 
• •' • to .a .Deed of Tru-t in favor- of 3KTTILYON 
>*0lirGAG2 LOAN CO. recorded December 19, 1979, 
ir. Book 5009 at p/*ge lOGlvOf Official Records 
end amended by Amendment recorded July 6, 
1?01 in Book 5267 at page 811 of Official 
Rscor&s and subsequently assigned to OLD 
STONE 8&KX, by Assignment of De<-d of Trust 
recorded April 9, 1930 in book 5085 at page 
117 of Official Records having an unpaid 
principal balance of j£$697,069.10 as of 
' January 27, 1532, which &eed of Trust and the 
debt secured thereby the Grantees herein 
•' . hereby assu»yy;and agree tc £ y. j 
•;•'•;•'•; :'..,',;• .-.
 t. .. • • .• T H I S 1 : CONVEYANCE .is-; madai- subject . tp< !„cncuni-
:
 ';:; '';,:.;
r;-' ». "• brances/^eastrasnts and restrict ions ( includ-
ing restrictive covenants 'and amendments 
• thereto) e x i t i n g of record on January 27, 
1932; an<3 is .further subject to any -and all 
boundary line discrepancies or encroachments, 
rhether ezis-ing before "or after January 27, 
1982 (except c.s provided$by casnacnt or other 
.;** ';•».- a$res»€nts as at fact ingi either • property as 
described herein}; a n d ^ n y end all encuaa-
br^ncoa, restrictions or easewentrt e n f o r ^ -
able in lav or equity, .created or perfected 
on or after January 27,il582, Ur.lr*s any of 
the above v«rc cr*at4KS o: perfected by 
Western Managera^nt or Saith, Ha^ander, Saith 
k Associates or any of their partners. 
'•. '. 
; } 
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CRAm-EE'S ADDRESS 
Los A l t o s . C a l i f o r n i a 94022 
w 
CO 
o 
Rec 8T:Z JCHAH30N ,0£?un - WI 
WARRANTY DEED 
WILLIAM J . LOWEN3ERG 
e/ San F r a n c i s c o Q » W O { 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
San Francisco 
pxntof 
CA 
Sate olAJt&, hereby 
WILLI All S . LOVE and IREUE C. LOVE 
a s j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h f u l l r i g h t s o f s u r v i v o r s h i p 
rf Los AltOS County , Scire of )}p$i CA 
fof the mm erf
 TEtf DOLLARS AND OTHER OOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION DOLLARS 
the followin« described snxt of land In • S a l t Lake County 
5ft re of Utah, to*«Hr? 
S e e E x h i b i t "A" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o 
and by t h i s r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t 
h e r e o f -
Grantor q u i t - c l a i m s , b u t d o e s n o t w a r r a n t , t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b : - . : t r a c t 
o f l a n d l o c a t e d i n S a l t Lake County , S t a t e o f Utah , t o - w i t : , 
S e e E x h i b i t "B" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o 
and by t h i s r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t » ' 
h e r e o f . 
This conveyance is made subject to those items set forth in Exhibit nCM 
attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
WITNESS the hand ofuSdmuicor ,thii l l / 0 * day of January 
Signed in the presence of 
SS. 
A.D. 19 95 
/-g£0?^< 
*" WILLIAM J . LOWENBE&G 
STATE OF yj*fl C a l i f o r n i a 
COUNTY OF San F r a n c i s c o 
On the dif cC January A. D. 19 9 5 peowieily 
•ppared before me WILLIAM J . LOWENBERG 
the aifcxr of the within inurnment who duly *c&oowi*dftd 
' vo am that bt exeaxed the jam* 
Notary Public, 
Betiding al 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY My<*™*«°°w«-
Or«kt N o _ 
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CALIFORNIA ALL-PURPOSE ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
8 Ste «. State of r j ftU.f%vpxlP 
™ County of ^ r r ^ s ^ g y ^ cc^-=s 
On zSwouLft^ -y \ U 1455* before ma. 
6*TS / NAAC. 7IU.E Of CFRCCM • 6.0, 'JAN6 00€. MlfAAY WCUC 
personally appeared U'I IV « nrr ^Tv V-OCogr^Qg<aLg^ HUC{SlC^SX3N€ntSj 
S^personally known to me - OR - • proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence 
to be the parson(^whose name/s^is/pro 
subscribed xo the within instrument a^d ac-
knowledged to me that hefch^they'f-xec-jted 
the same in his/JjetYtbsrf^authorized 
capacity£€^f and that by his/her/their 
signaturej^on the instrument the person(e f^ 
or the entity upon behalf of which the 
person^f acted, executed the instrument. 
CKSSuNS J. HHN0RICX3ON 
C0MM. * 1045192 
Noiav PUrfc - Cdfomta 
SAN FRANC3CO COUNTY 
\*t Comm. b&tm C 
v M m w w w v 
3ir«0eC!2.19O«l 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
OPTIONAL •wmwjg 
Though the data betow is not required by law, it may prove valuable to persons relying on the document and cculd prevent 
fraudulent reattachment cf this form. 
CAPACITY CLAIMED BY SIGNER 
• INDIVIDUAL 
• CORPORATE OFFICER 
Q PARTNER(S) D UMTTED 
D GENERAL 
• ATTORNEY-IMPACT 
D TRUSTEE(S) 
• GUARD1ANC0NSEHVATOR 
G OTHER' 
DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT 
^fi,rrfrNn7 lP5g^?, 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
(PROPSXTY DBscximoH) 
Those certain parcels of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State cf Utah and 
more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the north line of 2300 South Straot. said point 
being North 0°02'35" East 1083.00 feet and West 2555.812 feet from 
the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the Center of Section 22, 
Township 1 South. Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence North 848.4-34 feet to the south right of way line of the 
1-215 mF" ramp exit; thence Southwesterly 69.833 feet along said south 
right of way line, around a 1146.23 foot radius curve to the left (chord 
bears South 59°46'53* West 69.822 feet); thence South 58°19'02" 
West along said south right of way line 227.853 feet; thence South 
16°02'36" East 522.935 fe-rt; thence South 73°57'24" West 82.0 feet; 
thence South 16o02'36- East 67.0 feet; thence South 104.00 feet to the 
north line of said 2300 South Street; thence East along said north line 
170.00 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH A RIGHT OF WAY as was obtained by Grantor pursuant 
to that Corrective Warranty Deed entered into betweon Western 
Management, a partnership, as grantor, and conveyed and werranted to 
William J . Lowenberg, as grantee, and dated January 22. 1991, and 
recorded January 23, 1991, in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office as 
Entry No. 5015202, in Book 6284, at Page 1366-1372. The proparty, 
subject to the right of way is described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the North line of 2300 South 
Street, said point being North QQ°Q2'35m East. 1083.00 feet 
and West 2726.812 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey 
Monument at the center of Section 22, Township 1 South, 
Rcr.gb 1 West. Sait Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence forth 104.00 feat; thence North 16°02'36" West 
67.00 feet; thence North 73357'24" East 82.00 fnet; 
thenc8 North 16°02'36" Wast 522.935 feet to the South 
line of the "F" ramp of i-215; thence South 58° 19'02" West 
192.072 feet along said South line; thance Soutn 
53°28'29" West 159.555 feet along said South line; thence 
South 16°02'38" East 526.912 feet to the North line of 
said 2300 South Street; thsnca Northeasterly 61.922 feet 
around a 221.143 foct radius curve to the right {chord bears 
North 81°58,42"r East 61.72 feet); thenca East 169.16 feet 
to the point of BEGINNING. $ 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
(PROPERTY DESCRIPTION) 
That certain parcel of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and 
more particularly described ao follows: 
TOGETHER WITH A perpetual easement for the purpose of providing 
access to and from 8 loading dock, as disclosed in that certain Grant of 
Easement recorded April 08, 1980 as Entry No. 3421031, in Book 
5084, at Page 322 and effecting the following described property: 
BEGINNING at a point which is North 0°02'35" East 
1083.00 feet, West 2666.520 feet and North 191.074 
feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the 
center of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 73°57'24" 
W8st 5.30 feet to the West side of a concrete retaining 
wall; thence North 00°02'39" Wast along said wall 4.68 
feet; thence North 89.°57'21" East 4.17 feec; thence 
South 16°02'36" East 3.35 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
i 
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EXHIBIT "C 
(EXCEPTIONS TO TTTLE) 
Taxe9 for the year 1995 and thereafter. {Tax Pares! No. 15-21-226-006) 
Said property is located within the boundaries of West Valley City and Granger-
Hunter improvement District and Is subject to charges and assessments levied 
thereunder. 
Assignment of Leases, Contracts and Warranties, dated January 27. 1981, 
wherein WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a Partnership, as Assignor, assigns to 
WILLIAM J . LOWENBERG, an individual, as Assignee, all its right title and 
interest in and to those certain Leases. Said Assignment recorded February 03, 
1982, as Entry No. 3645189, in Book 5337, at Page 1151, Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. 
Subject to a drainage easement along the Northerly 10 feet of the subject 
property as disclosed in that certain Quit Claim Dsed dated September 19, 
1979, recorded October 15, 1979, as Entry No. 3350222, in Book 4964, at 
Page 11, Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
A non-access reservation to the property owned by the State Road 
Commission of Utah, being along the Northwesterly line thereof as disclosed 
by various instruments of record. 
Subject to the following matters disclosed on that certain survey prepared by 
Robert G. Walker, having been certified under the data of August 12, 1986, 
by Robert G. Walker, a Registered Land Surveyor holding License No. 3559: 
a. overhead utility lines 
b. buried concrete storm flume & inlet boxes 
c. 10 foot drainage easement 
d. sewer manhole 
Restrictive Covenants, signed July 01, 1968 and recorded October 17, 1969, 
as Entry No. 2307259, in Book 2799, at Page 156, Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. 
Amendment to Restrictive Covenents of Redwood Park, executed July 27, 
1972, recorded August 14, 1972, as Entry No. 2476874, in Book 3129. at 
Page 110, Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
An Ordinance No. 82 15 changing the name of 2300 South Street in West 
Valley City from Cecker Lake Boulevard to Printers Row, recorded May 19, 
1982. as Entry No. 3676608, in Book 5374, at Page 304, Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office. 
Subject to the rights of parties In possession of the subject property under 
unrecorded Leases, Rental or Occupancy Agreements and any claims 
thereunder. 
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at M.Fee Paid. 
by Dtp. Book Pit* Ref. 
MiiiiaxnotkAto Qr.an.tjw Address 6SP..N9r/u/iw j-rfe..Cnvr.t. 
Los A l t o s , Ca„ 94 022 
QUIT CLAIM DEEft 6 0 3 7 3 0 4 1/10/W 1H32 Art 1 ? - C 
N A N C Y U O R K t t A N 
RECORDER i SALT LAKE COUNTY t UTAH 
ASSOCIATED TITLE 
REC »YiB GRAY rOEPOTY - UI 
WILLIAM S . 
0f Lo3 A l t o s 
QUIT CLAIM to 
WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C . LOVE, a s c o - t r u s t e e s under THE 
WILLIAM S . AND IRENE C. LOVE LIVING TRUST d a t e d March 2 2 , 1990 
LOVE and IRENE C. 
.County of 
LOVE iHo-4 j> grtnlor 
State of Utah, hereby 
of Los Altos, California 
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 
the following described tract 
Stat* of Utah, to wit: 
ofkodin S a l t Lake 
grantee 
for the turn of 
DOLLARS 
County, 
See E x h i b i t ' s A and B a t t a c h e d h e r e t o and b y t h i s 
r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t h e r e o f . 
COURTESY RECOitLM.J 
This document is berng recorded solely «- •> «w:*.v/ 
and an acco /irncxjitlcn to the parties tatted thei »nv 
Associated Title Company hereby expressly disclaims 
any responiibUity or liability for the accuracy or me 
content thereof. 
WITNESS the land of tnidgraator .thie 2 4 t h dayof March 
5*gpid in the pretence of 
If 95 
sjt^t^. <.<J*— C . -p^rrx^-
IRENE C. LOVE 
STATE OF l/fti1 . / C a l i f o r n i a 
day of March 
County of 
O B U M If 9 5 
per tonally appeared before a 
WILLIAM S . LOVE AND IRENE C. LOVE 
tbtalfntr of in* fotnjueng betnueem. who duly acknowledged to eae that executed the lame. 
Notary kNbifc, raiding at S 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMf*NY 
o 
-o 
en 
on 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION) 
Those certain parcels of real property situated in Salt Lake County* State of Utah and 
more particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the north line of 2300 South Street, said point 
being North O°02'35w East 1083.00 feet and West 2556.812 feet from 
the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the Center of Section 22, 
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running th6nc6 North 848.434 feet to the south right of way l»n» of the 
1-215 "F" ramp exit; thence Southwesterly 69.833 feet along said south 
right of way line, eround a 1146.23 foot radius curve to the left (chord 
bears South 59°46'53w West 89.822 feet); thence South 5B°19'02" 
West along said south right of way line 227.853 feet; thence South 
16°02'38" East 522.935 faet; thence South 73°57'24H West 82.0 feet: 
thence South 16o02'36" East 67.0 feet; thence South 104.00 feet to the 
north line of said 2300 South Street; thence East along said north line 
170.00 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH A RIGHT OF WAY as was obtained by Grantor pursuant 
to that Corrective Warranty Deed entered into between Western 
Management, a partnership, as grantor, and conveyed and warranted to 
WilKam J . Lowenberg, as grantee, and dated January 22. 1991, and 
recorded January 23, 1991, in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office as 
Entry No. 5015202, in Book 6284, at Page 1366-1372. The property, 
subject to the right of way is described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the North line of 2300 South 
Street, said point being North O0°02'35" East. 1083.00 feet 
Bnd West 2726.812 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey 
Monument at the center of Section 22. Township 1 South, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence North 104.00 feet; thence North 16°02'36" West 
67.00 feet; thence North 73°57'24" East 82.00 feet; 
thence North 16°02'36" West 522.935 feet to the South 
line of the "FH ramp of 1-215; thence South 5B°19'02M West 
192.072 feet along said South line; thence South 
53°28'29M West 159.655 feet along said South lino; thence 
South 16°02'36" East 526.912 feet to the North line of 
said 2300 South Street; thence Northeesterly 61.922 feet 
around a 221.143 foot radius curvo to the right {chord bears 
North 81°58'42" East 61.72 feet); thence East 169.18 feet 
to the point of BEGINNING. 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
(PROPERTY DESCRIPTION) 
That certain parcel of real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and 
more particularly described as follows: 
TOGETHER WITH A perpetual easement for the purpose of providing 
access to and from a loading dock, as disclosed in that certain Grant of 
Element recorded April 08. 1980 as Entry No. 3421031, in Book 
5084, at Page 322 and a Hading the following described property: 
BEGINNING at a point which is North 0°02#35* East 
1083.00 feet, West 2666.520 feet and North 191.074 
feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the 
center of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 73°57'24" 
West 6.30 feet to the West side of a concrete retaining 
wall; thence North 0O°02'39H West along said wall 4.6B 
feet: thence North 89°57'21M East 4.17 feet; thence 
South l e * ^ ^ " East 3.35 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
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CALIFORNIA ALL-PURPOSE ACKNOWLIDOMINT 
State of <^>i-/ fi>/£0/Tf 
County of ^HTTth CA/HOfr-
On MAA^UVJ 'iohs- before me, h\&/ZTA -3^ Z.Q MJOMAA 
DAif / » iJM<g meemrrmiv . i t >*nt peg NOTAEV mane 
personally appeared * 2 ^ c t A /x^yy «x7 • ^h>-vA-c^> C ^ J L - * » £ > U ^ > ^ L , C - • 
t J peroonelly known to me * OR -jSf proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence 
to be the person(s) whose name(s)/^/are 
subscribed to the within instrument and ac-
knowledged to me that p^sh^/they executed 
the same in J*6/rjji(r/their authorized 
capacitjf(ies), and that by WgltiXffXheir 
signature(s) on the instrument the person(s)> 
or the entity upon behalf of which the 
person(s) acted, executed the instrument. 
i 
I WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
7 ~~~~" SKiMATU^OTMOtAII* 
• O P T I O N A L ' 
Though the data below is not required by law. it may prove valuable !o persons relying on ths document and could prevent 
Irtudulent reattachment of this loan 
CAPACITY CLAIMED BY SIGNER 
• INDIVDUAL 
D CORPORATE OFFICER 
D PARTNEfl(S) D LIMITED 
D GENERAL 
Q ATTORNEY-IN-FACT 
E l TRUSTEES) 
HI GUARDIAN/CONSERVATOR 
D OTHER: 
8JQNER ti REPREtCNTWW: 
MMIO»PfMaN(S)OWfMiriT!lll»1 « 
DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT 
di^jt CJUI™ *&~J~ 
TITLE OR TYPE OF DOCUMENT 
.3 _ 
NUMBER OF PAGES 
. . ... 7f°**A<> ..A^j/f€~ 
DATEOFDOCUWENT 
_JSpjJer^ 
SIGNER(S) OTHER THAN NAMED ABOVE 
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t a::t* 
: i 
M 
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^ 
1:1 
i.M 
Recorded a! Requeat of ^7l\(.^.f t\^J 
»»/* M. Fat Paid 
—^-rv—— = 
'J.*^ 
<. rv.^t 
WQV 1 8 1975 
t ^ i L Xatls L 0;i:a. Salt Late Ccur.ly r.:::r::r 
fry ( 17 )^0HUV. 
. Dep. 3ook_ . Paje. Ref.-_ 
Mail tax notice to_ _Addreej 
2761314 WARRANTY DEED £&/? 
Plan-Tech Corp. 
of Salt Lake City 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
, Count7 of Salt Lake 
jrantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
^
arcon Investment (A partnership) 
0f Salt Lake City, Utah 
Ten dollars and other good and valuable consideration 
the following described tract of land In 
State of Utah: 
Salt Lake 
jrantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
BEGINNING AT A POINT ON TKE NORTH LINE OF 2300 SOUTH STREETj 
SAID POINT BEING N 00* 0 2 ' 35" E 1 0 8 3 . 0 0 * AND DUE WEST 2757- 316 • 
FROM TKE S^LT LAKE COUNTY MONUMENT AT TKE CENTS?: OF SECTION 2 2 , 
T. I S . , R. 1 W., SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN AND RUNNING TKENCE 
N 0 2 ' 0 1 ' 56" W 7 1 2 . 7 6 1 * TO TKE SOUTH RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE OF THE 
"F" RAMP OF TKE PROPOSED 1 - 2 1 5 : THENCE S 5$' 19 ' 02" W 2 2 5 - 3 3 2 ' 
ALONG SAID SOUTH LINE: TKENCE S 53* 28* 29" W 1 5 9 - 5 5 5 ' ALONG 
SAID SOUTH LINE; TKENCE S 16* 0 2 ' 36" E S27-912* TO TKE NORTH 
LIifE OF SAID 2300 SOUTH STREET; THENCE NORTHEASTERLY ALONG 
SAID NORTH LINE 6 1 . 9 2 2 * AROUND A 2 2 1 . IkV RADIUS CURVE TO 
THE RIGHT (CHORD 3EARS N 81* 58* U2" E 6 1 . 7 2 0 " ) $ TKENCE EAST 
1 3 8 . 6 5 6 ' TO TKE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
CONTAINS* 3 . 8 7 9 ACRES 
WITNESS, the hand of said jrantor
 f thU Fourteenth 
October
 f / . D . 19 75 
Signed In the Presence of i/d&LS. 
fJn^Jz. KCt4if?/>s\ 
day of 
Pre3. 
Sec. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Cotmtjo* Salt Lake 
On the Fourteenth day of October 
personal!/ appeared before me, £. Fred 5brtt>rf QTSSarti^. Balander 
the iljrnerj of the within imtrurnent, irh 
aame. 
OfStetf *$)cnp&fc^pd 
\ 
Mr cotnmUaion «xpir*e_ 
m -^ -»WA*nt f>+* m. r* /[ mSS^uuMiSSa 
io/s/73 y\&^.&<:&t t*k* city. vtA 
!;;; 
• ^ : - T T : g " ; ^ f . SE3 
Mill 
CO 
CO 
CO 
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by Dep. Book Page.. Ref.; 
Mall tax notice to...y.e3.c.errK.Ma3£?.^nf Addrejj....338.5...Wes^..I32p._South 
Salt Lake. City, Utah S4104 
3625896 QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
[CORPOXATE FORM] 
#CARRER\ CORPORATION, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the Stace of Utah, wicb its principal office at 
S a l t Lake C i t y , of County of S a l t Lake , Stace of Utah, 
xrantor. hereby QUIT CLAIMS to 
H. F r e d SrLith, Ronald W. S m i t h , D a l e N. M l n s o n , & R o b e r t S. H a l a n d e r / 
H. F r e d S n d t h Ronald S m i t h Da le V i n s o n . ~?n5C ? " ?Rn c! 
3 1 5 1 C r a i g D r i v e 17G1 J a n e l ' I a C i r c l e 3335 !/ . 1820 S. * , f s , • Z?° 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah Shandy* TJtah „ S a l t X a k e , C i t y , UT ^ ^ e f e a k e C i c > r 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , Sa l e 7 Lake C o u n t y , S t a t e o f l f t a h h for che sum of 
TEN ( o t h e r good and ".-\ luable c o n s i d e r a t i o n ) DOLLARS, 
the following described trace of land in S a l t Lake Councy, 
Stace of Utah: B e g i n n i n g at a p o i n t on t h e North l i n e o f 2300 S o u t h 
S t r e e t ; s a i d p o i n t b e i n g Nor th 0 0 ° 0 2 , 3 5 " Ea3t 1 0 8 3 . 0 0 f e e t and due 
West 2 7 2 6 . U 1 2 f e e t from the S a l t Lake County S u r v e y Monument a t t h e 
c e n t e r o f S e c t i o n 2 2 , Township 1 S o u t h , Range 1 W e s t , S a l t Lake Base 
and M e d i d i a n , end running t h e n c e N o r t h 1 0 4 . 0 0 f e e t , t h e n c e North 16° 
0 2 ' 3 6 " West 6 7 . 0 0 f e e t ; r.hence N o r t h 7 3 ° 5 7 ' 2 4 " E a s t 8 2 . 0 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e 
N o r t h 16° 0 2 ' 3 6 " West 5 2 3 . 9 3 5 f e e t t o t h e South l i n e o f the "F" Ramp 
o f 1 - 2 1 5 ; t h e n c e South 5 8 d 1 9 ' 0 2 " Wes t 1 9 2 . 0 7 2 f e e t a l o n g s a i d S o u t h 
l i n e ; t h e n c e South 5 3 ° 2 8 ' 2 9 " West 1 5 9 . 5 5 5 f e e t a l o n g s a i d S o u t h l i n e ; 
t h e n c e S o u t h 1 6 ° 0 2 , 3 6 " Eas t 5 2 7 . 9 1 2 f e e t t o t h e N o r t h l i n e o f s a i d 
2 3 0 0 S o u t h S t r e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h e a s t e r l y 6 1 . 9 2 2 f e e t around a 2 2 1 . 1 4 3 
f o o t r a d i u s c u r v e t o the r i g h t ( C h o r d bear;* N o r t h 8 1 0 5 8 ' 4 2 " E a s t 6 1 . 7 2 
f e e t ) ; t h e n c e E a s t 1 6 9 . 1 6 f e e t t o t h e D o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g , l y i n g and 
s i t u a t e d "in S a l t Lake County, S t a t e o f * U t a h . FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS: 
2 2 1 2 West 2300 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 9 . 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and che transfer represented 
'thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopced by the board of direccors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and atcended by a quorum. 
^L* WT*»«$S whereof^ne grantor ha.i caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
b y its .du^ T" luiKbr 
/} 
day of , A. D. 19 
Attex 
.CARKM..CORPORATIQN Company 
By H. ' ^ 
[CORPORATE 'SEA L/f 
.. * • \ .•• 
ST/n^QE^UTAH, 
. < ^ ^ f ^ y T ^ L T LAKE 
jCTn'tnc 3Dth aay o f October, 
3 KITH and 
1 9 8 1 , A. D. 
ROBERT S. HALANDER 
FRED SMITH, 
is the secretary 
Company, and tha: .Kiri and foregoing 
instrument w u ligned in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of 
dirccton and said H. FRED SMITH and ROBERT S. HALANDER 
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed che same^nd chat the seal affixed 
is the seal of laid corporation. 
peysoWaTlf-ip peered"* be fore me H. FRED 
% • who bein^ by.'me.duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said 
i ; n W p £ F d & L . 4 r ^ r * , the said ROBERTS. HALANDER 
* of"- ..CARRERA CORPOR :0 0 ATI0N 
My commission expires.. kh lis. J . Notan£Pt)b!ic. ! il • ^ 4 ^ y . . . ^ Z . ^ J . 
Co 
en 
.My residence i 
fLAUK ttf/i lO»Q^- Oi inr rn f l^ i i i i i f l naa t i n . m T i u f NTY' 
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"THIS 15 A LSGALLY 5IN0ING CONTRACT. If NOT UNCERSTGCO SR>. COMPETENT AC'.'tCS." 
! ' 
Aecottied it Request of .yE?X?.^i..?MAp.^?.;!.T. 
I i at M. Fee Paid ) 
bv Dep. Book Pu*e Ref.: 
Mail tax norce co.3;fe.?..?.^n^^ Address. .3.385. Wes.t. 13Z0_.South 
Sa le ' LakV'Citv'r'u'c'an* 9S104 
362435'! QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
ri. F?£D SMITH. RONALD W. SMITH, 
DALE N. MINSON, AND ROBERT S. HALAHDF.R, vancors 
of H a l t Lake C i t y , County of S a l e Lake , Scire of Utah hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to W e s t e r n Management, A Utah p e : n - r a l p a r t n e r s h i p 
( a d d r e s s : 3365 V.'est 1820 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84L04) 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , S a l t T-ike County , S t a t e o f Utah 
TEN ( o t h e r g o o d and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ) 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in S a l t Lake County, i 
State of Utah: B e g i n n i n g a t a p o i n t on chfi North l i n e o f 2300 South 
S t r e e t ; s a i d p o i n t b e i n g N o r t h 0 0 ° 0 2 ' 3 5 M E a s t 1 0 8 3 . 0 0 f e e t find due " e s t ! 
2 7 2 6 . 8 1 2 f e e t from t h e S a l t Lake County Survey Monument a t the-, c e n t e r on 
S e c t i o n 2 2 , T o v n s h i D 1 S o u t h , Range 1 West , S a l t Lake Base zc\d M e r i d i a n , 
and r u i m l r g t h e n c e North 1 0 ^ . 0 0 f e a t , t h e n c e N o r t h 1 6 ° 0 2 , 3 6 M West 6 7 . 0 0 ! 
f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h 7 3 ° 5 7 , 2 V F a s t 8 2 . 0 0 f e e t ; t h e n c e N o r t h l b 3 02*36" j 
West 5 2 3 . 9 3 5 f e e t t o t h e South l i n e o f t h e "F" R.amp o f 1 - 2 1 5 ; t h e n c e 
S o u t h 56°}.9'02n West 1 9 2 . 0 7 2 f e e t a l o n g s a i d S o u t h l i n e ; t h e n c e South 
5 3 ° 2 8 ' 2 9 , : ' West 1 5 9 . 5 5 5 f e d . a l o n g s a i d South l i n e ; t h e n c e S o u t h 16° 
0 2 ' 3 6 " E a s t 5 2 7 . 9 1 1 f e e t t o t h e N o r t h l i n e o f s a i d 2 3 0 0 S o u t n S c r f S t ; 
t h e n c e N o r t h o a s t e r l y 6 1 . 9 2 2 f e e t around a 2 2 1 . 1 4 3 f o o t r a d i u s curve no 
the r i g h t (Chord b e a r s North 0 1 ° 5 8 ' 4 2 " E a s t 6 1 . 7 2 f e e t ) ; t h e n c e Eas>'^  
1 6 9 . 1 6 f e e t t o t h e p o i n t o f b e g i n n i n g , l y i n g and s i t u a t e d i n S a l t Lake 
v->unty, S t a t e o f U t a h . 
I I 
FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS: 2212 West 2300 South, 
8U19. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
r-£- tf 
VITNESS the hand of jaid grantor , chia 3&S' A-
£•'0 l~6 L^ /**] & I , A. D. one thousand nine hundrecka, 
Signed in the presence of 
\ ' ' ' 
i^ 
^-^
m
- £-£*• ~-t-p+ 
R o n ' ^ ? * w T S p v T ^ 
D a l e ^ r : i b u n i o n / 
} „~^0 IW«, < w 
Onto'' ;.$h.t-' day of 
penonilJx.tpppiTod before me 
il»e ilgncr••• 
name. 
7<^d it HZ l a n d e r 
,A.D. 19 c f / 
IS 
of the */':],;n lusirumenl, who duly acknowledged to me^hat he executed the 
/ / ' (7 -" /? / *N°li5 ^ ^ c -
My commlnion expirei_. il 
fOXM lOl—©U»T CLAIM OftD-a l t 
AfPSOYf0 'ORM - UTAH SCCURIT1C5 COMMISSION 
'»•> » « U l l « U C . U K H 
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m 
&*v 
$8 
If! 
ft**'. 
l#fi 
w 
2Ucocd«d it Requett of„I^„arJSOM MAByrr..'.g£jBLURBIDGEr-MAAg>/ A vrrTrurrT. 
it_ • M. Pit piU } '»/.
 t '., ,-V'; ;1 ^ ^ \ 
by- 111L i.?* .Dt^BooL. ™ Pr^ lUf.r 
Mia ux ood« bJllEUUauWffiMlltlflru, Add«M_13fli-H«Jl.tJL.82a^ttthL. 
</ . . • • • > - Sa l t Lake City, Utah 8U04 
:3634?li;K; QUIT-CLAIM DEED . 
..' '< * 
R. FRED SKTTH, RONALD W.-SMITH, DALE.U. MINSOH, ROHERT S. HALAHSfcR; 
and WESTEKT MANAGEMENT/ a Utah general p a r t n e r a h l p V ^ 7 ^ ^ " » irmu* 
<^  S a l r Lake City j . County of Sa l t Lake , Scat* of Uuh/1 
HMaH 
grin a* 
foe the mm of 
DOLLARS, 
Cajrrera Corporation,' a Utah corporation, 
•:. .°* Sal t Laktv.City, Salt Lake Comity, State of Utah 
''TEH (other good arid«valuable considerat ion) 
- the following described tnct of land In Sa l t Lake • County, 
Seak of Ucab: Beginning at a point on the North l i n e of 2300 South 
Stree t ; aaid po int being North 00*02*35" East 1083.00 fee t and due' 
Vest :2726.812 f e e t from the Sa l t Lake County Survey Moninaent at the 
•.center of Sect ion 22, Township 1 South, Ranee 1 West, Sal t Lake Base 
* and.Meridian, and running thence North 104.00 f e e t ; thenct North 16* 
G2,36"i West 6J.0O. f ee t ; thence North 73*57'24" East 82.00>feet; thence| 
. iHorth%-i6*02 ,J6M.Veat 523.935 f e e f t o the South l i n e of the "F". R*np ' -
1
 t o f 1-215; thenen South 5 8 , 1 9 , 0 2 n West 192.072 f ee t along aaid South*. 
* l i n e ; thence South 53*28'29n West 159.555 f e e t along sa id South l i n e ; 
'thence South :16*02 !36"\East.527.912 f e e t to the North line-"of said •..•• 
2300 South S t r e e t ; thence Northeasterly 61.922 feet around a 221.1*3 
foot'radiua curve to the r ight (Chord bears North 81°5S'42" East 61.72 
' f e e t ) ; thence East»169.1G f e e t ' to. the. point of beginning, ly ing and -% 
' s i t u a t e d in Sa l t ' Lake County / State of- Utah. '"• TURXHER IDENTIFIED AS:- . 
•2212 West 2300 South,-Salt Lake City, Utah 84119. • ••} .-.• 
? V • . ' • - . . , - , ,^;i^\- . , . • • . • . : • , " : , : - ' - - • ' 
!!•:• 
vYmnw tb* Sand of MH? jprantoc s, tbii \ vizf^C •". 
: " ^ ^ ^ Z ^ T T U I ^ ^ ^ A*®' °°* thouiixid'iiine hundrtd and 81 
:£ 
••'>' 
Sjned In tie proieccf of 
r.t^orrTi tf-/SalC* Li i c t^: ? 4 '^  H 
dividually and a 
eneral .partner 
vidual ly and^ai 
partner •••/; 
..individually-an 
a s , j t nera l nart 
individual ly , and A* 
^V 
m 
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K \ **3t. 
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a* M. ? « Paid ; 
7=77-
by « Dep. Book.. 
Mail tax notice co...foL*r!;. J.u.&aUn^er 
\ J I 1 * *' 
Pa^ e Red.-i *...» 
1 1 Tr>i 
j\ddre« 7 7 2 2 a a C 3 3 0° South __ 
'"*sriV"Uka""Cicy* ,**''UtTh**T4TQ6 
3724936 QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
[C0*r0*A7E FORM] 
CARRI3A CORPORATION, A Utah cor?ora:icn
 f a corporation 
organized and existing under die laws of the Sta:e of Utah, with its principal office at 
Sal- La'-- Cicx . of County of Sale Lake , State of Utah. 
gr?nwr^cre5y QUIT CLAIMS to 
H. Fred Saich, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minscn, & Robert S. Halnnder, 
H. Fred Saich Ronald Saich Dale MInson Roberr Halander 
3151 Craig Drive 2090 Pinecrest Lane 3774 So. 3145 Ea. 1150 Ir is Lane 
Sale Lake Cicy, Utah Sandy, Utah Sale Lake Cicy, UT SLC, V?£ . S-'^tee 
°Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Scare of Ucah 
TE2J (other good and valuable consideration) 
for t!'e sum of 
DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Salt Lake 
Stiwe of Utah: Beginning ac a point on Che North line of 2300 Souch Scree: 
juld poinc beiug North 00°02,35M East 1033.00 feet and due Went 2726.S12 
feet froa the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the center of Section 
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 3ase and Medidian, and running 
thence North 104.00 feet, thence North 16o02,36" Woat 67.00 feet; thence 
North 73°57»24" East 82.00 feet; thence North 16°02,36M West 523.935 fee 
to the South line of the M?" Ranp of 1-215; thence South 58o19'02" West 
192.072 feet along said South line; thence South 53°28'29" West 159.555 
feet along said South line; thence South 16°02,36M East 527.912 feet to 
the North line of aaid 2300 South Street; thence Northeasterly 61.922 fe 
around a 221.143 foot radius curve to the right (Chord bears North 81°53 
EaaC 61.72 faet); thence East 169.16 feet to the point of beginning, lyi 
and situate 1 in Salt Lake County, Scat- of Utah. FURTHER IDENTIFIED AS: 
2222 Weat 2300 South, Sale Lake City, Utah 34119 
County, 
22, 
et 
I " H I 
ng 
The officert who sign this dctd hereby certify chat this derd and the transfer represented 
thereby waa duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
jranto'r at a lawful meeting duJ/ held and attended by 1 quorum. 
In wi tn« whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and xal co be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authc^zedjftfpcen this 29th day of October , A. D. 19*' 
Company 
Secretary. 
STATt'OrVTAK 
C*yny'of ''jJ<ZJL}-.Xcdj--. 
Z\<$T^b* 29ta 
• *f • 11 . - - • * 1 -
S S ^ _ 
President. 
***** 
day of October, 
rid bfcfort me \\, FRZU SMITH 
1982 , A. D. 
and ROBERT S. HALANDER 
y rpfc^uly sworn did uy, each for himself, that he, the said H. FRED SMITH, 
k ^ W i O i n i W h * , the said ROB&T S. HALANDER U the xcretary 
of--QJSxiAX CpAPORATION Company, ind that the within and foregoing 
inatrumerrr'^aj lijned in behalf of uid corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of 
dirtcron m i aid H.7RED SMITH
 l n d ROBERT S. HALANDER 
e*ch duly »c^now!edjtd to me that uld corporation executed the same lr.d that the xal affixed 
\% tha xal of said corporation. 
-<lidtT.£...&u^J^^ 
My commission cxpirei Y.J.lL .?..£.. My residence \\^\L^^j^j...^Li 
i • 
I ! 
> i 
I 
C? 
>+> 
CT5 
IS 
?••*rXAWf X . • *frfl-> —IS »«» " t w i - » t t ^ i t m ^ i ***• 1 *V> *A 
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Recorded at Requeic o L . . 3 C 3 E ? T . ^ A . . H ^ 
RONALD w"V SMITH*" 
v M. Fee Piid ; 
by Dtp. Book Pige R«f.: 
Mai! tax notice toWSSnSJLJiAHAffSKEHI Addrwi.i7.?...?A».?.J.M.S.?.y.$h 
Salt Uka City, Utah G4106 
3724937 QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
H. FR£D SMITH, RONALD W. SMITH, DALE N. MTNSCN, ROBERT S. HALANDER, 
. .^ ntor 
of Salt U k a CI.7 , Coui.ty of Salt Lake $ClCe ?f tjl:' ^:z'0y 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
Western Hanageaent, a Utah general partnership, 
of Salt Laka City, Salt Laka County, State of Utah 
TEN (othtr jood ind valuable consideration) 
the following described tract of land In Salt Lake 
Scare of Utah:3eginning at a point on the North line 
aaid point being North OOVQl'lS" Eact 1083.00 feet 
feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at 
Township 1 South, Ilnnge 1 V»>st, Salt Laka Baae and 
North 1U.00 teet; thence North 16° 02'36" West 67 
73°b7'24" East 32.00 feet; thence North 16o02,36" 
South line of the "7 M Ilnnp of 1-215; thence Scuth 
along naid Scuth line; thence South 53°28'29" West 
South line; thenct South 16o02'36M East 527.912 fe 
2300 South Street; thtnee Northeasterly 61.922 fee 
curve to the right (Chord bears North 81°58'42M Ea 
169.16 fiet to tha point of beginning, lying and a 
State of Utah. FURTHER. IDENTIFIED AS: 2222 West 
Utah 84119 
of 7.300 
and due 
the cent 
Meridia 
.00 feet 
West 523 
58°19'Q2 
159.555 
ec to th 
t around 
st 61.72 
ituated 
2300 Sou 
South 
West 
er of 
n, and 
; then 
.935 f 
" West 
e e t 
e Nort 
a 221 
f e e t ) 
i n S a l 
t h , Sa 
>;. rttee 
for the x;m nf 
HOLLARS, 
County, 
Street; 
2726.312 
Section 22, 
running thenca 
ce North 
eet to the 
192.072 feet' 
along aaid 
h line of said 
.143 foot radius 
; thence East 
t Lake County, 
It Lake City, 
£*; m •<- o 
e 
V I T N E J S the Kind of said grantors , this 29th 
OCTOBER , A . D . one thoui ind nine hur 
,.%Sk^^L.S 
I ' l l day of 
diyof October \ / T Q Q d * . ^ h i   A. D. one 
y.^buiW^ciJinjJrtd ind 82 penonilly lppcired before me
 H . FRED SMITH, 
lOKALD V* SMITH, DALE N. MINSON, AND ROBERT S. HALANDER 
the xigner of the forejoin j trutrument, who duly acknowledjt to mi th*: i hey executed the 
My commluicn ixpirti W / / J O Addrwt / / , ( \ SLANK HO. I0>— C »»« r t : S». - »II» » • »*— l*IT — »*WT WA*. 
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Recorded i t R*qu«t of 
it M. Fw ?»id J.. 
by -. 
O V a n i c a i i r e !>»'low 
. Dtp. 3oo!c Page .... K r : > . : 
Mail tax notice to ° ^ 1 ^ Addrc*s..A.6^2..:^:?.=..ir.v£.i?.^Al.LlL.r.». .^. :.?h....34L 
394=3375 WARRANTY DEED 
(Special) 
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a Utah Gener?] P a r t n e r s h i p j ranrcr 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah hereby 
C O N V E Y AND V A R I A N T againat ill claiming by, through or under 
co SMITH HALANDER SMITH AND ASSOCIATES 
of S a l t Lake C i t y , ULaii 
I i 
TEN AND NO/100 , — , - - . r — T .".. 
ana o t n e r rjooa and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
chc following described cr.-:: of land in S a l t Lake C i t y . S a l t Lake 
Scste of Utah : 
SEE EXHI3IT "A" ATTACHED HERETO 
grantee 
for the sum of 
. . D O L L A R S . 
County, 
i: 
.1 
w 
rS>< T v
^ 
*>> ' <r i 
HP} 
R U 
c 
~ 
L-
~T3 r -
:--o--ici 
- a C : 3 Q 
WITNESS, the hands of .'aid grantor
 s , this 
May , A. D. \9 84 
$»»r>rd in the Prestnc; of 
25 th oV; of 
a Utah Geptfral P a r t n e r s h i p 
j i 
STATE OF U T A H , 
I I 
County of S a l t Lake 
On the 25th day of May , A. D. 1984 
personally appeared before me H. FRED SMITH, ROBERT S. HALANOER. RONALD W. SMITH AND 
. . DALE N. MINSON 
th&ffc+F*? <J?OiR>uchin instrument, who duly acknowledgrd co me that The y executed the 
2z**.c<S. 
1
 Vfiwrf Publ ic ^> 
OUrJ^^L F.eiidintf in,...^^.i^,..^^^7... 
o 
rO 
O 
On 
- » i u to t i 9 o i » i - U U U « « : I M 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
BEGINNING' at a point or. the North l ine Of 2.ICG South Street; srJd peine 
being North 0O°02,35" East 1003.00 feet and du* West 2726.312 *eet fro* 
the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the center of Section 22, Town-
ship 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and r-nning 
the.nce North 104.00 feat; thence North 16aQ2'3b'" West 57.00 feet; thence 
North 73°57'24" East 92.00 feet; thence North 16*02'36M West 523.935 feet 
to the South lir»«* of the "F" Ramp of 1-215; thence South 53°1?,02" West 
192.C/2 feet along said South l ine ; thence Sout'.i 53°25'29" West 159.555 
feet along said South l ine ; thtnce South 16°02'36" East 527.012 feet to 
the North l ine of said 2300 South Street; thence Northuasterr. 51.922 feet 
around a 221.143 foot radius curve to the right (Chord bears North 
3r53'42" East 61.72 feet) ; thence East 169.16 feet to the p io i r o f BEGINNING. 
On 
CP. 
O 
o 
O 
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iarrantg SEE& 
SMITH HALANDER SMITH AND ASSOCIATES 
of .Countyof Salt: Lake 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
KAY L . WALKER and LAWRENCE A . McELLIOTT 
of , County of 
forthesumof TEN ANO NO/100 3 - - re J " - T ~ C T *i~-z" ' " 
' and other good and v a l u a b l e cons idera t io ; . s . 
Space Above for Recorder's Use 
S a l t Lake 
, grantor, 
.State of Utah. 
, grantee. 
..•tateof Utah. 
DOLLARS. 
the folloving described tract of land in Sa 11 La ke 
BEGINNING at a poin t on the North l i n e of 2200 South 
North 0°02 ,35" East 1083.00 f e e t and due West 2726.8 
County Survey Monument a t the center of S e c t i o n 22 , 
West, S a l t Lake Base and M e r i d i a n , and runniruj thenc 
North 16°02 ,36H West 67.00 f e e t ; thence N o r t h ' / 3 ° 5 7 ' 
North 16°02 * 36M West 523.935 f e e t to the South l i n e 
thence bouth 58o19'02" West 192.072 fee t a long sa id 
28 '29" West 159.555 f e e t along sa id South l i r e ; then 
527.912 f e e t to the North l i n e o f sa id 2300 South St 
61.922 f e e t ground a 221.143 foo t rad ius curve to th 
8 r 5 8 ' 4 2 " East c'1.72 f e e t ) ; thence East 169.16 fee t 
County. State of Utah, to-wit. 
S t r e e t , sa id po in t being 
12 feet from the S a l t Lake 
Township 1 South, Range 1 
e North 104.00 f e e t ; thence 
24" East 82.00 f e e t ; thence 
of the "F" Ramp of 1-215; 
South l i n e ; thence South 53° 
ce South 16°02 ,36M East 
r e e t ; thence Nor theaster ly 
e r i g h t (chord bears North 
to the point of BEGINNING. 
Subject to cur rent general taxos , easemei:w.s and r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
WITN&Btfie hands of said grantor 5 . this 1 8 t h d*»yof J u n e 
Signed In the presence of 
1 84 
June ,19 84 .personally appeared before me 
SJATE-tiP UTAH .^  \ . 
c o t S ^ O F - - S A L T ^ K E 
On the 
fin f(CyS*\] l/i j'ftubfff w.5. kW/t''\(t*'- *l- kr**et \'I :0 ^S/>/, ^<
 § »he iignec.3 of the above instrument. 
who duly acknowledged to me that • he / executed the same. 
i 1 
i I 
/inl^;/ /yy.^S-f 
Notary Public 
My Corr.mbahm Expire*: 6 / ' ' / . ) ^ Residing at: ^ y ) . ^ / . / ^Vul <l 
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"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMFETENT ADVICE." 
Recorded at Requestor 
at .M. Fee Paid $ 
by Dcp. Book 
Mail tax notice to ( r y y y ^ - u C T ^ . Address. 
Pa£e_ Ref.:_ 
772. g . 3 3 0 0 S o . 
QMt-GUatoi 8aei> 
KAY L. WALKER and LAWRENCE A. McELLIOTT 
of Salt Lake City .Countyof Salt Lake 
. grantor? 
.State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM tc SMITH, HALAMDER, SMITH 6c ASSOCIATES, a Utah g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s h i p 
and WALKER, McELLIOTT AND WILKINSON & ASSOCIATES, a M i s s o u r i g e n e r a l p a r t n e r s h i p 
. grantees 
0 f 772 East 3300 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84106 
Ten and n o / 1 0 0 forthesumof 
and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in S a l t Lake C o u i t v County, 
Stele of Utah: 
As described in the attached Exhibit "A" 
, 1 CT^J 
o % ^ 
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WITNESS the hand of said grantor .this 22nd 7 
February , A.D., one thousand nine hundred and 1 e i ^ n t y 
Signed in the presence of 
day of 
STATE OF UTAH 
> S3. 
COUNTY OF S . L . j 
On the 22nd day of 
KAY L. WALKER 
duly acknowledged to me thai she executed the seme. 
February 119 85 i personally app*&r£dIbefov mev *] 
the signer of the wilhin:ins£r\jmenrf<\<5fy y\ 
Residing at: 
APPROVED FORM - UTAH SECURITIES COMM 
My Commission Expires: 
FORM 103.1 - QUIT-CLAIMTIEED - Kally Co., M W. NInlh South, S.L.C., UUh 
Notary Public 
[ ISSION 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
On the gg7^ day of February, 1985, personally appeared before 
me LAWRENCE A. McELLIOTT, the signer of the within instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC \~^\ '»* . •.• 
Residing at: 7U^T-. £fr I&f, W&#fl 
My Commission Expires: ' •• ' 0 Y ^  
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EXHIBIT "A1 
THE GSA PROPERTY; 
B E G I N N I N G at a point on the North line of 2300 South 
S t r e e t , said point being North 0 ° 0 2 , 3 5 H East 1083.00 
feet and due West 2 7 2 6 . 8 1 2 feet from the Salt Lake 
C o u n t y survey M o n u m e n t at the center of Section 22, 
T o w n s h i p 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
M e r i d i a n , and running thence: North 104.00 feet; thence 
North 1 6 ° 0 2 J 36n West 67.00 feet; thence North 7 3 ° 5 7 l 2 4 n 
East 82.00 feet; thence North 1 6 ° 0 2 , 3 6 u West 523.935 
feet to the South line of the "F" Ramp of 1-215; thence 
South 5 8 ° 1 9 , 0 2 H West 192.072 feet along said South 
l i n e ; thence South 5 3 ° 2 8 , 2 9 " West 159.555 feet along 
said South line; thence South 1 6 ° 0 2 , 3 6 " East 527.912 
feet to the North line of said 2300 South Street; 
thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y 61.922 feet around a 221.143 foot 
r a d i u s curve to the right [chord bears North 8 1 0 5 8 ' 4 2 " 
East 61.72 f e e t ) ; thence. East 169.16 feet to the point 
of B E G I N N I N G . 
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"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPETED ADVICE/" 
Roconicdit Request of Smith Halander Smith & Associates 
n H. Fee Paid $ : 
by- Dtp. Book^ P*gt_ Ref.:_ 
HAU Ux DO-:I« to H- Fred Snith A ^ T ^ 772 East 3300 South, Suite 200 
Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84106 
4416765 ONt-QIlata! $££*> 
Scrith Halander Smith & Associa tes , a Utah general partnership .rrantor, 
of S a l t Lake C i t y .Countyof S a l t Lake , Sat* of Uah, hereby 
QtJTT-CLAJLM lo H. Fred Smith, Pcbert S. Halandcr, Dale N Minsoa and Ronald 
W. Smith 
772 East 3300 South, Sui te 2CO, Sa l t Lake City, UI 84106 .grmnuc. 
of Sa l t Lake City, Salt Lake County, S ta te of Utah 
for the Run of 
TEN (ether good and valuable considerat ion) DOLLARS, 
the fotknrinjf described tract of land In S a l t Lake • County, 
suaotuah: 
Described nnre particularly on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and inooTDorated 
herein. ^n 
cr* 
oo 
WITNESS the haixi of aaid grantor .th.U 2 3 r d 
F e b r u a r y , A.D.t oo« LhoufcAnd nine huiKired and 
o ' ^5 
• ft 
i V - — 
O ^ 
7 =*> 
5s ^ 
I— 
T 
^ 5 
^ 
87. 
^ 
d«ycf 
Siftxd In th« prtatence cf Smith Halander Smith & A s s o c i a t e s , a 
•Utah w&vdLul uaj/uy.',Li>LjLLu, 
I-
!X 
C 
o 
I 
STATE Or UTAH ) 
coomrorSalt j 
Octbt 23rd^yof February , i* 87 ,p«rKxiattytpp*ir^bcforom«. 
Robert 5." Halander and H. Fred Smith, general par tners of Sd.^1*^""^^1 
dc Associates , a Utah general par tnersh ip _ ,tori$r*<rflcfjyh ' 
&ify tcfaw^k^id tu EM that .^ W txaarUd tbt Mine. 
M7 OoaunWloQ EzplrM* 
1-2-90 
rOCM MLl - QUTT-OJUM t*2> - M r Ot, • W. Mr* tak, IXC, UUk 
******* n: Sal t L a k e ' v i t ^ UtA-> 
Amctia rant - UTAM ncuxrrm ooncwwn "* 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
THC GSA P K U P U T Y : 
B E G I N N I N G al a p o i n t on the North line of 2300 South 
S t r e e t , said point bein.j Worth 0 ° 0 2 ' 3 f East 1 0 G 3 . 0 0 
feel and due Wnst 2 7 2 6 . 8 1 2 feel from the Salt Lake 
County survey M o n u m e n t at the c e n t e r of Section 2 2 , 
T o w n s h i p 1 South, Ran-je 1 West, Salt Lake Cc-sc and 
M e r i d i a n , and running thence North 104.OU feel; I hence 
North- 10*02 * 36" West 67.UU feet; thence North 7 3 ° 5 7 , L M d 
East 82.00 feet; t h e n c e North 1 6 ° 0 2 ' 3 6 M West 5 2 3 . 9 3 5 
feet to the South line of the H F " Ramp of 1-215; thence 
South 5 B ° 1 9 ' 0 2 H W e s t 19 2 .07 2 feet alony said South 
line; thence South 5 3 ° 2 B I 24" West 1 5 9 . bS5 feet aloncj 
said South l U e ; t h e n c e South 1 6 ° 0 2 ' 3 6 M East 5 2 7 . 9 1 2 
feet to the Korth line of said 2300 South S t r e e t ; 
thence N o r t h e a s t e r l y 61.922 feet around a 2 21.14 3 foot 
radius curve to the t'iyhl (chord bears North B l ° 5 0 , 4 2 w 
East 61.72 f e e l ) ; thence East 169.16 feet to the point 
of B E G I N N I N G . 
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Mirrphy, TnlhnP-frMa 
KAT u : I _ D I X O N 
_-*?» 376 East '400 South;^ *j&?-~ V - Space Above for Reccrder's U« 
ifKTr'"... 
?EFlJ 
S a l t Lake City, UtahJS 
Walker, McElliott and Wilkinson1 & Associates, a Missouri general Dart:nfn§riri-
of . •V'<5^:V^f:;.H:.^V; :'•:.'-• here* 
CONVEY AND WARRANT agalratallcUiming^throueh or undo- said partnership or the 
:
 individual partners ^•W^^i^^'MV^-
to H. Fred Smith, Robe~T S.'Halandef;r-Dale N. Minson and Ronald W. Smith 
772 East 3300 Souui, Suite;200,';..Salt Lake City, Utah S410fi .grants, 
0/ Sa l t Lake City, Salt LakeiCouity, : S ta te of Utah for the sum of 
TEN (other good and valiiable^ consideration) DOLLARS. 
the following described tract o f I t a d l n ^ - > ^ S a l t " L a k e County, 
SuteofUuh: 
!»i 
See attached Exhibit "A" hereto and incorporated bv reference hcrei LH 
WITNESS, tha hand of said gnu&r..', this ' 
Apr i l .AJU1...87 
Slgaad in tht prcaeoca of ? 0 - : ^ - ; 
V 
"15th / / 7 day of •'*>' 
Walker, McElliott apd Wilkinson £ Associate 
' a M i s s o u r i ^ ^ ^ r ^ V ^ ^ t n ^ s h i n 
11 
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Jeer ;* ^ ^alipaitrii^b^wal 
5TATX0F 
^ i ^ o ^ ^ ' l 5 0 i > y o ^ 
-fRay't'^  VZalkeriv ^alipait  
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^*and ;Vftlkin5Gn - SJ Astoc l i 
f a Miisouri% generidlr 
wO coflEkssttioa JEMCDC^MM 
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t\m:m\ 
::v^;.^,NoUryPi^c ^^;»J - H ; •*»'. 
& S a l t j t L a t o - a t y , ' - . U c a h - 4 ! K 5 ^ 
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EXHIBIT "A" TO SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
TIIL CSA PKQPLhTy 
t J ^ 
t Tic: 
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INNING 
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Salt 
ter of 
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nee NO 
t 67.0 
00 fee 
t to t 
ncc So 
d Sout 
.555 f 
02'36-
d 2300 
c;2 2 f 
the n 
72 fee 
;.t of 
«t a point on the North line of 2 .0 
et-t, said point being North C 8 o r "»{> 
.00 feet and duC Kcat 2726.812 ( v a 
Lake County Survey Monument at » h«-
Section 22, Vownship 1 South, K,:,^ 
t Ldke Base and Meridian *-•» - ..
 n 
rtn 104.00 feet; thenceforth lb'02' 
0 teet; thence North 7J*57f24- Last 
t; thence North 16*02'J6~ Kcir 52J.> 
he South line of the T " Rc-nu o' 1-2 
uth 56M9'02- West 192.072 f.-e/alcn 
n line; thence Soath 53tt2a,29" K«st 
eet along said South line; thr--.ee <c 
^ s t 527.912 feet to the North line 
South Street; thence Northeasterly 
et around a 221.143 foot radium curv 
gnc (chord bears North fcl«56S2" z J b 
t); thence East 165.16 feet to the 
BLGiNNING. 
f rein 
1 
3b 
1 5 ; 
i t n 
of 
Subjec t co a rru.se deed note o b l i g a t i o n and t r u s t deed in f.r.-^r •: ;V; • 
l i f e Insurance Ccroany ( o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p a l sun of r*J. 70<V;M/: )• .-«•• 
recorded March 22." 1985. as Entry to. /^064555. Bcxxk 56.5,:>, ac r-;u.-.c . r \ 
Countv r e c o r d e r ' s records , and subjec t t o re la ted-Afnj .c r rvq t ^C l e a ^ s ar..; 
•1064556) arri Financing Statement (Entry No. 40b4:>:>/; EW-:-. Mnr'/l <T': :v.rr7-:,-Subject t o genera l r e a l Droperty *;axes acc ru ing for "he year 19"7 . • • •/,-.•: 
S p e c i a l warranty deed in s a t i s f a c t i o n and c a n c e l l a t i o n of .in :c-ii,:a:.i-.--. .-v 
by a r.rust deed dated >tarch 1. .1984, secur ing a nor.? Lr t'ne ^rie.ir.al n: : : . 
S2. 7^9.^39.42, che b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t of which was C-.-V"! )-.- ^rancc. •:. 
Releas ing any and a l l c l a i r a by Grantor , o r anyone ov, through T iir.vJe. ''.•:. 
to the b u i l d i n g on che subjec t r e a l p roper ty o r under a r~j-Verves- '•.;::•?•• r» 
between Grantor and Grantses under date of October *. I. !"^-
Re leas ing to and ass ing ing to Grantees a l l r i g h t . ti: .U- .mc i::cerv>: 
: ' : L U : i i 
:»; q»; ^ 
i ' L ike 
r:d navab.^ . 
"or secured 
p of 
in anu 
."TVl'.ie 
.1": i i J •*. 
;uid und.." 
rea l 
• with a l l 
a c e r t a i n l ease made v/ith the United Scates of America respec tmt ; :.v\-
p r o p e r t y wi th Lease No. CS-08,8-10728, as amended or .;u:"oli ,rer.ced. an. 
income and r i g h t s accruing tlhereunder. 
Walker. XcKi I :••: • ^,.1 V:Lk:;.,v- c< 
As.-.oriace^ a".:.*e.ouri i»encral nor tnershiD 
Bv 
S3y*L. ^alkcr.""ppncivi 1" ;>«rtncr 
ss 
STATE OF l/rAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Ot the 15th day of A p r i l . 1987, p e r s o n a l l y anpearcd before rij Vjiy L. Walker 
g e n e r a l p a r t n e r of Walker. McEl l io t t and Wilkinscn & .Associaces, a Missouri general 
p a r t n e r s h i p , and executed the wi th in Spec ia l Warranty Deed. h 
My Canrdss ion Expires 
Rjcsry PuEIic 
Residing « S a l t ' L a k e C^ry. Uc^h 
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ri*#£?5?*3 ?}'??&'*r- ** ^ r ^ ^ W > 
R«»cord*d at tha r*qu*st of La Bamion Hab«y 
Murphy, Tolboa & iteb«y 
124 S o u t h 600 E a a t , #100 
8LC# UT. 84102 
H. P H Pmid $ -,-• at 
By 
f u l l tMX notic* t o : 315J.:XWULg Driva 
S a l t Laka City, Utah 
Page_ 
8A124 
Ref 
OTIT*CMTM PIKP 
1. HOtD SXTtt, BOttttf S. AXJUflrKft, and KOSXJUO W» 5M1TB, 
aa Crantora, of S a l t LaJcatfCoonty, s ta ta of Utah, htraby QUIT-
CLAXX and conray t o OOaWaJT, m e . , a Utah corporation, 3151 
Craig Driva, Sa l t , Lalca Goonty, Stata of Utah, aa Grantaa, for 
tha rai of TfV D0tLlXS'(ota«r good and Tainan la con* i deration), 
tha raal pcupaity which baa tha comon addraae of 2222 Waat 2300 
South, Waat Vallay City, Utah 84119, aor<» particularly 
daacribad aa a trac t of land in Salt LaXa County, s tata of Utah: 
(an ARICSID nonsn ossernxmov) 
N3V«ab«r, 1990. 
th« hand Of aald Crantora, thi» 28th day of 
r 
1 1 1 
Li 
STATX OF UTAH 
cotnrrr or SALT LAO 
On tha 28th day of Kovaabar, 1990, and tha abov« personally 
appaarad bafora M , tha aignaro H. rPED SMITH, ROBERTAS. 
HALAKTTH and RONALD M. SHITH^af—tha forgoing; in«tru»«nt, Who 
duly acfcnovladgad to mm tlyrtTthay axacuta<l tha-**»*. 
; ^ a f w j 
.1 1 
1 
/ 
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" ISM'!' 
Bejlnnin? *t a point on tht North I t * of 2300 South Street, said point being f»rth 
0*02'35" Eest 1083.00 feet end dt»« tttit 2724.812 feet frc* the Salt Lake County Surrey 
Homaewat «t the center of 5ect1oa'22i'Toii«Jh1p 1 South, Range 1 West, SaH »_ake B»se 
end HtrldUn, end running th*i«t;iiorih'10«;00 fett; thence worth 16*C2*36- west 67.00 
f t t t ; tbt*ct north 73#57'2«« |«»ti;82:;06tfttt^thtnce north IS'02'36" West 522.935 feet 
to tht Sooth l int of tht ."F^Raap:0fgt<415i'tlitflCt South 58'19'02" West 192.072 feet 
•lo*« *etd Swth l int : tht.Xt So«th 53*28'2> West 159.555 feet along said South line; 
thtuce South 16*02'36* E«U ^1.112 feet to the *o*th line of said 2300 Soyth Street; 
thtnet northeasterly 61.922 ftvt*r«md 1 221.143 foot radius cu«-ve lo th« right (chord 
btert north Bl*Sa'*2- East 61.7.! f t t t ) ; thtnet Eest 169.16 feet to the point of 
btflnftUf. 
Sltaatt In Salt lake Count/, State of Utah. 
5 G 3 A 2 5 7 
08 0AKH »1 W«51 n 
K A T I E L . DIXON 
fcEUWGti SALT U * £ COXTTi ITT* 
5UMSIA* TITLE 
ittc ST« o i w c KILPACX > xpvnr 
* 
If 
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SU^inyjvuc;;* 
7 i l t nuaaeri 33007330 
Hai l Taa notice to: 
^ ; , ^ ^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ 
3 vU7 n 0413? fll 
KvATIH L- DIXON 
ttCC*C«> 3ACT LA«r C<XW> UTAH 
I.* 
» A n A » i D 2 2 0 
li'Ki-
te 
CONH^T, : , c . , » ' o u h corporation ,nd DALS , . ,:N3C.y 
r
 "AHJR^D" 
deaoribed t r a c t f s ^ o f 
4 Utah corporation 
GRANT22 
ah, for tha iua of TZN AND 00/100's 
<UID VALUA3L2 CON3IDZRATION, the following 
and in JALT LAX2 County, State of Utah: 
Beginning at a point on the Jforth line of 2300 South Straat, 
aaid point being North 0 deg. 02,33" Zaat 1033.00 feat and dua 
Heat 2726.312 feet frosi the 3alt Lake County Survey Monument at 
the center of Section 22, Townahip 1 South, Range I Heat, 3ait 
Lake B a n and Meridian; and running thenco North 104.00 faat/ 
thence North 15 deg. 02,35" Kest 67.00 faet/ thanca North 73 
deg. 37,24" 2aat 32.00 fast; thence North 15 dag. 02'36" Neat 
322.933 faet to tha 3outh line of tha V Ramp of 1-213; thence 
3outh 33 dag. 19*02" Keat 192.072 faat along i/iid South line; 
thence South 33 dag. 23*29" *est 139.333 fact along aaid South 
lina; thane* South 16 dag. 02*36* 2ast 326.912 faat to tha North 
Una of aaid 2300 South atraat; thanca Northeasterly 61.922 
faat around a 221.143 foot radius curvs to tha right (chord 
bears North 31 dag. 33*42" Saat 61.72 faat); thanca 2aat 169.16 
faat to tha point of beginning* 
SU3J2CT TO: County and/or City Taaaa net delinquent/ Sondt 
and/or Special Assessments not delinquent and Covenants, 
Conditions, aestrictione, aighta-of-Hay, Zaienanta, Leases and 
Reservations now of Record. 
3UBJ2CT TO! A Deed of Truit and all aodificationa and amendments 
thereto dated March 22, 1993 aiecuted by XALX2R, McZLLIOTT and 
HILXIN30N & A330CIAT33 as Trustor(t) to secure payn>ent of a nota 
bearing even data thersof in the original sun of $3,700,000.00 
with interest thereon, p*yabl* as theroin provided to UTAH TITLZ 
• A33TRACT CO. as Trustee), in favor of MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL Lirs 
INSURANCE COMPANY as Beneficiary, recorded MARCH 22, 1933 in Book 
3639 at Page 409 as Intry No. 4064333 of Official Recorda, which 
Deed of Trust the Grantee fa) hereby aaaume(s) and agree(a) to 
pay and agreed) to be) bound by all of the provision* of the aaid 
Dead of Truat to the J A M effect than the signer(a) of the aaid 
document as Trustor(s) art bound* 
JITJ1M. th. h.nd„, of
 M l d 9rmor(>)# thi, 13fch ^ ^ 
JULY, 
O M : , ac. 
<% 
STAtS OF UTA3, County of JALT LAX1 ) is: 
On th i s data, July£jta1993 personally appeared before rrva 
DAL* ft, MlftSO* the) tign#r(«) of the within instrument, who duly 
acknowledged to M>*that^hir MMtittd the ia:»e. 
CTJ 
-T3 
CT7 
C/V 
CO 
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^t^WW^^^^^ 
Notary Ac)wo*]*4ga*antUcontinuid) 
HI > *» • * * * Kit 
--*':?* .-'i 
My cciaoiajion'-tipirtjt ^ r w « 
Staiding ini "'JAM LAI3 q m ^ U T A H 
JTAT3 OF UTA3, County oi JALT LAK3 ) aai 
Cn £Ma datt,. July ,tS^1393 personally appaarad b«£or* me. 
/V ^/^'t^^r^^K' ^ * ? ° ^ ^ng by n* duly iworn did 
jay, that _ h a ij/ar* tha ^if^r^Tf- — ^ °r 
C0NMA37, INC., th* corporation that ax«icut*d tha abova and 
foraaoing inJtnawnt and that laid inatrura«nt *aa signed in 
bahali oi laid corporation by authority at ita by-lava (or by 
authorj^y oi^X r«oluticrwof ita board ot diractora) and aaid 
*£ ^ ^'^'-x^+^^X acknowladgad to m* that laid corporation aaacutad tha iaja«« 
My coMinion tapir.ai 4 ^ ^ 2 ^ L 
Raaiding int 3ALT LAX3 CITY, UTAH 
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[CORPORATE FORM] 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Ucah Corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of 
Sa l t Lake Ci ty , of County of S a l t 
grantor, hereby CONVEYS A N D WARRANTS to 
, a corporation 
with its principal office at 
rar*
 t State of Utah, 
2212 WEST, L .L.C. , a Delaware l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y oonpany, 
of Sail. Lake C i t y , County of S a l t Lake, S t a t e o f Utah 
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 
grantee 
for the sum of 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
S a l t Lake County, 
See Exhibit "A" at tached here to and 
by t h i s r e f e r e n c e made a part hereo f . 
The officcri who sign this d^cJ hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized vndtr a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting; duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has earned its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this fch day of February , A. D. 1? 97 
Attest: 
Secretary. 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
jOEah Corporation 
PETER President. 
h 
Bebruary A . D . 1997 
[CORPORATE SEAL] 
STATE CF UTAH, 
County of S a l t Lake 
On the 15- I In ds? of 
personally appeared befoie me P E I E * J . AENQLD " XHil 
who being by me duly sworn did fay.jeffik&fiOtoufiatkfc that he, the said PEIER J . AFNOLD 
it the president, 6B&taQ&b€tfkk iXXJtJWKECGW 
of ARNOLD ECUSTRIES, INC. tftomQQSt* and that th« within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of aaid corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of 
director! #nd said PETER J . WWCII? Xjrfx 
each duly acknowledged to me that *a»d corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed 
is the seal of Mid corporation. 
Notary Public. 
'°*> My rcidence b^StiJ±^.„LlY/._±if?_^ 
BXWmUMMfJUZ K|B^B!£ggBg^^ 
cr; 
WW 
IT& # /7S^° W *X\<~1 
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fcSCHIBIT mK> 
A parcel cf land situated in the Northeast quarter of Section 21, 
township 1 South, Range 1 Woot, Salt Lake rvuoe and Meridian, more 
particularly described as fol lows; 
BEGINNING a t a point on the North l i n e of 2300 South Street, said 
point being North 0°02 ,35w Eaot 1083.00 feet and due Vfest 2726.812 
fee t f rem the Salt Lake County Survey Monument a t the center of 
Section 22, Tovns^ip 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Dane and 
Meridian; and running thence North 104.00 feet; thence North 16°02 ,36" 
Wcut 67.00 f ee t ; thenco torth 73°57 ,24" Fant 02.00 fee t ; thence Tbrth 
16°02'36M Wcr.t 522.935 foet t o the South l i n e of the "FM Ranp of 
1-215; thence South 58°19 l02" West 192.072 feet along said South 1 ine; 
thence South 53°28 ,29" Went 159.555 f e e t along aald South l ine; thence 
South 16°02 ,3 6M Ear.t 526.912 feet t o the North l i n e of said 2300 South 
Street; thence Northeasterly 61.922 f ee t around a 221.143 foot radiuc 
curve to the r i cht (chord bears fbrth 81°58'42M East 61.72 f e e t ) ; 
thence Ea3t 169.16 feet t o the point of BBGINMINC. 
SUBJECT TO current general ta>cs, easements, r e s t r i c t i v e covenants and 
righto of way of record. 
Tax ferial No. 15-21-226-004 
KtUJKUEKf SALT LAKE COUNTYF UTAH 
LANDttARK TITLE 
REC BT:J FERGUSON iDEPUTY - WI 
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NANCY WORKMAN 
RECORDER! SALT LAKE COUHTTt UTAH 
ReturnTo: ~ A o o o n TT „ . T _ LAMOOARK TITLE GSA 2 2 2 2 West , i , . L . C
 R£C BYiV ASHBT D^EPUTY - UI 
• ^ c / o Arnold Indus tr i e s 
p j 324 South State Street, Suite 157 
O 
> H Salt Leke City, Utah 84111 
S
 ,„, WARRANTY DEED, 
2212 West, L.L.C., a Dalaware limited l i a b i l i t y coapany new known as 
GSA 2222 WEST, L .L .C , a Delaware lihdted l i a b i l i t y conpany tranter 
of Salt Lake City, .County of Salt Lake • State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to 
GSA 2222 WEST, L.L.C, a Delaware Limited Liability Company 
grantee 
°t S a l t Lake Ci ty , Qnnty o f S a l t Lake, State o f Utah for the mm of 
TEN DOLLARS AND No/100 DOLLARS. 
AND CMER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION ! 
the following described tract of land in s a ] ^ t L ^ County, 
State of Utah: 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A" 
Sidwel l No. 15-21-226-004 
SUBJECT TO CURRENT GENERAL TAXES, EASEfriENTS, RESTRICTIONS AND RIGHTS OF WAY OF 
RECORD. 
WITNESS, the hand of eaid grantor , this 3 r d day of 
A p r i l
 ' ' ' GSA 2222 WEST, L . L . C , a Delaware limited 
l i a b i l i t y ccqpany 
Signed in the Presence of | BY; 
Kimbers I I I , Inc . , a Delaware corporation 
is'g ftniflging Umber 
BY; 7***>? ^ U . ^ M 
Peter J. Arnold, President 
} -STATE OVVTXSt, County of * J ^ D W * « C -
OB the 3rd day of A P r i l
 # A.D. I * 9 7 -
personally appeared before ma PEflER J* ARNOLD, President of KIMBERS III.- INC., a Delaware 
corporation, Managing Motber of GSA 2222 WEST, L .L .C , a Delaware limited l i a b i l i t y cxjipagfr 
the signer of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that lie executed the ^*] 
same, for and on behalf of GSA 2222 WEST, L.L.C, a Delaware limited l i a b i l i t y company, ^J 
as Managing Member therein. ^ 
J5fc*S&*S*%. Notary Public. S 
' " JUsiding in"« M AiMrtm *YtW*ft6 ^ 
"5^ i^^ SSSwROC.MUU)M £f 
i^<>^^O^T^^02MUSOS70S7 
^^^"fJfftWN*X X U AHi NewYbikCouAtv T T r J»177^n 
^ ^ ^ £ j ^ e * U * # i U | , ^ » O n i . 7 l i e l 5 r LTC #17750 
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EXHIBIT »* ' 
h parcel nf land situated in the Northeast quarter of Section 2), 
Township 1 South, Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, *ore 
particularly described as fol low: 
BEGINNING at a point on the North line of 2300 South Street, said 
point bein? North 0"02'15M East. 1083.00 feet and due West 2726.812 
feet troa the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the renter of 
Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; ana running thence North 104.00 feet; thence North 16'02,36M 
West 67.00 f*»*t; thence North 73'57'24" East 82.00 feet; thence North 
16'02,36" West 522.935 feet to the South line of the T Rawp of 
T-215; thence Sooth 58#19«02H West 192.072 feet along said Sonth l ine ; 
thence South 53*28'29" West 159.555 feet along said South l ine ; thence 
South 16*02* 36" Fast 526.912 feet to the North line of said 2300 Sonth 
Street; thence Northeasterly 61.922 feet around a 221.143 foot radius 
curve to the right (chord bears North 8r58 ,42* East 61.72 feet) ; 
thence Bast 169.16 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Case Law and Other Authorities 
ITEM1 Selected Cases 
Bartlome v. State Farm & Casualty Co. 
Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile and Investment Co. 
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine 
Hamner v. B.K. Bloch & Co. 
Hanson v. Zoller 
In re Granada, Inc. 
In re Ostler's Estate 
Klinger v. Kightly 
Noronha v. Stewart 
Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Co. 
Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports 
Medicine 
Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah 
Sharp v. Riekhof 
Wall Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, Inc. 
ITEM 2 Other Authorities 
23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds § 15 
59A Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership § 384 
26A C.J.S., Deeds §§ 42, 43 
31 C.J.S., Estoppel & Waiver § 10 
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256 Cal.Rptr. 719 
(Cite as: 208 CaI.App.3d 1235, 256 Cal.Rptr. 719) 
Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, 
California. 
Nancy BARTLOME, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. A041940. 
March 23, 1989. 
Certified for Partial Publication [FN*] 
FN* Pursuant to rules 976 and 976.1 of the 
California Rules of Court, this opinion is certified 
for publication only through the end of section I, 
excluding text enclosed in []. 
Party injured in collision with rental boat brought 
action to establish coverage under personal liability 
umbrella policy issued to one of the partners of the 
boat rental firm. The Superior Court, Alameda 
County, Robert K. Byers, J., entered judgment in 
favor of insurer, and injured plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeal, Stein, J., held that policy 
which provided coverage to boat owned by partner 
did not provide coverage for boat registered to 
partnership and used exclusively for partnership 
purposes. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Insurance 0=^1832(1) 
217kl832(l) 
(Formerly 217kl46.7(l)) 
If an ambiguity exists in an insurance policy, it shall 
be construed against the insurer if that construction 
conforms to the reasonable expectations of the 
insured. 
[2] Insurance <®^1808 
217kl808 
(Formerly 217kl46.1(2)) 
If term in insurance policy has been judicially 
construed, it is not ambiguous and the judicial 
construction of the term should be read into the 
policy unless the parties express a contrary intent. 
[3] Insurance <®^ =>2272 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim 
Page 1 
217k2272 
(Formerly 217k435.22(l)) 
Personal liability policy of partner in boat rental 
operation which covered boats owned by the named 
insured did not include a boat registered to the 
partnership and used exclusively for partnership 
purposes. 
[4] Partnership <@^1 
289kl 
Partnership is a hybrid organization which is viewed 
as an aggregation of individuals for some purposes 
and as an entity for others. 
[5] Partnership <@=>63 
289k63 
One of the primary areas in which a partnership is 
viewed as an entity is with respect to ownership of 
property. 
*1237 **720 Stanley Pedder, Malott, Pedder, 
Stover & Hesseltine, Lafayette, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
J. Scott Buresh, Steven K. Austin, York, Buresh & 
Kaplan, Berkeley, for defendant and respondent. 
STEIN, Associate Justice. 
Nancy Bartlome appeals from a judgment in favor 
of respondent State Farm Fire & Casualty (State 
Farm) in a declaratory judgment action. 
After settling her personal injury claim for the 
limits of a commercial liability policy issued to 
"Tahoe Boat Rental," Bartlome sought to establish 
additional coverage under a personal liability 
umbrella policy issued by State Farm to Lloyd 
Canton, one of the partners of Tahoe Boat Rental. 
On appeal she contends[ - ]The operators of the boat 
that caused her injury were *1238 insureds under 
Canton's policy because any property owned by the 
partnership was also "owned by" Canton, as an 
individual.[ - ] 
We hold that the definition of "insureds," as 
including permissive users of boats "owned by" the 
named insured under Canton's personal liability 
policy, did not include permissive users of a boat 
owned by the partnership.! - ] 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
256 Cal.Rptr. 719 
(Cite as: 208 CaI.App.3d 1235, *1238, 256 Cal.Rptr. 
FACTS 
On July 7, 1986, a motorboat operated by Warren 
Eacret collided with appellant causing the 
amputation of one of her legs below the knee. Kreg 
Eacret rented the boat from Tahoe Boat Rental 
earlier that day. The motor boat was registered 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles in the name 
of "Tahoe Boat Rental," which is a California 
partnership formed for the purpose of renting 
pleasure boats along the northwest shore of Lake 
Tahoe. Lloyd Canton and John Kearns are the sole 
partners of Tahoe Boat Rental. 
A comprehensive business liability policy issued by 
United National Insurance Company to Tahoe Boat 
Rental was in effect on the date of this boating 
accident. The boat involved in the accident was 
specifically identified as a covered boat in the 
United National policy, which provided coverage in 
the amount of $500,000 for losses arising from the 
operation of the Tahoe Boat Rental business. 
Appellant filed a personal injury action against 
Kreg Eacret, Warren Robert Eacret, and Lloyd 
Canton and John V. Kearns both individually and 
doing business as the general partnership "Tahoe 
Boat Rental." United National Insurance Company 
acknowledged that its comprehensive business policy 
issued to Tahoe Boat Rental provided coverage and 
the parties negotiated a settlement resulting in the 
payment of the United National policy limit of 
$500,0000 to appellant. 
Appellant continued to pursue the instant 
declaratory relief action against State Farm which 
had issued a policy entitled "Personal Liability 
Umbrella Policy" to Lloyd E. Canton and his wife 
Sharon. 
[ - ] 
The trial court held that the Eacrets were not 
"insureds" under Canton's personal liability 
umbrella policy because the boat involved in the 
accident belonged to the partnership and was not 
"owned" by Canton, the named insured. [ - ] 
*1239 ANALYSIS 
I. 
Appellant relies on the following portion of the 
definition of "insured" as the basis for finding 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim 
Page 2 
», **720) 
coverage for the Eacrets: 
**721 "any person or organization while using or 
holding an automobile, recreational motor vehicle, 
or watercraft owned, rented by, or loaned to the 
named insured, provided that the named insured 
gave permission for the type of use." 
Appellant contends that the Eacrets were permissive 
users of a boat "owned" by Lloyd Canton, and that 
they therefore are insureds as defined by Canton's 
personal liability umbrella policy. She asserts that, 
despite the absence of any facts showing that Canton 
considered the boat, which was registered to the 
partnership, to be his personal property, or that he 
exercised any actual control over it, he must 
nonetheless, be deemed the "owner" of each of the 
partnership's specific assets because a partnership is 
not an entity, but rather is an "aggregation of 
individuals." 
[1][2] It is by now well established that words used 
in an insurance policy are to be interpreted 
according to their plain meaning, and the courts will 
not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order 
to create an ambiguity where none exists. (Reserve 
Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 
807, 180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764.) If an 
ambiguity does exist it shall be construed against the 
insurer, if that construction conforms to the 
reasonable expectations of the insured. (Id., at p. 
808, 180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764.) If, 
however, a term in an insurance policy has been 
judicially construed, it is not ambiguous and the 
judicial construction of the term should be read into 
the policy unless the parties express a contrary 
intent. (Couch on Insurance, 2d ed., § 15:20; 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chirm (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 
274, 279, 76 Cal.Rptr. 264.) 
[3] Neither party cites any California case 
specifically addressing the question whether a policy 
insuring permissive users of property "owned" by an 
individual also covers permissive users of property 
of a partnership of which the individual is a 
member. We are persuaded by cases from other 
jurisdictions, by our own interpretation of California 
partnership law, and the particular facts of this case 
that the term "owned by ... the named insured" in 
Canton's personal liability insurance policy cannot 
include a boat registered to Tahoe Boat Rental, and 
used exclusively for partnership purposes. 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(Cite as: 208 Cal.App.3d 1235, H239, 256 Cal.Rptr. 
[4][5] The premise of appellant's argument is that 
individual partners must be deemed the owners of 
partnership property because a partnership is merely 
an aggregation of individuals. In support of this 
proposition she *1240 relies on several cases that 
she contends stand for the proposition that California 
follows the "aggregate theory of partnership": Reed 
v. Industrial Ace. Com. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 191, 73 
P.2d 1212 and, National Auto Ins. Co. v. Indus. 
Ace. Com. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 689, 81 P.2d 926. 
[FN1] Although these cases do announce that 
general principle, California law treats a partnership 
as a "hybrid" organization that is viewed as an 
aggregation of individuals for some purposes, and as 
an entity for others. (Epstein v. Frank (1981) 125 
Cal.App.3d 111, 119, 177 Cal.Rptr. 831.) One of 
the primary areas in which a partnership is viewed 
as an entity is with respect to ownership of property. 
California Corporations Code section 15008 
specifically provides that a partnership may hold 
title to real property, and further defines any 
property, real or personal, that is acquired "on 
account of the partnership," as partnership property. 
FN1. Southwestern Financial Corp. v. Kelly (1987) 
233 Cal.Rptr. 639, relied upon by appellant, was 
ordered depublished on April 30, 1987. 
California Corporations Code section 15025 defines 
an individual partner's interest in specific 
partnership assets. Section 15025 begins by stating 
that "[a] partner is a coowner with the other partners 
of specific partnership property holding as a tenant 
in partnership," however, the restrictions placed on 
an individual partner's interest in partnership 
property by section 15025 are all encompassing. 
The section states that a partner has no right to 
possess specific partnership property for 
nonpartnership purposes without the consent of his 
fellow partners; it prohibits a partner **722 from 
assigning or selling his interest in specific 
partnership property without the consent of his 
partners; it prohibits enforcement of a money 
judgment against specific partnership property in 
connection with the debt of an individual partner; it 
requires that the right to specific partnership 
property vests in surviving partners rather than in 
the estate of a deceased partner; and it states that 
specific partnership property is not the community 
property of any individual partner. Thus, most of 
the normal incidents of ownership are held by the 
partnership as a group rather than the individual 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim 
Page 3 
», **721) 
partners. [FN2] 
FN2. Except for the substitution of gender neutral 
language and the phrase "enforcement of a money 
judgment" for "attachment and execution," 
California Corporations Code section 15025 is 
identical to section 25 of the Uniform Partnership 
Act. 
The only California case arguably addressing the 
issue whether a partner possesses what are 
commonly understood as the rights of an owner, 
with respect to specific partnership assets, is Becker 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (1975) 52 
Cal.App.3d 282, 124 Cal.Rptr. 739. In that case 
the plaintiff was injured by a truck the parties 
characterized as "owned by" a partnership. The 
plaintiff obtained a settlement for the limits of the 
policy issued to the partnership and then sought 
declaratory relief that a policy issued to one of the 
partners, individually, also provided coverage. 
That policy *1241 provided coverage to the 
individual for damages arising out of the use of an 
automobile "owned by" him or for nonowned 
vehicles "used by the named insured or a relative." 
The court stated that the truck was not owned by the 
individual partner but rather was owned by the 
partnership. (Id., at p. 285, 124 Cal.Rptr. 739.) 
Becker, while instructive, is not dispositive of this 
issue for two reasons: The policy in Becker defined 
an "owned automobile" as one which was listed in 
the declarations, a temporary substitute or a newly 
acquired automobile. The truck was not listed in 
the declarations. Thus, the court's statement that 
the individual partner did not "own" the 
partnership's truck may have been based on this 
definition. Second, the court stated later in its 
opinion that it was stipulated that the truck was 
"owned by the partnership." 
Respondent cites Mission Ins. Co. v. Feldt (1964) 
62 Cal.2d 97, 41 Cal.Rptr. 293, 396 P.2d 709 as 
authority for the proposition that an individual 
partner should not be deemed the "owner" of a 
vehicle registered to the partnership. In Mission 
Ins. a vehicle registered to a joint venture was 
involved in an accident. One of the partners of the 
joint venture had an automobile liability policy that 
provided coverage only for the use of a motor 
vehicle "not owned" by the individual partner. At 
the time he took out the policy he did not own any 
vehicles and had not yet formed the joint venture. 
The court held that the vehicle was "not owned" by 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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Page 4 
the individual partner despite the fact that, as a 
partner, he had an "equitable interest" in the 
vehicle. (Id,, at p. 102, 41 Cal.Rptr. 293, 396 P.2d 
709.) This case is also distinguishable because the 
decision to construe ownership to mean only 
registered ownership was based primarily on certain 
vehicle code provisions requiring proof of financial 
responsibility that were relevant to the particular 
policy in that case. 
There are, however, persuasive decisions from 
other jurisdictions that are directly on point. In 
Employers Casualty Co. v. Employers Commercial 
Union (5th Cir.1980) 632 F.2d 1215, an individual, 
Robert Owens, was a member of several 
partnerships including Russellville Steel Company, 
and Owens Fabricating. A vehicle that was owned 
by Russellville was involved in an accident while 
being driven by an employee of Owens Fabricating. 
A condition of the Commercial Union policy in 
dispute provided that it was only excess insurance as 
to any vehicles not owned by the named insured, 
Robert Owens dba Owens Fabricating. The issue 
before the court was whether Robert Owens was 
also an owner of the truck by virtue of his status as 
a partner in Russellville. If Robert Owens did not 
own the truck, Commercial Union was only an 
excess insurer. Employers, the insurer of 
Russellville, made an argument in support **723 of 
its claim for contribution identical to that advanced 
by appellant in this case: 
"Employers argues that Alabama has rejected the 
entity concept of a partnership and adopted the 
theory that a partnership is merely an aggregate of 
its individual members. Thus, any property 
owned by the partnership of Owens and Brignet, 
doing business as *1242 Russellville, would be 
owned, separately and severally, by Owens and 
Brignet." (Id., at p. 1219.) 
The court rejected this argument based on its 
interpretation of the relevant provision of the 
Alabama partnership law, which is identical in all 
substantive respects to section 25 of the Uniform 
Partnership Act and California Corporations Code 
section 15025. The court reasoned as follows: 
"Alabama has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act 
(UPA) with some modifications not material to our 
discussion. Although Ala.Code § 10-8-72(a) (UPA) 
§ 25(a) states that '[a] partner is a co-owner with his 
partners of specific partnership property holdings as 
a tenant in partnership,' it proceeds to destroy the 
traditional incidents of ownership. For example, a 
partner has no right to possess the property without 
the consent of the partners; a partner's right to 
specific partnership property is not assignable; and 
the right to property vests in the surviving partners 
rather than the estate of a deceased partner. One 
authority has made the following observation: 
"Although stating that each partner is a co-owner of 
the partnership property, the [ - ] Act systematically 
destroys the usual attributes of ownership.... 
Functionally, despite the literal language, the 
partnership owns its property and the partners do 
not. The Act would be better if it conceded this 
rather than accomplishing it by indirection. Crane 
and Bloomberg, Law of Partnership, § 40(b) (1968) 
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)." (Id., at pp. 
1219-1220.) 
Another federal court reached the same conclusion 
in Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Helfin (1956 
D.C.Ark.) 137 F.Supp. 520. In that case the court, 
analyzing the same provisions of the Uniform 
Partnership Act, held that an individual partner was 
not the owner of a vehicle purchased with 
partnership funds and used only for partnership 
purposes. (Id., at p. 523.) 
We consider these decisions from other jurisdictions 
interpreting provisions of the Uniform Act as 
persuasive authority. (Estate of Butler (1947) 29 
Cal.2d 644, 177 P.2d 16.) 
Appellant, attempting to distinguish Employers, 
argues that the court's analysis in that case is 
inapplicable because that case involved a dispute 
between two insurers. She contends that in the 
context of this case, " 'owner' would be defined in 
the broadest sense and would include ... a partner 
like CANTON." Underlying appellant's argument 
is an assumption that the term "owned by" is 
ambiguous as applied to the interest of a partner in 
specific partnership assets. Although the concept of 
ownership *1243 may be ambiguous in other 
contexts (see, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Condon (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 148, 151, 243 
Cal.Rptr. 623), it is not in this case in light of the 
provisions of the California Corporations Code and 
prior judicial construction of the term as applied to 
these facts. (Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. 
Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 916, fn. 7, 
226 Cal.Rptr. 558, 718 P.2d 920.) 
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(Cite as: 208 CaI.App.3d 1235, *1243, 256 Cal.Rptr. 719, **723) 
Even assuming, arguendo, the term is ambiguous 
the interpretation urged by appellant is unreasonable 
in light of the extrinsic evidence admitted below. In 
his application Canton never disclosed his 
partnership affiliation. Appellant asserts that this 
was purely inadvertent because the policy was 
routinely renewed after Canton became a partner 
without amending the application. Appellant's 
argument misses the point. The significance of this 
omission is not that Canton intentionally 
misrepresented the facts on his application; rather, 
the failure to make any effort to correct this 
omission strongly supports the inference that Canton 
did not expect or intend that this personal liability 
umbrella would provide coverage for losses incurred 
through his business partnership. Further support 
for this inference is found in the fact that each of the 
policies listed as underlying insurance in the 
application for **724 the umbrella policy were 
clearly policies covering vehicles owned by Canton 
and/or his wife, individually. 
In addition to the insurance application, respondent 
offered Canton's deposition testimony that he never 
used the boat for his personal purposes. Appellant 
offered no evidence that Canton, in any way 
exercised dominion and control over the boat, or 
that there was any commingling of his personal 
property with partnership assets. Thus, there was 
no evidence to refute the characterization of the boat 
as partnership property as defined by California 
Corporations Code section 15008. 
In light of these facts, we conclude that the only 
reasonable construction of Canton's personal 
liability umbrella policy is that the boat registered to 
Tahoe Boat Rental, and used exclusively for 
partnership purposes, was not "owned by" Lloyd 
Canton individually. Our decision should not, 
however, be construed to mean that a vehicle legally 
registered to a partnership can never be deemed 
"owned by" one of the individual partners for 
purposes of finding insurance coverage under a 
definition of "insured" such as the one set forth in 
Canton's personal liability umbrella coverage policy. 
We merely reject the proposition that an individual 
partner is, in effect by operation of law, deemed the 
owner of specific partnership assets, simply by 
virtue of his status as a partner. As the court below 
observed, the effect of such an interpretation would 
be to permit individuals, who also happen to be 
members of partnerships, to take out personal 
liability policies at a comparatively *1244 small 
premium and then read into them coverage for any 
number of undisclosed partnerships. 
II. [FN**] 
FN** See footnote *, ante. 
THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. 
RACANELLI, P.J., and NEWSOM, J., concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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BOYER 
v. 
PAHVANT MERCANTILE & INVESTMENT CO. 
No. 4614. 
April 22, 1930. 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake County; 
William M. McCrea, Judge. 
Action by T. W. Boyer, as trustee for the First 
National Bank of Rock Springs, Wyo., against the 
Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Company. 
Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. 
Reversed and remanded, with directions. 
STRAUP and ELIAS HANSEN, JJ., dissenting. 
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266kl71(6) Sufficiency of Record in General. 
Mortgage index disclosing enough to put ordinarily 
prudent examiner on inquiry is sufficient (Comp. 
Laws 1917, § 1579). 
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4875, 4900, 4901). 
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appellant. 
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respondent. 
FOLLAND, J. 
An opinion was heretofore written and filed in this 
case wherein the judgment of the district court was 
reversed and the cause remanded, with directions. 
Upon consideration of a petition for rehearing which 
was filed by respondent, we entertained some doubts 
as to the correctness of that opinion and granted a 
rehearing. The case was again argued by respective 
counsel. Upon further consideration we are of the 
view that the conclusions reached in the former 
opinion as to the disposition of the case were 
correct, although we reach such result by means of 
other reasons than those heretofore expressed. The 
former opinion, therefore, is withdrawn and will not 
be printed, but this opinion will stand and be 
published as the decision of the cause. 
This case involves a controversy as to the priority 
of a trust deed and a warranty deed, both executed 
by a common grantor and affecting real estate 
situate in Millard county, this state. The execution 
of the trust deed was prior in time. The case hinges 
on the question of whether the trust deed was 
properly or effectively recorded so as to impart 
constructive notice of its contents to the grantee of 
the warranty deed, a subsequent purchaser for value 
and without knowledge of the trust deed. The 
plaintiff claims under the trust deed, the defendant 
under the warranty deed. No claim is made that 
defendant had knowledge or actual notice of the trust 
deed. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of 
defendant adjudging the warranty deed the superior 
and better title. Plaintiff appeals, claiming that on 
the facts found and stipulated, which are not in 
dispute, he, instead of defendant, was entitled to a 
judgment declaring the trust deed, which in effect is 
a mortgage, a lien superior to the warranty deed. 
The material and stipulated facts are: 
To secure the payment of a loan William D. 
Livingston and his wife executed and delivered the 
trust deed of the property in question, and of other 
real estate, to Boyer as trustee for the bank, which, 
on January 20, 1917, was filed for record by the 
plaintiff with the county recorder of Millard county, 
and entered in the entry book as entry No. 7001. 
The information entered in the entry book contains 
all that was required by the statute except a brief 
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description of the property. The number of the 
instrument, name of grantor and grantee, the kind of 
instrument, date and time of filing were correctly 
noted. The trust deed was thereafter timely 
recorded, or copied, at length in Book E of 
Mortgages, pages 351 to 359 of the Record of the 
county recorder. It was indexed in the indices of 
grantors, grantees, and mortgagors and mortgagees 
of the records, but without any description of the 
property covered by said deed being entered in the 
indices or any of them except for the words "See 
record for description." The trust deed was at the 
time abstracted as to all of the land described in it 
except the property in question, which was omitted 
from the abstract record. Some time during the 
years 1925 and 1926 the county recorder corrected 
the abstract record by including therein a proper 
description of the land in question. 
On February 7, 1921, for value, the Livingstons, 
by warranty deed, conveyed the property in question 
to the Western Securities Investment Company, 
who, by warranty deed, in June, 1921, for value, 
conveyed it to Pahvant Mercantile & Investment 
Company, the defendant here. These warranty 
deeds, on the face of each, purported to convey a 
clear and unincumbered title to the land described, 
and each was timely and properly filed for record 
and recorded in the office of the county recorder of 
Millard county. 
It is also stipulated and found that, when the 
Western Securities Investment Company purchased 
the property, it caused a search of the record title of 
the property to be made in the office of the county 
recorder by the Fillmore Abstract Company, 
licensed to search land titles and make abstracts 
thereof, but, because of the failure of the county 
recorder to make any notation of the trust deed in 
the abstract record pertaining to the particular land 
in question, the abstract company failed to find the 
record of it, and failed to report the trust deed to the 
company. The Western Securities Investment 
Company and the defendant, at the time of their 
respective purchases, both were without actual 
knowledge of the existence or transcription upon the 
official records of said county of said deed of trust 
or of the contents thereof as far as said deed of trust 
covers or relates to the land in controversy other 
than such knowledge and notice, if any, as they may 
be chargeable with by reason of the recording of the 
trust deed in the manner stated. 
The trial court entertained the view that under our 
recording statutes the record was such that it did not 
impart notice to subsequent purchasers of the 
contents of the trust deed, and held respondent's title 
superior to the claim of appellant. 
Here are two claimants to a parcel of land-the 
appellant as prior mortgagee, the respondent as the 
subsequent purchaser. Both *190 acted in good 
faith and paid a valuable consideration. Through 
fault of the county recorder in failing to enter a 
description of the land referred to in the trust deed 
in the indices and entry book, and to make any entry 
thereof in the abstract record, one of the parties 
must lose the land and be left to his action for 
damages against his warrantor or the county 
recorder. 
The legal questions presented are stated by 
respondent as follows: 
"(1) Did the mere filing of appellant's mortgage 
for record absolve appellant from all further 
responsibility in respect of seeing that the instrument 
was properly recorded and charge the appellee with 
constructive notice of the contents of the recorded 
instrument irrespective of the sufficiency of the 
record? 
(2) If the burden rested on the appellant to see that 
the mortgage was recorded in the manner required 
by Statute, was the record of the mortgage in 
question sufficient to impart constructive notice of 
its contents to appellee?" 
Both these questions have been ably and fully 
argued in the briefs. In view of the facts stipulated 
by the parties, which are substantially followed in 
the findings of the court, we deem it unnecessary to 
pass directly on the first question stated above, 
notwithstanding both parties in their briefs devote 
most of their space to that point. 
It may become necessary at some future time, and 
in a proper case, for this court to decide whether a 
mere filing of an instrument for record with the 
recording officer is sufficient to impart constructive 
notice. The facts before us do not call for a decision 
on this point. Anything we say not required by the 
facts stipulated by the parties and found by the court 
may well be regarded as dicta. 
The trust deed was not only filed for record with 
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the proper recording officer, but was noted in the 
entry book with the information required by statute 
as to names of parties thereto, its date, time of 
filing, and number. The requirement of a brief 
description of the premises was omitted. The 
instrument was fully and accurately recorded by 
being copied into the proper record book, and 
correctly noted in the grantor's, grantee's, 
mortgagor's, and mortgagee's indices. All that was 
lacking in these index entries was the "brief 
description of the premises," but in lieu thereof was 
written the words, "See record for description." 
The recorder is required by statute (section 1579, 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, subd. 6) to keep an 
"abstract record" in which shall be entered all 
mortgages, deeds of trust, and other instruments 
showing the number of the instrument, names of 
parties, brief description of property charged, etc. 
There was an entire failure on the part of the 
recorder to make any entry affecting the property in 
question in the "abstract record" until some time 
after respondent had acquired its deed to the 
premises. 
It is specifically stated in the stipulation of facts 
that "because of the failure of the County Recorder 
of Millard County to make any notation of the said 
trust deed in the abstract record in the county 
recorder's office pertaining to the land above 
described, the said abstract company failed to find 
the record of said deed of trust," etc. 
It is nowhere said in the stipulation of facts that the 
failure to find the record of the trust deed was 
because of any faulty indexing or deficient entry in 
the entry book, but it is definitely stated to be 
because it was not included in the abstract record. 
After a careful search and the reading of scores of 
cases, we are unable to find any case which turns 
upon the failure of the recorder to abstract any 
instrument in the abstract record. No such case is 
cited in the briefs. The relevant cases all involve 
one or more of the following deficiencies, namely, 
of faulty recording (that is, copying into the record 
book): Failure to index at all, or failure to correctly 
index. The naked question for decision, therefore, 
is whether or not the record of the trust deed by 
filing, entry in the entry book, copying into the 
record book, and the indexing, though incomplete, 
was nevertheless sufficient to impart constructive 
notice to subsequent purchasers. The sections of the 
statute, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, material to be 
considered here are sections 4875, 4900, and 4901. 
These sections are in title 93 under the general 
heading "Real Estate." Section 4875 requires that 
"every instrument of writing, * * * to operate as 
notice to third persons, shall be proved or 
acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed 
by this title and recorded in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which such real estate is 
situated. * * *" Section 4900 states that "Every 
conveyance or instrument in writing * * * required 
by law to be recorded in the office of the county 
recorder, shall, from the time of filing the same 
with the recorder for record, impart notice to all 
persons of the contents thereof, and subsequent 
purchasers, mortgagees, and lienholders shall be 
deemed to purchase and take with notice." Section 
4901 provides that every such conveyance "which 
shall not be recorded as provided in this title, shall 
be void as against any subsequent purchaser," etc. 
There is nothing in these sections nor the other 
sections in title 93 which specifically defines what is 
meant by the word "recorded." Sections 1576, 
1579, and 1592, all in title 20 under the general 
heading "Counties," and in the chapter entitled, 
"County Recorder," contain matter pertinent to the 
recording of instruments. *191 Section 1576 
specifies the manner of recording documents, thus: 
"He [the recorder] must, on the payment of the 
fees for the same, record in books provided for the 
purpose, in a fair hand, or by means of a typewriter, 
camera, or other machine, all papers, documents, 
records, and other writings required or permitted by 
law to be recorded." 
This section, which defines the manner of 
recording, indicates that this is done by transcribing 
or copying into the proper record book, and by 
implication negatives the idea that "recording" 
includes indexing or abstracting. Section 1579 
provides for the books which the recorder must 
keep, and under each heading specifies the kind of 
entries to be made therein. In this section it is 
provided that the recorder must keep an "entry 
book," a "grantor's index," a "grantee's index," a 
"mortgagor's index," "mortgagee's index," and an 
"abstract record." Section 1592 covers the liability 
of the recorder for failure to do his required duty: 
"If any recorder to whom any instrument proved 
or acknowledged according to law, or any paper or 
notice which may by law be recorded, is delivered 
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for record: 
1. Neglects, or refuses to record such instrument, 
paper, or notice within a reasonable time after 
receiving the same; or 
2. Records any instrument, papers, or notices, 
wilfully or negligently, untruly, or in any other 
manner than is hereinbefore directed; or 
3. Neglects or refuses to keep in his office such 
indexes as are required by this chapter, or to make 
the proper entries therein; or 
4. Neglects or refuses to make the searches and to 
give the certificate required by this chapter; or 
5. Alters, changes, or obliterates any record or 
paper deposited in his office, or inserts any new 
matter therein, 
He shall be liable to the party aggrieved for three 
times the amount of damages which may be 
occasioned thereby." 
It will be noted that the basis for liability is 
segregated. Subdivision 1 has to do with the failure 
to record an instrument. Subdivision 2 covers faulty 
recordation. No. 3 has to do with failure to index. 
This section would indicate that the word "record" 
as used in the statute has reference alone to the 
transcription of a document into the record book. 
This language, taken in connection with that 
contained in section 1576, would seem to indicate 
that an instrument might be "recorded," though not 
indexed or abstracted. 
The weight of authority seems to be that an index 
is no part of the record, and that a mistake in it does 
not invalidate the notice afforded by a record 
otherwise properly made. 5 Thompson on Real 
Property, 146, § 4124; 23 R. C. L. 190, § 48; 1 
Jones on Mortgages, 907, § 637; Warvelle on 
Abstracts, 72, § 68. Note in 96 Am. St. Rep. 404; 
Sinclair v. Gunzehauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 
100 N. E. 376; Seat v. Louisville & Jefferson 
County Land Co., 219 Ky. 418, 293 S. W. 986. 
The rule is stated in Jones on Mortgages, supra, as 
follows: 
"The general policy of the recording acts is to 
make the filing of a deed, duly executed and 
acknowledged, with the proper recording officer, 
constructive notice from that time; and although it 
be provided that the register shall make an index for 
the purpose of affording a correct and easy 
reference to the books of record in his office, the 
index is designed, not for the protection of the party 
recording his conveyance, but for the convenience of 
those searching the records; and instead of being a 
part of the record, it only shows the way to the 
record. It is in no way necessary that a conveyance 
shall be indexed, as well as recorded, in order to 
make it a valid notice." 
There are cases, however, to the contrary, 
particularly in the states of Iowa, Washington, and 
North Carolina. It is unnecessary for us in this case 
to align this court with either the majority or 
minority rule on that question. 
[1] Irrespective of whether the index is considered 
essential to complete recording or not, the rule is 
that it will be sufficient if enough is disclosed by the 
index to put an ordinarily prudent examiner upon 
inquiry. 1 Jones on Mortgages, 910; 23 R. C. L. 
193; 5 Thompson on Real Property 152, 153, § 
4126; 41 C. J. 568, "Mortgages"; 91 Am. Dec. 
109, Note; Warvelle on Abstracts, 73. 
In Iowa it is held that indexing is essential to 
complete recording. Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa, 
510, 83 Am. Dec. 427. The record is, nevertheless, 
sufficient to impart notice where the recorder, 
instead of noting the description of the property in 
the index, has, in lieu thereof, written "see record" 
(Calvin v. Bowman, 10 Iowa, 529; White v. 
Hampton, 13 Iowa, 259), or "certain lots of land" 
(Bostwick v. Powers, 12 Iowa, 456). In each 
instance the subsequent purchaser was charged with 
constructive notice. To similar effect are Oconto v. 
Jerrard, 46 Wis. 317, 50 N. W. 591; Bardon v. 
Land & River Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327, 15 S. Ct. 
650, 39 L. Ed. 719; Breed v. Conley, 14 Iowa, 269, 
81 Am. Dec. 485; Jones v. Berkshire, 15 Iowa, 
248, 83 Am. Dec. 412; Sinclair v. Slawson, 44 
Mich. 123, 6 N. W. 207, 38 Am. Rep. 235. 
The case of Barney v. McCarty, supra, is relied 
upon and quoted at length in respondent's brief. 
The decision was written by Judge Dillon. A 
mortgage, given by the owner of real property, was 
filed for record and recorded at large in the proper 
record book, *192 but an index of the instrument 
was entirely lacking. Later the property was sold 
and a deed given. The question for determination 
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was whether the record as made imparted notice; the 
mortgage not being indexed at all. The court held 
that the index was essential under the statutes of 
Iowa to impart notice. That the case of Barney v. 
McCarty supra, did not go beyond that specific point 
is clearly indicated by the case of Barney v. Little, 
15 Iowa, 527. That decision was also written by 
Judge Dillon speaking for a unanimous court. In 
Barney v. Little, handed down the day after the 
decision in Barney v. McCarty, the only question 
presented was whether the registry of a mortgage 
was so imperfect and incomplete as not to charge 
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees with 
constructive notice. The statute provided that the 
recorder must keep an entry book and an index 
which must show (1) the grantors, (2) the grantees, 
(3) the time when the instrument is filed, (4) the 
date of the instrument, (5) the nature of the 
instrument, (6) the book and page where the record 
may be found, and (7) the description of the lands. 
The mortgage was recorded in the proper book. 
The index gave the name of the mortgagor and 
mortgagee and the nature of the instrument, but, in 
referring to the page where recorded, it gave the 
paging inaccurately. There was wholly omitted 
from the index the time of filing, the date of the 
instrument, and a description of the lands conveyed. 
It was held, however, that subsequent searchers of 
the record were chargeable with notice of plaintiff's 
mortgage. In the course of the opinion Judge Dillon 
says: 
"In the case of Barney v. McCarty, decided at the 
present term, we had occasion to consider the nature 
of the index book under the former recording act in 
this State. It was there held that the total omission 
to index the plaintiff's mortgage, deprived the 
record of it of the quality of imparting implied 
notice. 
The general nature and spirit of that law and of the 
present one are the same. * * * The chief object of 
the index book is that which its name implies. Its 
function is in the first place to indicate the existence 
of all instruments which are recorded or on file to 
be recorded. If there is no index of an instrument 
the searcher after titles has a right to assume that 
none such is on file or on the record. 
Its office in the next place is to point out the book 
and page where the instrument is recorded. These 
are the essential uses and purposes of the index 
book. To facilitate the examination of titles, the 
present law, it is true, has directed the index to 
contain the date of the instrument; the date of filing 
and description of the property. Still this does not 
supersede the necessity of a record. * * * 
The prior decisions of this Court have settled that, 
while the index, which serves, so to speak, as a 
finger board to direct the inquirer, must not mislead 
him by giving a totally wrong description of the 
lands. (Scoles v. Wilsey et al., 11 Iowa, 261), yet 
it is not necessarily and essentially a prerequisite to 
a valid registration that the index should contain a 
description of the lands conveyed. It is sufficient if 
it points to the record with reasonable certainty. 
Bostwick v. Powers, 12 Iowa, 456; Calvin v. 
Bowman, 10 Iowa, 529. 
If the grantor's and grantees' names are given in 
the index, with the book and page where the 
instrument is recorded, and if the instrument is there 
really recorded, we believe that this, so far as the 
object of the recording act is concerned, is a 
substantial, though it may not be in all respects, as 
to the index book a literal compliance with the law. 
For the record book and the index book are not to be 
considered as detached and independent books, but 
related and connected ones, and a party (assuming it 
to be an instrument which the law authorizes and 
requires to be recorded) is, where the index makes 
the requisite reference, affected with notice of any 
facts which either book contains with respect to the 
title of his proposed grantor. 
Were it not for the mispaging in the index of the 
plaintiff's mortgage, we are all agreed that the 
requirements of the law were, in substance, 
observed. It remains briefly to consider the effect 
of this error. 
The proposition is indisputable and clear, founded 
in reason, and sanctioned by authority, that 'if an 
ordinarily diligent search of the records will bring to 
an inquirer knowledge of a prior incumbrance or 
alienation, he is presumed to know of it.' 2 Wash. 
Real Prop. 596, § 63; Flynt v. Arnold, 2 Mete. 
[Mass.] 619-625. The prior decisions of this court 
(Bostwick v. Powers, and Calvin v. Bowman), rest 
upon this principle; and although questioned by 
counsel, they have not produced any authority 
showing, or tending to show, that these cases should 
have been decided differently." 
The court then points out that, notwithstanding the 
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inaccuracy of the paging, a competent and careful 
searcher of the records would be led to the 
document recorded, and that subsequent purchasers 
are chargeable with notice. 
Another case strongly relied upon by respondent is 
Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 P. 341, 12 L. 
R. A. 384, 22 Am. St. Rep. 155. This case holds 
that mere delivery of a deed for record does not 
impart constructive notice, as, under the Washington 
statute, indexing is an essential part of recording. 
Here the prior deed, while copied into a record 
book, was not indexed at all in any of the index 
books. 
*193 Other cases are cited in the briefs addressed 
to the point of whether mere filing for record 
imparts notice. In view of the position we take as to 
the decisive question in the case, there is no need to 
further refer to them. 
[2] Our conclusion is that sufficient appeared on 
the records of the county recorder of Millard county 
to bind respondent with effective notice of the prior 
trust deed of appellants. 
This, of course, in no way affects the duty of the 
county recorder to fully comply with the statute in 
the making of full and proper entries in the various 
books it is his duty to keep, including indices and an 
abstract record. "Public policy and the rights of 
those directly interested in the proper recording of 
instruments require that recorders be held to a strict 
and literal performance of their official duties." 23 
R. C. L. 271. His duty in respect to entering 
recorded instruments in the abstract record is a duty 
owing to the subsequent purchaser rather than to the 
original grantee. Green v. Garrington, 16 Ohio St. 
548, 91 Am. Dec. 103. The recorder may be liable 
to a subsequent purchaser who sustains damage as a 
necessary and proximate result of such official 
negligence. Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N. D. 478, 121 
N. W. 616, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 127, 138 Am. St. 
Rep. 779, 20 Ann. Cas. 484; Title Guaranty & 
Surety Co. v. Commonwealth, 141 Ky. 570, 133 S. 
W. 577. The index and abstract record are for the 
convenience of those who desire to examine the 
record. 23 R. C. L. 191. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the 
cause remanded to the district court of Salt Lake 
county, with directions to proceed with the case in 
conformity with the views expressed herein; 
appellant to recover costs. 
CHERRY, C. J., and EPHRAIM HANSEN, J., 
concur. 
STRAUP, J. (dissenting). 
The statutes which I think are material to the 
controversy are section 1579 of chapter 10, title 20; 
section 4875 of chapter 2; and sections 4900 and 
4901 of chapter 4, title 93, Comp. Laws Utah 1917. 
Section 1579 provides: 
"Every recorder must keep: 
1. An 'entry book,' in which he shall immediately 
upon receipt of any instrument to be recorded * * * 
enter in the order of its reception or entry, as the 
case may be, the names of the parties thereto, its 
date, the day of the month, the hour, and the year of 
filing any such statement or marginal entry, and a 
brief description of the premises" and endorse 
thereon the number of such entry. 
"2. A 'grantor's index,' in which shall be indexed 
all deeds * * * which shall show the number of the 
instrument, the name of each grantor, in alphabetical 
order, the name of the grantee, date of instrument, 
time of filing, kind of instrument, consideration, the 
book and page in which it is recorded, and a brief 
description of the premises." 
"3. A 'grantee's index,' * * * which shall show" 
the same notations including "a brief description of 
the premises" as are required in the grantor's index. 
"4. A 'mortgagor's index,' in which shall be 
entered all mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all 
other instruments in the nature of an incumbrance 
upon real estate, which shall show the number of the 
instrument, name of each mortgagor, debtor, or 
person charged with incumbrance, in alphabetical 
order, the name of the mortgagee, lienholder, 
creditor, or claimant, date of instrument, time of 
filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the book 
and page in which it is recorded, and a brief 
description of the property charged." 
"5. A 'mortgagee's [mortgagor's] index,' in which 
shall be entered" and noted all matters required in 
the mortgagor's index, including "a brief description 
of the property charged." 
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"6. An 'abstract record,' which shall show by 
tracts every conveyance or incumbrance recorded, 
the date and character of the instrument, time of 
filing the same, and the book and page where the 
same is recorded, which book shall be so kept as to 
show a true chain of title to each tract and the 
incumbrances thereon, as shown by the records of 
his office." (Italics added.) 
Section 4875 provides: 
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every 
instrument of writing, setting forth an agreement to 
convey any real estate, or whereby any real estate 
may be affected, to operate as notice to third 
persons, shall be proved or acknowledged and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and 
recorded in the office of the recorder of the county 
in which such real estate is situated, but shall be 
valid and binding between the parties thereto without 
such proof, acknowledgment, certification, or 
record, and to all other persons who have had actual 
notice." 
Section 4900 provides: 
"Every conveyance or instrument in writing 
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged, or 
proved, and certified in the manner prescribed by 
this title * * * required by law to be recorded in the 
office of the county recorder, shall, from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder for record, impart 
notice to all persons of the contents thereof, and 
subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and lienholders 
shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice." 
Section 4901 provides: 
"Every conveyance of real estate within this state 
hereafter made, which shall not be *194 recorded 
as provided in this title, shall be void as against any 
subsequent purchaser, in good faith and for a 
valuable consideration, of the same real estate, or 
any portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall 
be first duly recorded." 
In January, 1917, William D. Livingston and his 
wife, for a valuable consideration, and to secure the 
payment of sums of money therein specified, 
executed and delivered to the plaintiff, T. W. Boyer, 
trustee, a trust deed in which a number of separate 
parcels of land in Millard county, Utah, are 
described: One parcel described as the E. 1/2 of the 
N. W. 1/4 and the W. 1/2 of the S. E. 1/4 of 
sec-17, tp. 16 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 32, tp. 
16 S., R. 7 W.; a parcel in sec. 33, tp. 16 S., R. 7 
W.; a parcel in sec. 28, tp. 16 S., R. 7 W.; a parcel 
in sec. 4, tp. 17 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 27, tp. 
16 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 33, tp. 16 S., R. 8 
W.; a parcel in sec. 15, tp. 16 S., R. 8 W., a parcel 
in sec. 26, tp. 16 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 26, 
tp. 16 S., R. 8 W.; a parcel in sec. 31, tp. 16 S., R. 
7 W.; a parcel in sec. 31, tp. 19 S., R. 1 E.; a 
parcel in sec. 25, tp. 19 S., R. 1 W.; a parcel in 
sec. 36, tp. 19 S., R. 1 W.; a parcel in sec. 7, tp. 
20 S., R. 1 E.; together with described water rights 
and easements. 
The only land in controversy is the land described 
in sec. 17, tp. 16, etc. It is to be noticed that all of 
the other parcels are in other sections. The trust 
deed, about a month after its execution, was left 
with the county recorder for filing and recordation. 
It was entered in the entry book and copied and 
transcribed in Book E of Mortgages, at pages 351 to 
359, in the recorder's office. It was indexed in the 
general indices of grantors and grantees and of 
mortgagors and mortgagees without a brief or any 
description of the premises conveyed or charged by 
the instrument, except a notation "See record for 
description." The instrument was also abstracted in 
the "abstract record" as to all of the lands described 
in the instrument, except the parcel in section 17, 
the land in controversy, which was wholly omitted 
from the abstract record. 
Since divergent views are entertained as to the 
manner in which the trust deed was exhibited on the 
records of the county recorder, I set forth the 
findings of the trial court with respect thereto. The 
court found: 
"That on the 20th day of January, 1917, the said 
trust deed was filed for record by the plaintiff with 
the County Recorder of Millard County, State of 
Utah, at 2:11 p. m., on said day; that the said trust 
deed was thereupon copied at length in Book 'E' of 
Mortgages, at Pages 351 to 359 of the records of the 
County Recorder of said Millard County, Utah, and 
entered in Entry Book or Reception Book, as it is 
some times called, No. 7001, in the following form: 
Number From To 
7001 Wm. D. Livingston, et ux. T. W. Boyer, 
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'Date of instrument Trustee. 
12-26-1916. 
Time of Filing Kind of Inst. 
1-20-1917, at 2:11 p. m. Trust Deed 
Recorded at Request of Continental National 
Bank.' 
That the said entry in the said reception book 
contained no description or reference to the property 
covered by said trust deed; that the said trust deed 
was at the same time indexed in the General Indices 
of Grantors, Grantees and Mortgagors and 
Mortgagees of the records of said county recorder's 
office, but without any description of the property 
covered by said deed being entered in said indices or 
any of them except for the words 'see record for 
description;' that the said trust deed was at said time 
abstracted as to all of the land described in it except 
that certain parcel hereinbefore particularly 
described (in Sec. 17, the land in controversy), 
which said parcel was omitted from the said abstract 
on the said county recorder's records." (Italics 
added.) 
Such finding is not questioned, and is in the 
language of the stipulation of the parties. So the 
matter stood when, on February 17, 1921, about 
four years thereafter, the Western Securities 
Investment Company, for a valuable consideration, 
purchased the lands in section 17, the lands in 
controversy, from the Livingston Land & Cattle 
Company, and at which time William D. Livingston 
and his wife, for value, executed and delivered to 
the Western Securities Investment Company a 
warranty deed conveying a clear and unincumbered 
title to such lands, which deed was duly recorded 
February 21, 1921. Thereafter, and on June 19, 
1921, the Western Securities Investment Company, 
for value, by warranty deed free and clear of 
incumbrances, conveyed the lands in section 17 to 
the Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Company, the 
defendant herein, which deed was also duly 
recorded. So the matter again stood until "some 
time during the years 1925 and 1926," and after this 
action was commenced, when the recorder corrected 
the abstract record in the recorder's office wherein 
the trust deed was abstracted so as to include a 
description of the lands in section 17, and which, up 
to that time, had been wholly omitted from the 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No 
abstract record. 
The court further found that, when the Western 
Securities Investment Company purchased the lands 
in section 17, "and at the time of such purchase it 
caused search of the record title of said land to be 
made in the office of the County Recorder of 
Millard County, Utah, by the Fillmore Abstract 
Company, a Utah corporation licensed to search 
land titles and make abstracts thereof within the 
State of Utah; that because of the failure o] *194 
the County Recorder of Millard County to *195 
make any notation of the said trust deed in the 
abstract record in the county recorder's office 
pertaining to the land above described (in Sec. 17), 
and of the other failures in properly entering and 
indexing said trust deed the said abstract company 
failed to find the record of said deed of trust as 
pertaining to the land above described (in Sec. 17) 
and failed to report said trust deed to the said 
Western Securities Investment Company, and the 
said last named corporation purchased the said 
described land without any actual knowledge of the 
existence or transcription upon which the official 
records of said county of said deed of trust or of the 
contents thereof so far as said deed of trust covered 
or relates to the land above described, other than 
such knowledge, if any, as it may be chargeable 
with by reason of the recording of said trust deed in 
the manner aforesaid." (Italics added.) 
The court also found that the Pahvant Mercantile 
& Investment Company, for a valuable 
consideration, purchased the lands in section 17, 
"without actual knowledge of the existence of said 
trust deed with relation to the lands above described 
(in section 17) other than such knowledge and 
notice, if any, as it may be chargeable with by 
reason of the recording of said trust deed in the 
manner aforesaid." 
As a conclusion of law the trial court found that 
the title of the Pahvant Mercantile & Investment 
Company was superior to and free from the lien of 
the trust deed, and rendered a judgment accordingly, 
from which the plaintiff and his beneficiary under 
the trust have prosecuted this appeal. The theory on 
which the case was presented to the trial court was 
upon the contention of the plaintiff that, under 
section 4900, the trust deed from the time of filing it 
with the recorder for record imparted notice of its 
contents to subsequent purchasers, regardless of any 
defects or omissions in recording it, and even 
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though it had not been spread on the records, or any 
notation made of it in the indices or abstract record; 
that, when the plaintiff presented the trust deed, 
properly executed and acknowledged and entitled to 
be recorded, to the recorder for filing and for 
record, and paid the fee therefor, he had done all he 
was required to do; and, if the recorder failed or 
omitted to record the instrument so as to impart 
notice to subsequent purchasers of its existence and 
contents, such failure or omission may not be visited 
on the plaintiff because the recorder, a public officer 
charged with public duties, was not the agent of the 
plaintiff. The contrary was contended by the 
defendant. The plaintiff also contended that the 
statutory provisions relating to indices and the 
abstract record are not a part of our recording acts, 
and in no particular modify or control section 4900, 
and hence need not be considered with it, and that 
under the provisions of section 4900 the trust deed, 
"from the time of filing the same with the recorder 
for record," imparted notice of its contents to all 
subsequent purchasers, though it may have been 
improperly or defectively recorded or wholly 
omitted from the records. 
On the other hand, the defendant contended that 
the statutory provisions respecting the entry book, 
the indices, and the abstract record are a part of our 
recording acts, and hence must be considered in 
connection with sections 4875, 4900, and 4901; that 
an instrument "to operate as notice to third persons" 
is required, not only to be acknowledged and left 
with the recorder for record, but must also be 
"recorded in the office of the recorder of the 
county" (section 4875); that depositing or filing an 
instrument with the recorder for record is not 
recording it, and that it is not recorded so as to 
impart notice until transcribed and entered in the 
proper record books kept for such purpose; that the 
language in section 4900 that an instrument imparts 
notice to subsequent purchasers "from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder for record" but 
means that, when an instrument in due course is 
transcribed and entered in books kept for that 
purpose, the record relates back and takes effect 
from the time the instrument was filed with the 
recorder for record, and that it is the record which 
imparts notice of the contents of the instrument; that 
the entry book and indices and abstract record are 
requisites of our recording acts; that failures or 
omissions of the recorder in not properly and 
sufficiently recording instruments so that the record 
may affect notice may not be visited on subsequent 
purchasers searching the record title. 
The case was here presented on such respective 
theories. Nearly the whole of the appellant's brief 
of one hundred fourteen pages, and the whole of the 
respondent's brief of fifty-eight pages, are devoted 
to a consideration of such theories and propositions. 
Many cases are cited by each party in support of his 
contention. On the first hearing the majority of this 
court, three members thereof, adopted the theory of 
the appellant, and thus reversed the judgment of the 
court below. Two members of the court dissented. 
That the cases are in conflict on the subject was 
conceded. The prevailing opinion followed the 
minority rule (Mangold v. Barlow, 61 Miss. 593, 48 
Am. Rep. 84) as being the better rule, and the 
dissenting members the majority rule. Ritchie v. 
Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 P. 341, 12 L. R. A. 384, 
22 Am. St. Rep. 155. 
A petition for a rehearing was granted, the case 
reargued and resubmitted on the same briefs 
theretofore filed in the cause. A prevailing opinion 
is now rendered to the effect that the theory stated in 
the former opinion, and on which the case was 
ruled, was not necessary to a proper disposition of 
the case, *196 and that the only question necessary 
to a decision is as to whether the entries in the entry 
book, the indices, and the abstract record with 
respect to the trust deed, though not in compliance 
with the statute, nevertheless were sufficient to put 
one with due diligence on notice of the existence and 
contents of the trust deed as to all of the lands 
described therein, including the lands in controversy 
in section 17. In the appellant's brief the point also 
is briefly adverted to and cases cited in support of 
the doctrine "that a person searching a record is 
charged with notice of every fact which the records 
disclose and of all other facts with which, by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, he ought to become 
acquainted," and in such connection again urged that 
indices and abstract records are mere conveniences 
and facilities in searching record titles, but are not 
dependable nor to be relied on, nor requisites to a 
complete recordation of an instrument. On an 
examination of the pleadings, the stipulation of 
facts, and the findings, I do not see wherein the case 
was presented or submitted to the trial court on the 
theory on which it is now ruled. I have set up all of 
the findings bearing on the subject. No finding is 
made that the licensed abstract company, employed 
by the defendant's predecessor to search and report 
on the record title of the Livingstons and as to their 
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right to convey the premises in controversy, was 
negligent or failed to exercise due or reasonable 
diligence, or that by the exercise of diligence it 
could or ought to have been discovered that the 
contents of the trust deed as to the property 
conveyed or charged by it was not accurately noted 
or reflected in the abstract record, and that such 
deed related to, or was a charge on, the lands in 
question. What the court found was, not that the 
licensed abstract company was negligent or failed to 
exercise due diligence, but that "because of the 
failure of the County Recorder of Millard County to 
make any notation of the said trust deed in the 
abstract record in the county recorder's office 
pertaining to the lands above described (in Sec. 17) 
and of the other failures in properly entering and 
indexing said trust deed, the said abstract company 
failed to find the record of said deed of trust as 
pertaining to the land above described (in Sec. 17) 
and failed to report said trust deed to the said 
Western Securities Investment Company," the 
predecessor of the defendant. It is such stated 
failures of the recorder, and not because of any want 
of diligence upon the part of the licensed abstract 
company, which, as found by the court, led to the 
failure to find that the trust deed pertained to or 
included the lands in question. 
It is, however, suggested that the further finding 
that the defendant and its predecessor purchased 
without "actual knowledge" of the existence of the 
trust deed, and that it conveyed and covered the land 
in question, "other than such knowledge and notice, 
if any, as it may be chargeable with by reason of the 
recording of such trust deed in the manner 
aforesaid," involved the question of diligence or the 
want of it in examining the record title and the 
question of constructive notice. But no finding was 
made on the subject. The reason for that I think is 
apparent, and is because the plaintiff asserted, and 
the defendant denied, that the mere presentation of 
the trust deed to the recorder for record and the 
mere filing of it, under section 4900, constituted 
notice of the existence and contents of the trust deed 
to all subsequent purchasers, no matter how 
improperly or defectively it may have been entered 
in the records of the county recorder. And such was 
the proposition or question presented on this appeal. 
Though it be assumed that the finding as made 
included or involved the proposition of whether one 
in searching the record title of the Livingstons with 
respect to the lands in question with due diligence 
could or ought to have discovered the contents of the 
trust deed, and that it conveyed or charged lands, 
not only as described in the abstract record, but also 
lands not therein described, yet I think sufficient 
facts were not made to appear to lead to a discovery 
of the trust deed in such particular. In considering 
the case from such viewpoint, I think it important to 
consider the effect of the statute relating to the entry 
book, the indices, and the abstract record required to 
be kept by the recorder and the entries to be made 
therein. In the prevailing opinion it is said that "an 
index" by the weight of authority is no part of the 
record, and that a mistake in it does not "invalidate 
the notice afforded by a record otherwise properly 
made." That but begs the question and assumes the 
proposition that there was a "record properly made" 
which afforded notice. Further, we are concerned 
not alone with a mere "index" or even with a mere 
"mistake" in an index. To support the contention 
that "an index" is no part of our recording acts the 
prevailing opinion cites and quotes from 1 Jones on 
Mortgages, 907, § 637. It is to be noted that by 
reading the whole section it is seen the author adopts 
the rule that an instrument properly acknowledged 
and entitled to be recorded is constructive notice of 
its contents affecting all subsequent purchasers from 
the time the instrument is left in the recorder's 
office for record, whether it is in fact recorded or 
not; that, when a grantee has delivered the 
instrument to the recorder for record, he has done 
all the law requires of him for his protection, and, if 
a subsequent purchaser is injured because the 
instrument was not recorded or was improperly or 
defectively recorded, he and not *196 the grantee 
must stand the loss. I think such doctrine is against 
the undoubted weight of judicial authority when 
applied to recording acts such as ours, and *197 is 
inconsistent with the meaning and intent of such 
acts. White v. Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber 
Co., 240 Mo. 13, 139 S. W. 553, 42 L. R. A. (N. 
S.) 151; Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 552, 63 P. 844, 
82 Am. St. Rep. 391; Federal Const. Co. v. Curd, 
179 Cal. 479, 177 P. 473; Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 
Wash. 429, 25 P. 341, 12 L. R. A. 384, 22 Am. St. 
Rep. 155; Bernard v. Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 108 P. 
439, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1051; Barney v. McCarty, 
15 Iowa, 510, 83 Am. Dec. 427; Koch v. West, 118 
Iowa, 468, 92 N. W. 663, 96 Am. St. Rep. 394; 
James v. Newman, 147 Iowa, 574, 126 N. W. 781; 
Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Penn. Cordage Co., 65 
N. J. Eq. 181, 55 A. 231; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 
449, 19 Am. Rep. 772; Gordon v. Constantine 
Hydraulic Co., 117 Mich. 620, 76 N. W. 142; 
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Sawyer v. Adams, 8 Vt. 172, 30 Am. Dec. 459. 
Warvelle on Abstracts, § 68, also is cited as 
holding that "an index" is no part of recording acts. 
Some indices may not be, depending upon statutes 
with respect thereto. But how about "an abstract 
record" required to be kept by the recorder which, 
among other things, "shall show by tracts every 
conveyance or incumbrance recorded" and "a true 
chain of title to each tract and the incumbrances 
thereon?" In sections 67 and 81 the author discusses 
the subject of a "tract index," here our "abstract 
record," the purpose and necessity thereof, and 
which the author calls an "indispensable adjunct," 
and says is "the source from whence the examiner 
draws all his primary information in preparing the 
abstract" and "is arranged with sole reference to the 
land in the county, by sections, or parts of sections 
in case of unsubdivided lands, and by lots, blocks or 
subdivisions in respect to such as have been 
resurveyed and platted." 
The cited cases of Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 
Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376 and Seat v. 
Louisville & Jefferson County Land Co., 219 Ky. 
418, 293 S. W. 986, do not, as I think, support the 
proposition to the extent to which the cases are 
cited. 23 R. C. L. 190, also is cited. The author 
there says that courts are in agreement as to the 
utility and practical necessity for "an index" to 
public records. He says that in most, if not in all, 
jurisdictions, there are statutes requiring a recorder 
to keep "an index." He also says that there is a 
sharp conflict, due in a great measure to the 
difference in the statutes in the several jurisdictions, 
in determining whether "an index" is necessary to 
complete the record so as to make it constructive 
notice. Then on page 191 the author says that 
"under statutes which designate the particular steps 
in the act of making a record, and require that all 
instruments shall be duly indexed in a book to be 
kept for that purpose, and that the index shall be 
made up in a certain manner, it is held that the 
record is not complete, so as to give notice, if the 
index is not properly made." He further says: "And 
indeed to hold that an index is not essentially part of 
a valid and complete registration would overlook the 
uniform practice of relying wholly on it to find the 
names of the various owners in tracing titles, and 
would also ignore the fundamental design of the 
recording acts, which is to give certainty and 
security to titles, by requiring all deeds and all liens 
to be made matters of public record, and thus 
discoverable by all persons who are interested in 
ascertaining their existence, and who will examine 
the records in the mode which the law has pointed 
out." And on page 193 he further says that "an 
index entry of a deed describing the land conveyed 
as in a different section, township and range from 
those of the deed, and containing the words 'for 
description, see record,' is not constructive notice of 
such deed to a subsequent purchaser." He further 
says that in some jurisdictions there must not only be 
a name index but also a "tract index," which gives 
to the investigator of a title a double check or 
protection against prior liens. 
Cases are cited by the author supporting the 
propositions stated in the text. Under statutes 
similar to ours, I think the weight of judicial 
authority is that indices and abstract records 
required to be kept and entries to be made therein by 
the recorder, as required by the statute, are parts of 
the recording act, especially the "abstract record." 
Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 P. 341, 12 L. 
R. A. 384, 22 Am. St. Rep. 155; Bernard v. 
Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 108 P. 439, 137 Am. St. 
Rep. 1051; Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa, 510, 83 
Am. Dec. 427; Koch v. West, 118 Iowa, 468, 92 N. 
W. 663, 96 Am. St. Rep. 394; James v. Newman, 
147 Iowa, 574, 126 N. W. 781; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 
Wis. 449, 19 Am. Rep. 772; Hall v. Baker, 74 Wis. 
118, 42 N. W. 104; Lander v. Bromley, 79 Wis. 
372, 48 N. W. 594; Bardon v. Land, etc., Imp. 
Co., 157 U. S. 327, 15 S. Ct. 650, 39 L. Ed. 719; 
Ely v. Norman, 175 N. C. 294, 95 S. E. 543; 
Fowle & Son v. Ham, 176 N. C. 12, 96 S. E. 639; 
Speer v. Evans, 47 Pa. 141; Prouty v. Marshall, 
225 Pa. 570, 74 A. 550, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211. 
While in the prevailing opinion it is stated that the 
authorities on the subject are in conflict (which I 
concede, but due largely to differences in statutes in 
the several jurisdictions), and that the weight of 
authority is that "an index" is not a part of recording 
acts, nevertheless it *197 further is considered that 
it is not necessary to now determine the question, 
and the case ruled on the theory that sufficient was 
made to appear on the indices and abstract record to 
impart constructive notice that the trust deed 
conveyed or charged the lands in question. In 
considering and in determining that, I again think it 
important to consider whether, under our statute, 
indices and an abstract record *198 are or are not a 
part of our recording acts, the use and necessity of 
them, and what reliance and dependability may be 
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given them. If they be regarded as mere facilities 
and conveniences in searching record titles, but not 
as being dependable nor to be relied on, that is one 
thing. If, on the other hand, they are to be regarded 
as a part of our recording acts, and may be relied 
on, then that is another thing. To assert the former 
and not the latter proposition does not, as I think, 
reflect the true intent and purpose of the statute. If 
sufficient was made to appear by the entries in the 
indices and in the abstract record to impart notice 
that the trust deed conveyed or charged the lands in 
controversy, then I see no necessity of considering 
or discussing questions of defaults or negligence of 
the recorder, nor as to his duty to comply with the 
statute in making full and proper entries in the 
indices and in the abstract record as required by the 
statute. I, of course, readily concede the proposition 
that, if from the entries appearing in the indices and 
in the abstract record it is disclosed that the trust 
deed conveyed or charged the lands in question, and 
thus affected the record title of the Livingstons with 
respect thereto, and whose record title was being 
investigated, or that such facts were disclosed by the 
entries as made that one, examining such record title 
as to the lands in question with reasonable diligence, 
ought to have discovered that the trust deed did 
affect the lands in question, then sufficient was made 
to appear to impart constructive notice. But what 
was disclosed by such entries? As to that, I take, as 
we all are required to take, the findings of the trial 
court. We are not permitted to enlarge upon them 
or read anything into them. The court found in 
express language the kind of entry as made in the 
"entry book." Not anything is there made to appear 
what lands, or that the lands in question, were 
conveyed or charged by the trust deed. The court 
found that the entry book contained no description or 
reference to the property covered by the trust deed. 
Then the court found that the trust deed "was at the 
same time indexed in the general indices of grantors, 
grantees, mortgagors and mortgagees of the records 
of said county recorder's office, but without any 
description of the property covered by said deed 
being entered in said indices or any of them except 
for the words 'see record for description.'" Other 
than that, the finding does not show how the trust 
deed was indexed. Nor is it found that it was 
indexed so as to show where or in what book the 
trust deed was recorded. It is found that it was 
indexed "at the same time" it was entered in the 
entry book. The recorder was required to enter the 
trust deed in the entry book "immediately upon 
receipt of" it, and of necessity before it was spread 
on the record or transcribed in a book kept for that 
purpose. If, as found by the court, the recorder 
indexed the trust deed "at the same time" that he 
entered it in the entry book, it follows that the deed 
also was indexed before it was transcribed in a book 
kept for that purpose, and hence, when it was 
indexed, no notation in the indices was or could 
have been made of the book and page where the 
deed was recorded. Thus, from the finding, I think 
it clear that the recorder entered the trust deed in the 
general indices at the same time and in the same 
manner he entered it in the entry book and before 
the deed was spread or transcribed on the record or 
in a book kept for that purpose. While a finding is 
made that the deed was copied at length in Book E 
of Mortgages at pages 351 to 359, yet it is not found 
that any entry was made in the general indices 
showing in what book or at what page the deed was 
copied or spread on the record. Hence the statement 
in the prevailing opinion that the book and page in 
which the trust deed was transcribed was shown by 
entries in the general indices is not borne out by the 
findings. True, the appellant in his brief in effect 
asserts that the book and pages in which the deed 
was transcribed were indicated by entries in the 
general indices. But we as to the facts are required 
to look to the findings and not to assertions of 
counsel except as supported by the findings. 
I now come to how the matter was exhibited in the 
abstract record. Here we again must look to the 
findings. As to that the court found "that the said 
trust deed was at the same time (at the time it was 
entered in the entry book and in the general indices) 
abstracted as to all of the lands described in it except 
that parcel hereinbefore particularly described (the 
lands in Section 17 and in controversy) which said 
parcel was omitted from the said abstract on the said 
county recorder's records." How was it there 
abstracted, except as to the description of the lands 
and omitting a description of or any reference to the 
land in question? When it is found that the deed was 
abstracted in the abstract record "at the same time" 
it was entered in the entry book, it again follows that 
it was abstracted before the deed was transcribed in 
a book kept for that purpose, and hence no notation 
was or could have been made in the abstract record 
as to the book or page where the trust deed was 
recorded. From the findings I think it may not be 
inferred or implied that the book or pages where the 
*198 trust deed was recorded were noted either in 
the indices or in the abstract record. So regarding 
the findings I do not see anything which would put 
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one searching the record title of the Livingstons on 
notice that the trust deed covered lands other than, 
or different from, those as disclosed by the abstract 
record. 
Though it be assumed, as asserted by the appellant 
in his brief and as stated in the *199 prevailing 
opinion, that in the abstract record the book and 
page where the trust deed was recorded was noted, 
yet how should the matter be regarded from such 
viewpoint? The consideration of it still involves the 
question of whether the abstract record is or is not a 
part of our recording acts, the purpose and necessity 
of it, and the reliance to be put upon it. The 
abstract record which the recorder is required to 
keep is something more than a mere index. It is a 
kind of record which, among other things, says the 
statute, "shall show by tracts every conveyance or 
incumbrance recorded," and "shall be so kept as to 
show a true chain of title to each tract and the 
incumbrance thereon as shown by the records" of 
the recorder's office. The distinction between a 
mere "index" and a "tract record" or "tract book," 
here our "abstract record," as has been seen, is 
pointed out by Warvelle. The obvious purpose of 
the Legislature requiring the recorder to keep an 
abstract record showing by tracts every conveyance 
or incumbrance recorded and a true chain of title to 
each tract as to the incumbrances thereon was, 
among other things, to save examiners of title to any 
particular tract the necessity of running down every 
instrument indicated on the record as having been 
executed or given by the person whose title to the 
particular tract is being investigated, irrespective of 
whether the instrument or instruments refer to or 
affect title to the particular tract the title to which is 
under investigation, or of examining records of 
transcribed instruments in the recorder's office 
irrespective of whether they do or do not involve the 
title under investigation. The appellant in his brief 
concedes, and says: "It is true abstracters in Utah 
rely to a large extent upon the 'abstract record' in 
the recorder's office." I think they have the right to 
do so. Warvelle, § 81, says: "The tract index 
occupies much the same position in the abstract 
office that the great ledger does in the counting 
room. It is the receptacle for all the notes of the 
entry books, where the great mass of each day's 
transactions is separated, classified and arranged, 
and exhibits at a glance on its broad pages the 
balance sheet of all land titles of the county." The 
examiner turns to it as the foundation stone, and 
from it derives his primary information. He turns to 
the tract in which is embraced the lands the title to 
which is being investigated as "a true chain of title" 
and "the incumbrances thereon." There finding no 
conveyance or incumbrance affecting the title under 
investigation he may rightly assume there is none. 
To hold otherwise is, I think, to overlook the 
practice of relying on the abstract record and indices 
and to ignore the fundamental design of our 
recording acts. 
Let it be assumed that an examiner is investigating 
the record title of another to a parcel of land, say in 
a particular section in the southern part of Salt Lake 
county. In the general indices and in the abstract 
record the examiner finds that the person whose title 
is being investigated had made conveyances of lands 
in a section or sections in the northern part of the 
county or of parcels in Salt Lake City, and which 
briefly are described in the abstract record without a 
description of any other lands or parcels or in any 
wise relating to or pertaining to the lands or the tract 
the record title of which is being searched and 
investigated. Is there in such case any good reason, 
either in fact or in law, that the examiner, 
nevertheless, is required to examine the recorded 
contents of all of such other transcribed conveyances 
or incumbrances to ascertain if by chance any of 
them-they may be numerous, hundreds of them-may 
or may not convey or charge the lands the title to 
which is being investigated? I think not. If the 
examiner is required to do that and may not rely on 
the abstract record, then equally well is he required 
to examine and inspect every instrument transcribed 
on the records to ascertain if it affects the title to 
lands under investigation. Here the examiner, in 
investigating the record title of the Livingstons and 
as to their right to convey the parcel of land in 
section 17, finds by examining the abstract record 
that the Livingstons theretofore had given a trust 
deed to lands described in other sections of the 
county, and which deed, as there noted, in no way 
affected or involved the title to the parcel of land the 
title of which was being investigated. Under such 
circumstances I see no good reason, either in law or 
in fact, why the examiner was required to inspect or 
examine the trust deed as transcribed on the records 
to ascertain if the description of the lands conveyed 
or charged by it was or was not properly entered in 
the abstract record, or as to whether or not the trust 
deed differently from the description as contained in 
the abstract record included lands in section 17. any 
more than, if it had been indicated on the abstract 
record that the Livingstons had conveyed parcels of 
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land in Fillmore or in Delta in Millard county, the 
examiner was required to inspect such conveyances 
to ascertain if any of them did or did not also 
include the lands in question, though on the abstract 
record there was not anything to indicate that such 
lands were affected by such conveyances. If due 
care or diligence requires that, and does not permit 
reliance on the abstract record and indices as by the 
mandatory provisions of the statute required to be 
kept, then they, instead of being aids and facilities in 
searching record titles, become a mere delusion and 
a snare and a ready vehicle to mislead and deceive. 
Stress, however, is put on the notation in the 
indices "see record *199 for description" as being 
sufficient information to put the examiner on inquiry 
that the trust deed did convey or charge, or may 
have conveyed or charged, or *200. in some 
manner affected, the lands in section 17, the title of 
which was being investigated; which, had it been 
followed up and the trust deed as transcribed on the 
record inspected, would have disclosed that it 
included the lands in section 17. As is seen, under 
the statute, the recorder in the indices, among other 
things, was required to show the book and page in 
which the instrument is recorded and a "brief 
description of the property charged" by it. The 
court found no kind of a description was given in the 
indices except "see record for description." While 
the court found that the deed was indexed in the 
general indices, yet did not find that it was properly 
indexed, or how it was indexed, or that it was 
indexed as by the statute required, except the finding 
that no description of the property was given. 
Nevertheless it is now assumed that the book and 
pages in which the deed was transcribed were given 
or noted in the indices. As already indicated, if as 
found by the court, the deed was indexed in the 
general indices "at the same time" it was entered in 
the entry or reception book, it was indexed before it 
was transcribed on the record. To uphold a 
judgment, inferences or assumptions in support of it 
are sometimes indulged. But they are not indulged 
to throw down or reverse a judgment. That is 
especially true in considering findings when 
unassailed and unchallenged. In such view the 
notation is of little, if of any, significance. 
In the next place, though in the general indices the 
book and pages where the deed was transcribed 
were noted, but without in any manner indicating or 
even suggesting that the deed in any particular 
affected the lands, the title to which was being 
investigated, how would such a notation reasonably 
or fairly put one examining the title on notice or 
inquiry that the deed did or might affect such lands? 
That but brings us back to the proposition that one 
examining the record title to a particular parcel of 
land or tract, finding on the indices a conveyance or 
conveyances by those whose title is being 
investigated of lands which, as disclosed by the 
indices and by the abstract record, in no particular 
pertain or relate to the lands the title of which is 
being investigated, must, nevertheless, inspect such 
instruments or conveyances and ascertain if they do 
or do not affect such lands. I think he is not either 
as matter of fact; nor especially as matter of law as 
in the prevailing opinion held, required to do so. 
Besides, the notation may as well lead the examiner 
to the "abstract record" where the property of the 
trust deed is so described as not to include or affect 
lands in section 17 the title of which was being 
investigated, and, finding such to be the fact, the 
examiner may have considered it unnecessary to 
look elsewhere. In view of that I am not as matter 
of law prepared to say he was required to do so 
whatever may be said of it as a matter of fact. The 
holding that sufficient was made to appear on the 
indices to constitute constructive notice of the 
contents of the trust deed and that it affected the 
lands in question, in effect, relieves the recorder of 
legal liability and casts it on the abstract company 
who failed to discover and report to those employing 
it that the trust deed affected the lands and the title 
thereto in controversy. 
I think the judgment of the court below should be 
affirmed. 
ELIAS HANSEN, J. 
I concur in the views expressed by Mr. Justice 
STRAUP in his dissenting opinion. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, Plaintiff, 
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Wesley F. SINE, dba Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, 
etal., 
Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee. 
COTTONWOOD MALL COMPANY, a joint 
venture, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wesley F. SINE, dba Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., Intervenor. 
Nos. 19839, 19861. 
Nov. 17, 1988. 
Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1989. 
Lessor brought action to recover possession of 
space occupied by lessee. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., entered 
judgment in favor of lessor and denied attorney fees 
to lessor. Lessee appealed judgment in favor of 
lessor and lessor appealed denial of attorney fees. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held 
that: (1) trial court properly declined to find or 
make an agreement to renew a lease which had 
terminated by its own terms at its expiration date 
where commercial lessor and lessee had failed to 
negotiate a renewal on their own, and (2) provision 
in lease regarding attorney fees remained binding on 
lessee deemed to have established a month-to-month 
tenancy with lessor where no evidence as to 
modification of the provision was presented. 
Affirmed, and case remanded to determine amount 
of fees and costs. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Joint Adventures <®=>8 
224 — 
224k6 Rights and Liabilities of Parties as to Third 
Persons 
224k8 Actions by or Against Third Persons. 
Joint venture can bring suit in its common name 
without the necessity of naming the joint venturers 
as plaintiffs. 
[2] Landlord and Tenant <@ =^>81.5 
233 — 
233IV Terms for Years 
233IV(D) Extensions and Renewals 
233k81.5 Nature of Right in General. 
(Formerly 233k811/2) 
Trial court properly declined to find or make an 
agreement to renew a lease which had terminated by 
its own terms at its expiration date in situation 
where commercial lessor and lessee had failed to 
negotiate a renewal on their own. 
[3] Landlord and Tenant <@=>44(1) 
233 — 
233II Leases and Agreements in General 
23311(B) Construction and Operation 
233k44 Express Covenants in General 
233k44(l) In General. 
Proof of a holding over after the expiration of a 
fixed term in a lease gives rise to the presumption, 
which in the absence of contrary evidence will be 
controlling, that the holdover tenant continues to be 
bound by the covenants which were binding upon 
him during the fixed term; this rule prevails even 
though certain of the provisions in the expired lease 
are changed. 
[4] Landlord and Tenant <§==>285(9) 
233 — 
233IX Re-Entry and Recovery of Possession by 
Landlord 
233k279 Actions for Recovery of Possession 
233k285 Jurisdiction and Proceedings 
233k285(9) Costs. 
In absence of evidence by either party that 
provisions and conditions of written lease were 
modified during month-to-month tenancy, except for 
the increase in the amount of rent, provision in 
written lease regarding attorney fees remained 
binding on the parties until expiration of month-to-
month tenancy established as a result of lessee 
holding over. 
Raymond Scott Berry, Salt Lake City, for 
Cottonwood Mall Co. 
Jack L. Schoenhals, Salt Lake City, for Wesley F. 
Sine. 
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for Cottonwood 
Bowling Lanes. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
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Plaintiff Cottonwood Mall Co., a joint venture, 
brought this action to recover possession of space in 
the Cottonwood Mall occupied by defendant Wesley 
F. Sine and intervenor Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, 
Inc., a corporation of which Sine is the president. 
Defendant and intervenor (hereinafter defendant or 
Sine) counterclaimed to enforce an alleged oral 
agreement to renew the expired lease under which 
the space was held. From a judgment in favor of 
plaintiff, defendant appeals. Plaintiff cross-appeals 
from the denial of an award *500 of attorney fees 
incurred in recovering possession of the space. 
On May 4, 1961, Sidney M. Horman, as lessor, 
and S.W. Pugsley, as lessee, entered into a twenty-
year lease of space in the Cottonwood Mall, a 
shopping center in Salt Lake County, Utah, to be 
used for bowling lanes. In 1979, Sine was 
contemplating the purchase of the outstanding stock 
of Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, Inc., a corporation, 
which operated the bowling lanes. The corporation 
was controlled by Pugsley's son. Sine caused his 
real estate agents to approach Horman and inquire as 
to his willingness to renew the lease which was due 
to expire on September 14, 1981. On at least two 
occasions, Horman advised the agents that he would 
be willing to renew the lease on reasonable terms, 
but that he would not sign a new agreement until 
closer to the time the lease expired. Allegedly based 
on these representations, Sine purchased the 
outstanding stock of the Cottonwood Bowling Lanes, 
Inc., for $338,000, took an assignment of the lease, 
and began to operate the bowling lanes. 
Prior to expending money for improvements on his 
newly acquired space, Sine again requested his 
agents to inquire of Horman regarding renewal of 
the lease. Horman allegedly assured the agents that 
he would renew the lease on reasonable terms at or 
about the time the present lease would expire. Sine 
contends that he spent $10,000 to $20,000 to 
improve and remodel the leased space, based on the 
additional representation by Horman and his 
reputation for being a man of his word. Horman's 
interest in the lease was thereafter assigned to 
plaintiff. 
Prior to the expiration of the lease, plaintiff 
notified defendant that the lease would expire by its 
terms on September 14, 1981, and that defendant 
would become a tenant on a month-to-month basis as 
provided for in the lease. In October of 1981, 
plaintiff increased the monthly rental substantially 
and shortly thereafter notified defendant that the 
month-to-month tenancy was terminated and the 
premises should be vacated by November 30, 1981. 
Defendant did not vacate by that date, as the parties 
were involved in negotiating a new lease. When 
those efforts failed, plaintiff brought this action to 
recover possession and its attorney fees thereby 
incurred. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking to 
enforce Horman's oral promise to renew upon 
reasonable terms. Before trial, defendant vacated 
and moved to other premises. The trial court denied 
defendant any relief on its counterclaim and awarded 
judgment to plaintiff for the reasonable rental value 
of the leased space during the time that defendant 
occupied it after the expiration of the written lease. 
Plaintiff, however, was refused any attorney fees. 
Defendant appeals, and plaintiff cross-appeals from 
the judgment. 
I 
In its answer to plaintiff's complaint, defendant 
asserted the defense of lack of standing of plaintiff, 
a joint venture, to sue in die name of the joint 
venture as indispensable parties plaintiff. It argued 
that the individual members are the "real party in 
interest" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). 
The trial court denied a pretrial motion to dismiss 
the complaint based on this defense. Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-1-3.1 (1981, Supp.1987) defines a "joint 
venture" as "an association of two or more persons 
to carry on as co-owners of a single business 
enterprise" and provides that the property and 
transfer rights of joint ventures shall be governed by 
the same statutes as general partnerships. Sections 
48-1-1 through -40 contain Utah's adaptation of the 
Uniform Partnership Act. Its provisions are silent 
on whether a partnership may sue in its own name. 
Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states that a partnership may be sued in its common 
name, but whether the partnership may sue is not 
specified. We noted in Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 
758, 759 (Utah 1984), that whether a partnership is 
empowered to sue in the partnership's name has not 
been decided in this state. Earlier in Wall 
Investment Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, Inc., 
593 P.2d 542 (Utah 1979), we held that a limited 
partnership is a statutory creation and, having 
characteristics somewhat similar to corporations, 
could sue in *501 the courts of this state in its own 
name without identifying its partners or making 
them plaintiffs. We noted in that case that the 
common law rule that partners were required to join 
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as plaintiffs in actions to enforce partnership rights 
has been criticized as a "useless relic of strict 
procedural rules with nothing, apparently, to justify 
its continued existence" and that the modern 
tendency is to depart from it. 
Recently, in Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil 
Products, 114 F.R.D. 69 (D.Utah 1987), Judge 
Winder analyzed the issue under Utah law and 
concluded that a joint venture can bring suit in its 
common name without the necessity of naming the 
joint venturers as plaintiffs. Noting our criticism in 
Wall Investment Co. of the common law rule and the 
tendency of courts to depart from it, Judge Winder 
opined that this Court would, when faced squarely 
with the issue, hold that joint venturers may sue in 
the name of the joint venture. In that decision, he 
also relied upon a recent opinion, Decker Coal Co. 
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 714 P.2d 155, 56 
A.L.R.4th 1227 (Mont. 1986), which came to that 
same conclusion after an analysis of Montana 
statutes and rules of procedure. The court there 
noted that there was no statute or rule of procedure 
in Montana granting partnerships or joint ventures 
the right to sue in their own names. Montana Rule 
of Civil Procedure 17(b) states that the capacity of 
persons to sue and be sued should be determined by 
appropriate statutory provisions. The court 
therefore looked to provisions of the Uniform 
Partnership Act, which has been adopted in 
Montana. Section 8 of the Act (our section 48-1-5) 
provides that partnerships may own property. 
Section 9(3)(e) (our section 48-l-6(3)(e) speaks of 
partnership "claim[sj." Another Montana statute 
allows partnerships to be sued in their own names. 
Finally, the court noted that partnerships are 
authorized to file small claims actions. In 
commenting on the effect of the foregoing statutes, 
the court stated: 
[T]his Court has little choice but to follow the 
clear intent of the Montana Legislature to treat 
partnerships as distinct entities with power to sue. 
It would be illogical and unfair to conclude that a 
partnership may own a claim but cannot enforce it; 
may own property but cannot protect it; may be 
sued but cannot sue; may sue in small claims 
court but not in Federal Court. The Montana 
Legislature should not be deemed to have acted so 
capriciously. 
Decker Coal Co., 714 P.2d at 157. To the list of 
examples given by the Montana court where the 
Uniform Partnership Act treats a partnership as an 
entity, we add section 13 of the Act (which is our 
section 48-1-10), making the partnership entity liable 
for the negligence of one of the partners while 
acting within the ordinary course of the business of 
the partnership. See Wayne-Oakland Bank v. 
Adams' Rib, 48 Mich.App. 144, 210 N.W.2d 121 
(1973) (where a partnership was held liable for a 
partner's negligence even though the partner had 
immunity under the law by reason of his parental 
relation to the injured party). 
[1] We agree with the analysis and reasoning of 
Judge Winder in Gary Energy Corp. and with the 
Montana Supreme Court in Decker Coal Co. and 
hold that the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss. 
II 
Defendant contends that the expressed affirmations 
and promises of Horman and defendant's reliance 
thereon either renewed the written lease or, in the 
alternative, entitled defendant to a renewal of the 
lease upon "reasonable terms." In that event, 
"reasonable terms" would be based on the written 
lease, the only issues to be determined being the 
amount of rent and the term of the renewed lease. 
This contention is fully answered by Pingree v. 
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 
(Utah 1976). There, the lease granted the lessee the 
option to renew the lease for two separate additional 
five-year terms upon the same terms and conditions 
of the original lease, except 
*502 that the rental amount will be renegotiated; 
however, maximum total monthly rental shall not 
exceed $900 per month. 
Factors of tax increase, costs of business 
increases or decreases, business volume and 
success, insurance costs and other reasonable 
allowances, will be the basis for terms of 
negotiation. 
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1320. 
The lessee gave timely notice of his exercise of the 
option to renew. The lessors responded that the new 
rental would be $900 per month, basing their 
demand on the increase in taxes and insurance and 
what they considered to be a fair return on their 
investment in the leased premises. The lessee 
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replied and proposed $500-per-month rent based on 
his increased costs of doing business and a decrease 
in his volume. When the parties were unable to 
agree on the rent for the renewal period, the lessor 
brought an action to recover possession. The lessee 
counterclaimed for enforcement of a five-year 
renewal at $500 per month. The trial court found 
that the parties had impliedly agreed on a reasonable 
rental figure which the court determined and fixed at 
$900 per month. On appeal, this Court reversed the 
trial court, stating that it had nullified the express 
factors specified by the parties in the lease and had 
substituted a new agreement to which the parties had 
not committed themselves. We held that the option 
to renew was too vague and indefinite to be 
enforceable and that the lease terminated at the end 
of the original term. We cited with approval and 
relied on Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 
P.2d 427, 428 (1961), where we stated, "[A] 
condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of 
the parties, which must be spelled out, either 
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness 
to be enforced." In so ruling, this Court followed 
what was termed the majority rule in Slayter v. 
Pasley, 199 Or. 616, 264 P.2d 444 (1953), which 
was stated to be 
that a provision for the extension or renewal of a 
lease must specify the time the lease is to extend 
and the rate of rent to be paid with such a degree 
of certainty and definiteness that nothing is left to 
future determination. If it falls short of this 
requirement, it is not enforceable. 
Pingree, 558 P.2d at 1321. In reversing the trial 
court, this Court expressly rejected its attempt to fix 
a reasonable rent for the parties when their 
negotiations bogged down. 
[2] Defendant would have us now do what we 
refused to do in Pingree. While it is true that 
defendant adduced evidence as to what would be a 
reasonable renewal term and what would be a 
reasonable rent, the trial court properly spurned 
defendant's invitation to find or make an agreement 
where the parties had themselves failed. Defendant 
argues that in Pingree, the court declined to fix the 
renewal rent because of the difficulty in balancing 
the several factors which the lease required the 
parties to consider in fixing the rent. Here, 
defendant's argument continues, no factors are listed 
in the lease and the task is less complicated. We do 
not agree. In determining what is "reasonable rent," 
many factors must be weighed and put into the 
equation. Business judgments must be made. 
Horman testified that he would not negotiate a new 
lease at the time Sine's real estate agents approached 
him because of inflation and instability in the 
commercial leasing market. He was unwilling to 
enter into another lease, either long term or short 
term, unless he could consider the costs of operating 
and owning the building as they compared to the 
amount of rent received. He only indicated that he 
would be willing to enter into a new lease at a 
reasonable figure and at the appropriate time. After 
he sold his interest in the leased property to plaintiff, 
plaintiff and defendant were unable to agree on the 
amount of rent. Courts simply are not equipped to 
make monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating 
commercial world and are even less prepared to 
impose paternalistic agreements on litigants. We 
therefore conclude that the written lease terminated 
by its own terms at its expiration date, was not 
renewed by the parties, and cannot be renewed for 
them by the courts. 
*503. Ill 
Turning now to plaintiff's cross-appeal, namely, 
that the trial court erred in denying it attorney fees, 
plaintiff's claim for fee was premised on the 
following provision in the 1961 written lease: 
If, during the terms of this lease, lessor is required 
to commence any action to collect any of the rental 
due under this lease, or to enforce any of the 
provisions herein, or to secure possession of the 
leased premises in the event this lease is 
terminated as herein provided, or at the expiration 
of the term, lessee agrees, in such event or events, 
to pay all costs of such action or actions, together 
with reasonable attorney's fee. 
The trial court denied fees "for the reason that the 
lease agreement upon which plaintiff makes claim 
for attorney's fees expired by its terms, and the 
plaintiff terminated the lease agreement and treated 
the lease agreement as though it had expired and 
been terminated...." 
[3][4] We do not agree with that conclusion. It is 
true that the 1961 written lease was for a twenty-
year term that expired on September 14, 1981; 
however, paragraph 36 of that lease provided: "Any 
holdover beyond the termination of this lease, and 
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any acceptance of rental beyond the term of this 
lease shall be deemed to have established a month-
to-month tenancy as between lessor and lessee." 
Nothing is there stated, however, regarding whether 
the provisions and conditions of the written lease are 
binding on the parties during the month-to-month 
tenancy. It is a firmly established rule that proof of 
a holding over after the expiration of a fixed term in 
a lease gives rise to the presumption, which in the 
absence of contrary evidence will be controlling, 
that the holdover tenant continues to be bound by the 
covenants which were binding upon him during the 
fixed term. Annotation, Binding Effect on Tenant 
Holding Over of Covenants in Expired Lease, 49 
A.L.R.2d 480 (1956). It is further pointed out there 
that this rule obtains even though certain of the 
provisions in the expired lease are changed, such as, 
for example, the provision as to the amount of rent 
to be paid. 
Applying those rules to the instant case, when the 
twenty-year term of the 1961 written lease expired 
on September 14, 1981, defendant held over on a 
month-to-month basis and continued to be bound by 
the provisions and conditions of the written lease 
during that holdover period. The fact that on 
October 12, 1981, plaintiff notified defendant that 
the monthly rental was being increased from $2,150 
per month to $4,500 per month did not affect the 
binding force of the other provisions of the written 
lease. On October 23, 1981, plaintiff advised 
defendant that it had elected to "nullify" the month-
to-month tenancy and requested that defendant 
vacate the premises by November 30, 1981. Since 
there was no evidence by either party that the 
provisions and conditions of the written lease were 
modified during the month-to-month tenancy, except 
for the increase in the amount of rent, the provision 
in the 1961 lease regarding attorney fees remained 
binding on the parties until the month-to-month 
tenancy expired on November 30, 1981. At that 
time, defendant had the duty to vacate, and when it 
failed to do so, the provision for the payment of 
attorney fees became operative. As will be noted, 
that provision specifically covers actions by the 
lessor to secure possession of the premises at the 
expiration of the lessee's term, which under the rule 
stated above includes the holdover period. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in denying any 
award of attorney fees to plaintiff. 
The judgment is affirmed, and the case is 
remanded to the trial court to determine and fix the 
amount of attorney fees and trial and appeal costs to 
which plaintiff is entitled under paragraph 33 of the 
written lease. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
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*770 52 P. 770 
16 Utah 436, 67 Am.St.Rep. 643 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
HAMNER 
v. 
B. K. BLOCH & CO. 
April 2, 1898. 
Syllabus by the Court. 
1. Where an appeal has been taken from a 
justice's court to the district court, and new parties 
are added, who enter their appearance, the latter 
court does not lose jurisdiction of the case by 
dismissing as to the only party in the justice's court. 
2. When a judgment has been obtained against a 
firm in the firm name, an execution against the 
property of an individual member of the firm is 
void, although an officer who executed it in good 
faith might be protected from a suit for the tort. 
3. It was competent for the plaintiff to offer in 
evidence the judgment roll in the action against the 
firm in order to prove that the judgment was against 
the firm, and not against the party whose property 
was seized upon a writ of execution issued on the 
judgment. 
Appeal from district court, Weber county; H. H. 
Rolapp, Judge. 
Action by John H. Hamner against Thomas H. 
Ballantyne. By amendment, B. K. Bloch & Co., a 
corporation, was made defendant, the action against 
the other being, upon plaintiff's motion, dismissed. 
Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
Justices of the Peace <S=> 141(2) 
231 — 
231V Review of Proceedings 
231V(A) Appeal and Error 
231kl41 Appellate Jurisdiction 
231kl41(2) Jurisdiction Dependent on 
Jurisdiction of Lower Court in 
General. 
Where an appeal has been taken to the district 
court, and new parties are added, who enter their 
appearance, the latter court does not lose jurisdiction 
of the case by dismissing as to the only party in the 
justice's court. 
Partnership <@^220(2) 
289 — 
289IV Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
289IV(D) Actions by or Against Firms or 
Partners 
289k220 Execution and Enforcement of 
Judgment in General 
289k220(2) Application of Individual Assets. 
When a judgment has been obtained against a firm 
in the firm name, an execution against the property 
of an individual member of the firm is void. 
Sheriffs and Constables <§=> 138(2) 
353 — 
353III Powers, Duties, and Liabilities 
353kl26 Actions Against Officers and 
Indemnitors 
353kl38 Evidence 
353kl38(2) Admissibility. 
The judgment roll is admissible to prove that the 
judgment was against a firm, and not against the 
party individually whose property was seized upon a 
writ of execution issued on the judgment. 
John W. Judd, for appellant. 
G. F. Boreman and Evans & Rogers, for 
respondent. 
ZANE, C. J. 
It appears from the evidence in this record that the 
defendant obtained a judgment in the district court 
against the firm of Blackburn & Co. for $366.28; 
that an execution issued thereon, reciting a judgment 
against the individual members of the partnership, of 
which the plaintiff was one, as well as against the 
company by its firm name; that Thomas H. 
Ballantyne, a deputy United States marshal, by 
virtue thereof seized and levied upon the $242.85 in 
dispute, the individual property of the plaintiff, 
Hamner, and paid it to the attorney of the defendant 
B. K. Bloch; that the plaintiff instituted this action 
against the officer for the trespass, before a justice 
of the peace, who rendered judgment against him for 
the amount so seized; that upon appeal to the district 
court a similar judgment was rendered by it, and 
upon appeal to this court it was reversed and 
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remanded, because the writ was against the plaintiff 
as well as the company, and was fair on its face, 
and therefore protected him from damages in 
consequence of the wrong. It further appears that 
the complaint was amended by the plaintiff, by leave 
of the district court, before another trial, by making 
B. K. Block & Co., the plaintiff in the first suit, 
defendant, and afterwards on the trial the suit was 
dismissed, on motion of the plaintiff, as to 
Ballantyne, and thereupon B. K. Bloch & Co., by 
their counsel, entered a motion to dismiss the suit, 
upon the ground that the voluntary dismissal as to 
the only defendant in the justice's court deprived the 
court of jurisdiction to try the case. Counsel for the 
defendant concedes that the district court had 
authority to grant the amendment, and admits the 
new defendant voluntarily appeared, but insists that 
the jurisdiction of the district court depended upon 
the jurisdiction of the justice. This position would 
have been correct had there been a want of 
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit in the 
justice's court. When the subject-matter of the suit 
is not within the jurisdiction of the justice, it is not 
within the jurisdiction of the district court on appeal. 
The appellate court gets jurisdiction by appeal, and, 
if the justice could have no jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter, none could be given to the district 
court by the appeal. Undoubtedly, the justice would 
have had jurisdiction of B. K. Bloch & Co. had the 
company been made defendant, and, as the justice's 
court would have had jurisdiction in that case, the 
appellate court had jurisdiction when the company 
was brought in by the amendment, and appearance 
was entered. The trial of the cause upon the appeal 
was but a continuation of the litigation commenced 
in the lower court. The justice's court had 
jurisdiction of the parties to the case before it, and 
of its subject-matter, and the appeal gave the 
appellate court jurisdiction of both, and it acquired 
jurisdiction of B. K. Bloch & Co. by the amendment 
and appearance, and the dismissal of the suit as 
against Ballantyne did not deprive it of jurisdiction 
of the case or of the party brought in. 
With respect to another point raised, the plaintiff, 
Hamner, and two other individuals, were associated 
together and doing business by the common name of 
Blackburn & Co., and the defendant, B. K. Bloch & 
Co., sued them by that name, and by that name 
obtained judgment against the firm. But the 
execution purported to be upon a judgment against 
the individuals composing the firm as well. The 
firm had a legal existence, and a *770 name by 
which it was capable of doing business and of being 
sued, and to that extent it had, in law, a separate and 
distinct existence from natural persons. In law there 
were four persons; the one was artificial, and with a 
more limited capacity. Section 3191, Comp. Laws 
Utah 1888, subjects to suit and judgment such 
artificial person, but the judgment binds only the 
joint property of the natural persons associated 
together under the common name. Levally v. Ellis, 
13 Iowa, 544; Davidson v. Knox, 67 Cal. 143, 7 
Pac. 413. The execution upon the judgment against 
the firm, so far as it purported to be against the 
individual property of its members, was absolutely 
void; but it protected the officer who, in good faith, 
executed it, but not the plaintiff who, in person or 
by his attorney, caused it to be issued and delivered 
to him. The levy did not pass the legal title to the 
money seized to the officer. He could not have held 
it, had suit been brought against him while it was in 
his hands, without showing a judgment against the 
person whose individual *771. property it was. But 
the writ, being against the owner, though void, so 
far as it could give any right to the money seized, its 
command executed in good faith excused the 
trespass or wrong or tort, as termed in law, as to the 
officer, and protected him from the consequences of 
the injury to the owner of the property, and from 
damages to the owner resulting from that injury. 
But the command of the writ did not protect B. K. 
Block & Co., or their attorney, for wrongfully 
causing the writ to issue, and for placing it in the 
hands of the officer, and in that way causing the writ 
to issue, and for placing it in the hands of the 
officer, and in that way causing the plaintiff's 
money to be seized, and for wrongfully taking the 
proceeds of such levy. They did not act under the 
writ, and it could not protect them for the part they 
took in the trespass or tort. The law required them 
to know the judgment was not against the owner of 
the money, the plaintiff in this case, and therefore it 
could not shield them from the consequences of the 
unlawful act. Day v. Bach, 87 N. Y. 56; 9 Bac. 
Abr. 494; Kerr v. Mount, 28 N. Y. 658; Foster v. 
Wiley, 27 Mich. 244; Thomas v. Hinsdale, 78 111. 
259; Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) p. 148. 
On the trial of this case the plaintiff offered in 
evidence the judgment roll in the case of B. K. 
Bloch & Co. against Blackburn & Co., showing a 
complaint and judgment against the firm only, and 
an execution thereon against the plaintiff and the 
other two members of the firm, as well as against 
the firm, and a return on the execution showing the 
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levy on the money in question as the property of the 
plaintiff, and the payment of it to the attorney of B. 
K. Bloch & Co. The defendant objected to its 
introduction on the ground that it was incompetent, 
irrelevant, and immaterial. It was sufficiently 
authenticated, and it showed that the judgment was 
against the firm, not against the plaintiff; an 
execution against the defendant, who was not a party 
to the judgment; a seizure of his money, and the 
payment of it to the attorney of the defendant in this 
case. It was clearly competent, relevant, and 
material, and we are of the opinion that the court did 
not err in overruling defendant's objection to it. 
The judgment is affirmed, with costs. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
187N.W.2d47. 
(Cite as: 187 N.W.2d 47) 
Pagel 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. 
Clifford P. HANSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
John ZOLLER and Martha Zoller, husband and wife 
et al., Defendants, 
and 
James P. Zoller and Alice R. Zoller, husband and 
wife et al., Defendants 
andRespondents. 
James P. ZOLLER and Alice R. Zoller, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
and 
Gate City Savings and Loan Association, a 
corporation, Third-Party Plaintiffand 
Appellant, 
v. 
NORTH DAKOTA GUARANTY & TITLE CO., 
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent. 
Eugene V. BINDER and Gloria A. Binder, husband 
and wife; and The DakotaNational 
Bank of Bismarck, a corporation, Third-Party 
Plaintiffs andAppellants, 
v. 
NORTH DAKOTA GUARANTY & TITLE CO., 
Third-Party Defendant and Respondent. 
Civ. No. 8511. 
April 20, 1971. 
Rehearing Denied June 7, 1971. 
Action to foreclose mortgage. The District Court 
of Burleigh County, W. C. Lynch, J., rendered 
judgment in favor of certain subsequent purchasers 
and encumbrancers, and mortgagee appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Adam Gefreh, District Judge, held 
that it was duty of mortgagee to protect his interest 
against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers by 
making certain that the instrument conveying his 
interest was properly recorded, that recordation did 
not constitute substantial compliance to recording 
statutes where the instrument was not indexed under 
the correct tract description in the tract index, and 
that subsequent purchasers and encombrancers could 
only be charged with notice of instruments correctly 
indexed in the tract index. 
Affirmed. 
Knudson and Paulson, JJ., dissented. 
See also N.D., 174 N.W.2d 354. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Records <@=> 19 
326kl9 
In order for instrument to impart constructive notice 
to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, it is 
not necessary that all sections of the statutes 
pertaining to the duties of the register of deeds in 
recording instruments be complied with, but there 
must be substantial compliance with those sections 
of the recording statutes that pertain to the matter of 
notice. NDCC 11-18- 01, 11-18-07 to 11-18-12, 
47-19-08, 47-19-19, 47-19-45. 
[2] Records <@=>19 
326kl9 
In order for instrument to impart constructive notice 
to the public it must actually be recorded; 
instrument deposited with the register of deeds for 
recording gives only temporary constructive notice 
from the time of deposit until recording has been 
completed, and after recording the actual record 
made constitutes constructive notice. NDCC 
47-19-08, 47-19-19, 47-19-45. 
[3] Records <@=>8 
326k8 
Since the tract index maintained by the register of 
deeds is the only practical index through which 
instruments on record can be located, instrument 
recorded but not indexed under the correct tract 
description in the tract index does not constitute 
substantial compliance with the recording statutes. 
NDCC 11-18- 01, 11-18-07 to 11-18-12, 47-19-08, 
47-19-19, 47-19-45. 
[4] Records <@=>8 
326k8 
Prospective purchaser or encumbrancer has right to 
presume that register of deeds has performed his 
duties correctly and has indexed every instrument 
correcdy in the tract index. NDCC 11-18-07, 
47-19-08, 47-19-19, 47-19-45. 
[5] Records <®=>8 
326k8 
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Prospective purchaser or encumbrancer can only be 
charged with notice of instruments that are indexed 
in the tract index, and so far as constructive notice is 
concerned is not obliged to consult the grantor-
grantee indexes or the reception book beyond the 
extent of determining whether there are any 
unrecorded instruments in the hands of the register 
of deeds that may not yet have been recorded and 
indexed. NDCC 11-18-07, 11-18-08, 11-18-10, 
47-19-08, 474949, 474945. 
[6] Principal and Agent <©=> 177(1) 
308kl77(l) 
Relationship between abstracter and persons that 
come into possession of abstract prepared by 
abstracter is not agency type of relationship so as to 
impute knowledge of the abstracter to such persons. 
[7] Principal and Agent <®» 177(1) 
308kl77(l) 
In absence of evidence to support principal-agency 
relationship between purchasers and encumbrancers 
of property and the abstracter, any knowledge 
acquired by employees of the abstracter during the 
course of their employment was not imputable to 
such purchasers and encumbrancers because of their 
possession of the abstract. 
[8] Vendor and Purchaser <®=>231(17) 
400k231(17) 
Mortgagee had duty to protect his interest against 
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers by making 
certain that the instrument conveying his interest 
was properly recorded and, therefore, as between 
him and subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers, 
the consequences of the failure of the register of 
deeds to correctly record or index such instrument 
fell upon such mortgagee. 
*48 Syllabus by the Court 
I An instrument deposited with the register of 
deeds for recording gives only temporary 
constructive notice from the time *49 of deposit 
until recording has been completed, and after 
recording the actual record made constitutes 
constructive notice. 
2. In order for an instrument to impart constructive 
notice to third persons there must be substantial 
compliance with those sections of the recording 
statutes that pertain to the matter of notice, 
3 The tract index maintained by the register of 
deeds, which index readily discloses all conveyances 
pertaining to any specific tract of real estate, is the 
only practical index through which instruments on 
record can be located. 
4. An instrument recorded but not indexed under 
the correct tract description in the tract index does 
not constitute substantial compliance with the 
recording statutes. 
5. A prospective purchaser or encumbrancer has a 
right to assume that the register of deeds has 
performed his duties correctly and has indexed every 
instrument correctly in the tract index. 
6. A prospective purchaser or encumbrancer can 
only be charged with notice of instruments that are 
indexed in the tract index, and any information 
appearing in the grantor-grantee indexes or in the 
reception book is not sufficient to put a prospective 
purchaser or encumbrancer upon inquiry. 
7. The relationship between an abstracter and 
persons who come into possession of an abstract 
prepared by an abstracter is not an agency type 
relationship so as to impute knowledge of the 
abstracter to persons who come into possession of 
abstracts prepared by the abstracter. 
8. Iii the absence of evidence to support a 
principal-agency relationship between persons in 
possession of an abstract and the abstracter, any 
knowledge acquired by the employees of the 
abstracting firm during the course of their 
employment is not imputable to the persons in 
possession of the abstract. 
9. The beneficiary of any interest in any real estate 
conveyance has a duty to protect his interest against 
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers by making 
certain that the instrument conveying his interest is 
properly recorded and, therefore, as between the 
beneficiary of the interest and subsequent purchasers 
and encumbrancers, the consequences of the failure 
of the register of deeds to correcdy record or index 
an instrument falls upon the person who had the duty 
to record. 
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Vogel, Bair & Graff, Mandan, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Conmy, Conmy, Rosenberg & Lucas, Bismarck, 
for Gate City Savings and Loan Association, a 
corporation, third-party plaintiff and appellant, and 
for James P. Zoller and Alice R. Zoller, third-party 
plaintiffs. 
Frederick E. Saefke, Jr., Bismarck, for Eugene V. 
Binder and Gloria A. Binder, husband and wife, and 
The Dakota National Bank of Bismarck, a 
corporation, third-party plaintiffs and appellants. 
Thompson, Lundberg & Nodland, Bismau 
Paul M. Breene, defendant and respondent. 
H. G. Ruemmele, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Grand 
Forks, for State of North Dakota, defendant and 
respondent. 
Zuger, Bucklin, Kelsch & Zuger, Bismarck, for 
North Dakota Guaranty & Title Co., third-party 
defendant and respondent. 
ADAM GEFREH, District Judge. 
In this action the plaint in ^:ck< ?r< i-reciose .>. 
certain mortgage given by K)hn /<-u:- ,md M;inh.t 
Zoller, husband and wife, pertaining to the South 
Half of the Northeast Quarter (s 1/2 NEl/4) of 
Section Twenty-six (26), Township One Hundred 
Thirty-nine (139), Range Eighty (80), Burleigh 
County, North Dakota, and other land not involved 
in this action. 
*50 In addition to John Zoller and Martha Zoller, 
other subsequent purchasers, encumbrancers and 
lienholders were made defendants to the foreclosure 
action. 
The defendants, James P. Zoller and Alice R. 
Zoller, husband and wife; Eugene V. Binder and 
Gloria A. Binder, husband and wife; Paul M. 
Breene and the State of North Dakota, are 
purchasers subsequent to the mortgage in question, 
and The Dakota National Bank of Bismarck, and 
Gate City Savings and Loan Association, are holders 
of mortgages subsequent to the plaintiff's mortgage. 
Defendants James P. and Alice R. Zoller, and Gate 
City Savings and Loan Association; Eugene V. and 
Gloria A. Binder and The Dakota National Bank of 
Bismarck, as third-party plaintiffs in separate actions 
impleaded The North Dakota Guaranty and Title 
Company as third-party defendant. 
In the District Court, judgment was granted in 
favor of the plaintiff as against John and Martha 
Zoller, the Credit Bureau, Inc., of Bismarck, Max 
D Rosenberg, trustee of State Acceptance 
Corporation, a bankrupt, and Atlas, Inc., who did 
not answer the complaint and were in default, and in 
favor of all the named defendants and against the 
plaintiff. Since judgment was granted in favor of 
defendants and third-party plaintiffs in the 
foreclosure action, the third-party complaint against 
The North Dakota Guaranty and Title Company was 
dismissed. After the plaintiff, Clifford P. Hanson, 
had filed his notice of appeal the defendants and 
third-party plaintiffs filed appeals from the orders 
dismissing their third-party complaints against the 
third-party defendant. All the parties demanded a 
Trial De Novo in the Supreme Court. 
The mortgage being foreclosed is dated May 16, 
1962, and was filed for record in the office of the 
Register of Deeds of Burleigh County, North 
Dakota, on March 6, 1963, at 10:30 A M., and was 
subsequently recorded in Book 358 of Mortgages on 
Page 108. 
The record shows that in July of 1964, John Zoller 
and Martha Zoller, the mortgagors, caused part of 
the land described in the mortgage to be subdivided 
into Tracts A, B, and C, and other parcels which 
subdivision plat was filed on November 5, 1964, in 
Plat File Z with the Register of Deeds. Subsequent 
to the date and recording of plaintiff's mortgage, 
James P. and Alice R. Zoller acquired title to Tract 
A, Eugene V. and Gloria Binder acquired title to 
Tract B, and Paul M. Breene acquired title to Tract 
C and also other lands, all by warranty deeds from 
John and Martha Zoller. Thereafter, James P. and 
Alice R. Zoller mortgaged their tract to Gate City 
Savings and Loan Association, and Eugene V. and 
Gloria A. Binder mortgaged their tract to The 
Dakota National Bank of Bismarck, which 
mortgages were filed for record subsequent to the 
recording of the plaintiff's mortgage. 
Additionally, the State of North Dakota acquired by 
condemnation part of the property in the South Half 
oi the Northeast Quarter (Sl/2 NEl.~n oi Sc,:\o\. 
'\\w\vv--.i\ (26), described in ?r- ;-:,.:;ir.*": -
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mortgage subsequent to the recording of plaintiff's 
mortgage. 
The record further shows that abstracts of title were 
obtained from the North Dakota Guaranty and Title 
Company for Tracts A, B, and C, and the State of 
North Dakota and obtained a Title Certificate from a 
title insurance company. The abstracts of title 
pertaining to Tracts A, B, and C, did not show the 
mortgage from John and Martha Zoller to the 
plaintiff. The Title Insurance Certificate to the State 
of North Dakota also did not make reference to the 
plaintiff's mortgage. It is undisputed that all of the 
defendants named had no actual knowledge of the 
existence of plaintiff's mortgage from John and 
Martha Zoller 
At the trial of the action, James Horner and 
Mildred Benesh, employees of the North Dakota 
Guaranty and Title Company, the firm that prepared 
the abstracts *51 to Tracts A, B, and C, testified 
that the abstracts they prepared were prepared from 
the information derived from the tract index 
pertaining to the land in question and at the time the 
abstracts were prepared plaintiff's mortgage was not 
indexed under the South Half of the Northeast 
Quarter (Sl/2 NE1/4) of Section Twenty-six (26), 
Township One Hundred Thirty-nine (139), Range 
Eighty (80). James Horner, further testified that 
sometime during September of 1966, he found the 
plaintiff's mortgage indexed in the tract index 
against either the northwest or southwest quarter of 
the northwest quarter. Mildred Benesh, also testified 
that on March 29, 1967, when she prepared the 
abstract of title for plaintiff pertaining to land 
embraced in his mortgage, the tract index showed 
the mortgage indexed against the South Half of the 
Northeast Quarter of Section 26, but subsequent to 
March 29, 1967, when she had an occasion to check 
the grantor-grantee and grantee-grantor indexes they 
still showed the property indexed as part of the 
Northwest Quarter. During the course of the trial 
all of the records from the register of deeds office, 
the reception book, tract index, grantor and grantee 
indexes and Page 108 of Book 358 of Mortgages 
were introduced as evidence. 
The District Court, upon conclusion of the trial, 
found that the Hanson mortgage was originally 
indexed insofar as the property in question was 
concerned as >as r the Northwest Quarter of 
Section 26, rathei r-av- me Northeast Quarter; that 
alterations in the records in the register of deeds 
office wer made subsequent to the recording of the 
conveyances to the defendants, and held that the 
recording of the plaintiff's mortgage in the manner it 
was recorded did not comply with our recording 
statute and therefore it did not constitute constructive 
notice to third persons, and that the defendants were 
purchasers or encumbrancers for value without any 
notice, actual or constructive. 
An examination of Page 108 of Book 358 of 
Mortgages, being Defendant's Exhibit 'V--1,' shows 
that when the mortgage was copied the portion 
pertaining to the description in question read: 'The 
South one-half of the North one- quarter of Section 
26, Township 139, Range 80 County of Burleigh, 
State of North Dakota.' A correction with different 
type was made by inserting the word 'east' below 
the word 'one' in the phrase 'North one-quarter.' In 
the original instrument which was introduced in 
evidence, a similar correction appears, but the 
correction is made in ink and the word 'east' is 
above the 'one' in the "North one-quarter' phrase. 
Defendant's Exhibit "I J', being a photocopy of the 
reception book page on which the mortgage 
instrument was entered shows under the description 
of the property other descriptions and 'Part of Sec. 
26-139—80." Preceding the quoted, description 
appeared an abbreviated description that has been 
crossed out and is not legible. 
Defendant's Exhibits 'R--1' 'R--2', the original 
pages from the Granto Index to Mortgages, shows 
the entry with a description in reference to the 
description of the property in question as appearing 
to read 'sl/2 N1/4-26- 139-80' with the first part 
being not very legible. 
Defendant's Exhibits 'S—1 and 'S—2', are pages 
from the Grantee Book to Mortgages which contain 
the entry in question. Again the description is 
difficult to make out and the only part of the 
description that is legible is 'S 1/2 26-139-80'. 
The writing after S l / 2 has been written over and 
apparently is intended to read 'Sl/2 NE1/4', but 
unless one knows that this is what is meant he would 
not be able to read it easily as such. 
Defendant's Exhib- 1 . :> Uie pasje :aken :oir ;he 
Tract Index 'Ah;., h contains the eiiir fii -...-r \- *. 
The instrumern n question appears :iue>.t\.' .Ms: 
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the SW and SE quarter of the NE1/4, but there also 
appear erasures in the SW and SE quarters of the 
NW1/4 of Section 26. 
These records clearly show that alterations in the 
records were made at some *52 time, and that some 
of the altered descriptions are not legible now. 
We have examined all of the exhibits relevant to the 
issues and have reviewed the transcript of the 
testimony adduced at the trial and agree with the 
finding of the trial court, that the original records in 
the office of the register of deeds incorrectly 
described the property in question, in the reception 
book, tract index, grantor and grantee indexes, and 
that certain corrections and alterations were 
subsequently made, and that these correctins and 
alterations were made subsequent to the conveyances 
of the defendants in this action. 
The trial court concluded that proper indexing is an 
essential part of the recording process and unless the 
indexes correctly reflect the existence and contents 
of an instrument, the instrument will not impart 
constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and 
encumbrancers. 
The issues presented in this appeal as they relate to 
the action between the plaintiff and defendants are: 
(1) Does an instrument that is errooneously indexed 
under the wrong description in the tract index 
constitute constructive notice of its execution and 
contents to subsequent purchasers and 
encumbrancers? 
(2) Does a prospective purchaser or encumbrancer 
ordinarily have a duty to consult the reception book, 
grantor and grantee indexes, that if consulted would 
contain sufficient information to put a prudent 
person upon inquiry? 
(3) If both questions are answered in the negative, 
should the consequence of the failure of the register 
of deeds to correctly index the mortgage in the tract 
index fall upon the plaintiff or the defendant? 
The plaintiff argues that his mortgage was deposited 
with the register of deeds for recording and that the 
mortgage was subsequently accurately copied in the 
book of mortgages, and therefore pursuant to 
Sections 47-19-45, 47-19-08 and 47-19-19 of the 
N. D.C. C. this constituted constructive notice to 
subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. 
The sections referred to read as follows: 
The depositing with the proper officer for record 
of any instrument shall be constructive notice of 
the execution of such instrument to all purchasers 
and encumbrances subsequent to such depositing, 
if such instrument is subsequently recorded. All 
instruments entitled to record, the record of all 
instruments, or a duly certified copy of such 
record, shall be admissible in evidence in all the 
courts of this state and may be read in evidence in 
all of the courts of this state without further proof. 
Sec. 47--19--45, N.D.C.C. 
An instrument is deemed to be recorded when, 
whether entitled to record or not, it is deposited 
with the proper officer for record, if such 
instrument is subsequently recorded. 
Sec. 47 19-08, N.D.C.C 
The record of any instrument shall be notice of the 
contents of the instrument, as it appears of record, 
as to all persons. 
Sec 47-19-19, N D.C.C 
The plaintiff further contends that an instrument is 
recorded within the meaning of these sections quoted 
when it is transcribed in the proper book in the 
register of deeds' office. 
The defendants argue that an instrument cannot be 
deemed recorded so as to constitute constructive 
notice to third persons until all the steps required by 
the statutes pertaining to the register of deeds have 
been completed, and that would include correct 
indexing in the tract index book. 
*53 The following sections pertain to the duties of 
the register of deeds: 
The register of deeds shall: 
1. Keep a full and true record, in proper books 
provided for that purpose, of each patent, deed, 
mortgage, bill of sale, security agreement, 
judgment, decree, lien, certificate of sale, and 
other instrument required to be filed or admitted to 
record, if the person offering such instrument for 
filing or recording shall first pa> to him the fees 
provided by law for such filing or recording; 
2. Endorse upon each instrument filed with him 
for record or otherwise the date and the hour and 
minute of the day of such filing; 
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3. Endorse upon each instrument, when the same 
is recorded, in addition to the data specified in 
subsection 2 of this section, the number or letter 
designating the book of records in which the 
record of the instrument is made and the page 
upon which it is recorded; 
4. When the instrument is recorded, endorse 
thereon, In a note at the foot of the recorded 
instrument, the date and the hour and minute of 
the date when it was filed with him and the book 
of records in which the record thereof is made and 
the page upon which it is recorded; * * * 
Sec. 11-18-01, N.D.C.C. 
The register of deeds shall keep a separate tract 
index of the deeds, contracts, and other instruments 
which are not merely liens and a separate tract index 
of the mortgages and other liens effecting or relating 
to the title to real property. Such indexes shall be in 
substantially the following forms: * * * (Forms 
omitted) 
Sec, I ' 
The register of deeds shall keep separate grantor 
and grantee indexes of the deeds, contracts, and 
other instruments not merely liens and separate 
grantor and grantee indexes of the mortgages and 
other instruments which are liens affecting or 
relating to the title to real property. Such indexes 
shall show: 
1. The names of the grantors and of the grantees; 
2. The dates of the several instruments filed for 
record; 
3. The dates upon whu.li llir several uisinniiciii1-
are filed; and 
I The descriptions of real property affected by 
such instruments. 
Sec. 11-18-08, N.D.C.C. 
The register of deeds, when any deed, patent, 
mortgage, receiver's receipt, contract, notice of lis 
pendens, copy of decree, or other instrument 
affecting the title to, or creating a lien upon, any 
real estate within his county is filed in his office, 
shall write or stamp thereon immediately a 
document number. Document numbers shall 
commence with the number one in each county 
and shall follow consecutively in the order of filing 
of the various documents. Priority of the document 
number on an instrument shall be prima facie 
evidence of the priority of the filing thereof. 
When the register of deeds receives by mail or 
other like enclosure more than one instrument at a 
time he shall affix document numbers thereon in 
the order in which such instruments actually come 
to his hand on opening such enclosure save that 
when more than one instrument is recorded from 
the same source at the same time, he may follow 
such directions, if any, as the sender may give in 
such numbering. 
Sec. 11-18-09, N.D.C.C. 
The register of deeds shall keep a book known as 
'The Reception Book.' *54 Such book shall be 
ruled in parallel columns showing: 
1. In the first column at the left side of the page, 
the document number; 
2. In the second column, the date of filing; 
3. In the third column, the name of the grantor; 
4. In the fourth column, the name of the grantee; 
5. In the fifth column, the character of the 
instrument; 
6. In the sixth column, the book in which and 
page upon which the instrument is recorded; 
7. In the seventh column, the name of the person 
to whom the instrument was delivered; and 
8. In the eighth column, a brief description of the 
property, if any, described in the instrument. 
Immediately after any document or paper of a kind 
mentioned in sectin 1 1 - 18-09 is numbered, it 
shall be entered in the reception book. The 
reception book shall be part of the public records 
of the office and open to public inspection during 
office hours. 
Sec. 11-18-10, N.D.C.C. 
When an instrument affecting the title to or 
creating a lien upon real estate within the county is 
numbered and entered in the reception book and 
indexed, it shall be recorded or filed as provided 
by law. The register of deeds shall write or 
stamp, or cause to be written or stamped, at the 
beginning of a recorded instrument the words 
'document number' and shall add thereto the 
number stamped or written on the document. He 
shall add, immediately after the record of such 
instrument, a certificate reciting that the 
instrument was filed in his office and giving the 
date and hour of filing. He shall authenticate the 
certificate with his official signature, but he need 
not affix his official seal thereto. 
Sec. 11-18-11, N.D.C.C. 
The affixing of the signature of the register of 
deeds to a recorded instrument shall complete the 
record thereof. Any person who thereafter 
willfully erases, adds to, interlines, mutilates, 
conceals, destroys, or in any manner changes the 
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record is guilty of a felony and shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less 
than one year nor more than five years, and, if an 
officer, in addition thereto, shall forfeit his office. 
Sec: 11 18-12, N.D.C.C. 
[1] Ilie defendants, accordingly argue that an 
instrument deposited with the register of deeds does 
not impart constructive notice to subsequent 
purchasers and encumbrancers until all of the steps 
required by the register of deeds in recording 
instruments have been complied with. We do not 
believe that all of the sections pertaining to the 
duties of the register of deeds in recording 
instruments have to be complied with in order for an 
instrument to impart constructive notice to 
subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. We 
believe only those sections or steps that pertain to 
the aspect of notice must be substantially complied 
with. 
The fundamental purpose of the recording statutes 
is to protect potential purchasers of real property 
against the risk that they may be paying out good 
money to someone who does not actually own the 
property that he is purporting to sell. The recording 
acts operate by making the history of the title 
involved in a real estate transaction readily available 
to a prospective purchaser, and by providing that the 
history so disclosed by the record is binding upon a 
prospective purchaser whether he consults the record 
or not. 
At the time North Dakota adopted its recording 
acts, many states were still *55 utilizing only 
grantor-grantee indexes as the chief aids in title 
search. This is a cumbersome way of digging out 
the history of the title to a given tract of land. 
Our recording acts date back to the territorial code 
of 1877, which in turn were adopted from the 
California Civil Code of 1875. Several of the 
midwestern and western states adopted similar 
statutes patterned after the California statutes. 
The territorial code of 1877 provided for a more 
modern recording procedure and provided for a 
numerical tract index in lieu of the grantor-grantee 
index 
Chapter 21, Counties and County Officers, Sec. 58, 
Rev ..Code Dakota 1877, reads as follows: 
The registers of deeds shall prepare from the 
records of their offices respectively, and shall 
hereafter keep a numerical index of the deeds, 
mortgages, and other instruments of record in their 
respective offices affecting or relating to the title 
to real property, in lieu of the indexes by names of 
grantors and grantees, as now kept. 
Apparently it was the intention of the Territorial 
Legislature to only require the register of deeds to 
keep a tract index. However, for whatever the 
reason may have been, the provision for also 
requiring grantor-grantee indexes was added in 
1887, and both provisions became a part of our law 
from the time of statehood. Since the original 
adoption of these recording acts by the several 
states, all have undergone some changes in order to 
make them more applicable to the specific needs of 
each state. 
Although this court over the years has had to 
interpret several sections of our recordings laws, the 
precise question that is now before us as to what 
constitutes sufficient compliance with the recording 
statutes so as to give constructive notice has never 
been decided. 
We believe, however, that some of our prior 
decisions are relevant to the issue before us and do 
provide a direction in what we believe to be the 
correct interpretation of our recording statutes 
[2] This court in Northwestern Improvement 
Company v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497, answered the 
argument that the mere depositing of an instrument 
with the register of deeds for recording would 
thereafter constitute notice to subsequent purchasers, 
by holding that Section 47-19-08 and Section 
47—19-45, quoted earlier, must be construed 
together, and stated: 
Their proper construction is that an instrument 
gives only temporary constructive notice of its 
contents when deposited in the office of the 
register of deeds and that when the instrument is 
recorded the record for purposes of constructive 
notice relates back to the date of deposit and as of 
that time is constructive notice of the contents 
actually and correctly recorded. 
The same principal was reaffirmed in Northern 
Pacific Railway Co., v Advance Realty, 78 
N.W.2d705. 
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There can no longer be any doubt that in order for 
an instrument to impart constructive notice to the 
public it must actually be recorded in the books 
required to be kept by the register of deeds. Must an 
instrument be also indexed? 
[3] The existence of a tract index, which not only 
makes all instruments equally accessible to 
reasonable search, but which has its primary focus 
upon tracts of land rather than upon grantors and 
grantees, makes the concept of 'chain of title' as 
developed in relation to the old grantor and grantee 
type index inapplicable. The fact that in our state we 
have developed a recording system by counties, and 
which consequently results in many thousands of 
instruments being recorded annually in some 
counties, makes it totally impractical for anyone to 
make a title search by means of grantor-grantee 
indexes. 
*56 In our state, today, the tract index is the only 
practical index through which instruments on record 
can be located. It would be a prohibitive burden to 
locate instruments on record without a tract index. 
It would certainly be a travesty of justice to hold that 
prospective purchasers are bound by the record, if 
for all practical purposes the record cannot be 
located. 
rhe practice today by abstracters, attorneys, and 
others making title searches is to use the tract index 
rather than by the old means of the grantor-grantee 
indexes. Although the register of deeds still has to 
keep all the indexes, the grantor-grantee index is 
actually a carry over from the old system, and is 
only an additional tool available to title searchers for 
other purposes. 
Under the tract index system the title is traced by 
searching the tract index for instruments pertaining 
to the tract to be searched. The names of the grantor 
and grantee are not material to this search. 
We have considered several decisions from other 
jurisdictions that appear to have recording statutes 
similai to ours and which have held that an 
instrument will not give constructive notice of its 
contents unless it has been recorded in substantial 
compliance with their recording statutes, and that 
failure to properly index an instrument does not 
constitute substantial compliance with the recording 
statutes. See Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 
P. } - \ \ .1WM. Rice v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 629, 32 
P.2d 381 (1934); Fleck v. Iowa Employment 
Security Commission, 233 Iowa 67, 8 N.W.2d 703 
(1943), and other cases found in the Annotation in 
63 A.I R 1057, 
We have also noted cases that are holding contrary 
to the cases cited above, such as Deming v. Miles, 
35 Neb. 739, 53 N.W. 665 (1892); Crook v. 
Chilvers, 99 Neb. 684, 157 N.W. 617 (1916), and 
Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile & Investment Co., 76 
Utah 1, 287 P. 188 (1930). However, in analyzing 
these cases we are inclined to believe that the rule or 
principle that they asserted was more applicable to 
the old grantor-grantee type recording systems than 
to the tract index system that we have in our state. 
After considering all the statutes and all of the 
authorities cited in this opinion, and considering the 
practice in use by lawyers, lending agencies and 
abstracters, we conclude that a prospective 
purchaser cannot be deemed to have constructive 
notice of instruments that are not indexed in the tract 
index under the specific tract of real estate to which 
they pertain. We conclude that there must be 
substantial compliance with those sections of the 
recording laws that pertain to the matter of notice in 
order to give constructive notice. Failure to index 
an instrument in the tract index does not constitute 
such compliance. 
The appellant also argues that if the error by the 
register of deeds in indexing the instrument under 
the wrong description deprives the instrument of 
giving constructive notice, the entries in the 
reception book, and in the grantor-grantee index 
books, would constitute sufficient notice to put a 
prudent person upon inquiry. The plain fact is that 
the reception book and grantor and grantee indexes 
only serve very limited purposes. The reception 
book would only be consulted for the purpose of 
determining whether thre are any instruments on 
deposit with the register of deeds that have not yet 
been fully recorded, or to determine priorities 
between instruments if priority becomes an issue. 
[4] Under the statute and oui holdings in 
Northwestern Improvement Co \ Norris, Supra, 
the actual instrument deposited with the register of 
deeds accords constructive notice of its execution 
only from the time of its deposit until the recording 
has been completed. After recording, the actual 
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record made constitutes constructive notice. The 
reception book, therefore, is primarily being 
consulted by a title searcher for the limited purpose 
of determining whether there are any unrecorded 
instruments in the hands of the register of deeds. 
The tract *57 index which contains a record of every 
instrument that has ever been filed pertaining to any 
tract of land in the county is the composite index 
that directs a title searcher to all the instruments on 
record that affect each specific tract of land. A 
prospective purchaser or encumbrancer searching 
the records has a right to assume that the register of 
deeds has performed his duties correctly and has 
indexed every instrument correctly in the tract 
index. The ordinary prudent person searching the 
record to determine the title status to a specific tract 
of land would have no need to consult the grantor-
grantee indexes, because the tract index discloses the 
names of the grantors and grantees of the 
instruments that pertain to a certain tract of land 
We see no material difference between the principle 
of substantial compliance with the recording sections 
pertaining to notice to constitute constructive notice, 
and the principle of sufficient information in the 
records to cause or require a person to make inquiry 
so as to be considered having actual notice of the 
instruments on record. The same standard should 
apply, since it is immaterial whether a subsequent 
purchaser looks at the record or not, he is bound by 
the record which he has a duty to search, and if such 
record is such that a person searching it should find 
the instrument, then the record is also such that it 
uill give constructive notice. Statutes should 
receive a reasonable interpretation that is consonant 
with what the actual practice is among those to 
whom the statute has application. 
C5J We therefore conclude that under our modern 
practice of recording real estate transactions, there is 
no duty upon a prospective purchaser in so far as 
constructive notice is concerned to consult the 
grantorgrantee indexes or the reception book beyond 
the extent of determining whether there are any 
unrecorded instruments in the hands of the register 
of deeds that may not yet have been recorded and 
indexed. To require a person to check the 
grantorgrantee indexes and go through the entire 
reception book to determine whether all the 
instruments on record have been properly recorded 
and indexed would be to completely nullify the use 
of the tract index which is the modern tool used by 
anyone making a title search. Therefore, the 
defendants cannot be charged with information that 
may have been obtained from consulting the 
reception book or grantorgrantee indexes. 
The plaintiff also contends that the abstracter had 
knowledge of the erroneous indexing within a couple 
of months after the mortgage was recorded, which 
knowledge of the abstracter must be imputed to the 
defendants, and therefore they cannot be considered 
encumbrancers without notice. 
[6] [7] We can not agree with this contention. The 
relationship between an abstracter and persons who 
come into possession of an abstract prepared by an 
abstracter is not an agency type relationship. The 
liability of an abstracter is contractual in nature, in 
addition to the statutory liability imposed upon him. 
There is no evidence in this case to support a 
principal- agency relationship, and consequently any 
knowledge that employees of the abstracting firm 
may have acquired during the course of their work 
is not imputable to the defendants in this case. 
Having concluded that appellants"" mortgage as 
recorded did not give constructive notice, or any 
other notice of the execution of the instrument to the 
defendants, upon whom should the consequences of 
the failure of the register of deeds to properly index 
the instrument fall? 
[8] In Northwestern Improvement Co, \ Nonis, 
Supra, this court held that it was the duty of the 
grantor in a conveyance to protect his interest 
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith by 
making certain that the reservation and exception of 
minerals therein was properly recorded. The 
holding in effect is that the beneficiary of any 
interest in any real estate conveyance has a duty to 
protect his interest *58 against subsequent 
purchasers by making certain that the instrument 
conveying his interest is properly recorded, because 
he is the only person that by exercising some 
diligence can discover errors in the recording which 
a subsequent purchaser even by the exercise of the 
greatest diligence could not possibly do. 
It is well recognized that every major lending 
agency operating in the state today will require an 
abstract of title continued to include all the 
instruments necessary to give it good title to the 
interest conveyed before it will release any money. 
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:*.u. the appellant followed this well established 
practice he would have promptly discovered :w 
error of i:he register of deeds and could, have h*i w 
'•or reeled. 
Plaintiff has cited Atlas Lumber Company v. 
Canadian-American Mortgage and Trust Company, 
36 N.D 39, 161 N.W. 604, in support of his 
contention that errors of the register of deeds should 
not be visited upon the persons leaving an 
instrument for recording. The facts in the present: 
case are materially different from the facts in, that 
case. In that case the clerk, of court, erroneously 
showed the wrong lien as having been satisfied,, 
There was no question but that the lien so 
erroneously satisfied had been properly filed and 
recorded. The principle of law stated in that case 
has no application to the case under consideration. 
The facts in Northwestern Improvement Co. \ • 
Norris, Supra, are more analogous to the present 
case and the principle established in that case has 
application here. The principle is fully in accord 
with the general principle of law which, appears to 
prevail in the majority of jurisdictions and stated in 
Section 64, Vol 1, Patton on Titles, P. 218: 
However, the majority rule is that, except as the 
existence of error is apparent on the face of the 
record, a subsequent purchaser is bound by what 
appears upon,, the record, only, regardless of the 
contents of the original, instrument. This rule 
places the loss upon the beneficiary in the 
instrument in the transcribing of which the error 
was made. As between him and, the subsequent 
• :.'*._..:. J : . I.. ..
 s i l ; j win* oi.v. wuw h a u ii ill iiil> 
powei to make comparison ana u; have the error 
,f
 red. and upon him devolved the dun *ioi 
\ of tiling his instrumer' •" -:v --s "> 
: u correctly recorded 
See aisi. :x. . i-*, Records and Recording Laws, 
t> Am.Jur. P. 485, and for a fairly recent holding 
to the same effect, see, Commonwealth oi Pa to 
Use of Orris v. Roberts, 3l>2 P- " ~ 
393, 71, A.L.R.2d 1,1,24 
For the reasons stated we affirm the decision of the 
trial court and the judgments entered by the trial 
court.. 
Since AL -:<i\' airiimec ::.L. ww».. .a the 
principal action the issues raised ;n ihe appeal 
between the third party plaintiffs o d ' •: ! party 
defendant have hernmr miv\t 
TEIGEN ; .. ,d v. ~v KhLSCH. district Judge, 
concur. 
KNUDSONMndPAULSO^ IT div.rni 
A:-VIN • S;-RIT/.. i J. and RALPH J. 
ERICKSTAD :i deeming themselves disqualified 
did not participate; ADAM GEFREH, District Judge 
of the Third Judicial District, and C. F. KELSCH, 
District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District, sitting in 
their stead. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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United States Bankruptcy Court, 
D. Utah. 
In re GRANADA, INC., Debtor. 
Peter W. BILLINGS, Jr., Trustee, Plaintiff, 
v. 
CINNAMON RIDGE, LTD., a Utah Limited 
Partnership, Defendant. 
Civ. No. 87PC-0812. 
Bankruptcy No. 87C-00693. 
Oct. 28, 1988. 
Chapter 11 trustee brought action to quiet title in 
real property. The Bankruptcy Court, Glen E. 
Clark, Chief Judge, held that under Utah law, 
Chapter 11 trustee took title to real property free of 
any unrecorded equitable interest in property of 
limited partnership for which debtor was general 
partner, where debtor was record fee title holder on 
petition date, and no representative or fiduciary 
capacity was indicated on title. 
Motion granted. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Bankruptcy <®=>2576 
51k2576 
Under Utah law, Chapter 11 trustee took title to real 
property free of any unrecorded equitable interest in 
property of limited partnership for which debtor was 
general partner, where debtor was record fee title 
holder on petition date, no representative or 
fiduciary capacity was indicated on title, and there 
was no evidence at site that limited partnership 
owned property. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 
544(a)(3); U.C.A. 1953, 57-3-2. 
[2] Bankruptcy <®=>2515 
51k2515 
For purpose of trustee exercising strong-arm 
provision of Bankruptcy Code, it is irrelevant that 
debtor would violate its fiduciary duty by 
transferring partnership property to third-party 
purchaser; only issue is whether bona fide 
purchaser could obtain title free and clear of any 
equitable interest which partnership might claim. 
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)(3). 
[3] Bankruptcy <@==>2543 
51k2543 
Real property in which debtor held legal but not 
equitable interest was property of the estate, such 
that trustee could obtain title to property through 
"strong-arm" provision of Bankruptcy Code. 
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 541, 544. 
*501 Peter W. Billings, Jr., pro se. 
Gary E. Jubber, Fabian & Clendenin, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, for plaintiff. 
N. George Daines, Daines & Kane, Logan, Utah, 
for defendant. 
David E. Leta, Hansen & Anderson, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, for Unsecured Creditors* Committee. 
Vernon L. Hopkinson, Watkiss & Campbell, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, for intervenor. 
*502 MEMORANDUM OPINION 
GLEN E. CLARK, Chief Judge. 
This civil proceeding comes before the court on the 
trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral 
arguments on the motion were heard by the court on 
June 2, 1988. At the hearing, Peter W. Billings, 
Jr., and Gary E. Jubber, of Fabian & Clendenin, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, appeared on behalf of the 
trustee; N. George Daines, of Daines & Kane, 
Logan, Utah, represented the defendant, Cinnamon 
Ridge, Ltd.; and David E. Leta, of Hansen & 
Anderson, Salt Lake City, Utah, appeared on behalf 
of the Unsecured Creditors' Committee. At the 
hearing, the court granted a motion by the John E. 
Keiter Defined Benefit Plan & Trust ("Keiter") to 
intervene herein as a party defendant; and Vernon 
L. Hopkinson, of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, entered an appearance on its behalf. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the 
trustee's motion under advisement and allowed the 
parties five days to file supplemental affidavits. 
Subsequent to the hearing, the parties informed the 
court that they had agreed among themselves that 
they would conduct four depositions and submit the 
transcripts to the court in lieu of the supplemental 
affidavits which the court had requested. The 
court, having now received those depositions and 
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having considered the respective arguments of 
counsel, as well as the pleadings and memoranda on 
file, issues the following Memorandum Opinion. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the trustee's Motion 
for Summary Judgment is granted. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This action concerns title to a mobile home park, 
commonly known as the Cinnamon Ridge Mobile 
Home Park, as well as ten acres of adjacent 
unimproved real property, located in Cache County, 
Utah. Defendant, Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd. (the 
"Partnership"), is a Utah limited partnership which 
was organized in November 1984. Granada, Inc., 
the debtor in this Chapter 11 case, was one of 
defendant Partnership's general partners and its sole 
general partner as of the commencement of this 
bankruptcy case. 
Prior to the organization of the Partnership, 
Granada purchased the real property for the mobile 
home park from Gary E. and Dorothy W. Bodrero 
and executed a trust deed in their favor. The 
mobile home park was platted under the name 
"Cinnamon Ridge Mobile Home Park." 
Subsequent to the organization of the Partnership, 
Granada applied for and was given consent to use 
the name Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd., as an assumed 
name. The Certificate and Agreement of Limited 
Partnership was filed with the Salt Lake County and 
Cache County Clerk's Offices but was never filed 
with the Cache County Recorder's Office. 
On or about July 23, 1985, "Granada, as trustor," 
executed a trust deed in favor of Scherer & Horn, 
M.D. Defined Benefit Plan Trust ("Scherer & 
Horn"), as beneficiary, which pledged the mobile 
home park as security. On or about August 15, 
1985, "Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd., by its general partner 
Granada, Inc., as Trustor," executed a trust deed in 
favor of Keiter, also pledging the mobile home park 
as security. 
Granada filed its Chapter 11 petition on February 
13, 1987. Peter W. Billings, Jr., was appointed 
trustee of the Granada estate on June 22, 1987. On 
the date of petition, the records of the Cache County 
Recorder's Office showed Granada as the fee owner 
of the mobile home park; the Partnership did not 
have any recorded interest in the property as of that 
date. Moreover, it is undisputed that, as of the 
petition date, the following facts and circumstances 
were indicated: 
(1) The sign at the entrance to the mobile home 
park read "Cinnamon Ridge Mobile Home 
Community"; 
(2) There was no sign on the property making 
reference to Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd., or to the 
Cinnamon Ridge Limited Partnership; 
(3) Lots in the mobile home park were rented to 
tenants; 
(4) None of the Cinnamon Ridge limited partners 
were residing at the property; 
*503 (5) Granada managed the mobile home park 
until December 1986, at which time Capital Hill 
Equities assumed management on behalf of 
Granada; and 
(6) Advertising for the mobile home park was 
done in the name of Cinnamon Ridge Mobile 
Home Community. 
When Granada filed bankruptcy, it listed the 
property at issue herein in its statement of affairs as 
"property held for another person." 
The trustee filed the present action pursuant to § 
544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code to quiet title to the 
mobile home park and the adjacent unimproved 
property. The Partnership asserts that the property 
was Partnership property and that Granada held only 
"bare legal title," which was held in its name to 
facilitate development of the property. Since the 
equitable title to the property assertedly resided in 
the Partnership, the Partnership argues that the 
property never became property of the estate 
pursuant to § 541(d) and, therefore, the trustee 
cannot set aside the Partnership's unrecorded 
interest under § 544(a)(3). Moreover, the 
Partnership argues that the trustee cannot become a 
bona fide purchaser under § 544 because at the time 
of the filing of the petition the Partnership was in 
actual, open, and unambiguous possession of the 
mobile home park, which would put a purchaser on 
inquiry notice of the Partnership's interest in the 
property. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the 
commencement of the case, and without regard to 
any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, 
the rights and powers of, or may avoid any 
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transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation 
incurred by the debtor that is voidable by-
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other 
than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom 
applicable law permits such transfer to be 
perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide 
purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the 
time of the commencement of the case, whether or 
not such a purchaser exists. 
By virtue of this so-called strong-arm power, the 
trustee is given, by force of law, the rights and 
powers of a perfected bona fide purchaser of real 
property as of the bankruptcy petition date. 
[1] In this case, the critical inquiry under § 
544(a)(3) concerns the rights of the parties under 
Utah law had the debtor transferred the mobile home 
park and the unimproved real property to a bona 
fide purchaser on the petition date, and had the 
transfer been perfected on that date. It is clear that 
under Utah law (aside from principles of inquiry 
notice and partnership law which shall be discussed 
below), a bona fide purchaser would obtain title to 
the property free and clear of any unrecorded 
equitable interest which the Partnership may have 
had in the property. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-3 
provides: 
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, 
which shall not be recorded as provided in this 
title, shall be void as against any subsequent 
purchaser in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real estate, or any 
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall 
be first duly recorded. 
As indicated in § 57-3-3, the rights of a bona fide 
purchaser may be cut off through the proper 
imparting of constructive notice by the recording of 
a competing interest "as provided in this title." 
Those requirements are set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-3-2(1): 
Every conveyance, or instrument in writing 
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged, or 
proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed by 
this title ... shall, from the time of filing the same 
with the [county] recorder for record, impart 
notice to all persons of their contents. Subsequent 
purchasers, mortgagees, and lien holders are 
deemed to purchase and take with notice. 
(emphasis added). 
By virtue of these statutes, a bona fide purchaser 
who perfects his interest takes *504 free of any prior 
unrecorded interest in the real property. It is 
undisputed in this case that as of the petition date, 
there was nothing recorded with the Cache County 
Recorder which would have given constructive 
notice of the Partnership's claim to an equitable 
interest in the property. Granada was the record fee 
title owner of the property on the petition date. No 
representative or fiduciary capacity was there 
indicated. 
The defendants mount several challenges to the 
application of this straight- forward analysis, 
contending that (1) the filing of the Certificate and 
Agreement of Limited Partnership imparted 
constructive notice of the Partnership's interest; (2) 
there could be no transfer of property of the debtor 
to a bona fide purchaser, since Granada, as general 
partner, held the property in trust for the 
Partnership, and Granada never had an equitable 
interest in the property; (3) a bona fide purchaser 
could not prevail under Utah law because the 
Partnership was in possession of the property, and 
any potential purchaser would be on inquiry notice 
of the Partnership's equitable or beneficial interest; 
(4) Granada could not have transferred the property 
because of its fiduciary duties as a general partner 
under Utah partnership law and would have been 
liable for criminal sanctions had it done so; (5) the 
trustee's avoiding powers under § 544 are restricted 
by trust principles, duties and obligations, 
incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code by § 541(d); 
and (6) it would be inequitable to allow the trustee to 
avoid the Partnership's interest and create a 
beneficial interest in Granada which never existed 
and which Granada did not assert. 
Constructive Notice. 
The defendants assert that constructive notice of the 
Partnership's equitable interest is effectively 
imparted since the Certificate and Agreement of 
Limited Partnership was filed with Cache and Salt 
Lake Counties. That documentation allegedly 
contemplates the development of the mobile home 
park and authorizes Granada to hold title to the 
property in its own name. However, the Certificate 
and Agreement was not filed with the Cache County 
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Recorder's Office. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-2 
expressly requires the filing to be made with the 
county recorder in order to impart constructive 
notice. Filing with the county clerk is not sufficient 
to put potential purchasers on constructive notice. 
Record title was indisputably in the name of 
Granada in its own capacity. Title could have been 
held in the name of "Granada, General Partner" or 
"Granada, General Partner of the Cinnamon Ridge 
Limited Partnership" or "Granada, in trust for the 
Cinnamon Ridge Limited Partnership." However, 
that was not done. Title, as it was held in this case, 
imparted no constructive notice of the Partnership's 
interest. 
Transfer of Property of the Debtor. 
The defendants next argue that the trustee's rights 
and powers under § 544(a)(3) are limited to that of a 
bona fide purchaser of "property of the debtor." 
Since under the defendants' analysis Granada never 
possessed any equitable interest in the property, the 
trustee may not utilize § 544(a)(3) to set aside the 
Partnership's equitable interest. As support for 
their position, defendants point to the debtor's 
statement of affairs in which the debtor indicated 
that it held title to the property for another person. 
[FN1] 
FN1. This argument is closely tied to defendant's 
defense under § 541(d) which is discussed infra. 
A close reading of § 544(a), however, reveals no 
such restriction on the trustee's powers. The 
language of § 544(a) provides that "[t]he trustee 
shall have ... the rights and powers of ... (3) a bona 
fide purchaser of real property ... from the debtor." 
(emphasis added). The legal fiction created by the 
statute assumes a transfer from the debtor to a bona 
fide purchaser on the date of filing. The trustee is 
then clothed with whatever legal rights the bona fide 
purchaser would possess. There is no requirement 
in that language that the property transferred be 
property oj the debtor. Of course, the debtor's 
interest in the property (or lack thereof) may well 
limit the bona fide purchaser's "rights and powers." 
*505 In further support of their contention that 
avoidable property under § 544(a)(3) must be that 
of the debtor, defendants rely on other language in § 
544(a), which provides: "The trustee ... may avoid 
any transfer of property of the debtor or any 
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by 
... (3) a bona fide purchaser...." (emphasis added). 
This § 544(a)(3) power to avoid any transfer of 
property of the debtor that is voidable by a bona fide 
purchaser is in addition to the trustee's § 544(a)(3) 
position of having the "rights and powers" of a bona 
fide purchaser, as discussed above. Furthermore, 
the parties to this action concede that Granada held 
at least bare legal title of record on the petition date. 
Under Utah law, Granada had sufficient interest in 
the property to enable it to transfer fee title to a 
bona fide purchaser free and clear of any unrecorded 
equitable interest. The Partnership may well have 
had cognizable claims against Granada for having 
done so, but the bona fide purchaser would still have 
taken title free and clear of those equitable claims 
under the recording statutes. [FN2] 
FN2. Counsel for Keiter apparently recognized this 
analysis in argument before the court at which time the 
following interchange with the court is noted: 
MR. HOPKINSON: The Court inquired under 
Utah Law, had a B.F.P. come in and acquired this 
property from Granada, who would prevail in this 
action if this were a state court. Obviously, if this 
were a state court and that were the factual 
situation, Cinnamon Ridge would have a very 
uphill battle winning that case. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Would you argue that if I put my 
home in your name, you record and, to go further, 
I let you live there. You sell that home to 
someone for value, that I can assert my rights in 
that property? 
MR. HOPKINSON: Did I have an express trust 
agreement with you? 
THE COURT: I don't know. I'll let you come to 
the conclusion. It's my home. You recognize 
that, and you say, "You can get it back any time 
you want. I'll take good care of it." That's our 
agreement. 
MR. HOPKINSON: Am I in bankruptcy or out of 
bankruptcy? 
THE COURT: You're out of bankruptcy. 
MR. HOPKINSON: I'm out of bankruptcy, a 
B.F.P. would prevail. In bankruptcy, a 544(a)(3) 
fictitious B.F.P. would not prevail because of 
541(d). THE COURT: It appears to me you don't 
believe in fictions. 
MR. HOPKINSON: It's probably how you read 
the book. 
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Keiter's position is that although a bona fide 
purchaser would prevail under Utah law outside of 
bankruptcy, the trustee with hypothetical bona fide 
purchaser status may not prevail under the 
Bankruptcy Code because of § 541(d). That 
argument is considered below. 
Inquiry Notice. 
The defendants also take the position that a bona 
fide purchaser could not prevail against the 
Partnership because the Partnership was in open, 
actual, and unambiguous possession of the mobile 
home park on the petition date. Since the 
Partnership was in possession, the defendants argue 
that any potential purchaser would be put on 
"inquiry notice" of the Partnership's ownership 
claims. This issue is complicated by the fact that 
the only way the Partnership could have been in 
possession would have been through its general 
partner, Granada, which, of course, in its non-
representative capacity was the record title holder. 
Although § 544(a)(3) specifically provides that the 
trustee shall have the rights and powers of a bona 
fide purchaser "without regard to any knowledge of 
the trustee or of any creditor," courts have held that 
that restriction applies only to actual knowledge and 
not to inquiry notice, construed to be a form of 
constructive notice. See In re Probasco, 839 F.2d 
1352 (9th Cir.1988); McCannon v. Marston, 679 
F.2d 13, 16 (3d Cir.1982); see also In re 
Richardson, 23 B.R. 434 (Bankr.D.Utah 1982). 
The doctrine of inquiry notice under Utah law was 
set forth by the Utah Supreme court in Johnson v. 
Bell 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983): 
[Notice] required by § 57-1-6 [is] satisfied if a 
party dealing with the land had information of 
facts which would put a prudent man on inquiry 
and which, if pursued, would lead to actual 
knowledge as to the state of the title. 
In that case, the court found no evidence that there 
was any activity on the property which would have 
reasonably alerted the *506 trustee under a trust 
deed to adverse claims or which would have 
required the trustee's further investigation. Id.; see 
also Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 P.2d 454, 
456 (Utah 1939) ("[Exclusive possession of real 
estate under an apparent claim of ownership is 
constructive notice to all the world of whatever 
claim the possessor asserts."); Toland v. Corey, 6 
Utah 392, 24 P. 190 (1890); Stumph v. Church, 740 
P.2d 820 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
In the view of this court, the doctrine of 
constructive inquiry notice under Utah law involves 
a two-step analysis: First, the court must determine 
whether the purchaser is in possession of facts, or 
whether inspection of the property would have 
brought to the purchaser's attention activity on the 
property, which would have reasonably alerted the 
purchaser to potential claims of any party other than 
the grantor or record title holder. If the purchaser 
has such facts, or if there is activity on the property 
reasonably alerting the purchaser to adverse claims, 
the purchaser is placed on inquiry notice; and, 
under the second step, the purchaser is charged with 
all knowledge that a reasonable due diligence 
investigation would have revealed. A purchaser's 
duty to investigate arises only when the purchaser is 
placed on inquiry notice under the first prong of the 
analysis. 
In this proceeding, the court must first analyze what 
a proper inspection of the property would have 
brought to a purchaser's attention, if such an 
inspection had been conducted on the petition date. 
[FN3] The undisputed facts now before the court 
are that such a purchaser would have found a mobile 
home park being rented to tenants and being 
managed by an on- site manager under the direction 
of Granada. The sign at the entrance read 
"Cinnamon Ridge Mobile Home Community." 
There was no sign on the property making reference 
to Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd., or the Cinnamon Ridge 
Limited Partnership. Advertising for the mobile 
home park was done in the name of Cinnamon 
Ridge Mobile Home Community. Since 
"Cinnamon Ridge" was an authorized d/b/a for 
Granada, there is nothing that an inspection would 
have produced which was inconsistent with record 
title. The defendants argue that had the purchaser 
inquired of the tenants or the property manager 
about the identity of the landlord, it would have 
been told about the Partnership's interest. That 
argument confuses the first prong of the test-
determining whether the purchaser has a duty to 
investigate and inquire after inspection of the 
property-with the duty of inquiry itself which the 
purchaser must discharge once it is put on inquiry 
notice. Unless there is activity apparent upon 
inspection "which would have reasonably alerted" a 
purchaser of the claims of the Partnership requiring 
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the purchaser's further investigation, no inquiry 
need be made. Here, a bona fide purchaser would 
not have been so alerted. 
FN3. Under § 544(a)(3) analysis, any actual 
knowledge which the trustee or the debtor as 
debtor in possession may have had on the petition 
date is irrelevant, whether or not such facts would 
have put the trustee or debtor on inquiry notice. 
The defendants contend that where property is in 
the possession of tenants, a purchaser must inquire 
about the identity of the landlord. They cite 
Meagher v. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 P.2d 454 (Utah 
1939), in support of that proposition. It may well 
be that possession by a tenant in 1939 was sufficient 
to alert a purchaser of potential adverse claims to 
residential property. However, we are unable to 
conclude that in 1988 tenants in possession of a 
mobile home park developed for that express 
purpose is sufficiently alarming so as to put a 
purchaser on constructive inquiry notice. See 
Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 820 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987) (Mortgagee's appraiser had no duty to 
inquire as to the identity of the landlord or to ask to 
see a copy of the lease or rental agreement when 
inspecting the property.). 
Trust and Fiduciary Duties. 
The defendants next argue that pursuant to Utah 
partnership law there existed an express trust 
between Granada, as general partner, and the 
Partnership. Therefore, defendants conclude that 
Granada never had an interest in the property, 
Granada could not transfer the property out of *507 
trust, and Granada would have gone to jail if it had 
attempted to do so. Defendants further contend that 
whatever Granada could have done, it did as an 
agent for the Partnership; thus, if Granada had 
transferred the property, the Partnership could have 
gotten it back. In support of their argument, the 
defendants call the court's attention to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 48-1-18, 48-2- 9(4), 48-1-7. Those 
sections provide in pertinent part: 
48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. 
Every partner must account to the partnership for 
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits, 
derived by him without the consent of the other 
partners from any transaction connected with the 
formation, conduct or liquidation of the 
partnership or from any use by him of its 
property. 
48-2-9. Rights, powers and liabilities of a general 
partner. A general partner shall have all the 
rights and powers, and be subject to all the 
restrictions and liabilities, of a partner in a 
partnership without limited partners, except that 
without the written consent or ratification of the 
specific act by all the limited partners, a general 
partner or all of the general partners have no 
authority to: 
(4) Possess partnership property, or assign their 
rights in specific partnership property, for other 
than a partnership purpose. 
48-1-7. Conveyance of real property of 
partnership. 
Where the title to real property is in the name of 
one or more or all of the partners, or in a third 
person in trust for the partnership, a conveyance 
executed by a partner in the partnership name, or 
in his own name, passes the equitable interest of 
the partnership, provided the act is one within the 
authority of the partner under the provisions of 
section 48-1-6(1). 
[2] Initially, it can be observed that for purposes of 
§ 544(a)(3), it is irrelevant that the debtor would 
violate its fiduciary duty by transferring partnership 
property to a third-party purchaser. Section 544 is 
designed to set aside unrecorded interests and secret 
liens. The question is not what liability, criminal 
or civil, the debtor might incur by transferring the 
property. The issue is whether a bona fide 
purchaser could obtain title free and clear of any 
equitable interest which the Partnership might claim. 
That question in this case is expressly answered by 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-409. Subsection (1) of that 
section mandates that trusts affecting real property 
be made of public record: 
75-7-409. Recitals when title to real property is in 
trustee-Failure. 
(1) When title to real property is granted to a 
person as trustee, the terms of the trust may be 
given either: 
(a) in the deed of transfer; or 
(b) in an instrument signed by the grantor and 
recorded in the same office as the grant to the 
trustee. 
Since the defendants argue that the property was 
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expressly held in trust by Granada for the benefit of 
the Partnership, that trust must be made of record 
"in the same office as the grant to the trustee "-the 
Cache County Recorder's Office. As noted, that 
was not accomplished. Although the Partnership 
agreement was filed with the county clerk, that 
filing did not meet the requirements of this section. 
Subsection (2) of § 75-7-409 prescribes the effect of 
failing to make the trust of public record: 
(2) If the terms of the trust are not made public as 
required in Subsection (1), a conveyance from the 
trustee is absolute in favor of purchasers for value 
who take the property without notice of the terms 
of the trust. 
Therefore, a bona fide purchaser from Granada 
would take free and clear of the equitable *508 
interests of the Partnership as beneficiary of the 
express trust. 
Moreover, the statutory provisions relied upon by 
the defendants may not provide a valid defense even 
by their own terms. For instance, § 48-1-7 
provides that, where property is held in the name of 
the general partner, the general partner may convey 
the equitable interest of the Partnership if that act is 
within the authority of the partner. Paragraph 7.1(a) 
of the Certificate and Agreement of Limited 
Partnership authorizes the general partner to 
"acquire, hold or dispose of any real property ... 
and may sell such properties ... as the General 
Partner, in its absolute discretion, deems to be in the 
best interests of the Partnership." Therefore, even 
ignoring the effect of the recording statutes, a bona 
fide purchaser could take title free and clear of the 
equitable interests of the Partnership under Utah 
trust and partnership law. Had that transfer 
actually taken place, the Partnership may have had a 
cause of action against Granada for breach of 
fiduciary duties, but that would not affect the rights 
of a bona fide purchaser who would take title free 
and clear of the Partnership's equitable interests. 
Interplay Between §§ 544 and 541 (d). 
[3] The court now comes to the crux of the 
defendants' argument—that the trustee may not quiet 
title in the property by virtue of § 544(a)(3) because 
of the operation of § 541(d). Defendants' argument 
seems to be that, in addition to the rights of the 
Partnership under state law, the Partnership may 
preserve its equitable interest in the property 
because § 541(d) operates independently to limit the 
trustee's avoiding powers and mandates that the 
equitable interest which the debtor did not possess 
prepetition cannot now become "property of the 
estate." 
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines and 
governs what is "property of the estate." That 
section provides in relevant portion: 
(a) The commencement of a case under section 
301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. 
Such estate is comprised of all the following 
property, wherever located and by whomever 
held: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and 
(c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case. 
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee 
recovers under section 329(b), 363(n), 543, 550, 
553, or 723 of this title. 
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the 
benefit of or ordered transferred to the estate 
under section 510(c) or 551 of this title. 
The concept of "property of the estate" includes not 
only rights to property which the debtor had 
prepetition (§ 541(a)(1)), but also additional rights 
which the trustee is given by virtue of the 
Bankruptcy Code (§ 541(a)(3), (4)). Section 541(d) 
expressly operates to limit the scope of the former, 
not the latter: 
(d) Property in which the debtor holds, as of the 
commencement of the case, only legal title and not 
an equitable interest ... becomes property of the 
estate under subsection (a)(1) or (2) of this section 
only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such 
property, but not to the extent of any equitable 
interest in such property that the debtor does not 
hold. 
(emphasis added). Thus, had the trust arrangement 
between Granada and the Partnership been a matter 
of public record on the petition date, it is clear that 
only a legal interest and not an equitable interest in 
the property would have become property of the 
estate. However, the trustee is arguing that title to 
the property should be quieted in the estate not 
under § 541(a)(1) or (2), but pursuant to § 541(a)(3) 
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or (4). 
Section 541(a)(4) includes as property of the estate 
"[a]ny interest in property preserved for the benefit 
of ... the estate under section ... 551 of this title." 
Section 551, in turn, provides that "[a]ny transfer 
avoided under section ... 544 ... is preserved for the 
benefit of the estate but *509 only with respect to 
property of the estate." Likewise, § 541(a)(3) 
includes as property of the estate "[a]ny interest in 
property that the trustee recovers under section ... 
550." Section 550 provides that the trustee may 
recover interests in property to the extent that they 
are avoided under § 544. Therefore, even if the 
defendants' argument that § 541(d) is an express 
limitation on the trustee's avoiding powers is 
correct, § 541(d) by its express terms would not 
apply to this case. 
Finally, the court turns to the defendants' argument 
itself to consider the relative roles of § 544(a)(3) and 
§ 541(d). In support of their position, the 
defendants rely on dicta of two cases. In United 
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 103 
S.Ct. 2309, 2313, n. 8, 10, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983) 
(emphasis added), the Supreme Court stated: 
The legislative history indicates that Congress 
intended to exclude from the estate property of 
others in which the debtor had some minor interest 
such as a lien or bare legal title. 
We do not now decide the outer boundaries of the 
bankruptcy estate. We note only that Congress 
plainly excluded property of others held by the 
debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the 
petition. 
The Supreme Court was not dealing with the 
interplay between § 544 and § 541; and there is no 
indication in Whiting Pools that the Court had in 
mind an unrecorded interest held in trust. In the 
present case, had the trust interest been of public 
record, the foregoing statement of the Court would 
accurately describe the operation of § 541(d). 
The other dictum relied on by the defendants is 
found in In re Quality Hoistein Leasing, 752 F.2d 
1009, 1013-14 (5th Cir.1985), wherein the court 
stated: 
As a general rule, it must be held that section 
541(d) prevails over the trustee's strong-arm 
powers. Although those powers allow a trustee to 
assert rights that the debtor itself could not claim 
to property, Congress did not mean to authorize a 
bankruptcy estate to benefit from property that the 
debtor did not own. Where state law impresses 
property that a debtor holds with a constructive 
trust in favor of another, and the trust attaches 
prior to the petition date, the trust beneficiary 
normally may recover its equitable interest in the 
property through bankruptcy court proceedings. 
(footnotes omitted). The court in that case dealt 
with a version of § 541(d) prior to its amendment in 
1984. At that time, the scope of § 541(d) arguably 
extended to all of § 541(a). In response to cases 
like Quality Holstein, Congress in 1984 amended the 
language of § 541(d), limiting its scope to § 
541(a)(1) and (2), as noted above. Therefore, the 
analysis of Quality Holstein is no longer consistent 
with the language of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The court believes the proper analysis concerning § 
541(d) and § 544 is set forth in In re Great Plains 
Western Ranch Co., 38 B.R. 899 
(Bankr.C.D.Cal.1984). The court there noted that 
to limit property of the estate to the prepetition 
property rights of the debtor is "only a partial 
analysis." Id. at 903. The court correctly observed 
that the concept of property of the estate has been 
expanded to include rights of creditors and the rights 
and powers of a bona fide purchaser: 
The strong-arm clause may be read as relying on 
the principle of ostensible ownership-the principle 
that, other things being equal, what the creditor 
sees ought to be what the creditor gets. There 
seem to be at least two important reasons why the 
idea of ostensible ownership bulks so large in 
bankruptcy law. First, it helps to police against 
fraud on the part of debtors-fraud that may occur 
with or without the collusion of creditors. 
Secondly, quite apart from any imputation of 
fraud, it helps to permit the kind of reliance said to 
be essential to a dynamic commercial economy. 
And that is why Section 541 does not end the 
inquiry in this case. Even conceding that the 
property rights of the estate are derivative from 
the property *510 rights of the debtor, still the 
trustee enjoys additional powers quite independent 
of his powers under Section 541, and in no way 
derivative from the debtor's rights at state law. 
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Failure to consider Section 544 together with 
Section 541 may lead to misleading generalizations 
and sometimes to unsound results.... 
Id. at 904-05 (citations omitted). 
The defendants argue that to so construe § 541(d) 
makes it surplusage. The court cannot agree. Had 
the Partnership's interest been of public record, § 
541(d) would operate to limit property of the estate 
to bare legal title. Since it was not, § 544(a)(3) 
operates to cut off the Partnership's unrecorded 
equitable interest. 
Principles of Equity. 
Finally, the Partnership argues that it would be 
inequitable to allow the trustee to avoid the 
Partnership's interest and create a beneficial interest 
in Granada which never existed and which Granada 
did not assert. Although the result may seem 
inequitable from the Partnership's standpoint and 
that of Keiter which took a conveyance from the 
Partnership, it is not inequitable as a legal policy 
and to creditors generally. As noted in Great 
Plains, 38 B.R. at 904-05, the strong-arm powers 
are designed to avoid fraud and to allow creditors to 
rely on record title. Creditors who extend credit to 
the debtor in reliance on record title would be 
unwilling to do so if their position could be eroded 
by secret liens and unrecorded equitable interests. 
The fact that Granada is willing to acknowledge the 
existence of an unrecorded interest is unavailing. 
Even in this case, there is an allegation that the 
Bodreros and Scherer & Horn relied on Granada's 
ownership in lending money to Granada. The court 
does not believe that its construction of § 544(a)(3) 
and § 541(d) is unfair or inequitable. Rather the 
court believes that such a construction is necessary 
to effectuate the stated policies of bankruptcy 
administration. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the trustee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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4 Utah 2d 47 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
In the Matter of the ESTATE of Harry OSTLER, 
deceased. 
Allie S OSTLER and Harry R. Ostler, executors, 
Respondents, 
v. 
S I \ FE I AX COMMISSION of Utah, Appellant, 
No. 8269. 
July 23, 1955. 
In the matter of a decedent's estate. From a 
decree of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, David T. Lewis, J., fixing the inheritance 
tax as contended for by the executors under 
decedent's will, the State Tax Commission and 
decedent's son, as a residuary beneficiary under the 
will, appealed. The Supreme Court, McDonough, 
C. J., held that a claim of decedent's widow, 
renouncing will, to distributive share of one-third of 
all of realty possessed by decedent during marriage, 
should be allowed, if decedent, at any time during 
marriage, was seized of real property held in his 
own right or conveyed to partnership of husband and 
wife without release of wife's interest therein, so as 
to require exclusion of one-third of value of 
decedent's interest in such property from gross 
estate for inheritance tax purposes, as contended by 
executors, but that such property, if brought into 
firm by wife as her contribution thereto, became 
partnership property and was converted to 
personalty, to which her interest as wife would not 
attach, on husband's death. 
Decree reversed and case remanded for further 
proceedings. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Partnership <®^68(2) 
289 — 
289II The Firm, Its Name, Powers, and Property 
289k68 Partnership Real Estate 
289k68(2) Real Estate Considered as Personal 
Property. 
Both English rule of "out and out conversion" of 
partnership's real property to personalty on a 
partner's death and American rule of "equitable 
conversion pro tanto" are generally interpreted to 
grant equitable right of survivorship for purpose of 
winding up partnership's affairs and subjecting its 
real or personal property to its creditors' claims 
before division and distribution to surviving partner 
and deceased partner's heirs, so that real property, 
for such limited purpose, is considered as 
personalty, but after payment of firm debts, realty 
resumes its historical incidents, including dower and 
curtesy rights, for distribution under American rule, 
whereas English rule distributes same property as 
personalty. 
[2] Partnership <®=>68(2) 
289 
289II The Firm, Its Name, Powers, and Property 
289k68 Partnership Real Estate 
289k68(2) Real Estate Considered as Personal 
Property. 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] Taxation <®==>895(6) 
371 
371XIII Inheritance and Gift Taxes 
371XIII(A) Legacy, Inheritance and Transfer 
Taxes 
371k894 Appraisement or Other Valuation 
371k895 In General 
371k895(6) Deductions in General. 
A claim of testator's widow, renouncing will, to 
distributive share of third of all real property 
possessed by testator during marriage, should be 
allowed under statute, so as to require exclusion of 
fair value of testator's interest in realty used in 
spouses' partnership business from gross estate for 
inheritance tax purposes, if testator was seized or 
real property held in his own right at any time 
during marriage or conveyed to partnership without 
release of wife's interest therein, but if property was 
brought into firm by wife as her contribution 
thereto, it became partnership property and was 
converted to personalty, to which her interest as 
wife would not attach, on husband's death, so as to 
require inclusion of third of value of such interest in 
estate for tax purposes. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-5, 
48-1-22, 48-1-23, 48-1-39, 74-4-3. 
*797 [4 Utah 2d 48] Harley W. Gustin, Pugsley, 
Hayes & Rampton, C. Preston Allen, Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
McCullough, Boyce & McCulloiijJi, Sail Like 
City, for respondents. 
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McDONOUGH, Chief Justice. 
The widow of Harry Ostler, Allie S. Ostler, and a 
son, Harry R. Ostler, were named as his executors 
in his will. Since Mrs. Ostler elected to renounce 
her husband's will and take instead the distributive 
share of one-third of all real property possessed by 
him during the marriage under U.C.A.1953, 74-4-3, 
the executors excluded from their computation for 
the Utah State Inheritance Tax an item of $13,600, 
representing one-third of the value of the deceased's 
interest in real property used in the business of 
Ostler Candy Company. The State Tax Commission 
gave notice that this amount must be included in the 
gross estate for tax purposes and the executors filed 
a petition in the lower court for the purpose of fixing 
the inheritance tax. A hearing was had and the 
court entered a decree fixing the tax as contended 
for by the executors. 
The Tax Commission appealed from this decree 
and was joined by the son, Harry R. Ostler, in his 
individual capacity, as a residuary beneficiary under 
the will. 
We have no transcript of the proceedings below 
and the entire record consists of the pleadings of the 
executors only and the findings of the trial court. 
Many pertinent facts must be gleaned from 
statements, to which no objections were taken, in 
the appeal briefs of the parties. 
The property with which we are here concerned is 
recorded in the name of Allie S. Ostler, respondent, 
the widow of Harry [4 Utah 2d 49] Ostler. The 
record title has so appeared for a number of years, 
but in 1949 Mrs. Ostler and her husband executed 
an instrument entitled 'Agreement and Declaration 
of Interest,' which described the premises and stated 
that 'the interest of Harry Ostler in the whole of said 
business, including the aforesaid real property, is an 
undivided fifty percent (50%) thereof and that the 
interest of Allie S. Ostler in the whole of said 
business, including the aforesaid real property, is an 
undivided fifty percent (50%) thereof.' 
Respondents' petition to the lower court alleged that 
since the date of that instrument the property has 
been listed as a partnership asset and the business 
has been conducted as a partnership and the lower 
court so found. 
[1] The character of partnership property upon the 
death of a partner at the common law is a question 
which has occasioned much litigation, the courts 
taking two views, the English rule of 'out and out 
conversion' of realty to personalty, and the 
American rule of 'equitable conversion pro tanto.' 
Despite their denomination, both rules have been 
used by different courts at different times in both 
countries. Both rules are generally interpreted to 
grant an equitable right of survivorship for the 
purpose of winding up the affairs of the partnership 
and subjecting the property, real or personal, to the 
claims of creditors of the firm, before division and 
distribution to the surviving partner and the heirs of 
the deceased partner. Thus, real property, for that 
limited purpose, is considered as personalty; but, 
after firm debts have been paid, realty resumes its 
historical incidents, including dower and curtesy 
rights, for distribution under the American rule, 
whereas, the English rule distributes the same 
property as personalty. See 25 A.L.R. annotations, 
page 389 ff. 
Proponents of each view have claimed for their 
theory simplicity of administration, *798 Darrow 
v. Calkins, 154 N.Y. 503, 49 N.E. 61, 48 L.R.A. 
299; cf. Darby v. Darby, 3 Drew 495, 61 
Eng.Reprint 992, and a closer adherence to the 
intention of the partners, Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 
557, 4 S.W. 56; cf. Pierce's Adm'r v. Trigg's 
Heirs, 10 Leigh, Va., 406. 
In 1890, England enacted the Partnership Act 
1890, 53 and 54 Vict. Chap. 39, declaring the rule, 
in accordance with the majority of her reported 
cases to be: 
'* * * where land or any heritable interest therein 
has become partnership property, it shall, unless 
the contrary intention appears, be treated as 
between the partners (including the representative 
of a deceased partner), and also as between the 
heirs of a deceased partner and his executors or 
administrators as personal or movable, and not real 
or heritable, estate.' 
This statute clearly settled the debate in England, 
but the American courts continued to split their 
decisions along the two lines, finding it necessary to 
engraft upon [4 Utah 2d 50] each rule many 
exceptions to reach an equitable result in hard cases. 
In 1914, the Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform 
Partnership Act, which was adopted by Pennsylvania 
and Wisconsin in 1915. At present, the laws of 33 
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states and Alaska contain this act. 
Section 25 of the Act, our U.C.A.1953, 48-1-22, 
sets forth with particularity the incidents of a new 
tenancy, 'a tenant in partnership.' The 
Commissioners' note to that section, 7 U.L.A., 
Uniform Partnership Act, p. 144, delineates their 
reasons for this description, explaining that the 
courts had attempted to apply the ancient concepts of 
co-tenancy as joint tenancy or tenancy in common 
even where they were inapplicable to the partnership 
relation: 
'The Commissioners, however, believe that the 
proper way to end the confusion which has arisen 
out of the attempt to treat partners as joint tenants, 
is to recognize the fact that the rights of a partner 
as co-owner with his partners of specific 
partnership property should depend on the 
necessities of the partnership relation. In short, 
that the legal incidents of the tenancy in 
partnership are not necessarily those of any other 
co-ownership. 
In the clauses of this section these incidents of 
tenancy in partnership are stated with several 
practical results of value. In the first place the law 
is greatly simplified in expression. In the second 
place the danger of the courts reaching an 
inequitable conclusion by refusing to modify the 
results of applying the legal incidents of joint 
tenancy to the partnership relation is done away 
with. Finally, ground is laid for the simplification 
of a procedure in those cases where the separate 
creditor desires to secure satisfaction of his 
debtor's interest in the partnership.' 
By U.C.A.1953, 48-1-22, the incidents of a 
tenancy in partnership are thus described: 
'(1) A partner is coowner with his partners of 
specific partnership property holding as a tenant in 
partnership. 
'(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that: 
'(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this 
chapter and to any agreement between the 
partners, has an equal right with his partners to 
possess specific partnership property for 
partnership purposes; but he has no right to 
possess such property for any other purpose 
without the consent of his partners. 
'(b) A partner's right in specific partnership 
property is not assignable, except in connection 
with the assignment of rights of all the partners in 
the same property. 
'(c) A partner's right in specific partnership 
property is not subject [4 Utah 2d 51] to 
attachment or execution, except on a claim against 
the partnership. When partnership property is 
attached for a partnership debt, the partners, or 
any *799 of them, or the representative of a 
deceased partner, can not claim any right under the 
homestead or exemption laws. 
'(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific 
partnership property vests in the surviving partner 
or partners, except where the deceased was the last 
surviving partner, when his right in such property 
vests in his legal representatives. Such surviving 
partner or partners, or the legal representatives of 
the last surviving partner, has no right to possess 
the partnership property for any but a partnership 
purpose. 
'(e) A partner's right in specific partnership 
property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or 
allowances to widows, heirs or next of kin.' 
(Emphasis added.) 
Ordinarily, the last quoted portion of this section 
would appear clearly to exclude the widow's rights 
in partnership realty, but respondent argues that 
dower and curtesy were abolished in this state in 
1888, U.C.A.1953, 74-4-9, and that U.C.A.1953, 
74-4-3, granting a wife's distributive share in one 
third of her husband's real property is unaffected by 
the Uniform Partnership Act. It is for this reason 
that we must consider whether by the Uniform 
Partnership Act the legislature intended to adopt the 
English rule of conversion of real property into 
personalty when it is partnership property. If so, 
then Mr. Ostler owned no real property in the firm 
to which his wife's interest could attach. Certainly, 
the above section would indicate such an intention 
and this view is buttressed by other sections from 
the Act: 
'48-1-23. A partner's interest in the partnership is 
his share of the profits and surplus, and the same 
is personal property.' 
'48-1-39. When any partner retires or dies and the 
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business is continued * * * he or his legal 
representatives as against such persons or 
partnership may have the value of his interest at 
the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall 
receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to 
the value of his interest in the dissolved 
partnership * * *.' 
Courts which have considered the changes brought 
about by the aodption of the Uniform Partnership 
Act have concluded that the legislative intention was 
to enact the English rule. Cultra v. Cultra, 188 
Tenn. 506, 221 S.W.2d 533; Wharf v. Wharf, 306 
111. 79, 137 N.E. 446. And, with the exception of 
one state, the courts have unanimously held that 
marital rights in specific partnership property have 
been excluded by the Act, In re Dumarest's Estate, 
146 Misc. 442, 262 N.Y.S. 450; State v. Elsbury, 
63 Nev. 463, 175 P.2d 430, 169 A.L.R. 364. The 
single case cited to us taking [4 Utah 2d 52] a 
contrary view under the Act is Hannold v. Hannold, 
4 N.J.Super. 381, 67 A.2d 352, which followed 
cases determined in New Jersey prior to the 
statutory enactment and merely considered one 
section of the Act. The reasoning that the 
legislature attempted to give some attributes of legal 
entity to a partnership and thus stabilize joint 
business ventures by making its property less subject 
to individual claims is far more compelling. 
[2] The scant record before us limits our view of 
this case, but respondent now argues that the 
property involved was never partnership property 
but rather real estate which her husband held in his 
own name for use of the partnership. It appears 
undisputed that a partnership existed, but we have 
no means of determining whether the agreement 
between husband and wife initiated it in 1949 or 
whether the conveyance of the property to Harry 
Ostler preceded the formation of the firm. This 
property was not acquired with partnership funds so 
as to bring it within the second paragraph of 
U.C.A.1953, 48-1-5, defining partnership property, 
and whether or not it was originally brought into the 
partnership stock or acquired on account of the 
partnership must depend upon facts not properly 
before us in this proceeding. If Harry Ostler was at 
any time during this marriage seized of real property 
held in his own right, or conveyed to the partnership 
*800. without a release of Mrs. Ostler's interest, 
her claim should be allowed under U.C.A.1953, 
74-4-3. If the property was brought into the firm by 
Mrs. Ostler as her contribution, then, of course, it 
became partnership property and was converted to 
personalty, to which her interest as a wife would not 
attach. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
Each party to bear his own costs. 
CROCKETT, WADE and WORTHEN, JJ., and 
NORSETH, District Judge, concur. 
HENRIOD, J., having disqualified himself, did not 
participate herein. 
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*868 791 P.2d 868 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Robert B. KLINGER and Karol J. Klinger, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
Eugene E. KIGHTLY, Helen L. Kightly, Harry D. 
Kreis, Peggy 
R. Kreis Barnett, United Farm Agency, Inc., and 
Gerald W. Wilkerson, Defendants and Appellants. 
Eugene E. KIGHTLY, Helen L. Kightly, Harry D. 
Kreis, Peggy 
R. Kreis Barnett, Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Glen H. CALDER and John Doe Wilson, 
individually and dba 
Wilson & Calder, Third-Party Defendants and 
Appellees. 
No. 880003. 
March 22, 1990. 
After they were sued for rescission based on 
mutual mistake, property vendors asserted third-
party claim against surveyor for negligence. The 
Seventh District Court, Salt Lake County, Dennis L. 
Draney, J., dismissed third-party complaint, and 
vendors appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., 
held that "discovery rule" applied to surveyor 
negligence statute of limitations. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, Associate C.J., concurred and filed 
opinion. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Judgment <©=> 181(2) 
228 — 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228kl81 Grounds for Summary Judgment 
228kl81(2) Absence of Issue of Fact. 
[See headnote text below] 
[1] Judgment <®^ 181(3) 
228 —-
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228kl81 Grounds for Summary Judgment 
228kl81(3) Presence of Question of Law. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
[2] Limitation of Actions <@=>95(1) 
241 — 
24III Compulation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(l) In General; What Constitutes 
Discovery. 
Under "discovery rule," cause of action does not 
accrue and statute of limitations does not begin to 
run until plaintiff learns of, or, in exercise of 
reasonable diligence, should have learned of, facts 
which give rise to cause of action; rule functions as 
exception to normal application of statute of 
limitations. 
[3] Limitation of Actions <@==> 199(1) 
241 — 
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review 
241kl99 Questions for Jury 
241kl99(l) In General. 
Whether discovery rule applies to cause of action 
and its statute of limitations is "question of law" and 
not of fact. 
[4] Judgment <§===> 181(2) 
228 — 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228kl81 Grounds for Summary Judgment 
228kl81(2) Absence of Issue of Fact. 
Questions of law may be disposed of through 
summary judgment if there are no outstanding 
questions of material fact to be discerned by the trier 
of fact. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
[5] Limitation of Actions <@=>96(2) 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
241k96 Mistake as Ground for Relief 
241k96(2) Discovery of Mistake. 
[See headnote texi below| 
[5] Limitation of Actions <S==> 100(1) 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
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Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
241k98 Fraud as Ground for Relief 
241kl00 Discovery of Fraud 
241kl00(l) In General. 
Statute under which limitations period governing 
actions for relief on grounds of fraud or mistake 
does not accrue until discovery of facts constituting 
fraud or mistake did not apply to property vendors' 
negligence cause of action against surveyor. 
U.C.A. 1953, 78-12-26(3). 
[6] Limitation of Actions <@=>95(3) 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(3) Nature of Harm or Damage, in 
General. 
"Discovery rule" applied to statute of limitations 
governing property vendors' negligence cause of 
action against surveyor; action would be completely 
barred if rule was not applied, and evidence 
pertaining to performance of survey was not so stale 
as to preclude proper defense. 
Ephraim H. Frankhauser, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
Rick J. Sutherland, Robert F. Babcock, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellees. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
This case is on appeal from the Seventh District 
Court, Duchesne County. The trial court found for 
plaintiffs and rescinded a land purchase contract 
based upon mutual mistake. Defendants were 
allowed to bring a third-party complaint against the 
surveyor of the property, Glen H. Calder, John Doe 
Wilson, and Wilson & Calder (hereinafter 
"Calder"), who were eventually granted a summary 
judgment dismissal on the basis that the statute of 
limitation *869 had run for a claim against the 
surveyor of the land pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25(2) (1987). We reverse the trial court's 
ruling of summary judgment with regard to the 
Kightlys' third-party complaint against Calder. 
FACTS 
In June 1971, defendants purchased a parcel of 
unimproved real property located in Duchesne 
County, Utah, from Strawberry River Estates 
(hereinafter "Strawberry") by uniform real estate 
contract. After the purchase, defendants hired 
Wilson & Calder to survey the property, and on 
May 15, 1972, defendants received a certificate of 
survey signed by Glen H. Calder, certifying the 
location and dimensions of the property and that 
there were no encroachments on it. 
Defendants used the property for camping and 
other recreational purposes between 1971 and 1983. 
On July 23, 1983, they sold the property to the 
Klingers by a warranty deed containing the 
description in the warranty deed from Strawberry to 
defendants and confirmed in the certificate of survey 
obtained from Calder. 
In February 1985, the Klingers discovered a 
discrepancy in the boundaries of the property. The 
Klingers brought suit against defendants for fraud 
and misrepresentation but later amended their 
complaint to a cause of action for mutual mistake. 
Defendants were granted leave from the trial court 
to file a third-party complaint against Calder for 
negligence in conducting the survey. 
The trial court granted a rescission of the sale 
contract from defendants to the Klingers and a 
summary judgment dismissal to Calder on the basis 
that the statute of limitation had run against 
defendants' third-party cause of action pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) (1987). Defendants 
obtained a settlement with the Klingers subsequent 
to trial and before appeal; therefore, the only issues 
on appeal are (1) whether the trial court properly 
used summary judgment to dismiss the third-party 
claim, and (2) whether the trial court should have 
applied the discovery rule to toll the statute of 
limitation with regard to defendants' third-party 
claim against Calder. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[1] Defendants' first contention is that the trial 
court erroneously granted summary judgment to 
Calder because defendants' reliance upon the 
"discovery rule" raised an issue of fact that could 
not properly be disposed of through summary 
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
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law. (FN1) The issue is whether the application of 
the discovery rule is a question of law or of fact. 
[2] [3] The discovery rule determines when a cause 
of action accrues in certain actions. Under the 
discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue and 
the statute of limitation does not begin to run until 
the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the facts 
which give rise to the cause of action. (FN2) The 
discovery rule functions as an exception to the 
normal application of a statute of limitation. (FN3) 
Whether the discovery rule applies to a cause of 
action is, like the statute of limitation, a question of 
law, not of fact. 
[4] Questions of law may be disposed of through 
summary judgment if there are no outstanding 
questions of material fact to *870 be discerned by 
the trier of fact. (FN4) Defendants' assertion that 
questions of fact existed with regard to whether the 
discovery rule should be applied to toll the 
applicable statute of limitation is erroneous. The 
trial court was therefore correct in ruling as a matter 
of law on the issue of whether the discovery rule 
should be applied to the applicable statute of 
limitation. 
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
[5] Defendants' third-party complaint states a 
cause of action for "negligence and failure of third-
party defendants to properly survey and locate the 
subject property for survey." Defendants assert 
that their complaint states a cause of action in 
negligence, and yet they cite Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-26(3) (1987), which states, "Within three 
years: ... (3) an action for relief on the ground of 
fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in 
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or 
mistake." 
Section 78-12-26(3) and actions alleging fraud or 
mistake are usually based on a contract, not a 
negligence, cause of action. Indeed, Utah case law 
reveals that this section has been applied only to the 
reformation of contracts, (FN5) not to actions in 
negligence. We hold that section 78-12-26(3) is 
inapplicable to defendants' cause of action. 
We note that Utah recognizes the theory of 
"negligent misrepresentation" with regard to 
surveyors. (FN6) No matter how the cause of 
action is characterized, whether in tort or contract, 
it would lapse under any other Utah statute of 
limitation without application of the discovery rule. 
DISCOVERY RULE 
[6] Defendants' second contention is that the trial 
court erred in refusing to apply the discovery rule to 
the statute of limitation applicable to their cause of 
action for surveyor negligence. (FN7) Because the 
issue of whether the discovery rule applies to toll the 
statute of limitation is a question of law, we need 
show no deference to the trial court's ruling on 
appeal, but we review it for correctness. (FN8) 
Observing how the discovery rule is applied 
nationally to the issue of surveyor negligence or 
breach of contract does not indicate any dispositive 
national trend. A number of jurisdictions have 
applied the discovery rule to surveyor negligence, 
(FN9) *871 while others have rejected it. (FN10) 
Legislative enactments are even more widespread. 
(FN11) 
Some arguments in favor of applying the discovery 
rule to cases of surveyor negligence include the 
following: (1) an innocent reliant party should not 
carry the burden of a surveyor's professional 
mistakes; (FN12) (2) "recovery ... by a reliant user 
whose ultimate use was foreseeable will promote 
cautionary techiques [sic] among surveyors"; (FN 13 
) (3) "[t]he passage of time does not entail the 
danger of a fraudulent, false, frivolous, speculative 
or uncertain claim.... Further, under the said facts 
it does not appear possible that by reason of the 
passage of time [the] defendant's testimonial proof 
of a defense would be made more difficult"; (FN14) 
(4) it is illogical to require the plaintiff to hire two 
or three surveyors to assure that the first survey is 
correct; (FN 15) (5) strict application of the statute 
of limitation would be unjust; (FN16) and (6) the 
plaintiff lacks the means or ability to ascertain that a 
wrong has been committed. (FN17) 
Arguments in opposition to application of the 
discovery rule in surveyor negligence cases include 
(1) "the onerousness of potential liability continuing 
throughout one's professional life, the prejudice 
wrought by the passage of time not only in terms of 
defending against claims but also in factually 
ascertaining the true cause or causes of injuries"; 
(FN 18) and (2) "mere ignorance of the existence of 
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a cause of action does not prevent the running of the 
statute of limitations." (FN19) 
*872 Because compelling arguments exist on both 
sides regarding the applicability or inapplicability of 
the discovery rule, we must seek a way to balance 
the interests of each party. In Myers, we listed 
three circumstances under which the discovery rule 
should be applied and we adopted a balancing test 
for application of the rule. The three circumstances 
set out in Myers whereby this Court will apply the 
discovery rule are where (1) the legislature has 
adopted the discovery rule by statute; (2) there is 
proof of concealment or misleading by the 
defendant; and (3) application of the general statute 
of limitation rule would be irrational or unjust. 
(FN20) Defendants do not assert either of the first 
two parts of the test, but they do seek an equitable 
ruling as to whether the application of the discovery 
rule would prevent an irrational or unjust result. 
In Myers, we applied the balancing test to evaluate 
whether the application of the discovery rule would 
be irrational or unjust. The plaintiffs in Myers were 
guardians of a minor who was killed in an 
automobile accident. However, they were unable to 
discover that the victim was their ward until after 
the statute of limitation for wrongful death had run. 
We held that the discovery rule should be applied 
where "[t]he hardship the statute of limitations 
would impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances 
of [the] case outweighed any prejudice to the 
defendant from difficulties of proof caused by the 
passage of time." (FN21) This balancing test is a 
question of law. (FN22) 
Applying the balancing test to the present case, we 
find the obvious prejudice to defendants is that 
without application of the discovery rule, their cause 
of action is completely barred regardless of whether 
their complaint is in contract or in tort. This is so 
despite the fact that there are no equities that weigh 
against them. They had no reason to suspect that 
the survey was inaccurate, nor did they refrain from 
doing anything that might reasonably have been 
expected of them that could have disclosed the error. 
On the other hand, the prejudice to defendants is 
that the record reflects that no survey records or 
notes are available after fourteen years and, 
presumably, the memories of the members of the 
survey party have dimmed. The only existing 
record of the survey is the survey certificate signed 
by third-party defendant Glen H. Calder that 
specifies the boundaries of the property. While the 
record reflects that Calder himself may not have 
been a member of the survey party, as signor on the 
survey certificate he is responsible for its content, is 
still actively engaged in the practice of surveying, 
and is available for testimony. 
Utilizing the balancing test and being conscious of 
the purposes of statutes of limitation, we hold that 
under the facts of this case the evidence is not so 
stale or remote as to outweigh the prejudice to 
defendants of having their claim barred by the 
statute of limitation. The discovery rule should be 
applied to the statute of limitation for surveyor 
negligence under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2). 
I he ruling of the trial court in favor of summary 
judgment for third-party defendants is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with our decision. 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (concurring) 
1 concur but write to observe that the application of 
the discovery rule here is consistent with the 
application of the discovery rule in a case of alleged 
medical malpractice, Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 
2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968) (broken surgical needle 
left in body). Since that decision, the legislature has 
enacted Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, shortening the 
period in which a *873. malpractice action may be 
brought against a health care provider to two years 
(subject to exceptions) after the patient discovers, or 
should discover, his injury, but not to exceed four 
years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect, or occurrence. No similar enactment has 
been made by the legislature with regard to alleged 
surveyor malpractice such as we are confronted with 
in the instant case. Thus the discovery rule adopted 
in Christiansen v. Rees would seem to be applicable 
here. Our action is also consistent with the 
application of the discovery rule in a legal 
malpractice action decided recently by our Court of 
Appeals, Merkley v. Beaslin, 778 P.2d 16 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989). 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
(FN1.) Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 
1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 
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P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986). 
(FN2.) Bngham Young University v. Paulsen 
Construction Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Utah 
1987); Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman 
Associates, Inc., 35 Wash.App. 318, 321, 666 
P.2d 937, 940 (1983); Metropolitan Services, 
Inc. v. Spokane, 32 Wash.App. 714, 720, 649 
P.2d 642, 646 (1982). 
(FN3.) See generally Becton Dickinson & Co. v. 
Reese, 668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983); Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981). 
(FN4.) Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
(FN5.) See Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah 
1975); Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 
158 P. 684 (1916). 
(FN6.) Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59-60 
(Utah 1986). 
(FN7.) The trial court applied Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25(2), which states, "Within four years: ... 
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for 
by law." The trial court found that a cause of 
action for surveyor negligence did not fall 
specifically under any existing Utah statute. We 
note that subsequent to the filing of this action, the 
Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25.5 (Supp.1989) and created subsection 
(l)(b), which states: "In an action regarding 
property boundary surveys, the seven-year time 
period commences when the property survey is 
either recorded in the county recorder's office or 
filed in the county surveyor's office under Section 
17-23-17." 
(FN8.) Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 713 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
(FN9.) See Cristich v. Allen Engineering, Inc., 458 
So.2d 76 (Fla.App.1984) (discovery rule implied 
where court did not apply the statute of limitation 
for surveyor negligence until the error had been 
discovered as directed by the statute); Rozny v. 
Marnul, 43 I11.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) 
(where the facts and statute are essentially on point 
with the present case, the court found that the 
discovery rule applied) (as modified on denial of 
rehearing); Raffel v. Perley, 14 Mass.App. 242, 
437 N.E.2d 1082 (1982) (trial court's dismissal 
reversed on grounds that plaintiff should have been 
able to present evidence that claims for relief did 
not accrue until plaintiff discovered error in 
survey); E.A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo 
Development Corp., 82 N.J. 160, 411 A.2d 697 
(1980) (where survey was performed in 1954, 
cause of action did not accrue until plaintiff 
discovered error in 1972); New Market Poultry 
Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 N.J. 419, 241 A.2d 
633 (1968) (court held that discovery rule applied 
where surveyor conducted an erroneous survey in 
1952 that was not discovered until 1963); 
Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman Associates, 
Inc., 35 Wash.App. 318, 666 P.2d 937 (1983) 
(confirming discovery rule for surveyor negligence 
established in Kundahl ); Kundahl v. Barnett, 5 
Wash.App. 227, 486 P.2d 1164 (1971) (action 
against land surveyor for negligence in making 
survey did not accrue until injured party 
discovered or had reasonable grounds to discover 
error in survey). 
(FN10.) See Lembert v. Gilmore, 312 A.2d 335 
(Del.Super. 1973) (court viewed cause of action as 
one in contract and held that cause accrued when 
contract was breached, i.e., when the stakes were 
erroneously placed by the surveyor); Howell v. 
Betts, 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962) 
(where survey was performed in 1934 and error 
was discovered in 1958, court found time too 
remote to hold a surveyor liable). 
*873_ (FN11.) See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 16-56-112 
(1987) (five-year statute of limitation from 
substantial completion of the project); 
Cal.Civ.P.Code §§ 337.1(a), 337.15(a) (West 
1982) (section 337.1(a)—four-year patent survey 
defect; section 337.15(a)~ten-year latent survey 
defect); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-80-105 (1987) 
(within three years after discovery, ten-year statute 
of repose); Del.Code Ann. tit. 10 § 8122 (1974) 
(to mark and bound lands, seven years from the 
date of return of commissions); 111.Rev.Stat. ch. 
110, t 13-222 (1984) (four years from the date 
plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
erroneous survey); Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code 
Ann. § 5-112 (1989) (three years after discovery 
or twenty-year statute of repose, whichever occurs 
first); Mich.Comp.Laws § 600.5838 (1987) 
(accrues when professional relationship ends or 
must be brought within six months of discovery); 
Minn.Stat. § 541.052 (1988) (two years after 
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discovery or ten-year statute of repose, whichever 
occurs first); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.098 (1986) (five 
years after date of discovery of surveyor 
negligence); Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-208 (1988) 
(ten years after completion of the project but may 
be applicable only to projects for construction or 
improvements); Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.135 (1987) (ten 
years after completion but may be applicable to 
projects for construction or improvements only); 
Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 42, § 5537 (Purdon 1981 & 
Supp.1989) (four years from date of discovery but 
in no event later than twenty-one years); 
Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-114 (1980) (four years 
from the date survey is recorded on plat); 
Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.011 
(Vernon Supp.1990) (ten years after the date 
survey is complete); Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.310 
(1989) (six years after completion but may be 
limited to improvements and construction); 
W.Va.Code § 55-2-6a (1981 & Supp.1989) (ten 
years after owner accepts or occupies, but may be 
limited to improvements and construction only); 
Wis.Stat. § 893.37 (1987-1988) (six years after 
completion of the survey). 
(FN12.) Rozny, 250 N.E.2d at 663. 
(FN13.) Id. 
(FN14.) New Market Poultry Farms, 241 A.2d at 
Page 6 
636. 
(FN15.) Kundahl, 486 P.2d at 1167. 
(FN16.) Id.; see also E.A. Williams, Inc., 411 
A.2d at 700; Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 
87 (Utah 1981). 
(FN17.) Hudesman, 666 P.2d at 940 (citing U.S. 
Oil & Refining Co. v. Department of Ecology, 96 
Wash.2d 85, 92, 633 P.2d 1329, 1334 (1981)); 
see also Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. 
(FN18.) E.A. Williams, Inc., 411 A.2d at 701; see 
also Howell, 362 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Ultramares 
Corp. v. louche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 
(1931)); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) (quoting Order of 
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 
L.Ed. 788 (1944)); Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. 
(FN19.) Myers, 635 P.2d at 86 (citing Baker v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 114 
Cal.Rptr. 171 (1974)). 
(FN20.) Id. at 86. 
*873_ (FN21.) Id. at 87. 
(FN22.) Id. 
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Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, 
California. 
Reginald and June NORONHA, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
Richard and Mattie Mae STEWART, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. B020539. 
March 10, 1988. 
Review Denied May 26, 1988. 
Landowners brought action as result of neighbors' 
refusing to remove encroaching wall. The Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County, Florence T. Pickard, 
J., entered judgment for landowners, and neighbors 
appealed. The Court of Appeal, Rothman, J., 
assigned, held that neighbors obtained irrevocable 
license in property, though predecessor owner of 
property did not have title when he granted 
neighbors permission to build wall, where neighbors 
believed that predecessor was owner of property and 
predecessor subsequently became owner of property. 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Estoppel <® >^47 
156k47 
Fact that grantor did not own property at time he 
attempted to grant easement did not prevent grantees 
from asserting interest in property, where grantor 
subsequently became owner of property; under 
doctrine of after-acquired title, once grantor became 
owner of property, he and his successors were 
estopped from contesting passage of easement to 
grantees. West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1106. 
[2] Licenses <S==>59 
238k59 
License acts, for all purposes, as easement, 
estopping grantor and his successor from revoking 
it, where grantee has made substantial expenditures 
in reliance on license. 
[3] Licenses <®=>59 
238k59 
Reliance on license was not rendered unreasonable 
by licensees' making only one attempt to perfect 
easement in real property subject to license, such as 
would preclude license from becoming irrevocable. 
[4] Licenses <@=>59 
238k59 
Landowners' lack of knowledge of license in their 
property, granted by their predecessor, did not 
preclude license from becoming irrevocable as result 
of licensees' expending substantial effort in 
execution of license before predecessor acquired 
property. 
[5] Licenses <£=>58(1) 
238k58(l) 
Licensees obtained irrevocable license in real 
property, though landowners' predecessor did not 
own property at time he granted licensees 
permission to construct wall, where licensees 
erroneously believed that predecessor was owner 
and predecessor acquired title to property after wall 
was built. 
[6] Adjoining Landowners <®=>10(1) 
15kl0(l) 
[6] Easements <©==> 12(1) 
141kl2(l) 
[6] Easements <®=>19 
141kl9 
Generally, landowner has no natural right to 
unobstructed view and law is reluctant to imply such 
right, although right may be created by express 
easement between parties. 
[7] Licenses <£=>51 
238k51 
Landowners did not have right to unobstructed view 
of harbor, such as would require licensees to 
remove structures and foliage placed on encroached 
property, where no conditions were expressed 
limiting use that could be made of encroached 
property, other than height of wall. 
[8] Appeal and Error <®=> 1056.1(10) 
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30kl056.1(10) 
Landowners, asserting cross complaint for trespass, 
injury to timber, and conversion out of alleged 
cutting of their trees by surveyors employed by 
owners of adjacent lot, suffered no prejudice 
resulting from exclusion of evidence relating to trees 
landowners planted on different adjacent lot, where 
surveyor allegedly responsible for cutting trees had 
previously testified that only trees cut were on first 
adjacent lot. 
*487 **95 Frye & Spencer, and Richard C. 
Spencer, Los Angeles, for defendants and 
appellants. 
Brown, Baron & Gailen, and Scott Gailen, Los 
Angeles, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
ROTHMAN, Associate Justice, assigned. [FN*] 
FN* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial 
Council. 
Defendants appeal a judgment pertaining to an 
encroaching wall that defendants built on plaintiffs' 
property. We reverse in part. 
In 1978, defendants Richard and Mattie Stewart 
purchased a house in a newly constructed residential 
subdivision in San Pedro, the Terragona Homes. 
Defendants' lot, Lot No. 11, was adjacent to and 
down a slight slope from Lot No. 12 which would 
eventually be purchased by the plaintiffs. Shortly 
after moving in, defendants contacted the apparent 
owner of the *488 adjacent Lot No. 12--at that time, 
Lawrence Jett-about building a wall between their 
properties. Jett, along with two partners, had 
previously owned all the land in the undeveloped 
subdivision, but sold it to the developer who 
constructed the houses. As part of the sale, Jett 
was to get title to Lot 12 after a house was built on 
the property. At the time defendants approached 
him about constructing a wall, however, Jett was not 
the legal owner of Lot 12, but was merely entitled to 
it under contract. 
As plaintiffs admit in their brief, this fact was 
unknown to defendants who erroneously believed 
that Jett was the legal owner of the property. Jett, 
who was guaranteed Lot 12, was permitted to 
exercise complete control over the property and 
willingly agreed to allow defendants to build a wall. 
The point of contention in this case is the slope 
between Lots 11 and 12. Lot 11, belonging to the 
defendants, is slightly lower than Lot 12, with a 
tapering slope between the two which reaches three 
to four feet in height at the rear of the lots. This 
slope lies entirely within Lot 12 as the boundary 
between the properties runs along the bottom of the 
slope. 
Neither Jett nor the defendants wished to build a 
wall following the properties' actual boundaries 
along the bottom of the slope, however, as this 
would provide no privacy to either lot. Anyone 
standing on Lot 12 could look down into Lot 11 and 
anything more than two or three feet high on Lot 12 
would be visible over the wall. Jett, therefore, 
agreed to allow defendants to construct the wall 
along the top of the slope, thus leaving the slope on 
defendants' side of the wall and encroaching on Lot 
12 from about four inches in the front to eight feet 
in the back. 
Jett testified that he intended to grant defendants a 
written easement on the encroachment property and 
invited them to come around to his office to obtain 
the proper form. No written easement was given, 
and, in fact, Jett was not the legal owner of the 
property at the time he gave his permission to build 
the wall on Lot 12. Defendants thereafter 
constructed a specially reinforced wall along the top 
of the slope, paying the entire $8,000 cost 
themselves. 
After the wall was constructed, Jett obtained legal 
title to the property, but held the lot only five days 
before selling it to plaintiffs. Eight months after 
moving in, plaintiffs demanded that defendants tear 
down the wall at their own expense and restore the 
slope to them. Defendants refused and this case 
ensued. 
Upon hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled that 
defendants had no easement or license to construct 
the wall as Jett was not the legal owner of *489 the 
property at the time he gave his permission. 
Balancing the relative hardships, the court permitted 
the wall to remain standing until defendants sell the 
property, at which time it appears defendants must 
pay for the wall's removal. The defendants were 
also ordered to pay $5,680 to plaintiffs as damages 
for the use of the property and to **96 remove a 
Copr. © West 2001 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
245 Cal.Rptr. 94 
(Cite as: 199 Cal.App.3d 485, *489, 245 Cal.Rptr. 94, **96) 
Page 3 
gazebo constructed on the encroached property. 
I 
[1] In rendering its decision, the trial court relied 
on the time honored doctrine that no grantee can 
have better title than the grantor. Since Jett had no 
present interest in the property at the time he gave 
his permission to construct the wall, the court 
reasoned then that no interest in the property could 
have passed to the defendants. 
It has long been recognized, however, that if a 
grantor purports to convey an interest in land which 
the grantor does not own, but afterwards acquires, 
the interest passes to the grantee at the time the 
grantor obtains it. "The general rule is that if the 
grantor in a conveyance of real property has no title, 
a defective title, or an estate less than that which he 
assumed to grant, but subsequently he acquires the 
title or estate he purported to convey or perfects his 
title, the after-acquired or perfected title will inure 
to the grantee or his successors by way of estoppel, 
i.e., the grantor is estopped to deny that the after-
acquired title passed by his conveyance." (1 
Ogden's Revised California Real Property Law 
(Cont.Ed.Bar 1974) § 4.20, p. 142.) The effect "is 
the same as if it were written upon the face [or the 
instrument] that the grantor conveyed all the estate 
which he then possessed or which he might at any 
time thereafter acquire. [Citations.]" (Younger v. 
Moore (1909) 155 Cal. 767, 773, 103 P. 221; 
accord Warburton v. Kieferle (1955) 135 
Cal.App.2d 278, 284, 287 P.2d 1.) 
This doctrine of "after-acquired title" is recognized 
in California and has been partially codified into 
Civil Code section 1106, which provides: "Where a 
person purports by proper instrument to grant real 
property in fee simple, and subsequently acquires 
any title, or claim of title thereto, the same passes 
by operation of law to the grantee, or his 
successors." 
This statutory rule is limited to grants of fee simple 
and is therefore not applicable to the case at hand. 
[FN1] The common-law rule, however, survived 
*490 the enactment of the statute (1 Ogden's 
Revised California Real Property Law 
(Cont.Ed.Bar. 1974) § 420, p. 143), and is 
considerably broader: "[T]he common-law rule of 
after-acquired title is based upon the doctrine of 
estoppel, that is, that the grantor has led the grantee 
to believe that a certain estate or title was being 
conveyed. When the grantor subsequently acquires 
the title or estate he purported to transfer, he is 
estopped to deny its passage to the grantee. 
Therefore, the common-law rule is not limited to fee 
simple conveyances but applies to the transfer of any 
estate when the grantee initially receives a lesser 
interest than he was induced to believe he had 
received." (2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of 
California Real Estate (1977) Deeds, § 14:56, p. 
588; emphasis in original; fn. omitted.) 
FN1. Most of the California cases that have 
addressed this issue have also done so in the 
context of interests conveyed by deeds for an estate 
in fee simple and, therefore, are not relevant to the 
fact pattern presented here. (See, e.g., Schwenn v. 
Kaye (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 949, 202 Cal.Rptr. 
374; Klamath Land & Cattle Co. v. Roemer 
(1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 613, 91 Cal.Rptr. 112; 
Leggio v. Haggerty (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 873, 
881, 42 Cal.Rptr. 400.) 
Contrary to the trial court's finding, therefore, the 
fact that Jett did not own the property at the time he 
attempted to grant the easement does not prevent the 
defendants from asserting an interest in the land. 
Under the doctrine of after-acquired title, once Jett 
became the owner of the property, he and his 
successors were estopped from contesting the 
passage of the easement to the defendants. (6A 
Powell, The Law of Real Property (1982) % 921, p. 
84- 113; 1 Ogden's Revised California Real 
Property Law (Cont.Ed.Bar. 1974) § 13.21, pp. 
552-553.) 
[2] The plaintiffs argue that no easement exists that 
can pass to the defendants as Jett's permission to 
build the wall was never reduced to writing. While 
Jett's oral promise may have lacked the formal 
requirements necessary to create an easement, **97 
it undeniably constituted a license. [FN2] And 
where a party has made substantial expenditures in 
reliance on a license, the license acts, for all 
purposes, as an easement, estopping the grantor and 
his successor from revoking it. As the court 
observed in Cooke v. Ramponi (1952) 38 Cal.2d 
282, 286, 239 P.2d 638: "it is well settled in this 
state that 'where a licensee has entered under a parol 
license and has expended money, or its equivalent in 
labor, in the execution of the license, the license 
becomes irrevocable, the licensee will have a right 
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of entry upon the lands of the licensor for the 
purpose of maintaining his structures, or, in general, 
his rights under his license, and the license will 
continue for so long a time as the nature of it calls 
for.' " 
FN2. Arguably, this oral promise could have 
constituted an easement if executed and based upon 
a valuable consideration—in this case, defendants' 
promise to bear the entire cost of building the wall 
themselves. {Cooke v. Ramponi, supra, 38 Cal.2d 
at p. 289, 239 P.2d 638; Wilkes v. Brady (1927) 
84 Cal.App. 365, 369, 258 P. 108.) 
[3][4] While recognizing this, plaintiffs argue that 
defendants' reliance on the license was not 
reasonable since they made only one attempt to 
perfect an easement, and that plaintiffs should not be 
estopped from revoking the license as they had no 
notice that the license existed. Neither argument is 
*491 meritorious. First, there is nothing inherently 
unreasonable in a party's reliance on a promise or 
the failure to insist on a writing. Indeed, 
defendants made a far greater effort to perfect their 
interest here than is evidenced in other cases 
granting irrevocable licenses. (See Cooke v. 
Ramponi, supra, 38 Cal.2d 282, 239 P.2d 638; 
Stoner v. Zucker (1906) 148 Cal. 516, 83 P. 808.) 
Secondly, as to plaintiffs' claim that they were 
unaware that the wall was on their property, 
Lawrence Jett repeatedly testified that he informed 
plaintiffs of this fact and showed them the location 
of the actual boundary. Nor is plaintiffs' 
knowledge required for the license to become 
irrevocable. Once defendants have expended 
substantial effort in execution of the license, "the 
license will continue for so long a time as the nature 
of it calls for." (Cooke v. Ramponi, supra, 38 
Cal.2d at p. 286, 239 P.2d 638.) Defendants 
accomplished this before Jett became the owner of 
the property. Once Jett acquired the property, the 
license was binding on him and his successors in 
interest, the plaintiffs. 
[5] Plaintiffs finally argue that no estoppel should 
apply as defendants had notice that Jett was not the 
true owner of the property. "When the grantee has 
knowledge or notice that his grantor does not have 
full title to the land conveyed, he is not misled to his 
prejudice and the general rule of estoppel is not 
applied." (1 Ogden's Revised California Real 
Property Law (Cont.Ed.Bar 1974) § 422(b), p. 
145.) "Because the common-law rule is based upon 
estoppel, it does not apply in favor of a grantee who 
has notice or knowledge that the grantor does not 
have the full title which he purportedly conveyed." 
(2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of California Real 
Estate (1977) Deeds, § 14:56, p. 588; fh. omitted.) 
The plaintiffs admit in their brief, however, that the 
defendants erroneously believed that Jett was the 
owner of Lot 12. Moreover, defendant stated as 
much when asked who he believed the owner of Lot 
12 was. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred 
in determining that no irrevocable license existed. 
II 
In addition to those portions of its judgment relating 
to the wall and the use of the encroached land, the 
trial court also ordered defendants to remove a 
gazebo partially constructed on the disputed slope. 
The court stated: "Defendants not only built the 
wall, but a gazebo which as stated above also 
encroached on a portion of lot 12. They further 
wilfully and intentionally embellished the gazebo 
with trellises, large slats and heavy foliage. This 
appears to the court to be an effort to totally block 
the view the plaintiff would have of the harbor **98 
area. The court determines that there was in fact a 
*492 view from lot 12 which was sought to be 
protected. This determination is based on Mr. 
Jett's testimony wherein he indicated to the 
Stewarts, defendants herein, that they should not 
build the wall, the height of which would block his 
view from lot 12." The court then concluded that 
the removal of the gazebo would not constitute a 
disproportionate hardship to defendants and ordered 
the structure taken down. 
[6] [7] As a general rule, a landowner has no natural 
right to an unobstructed view and the law is 
reluctant to imply such a right (Pacifica 
Homeowners' Assn. v. Wesley Palms Retirement 
Community (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1147, 1152, 224 
Cal.Rptr. 380), although this right may be created 
by an express easement between the parties. ( 
Petersen v. Friedman (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 245, 
247-248, 328 P.2d 264.) The record in the instant 
case, however, does not support such a condition in 
the easement. Lawrence Jett testified that: "Part of 
my understanding with Mr. Stewart [the defendant] 
was I did not want the wall to reach a particular 
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height that would interfere from being in the house 
looking out...." But Jett also testified that the 
defendants had done what they had agreed to do and 
that the wall was not an obstruction. As to the 
encroached land, Jett stated that he had granted 
defendants a right to make use of it, and that there 
were no other restrictions in their agreement. No 
conditions were expressed limiting the use that could 
be made of the encroached property, other than the 
height of the wall. In light of this, a height limit on 
the trellises and bushes that defendants may place on 
the slope is not supported by substantial evidence. 
No restrictions were made on the landscaping of the 
slope and the agreement as to the height of the wall 
is insufficient to impose a limitation on the 
structures or foliage that may be placed on the 
encroached property. [FN3] 
FN3. It should also be noted that ordering the 
gazebo removed from the slope is not likely to be 
effective in restoring the plaintiffs' view. The 
defendants need only move the gazebo a few feet 
onto their own property where it can be just as 
much an obstruction. The same result will no 
doubt occur as the trees on defendants' property 
mature. 
Ill 
[8] Defendants further contend that the trial court 
erred in excluding evidence on their cross-complaint 
for trespass, injury to timber and conversion. This 
cross-complaint arises out of the alleged cutting of 
defendants' trees by surveyors employed by the 
plaintiffs. In addition to planting trees on their own 
property, defendants had also planted them on a 
portion of the property behind their lot belonging to 
a third party. This encroachment was settled before 
trial. The defendants cross-complained against the 
plaintiffs, however, seeking treble damages for 
injury to timber, alleging that surveyors employed 
by the plaintiffs had entered this other lot and cut the 
trees defendants had planted there. The defendants 
point out that although the *493 property was not 
theirs and they may have had few rights against the 
true owner, this does not affect their rights against 
the plaintiffs who had no claim to the property 
whatsoever. The defendants protest that when they 
questioned the surveyor specifically about the trees 
on the adjacent lot, the trial court sustained an 
objection that this matter pertained only to the 
settled suit and had no relevance to the case at hand. 
We see no conceivable prejudice resulting from the 
exclusion of the evidence relating to the trees 
defendants planted on the adjacent lot. The 
surveyor allegedly responsible for cutting the trees 
had previously testified that the only trees cut were 
on plaintiffs' lot on plaintiffs' side of the wall. 
Considerable effort was devoted to this inquiry, in 
which the surveyor simply reiterated his statement. 
We can find no harm, therefore, arising from the 
trial court's ruling, limiting further questioning on 
this matter. 
As we are reversing the judgment except as it 
relates to defendants' cross- complaint, we need not 
address defendants' other alleged **99 errors. 
[FN4] 
FN4. Defendants contend that the trial court 
abused its discretion by allowing this case to go to 
trial after the expiration of the five-year statute in 
Code of Civil Procedure section 583, 
subdivision (a). We see no abuse of 
discretion here as this case was set for trial 
one month prior to the expiration of the 
statute and had been trailing during that time 
while waiting for a courtroom to open up. 
Congestion of the court calendar is a valid 
exception to the mandatory dismissal rule. ( 
Goers v. Superior Court (1976) 57 
Cal.App.3d 72, 74-75, 129 Cal.Rptr. 29.) 
Plaintiffs informed the clerk of the court that 
the five-year rule was set to expire and acted 
with reasonable diligence in trying to bring 
the case to trial prior to that time. 
That portion of the judgment denying defendants' 
cross-complaint is affirmed. In all other respects, 
the judgment is reversed. Appellants to recover 
costs. 
McCLOSKY, Acting P.J., and GEORGE, J., 
concur. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Ward PERKINS, Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Norma 
Perkins, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
GREAT-WEST LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY 
and Lincoln National Life 
Insurance Company, Defendants and Appellants, 
GREAT-WEST LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SOUTHWEST HEALTH MANAGEMENT 
COMPANY, INC., a California 
corporation, and Lincoln National Life Insurance 
Company, an Indiana corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants and Appellees. 
Nos. 890732-CA, 890733-CA. 
June 21, 1991. 
Personal representative of estate of deceased 
employee brought action to recover benefits under 
employer's group life policy. The Sixth District 
Court, Kane County, Don V. Tibbs, J., denied 
insurer's motion for summary judgment and granted 
summary judgment in favor of representative and 
insurer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Russon, 
J., held that insurer which had paid medical benefits 
in reliance on representations in employee's 
application that she was full-time active employee 
was not estopped from denying claim for life 
insurance proceeds; insurer reasonably relied on 
employee's misrepresentation, employee's reliance 
on insurer's conduct in paying medical claims was 
not reasonable in light of express provisions 
contained in booklet given employer for distribution 
to employees, and effect of estoppel would be to 
extend coverage to risks not covered by express 
terms of policy. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Contracts <@=> 147(3) 
95 — 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules of Construction 
95kl47 Intention of Parties 
95kl47(3) Construing Whole Contract 
Together. 
In interpreting contract, court looks first to four 
corners of agreement to determine intent of parties. 
[2] Insurance <®^2422 
217 — 
217XIX Coverage-Life Insurance 
217k2422 Groups Covered. 
(Formerly 217kl69(2)) 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] Insurance <®=>2460 
217 — 
217XX Coverage-Health and Accident Insurance 
217XX(B) Medical Insurance 
217k2458 Persons Covered 
217k2460 Group Insurance. 
(Formerly 217kl69(2)) 
Where employee was disabled and unable to work 
when group medical and life policy underwritten by 
defendant went into effect, and by terms of policy 
eligible employees must work full time, employee 
was not eligible even though employer considered 
her a full-time employee throughout her absence. 
[3] Estoppel <®^52(3) 
156 — 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k52 Nature and Application of Estoppel in 
Pais 
156k52(3) Estoppel by Conduct. 
"Equitable estoppel" is conduct by one party which 
leads another party in reliance thereon, to adopt 
course of action resulting in detriment or damage if 
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. 
[4] Insurance <@=>2958 
217 — 
217XXIV Avoidance 
217XXIV(A) In General 
217k2953 Representations 
217k2958 Materiality. 
(Formerly 217k255) 
[See headnote text below] 
[4] Insurance <®=>2966 
217 — 
217XXIV Avoidance 
217XXIV(A) In General 
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217k2961 Concealment or Failure to Disclose 
217k2966 Reliance. 
(Formerly 217k258) 
Misrepresentation by insurance applicant of 
material fact that is relied on by insurer permits 
insurer to void policy unless it is established that 
there should have been no actual reliance on 
applicant's misrepresentation, concealment, or 
omission. 
[5] Insurance <®=>3001 
217 — 
217XXIV Avoidance 
217XXIV(B) Particular Kinds of Insurance 
217k3000 Life and Health Insurance 
217k3001 In General. 
(Formerly 217k256.2) 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Insurance <@=>3114 
217 — 
217XXVI Estoppel and Waiver of Insurer's 
Defenses 
217k3105 Claims Process and Settlement 
217k3114 Payment of Loss. 
(Formerly 217k399) 
Insurer which entered into contract with employer 
to provide group health and life insurance for 
employees reasonably relied on representations in 
employee's application regarding her status as full-
time employee and was not estopped from denying 
claim for life benefits by virtue of having paid 
previous health benefit claims in reliance on false 
information. 
[6] Estoppel <S==>54 
156 — 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k54 Knowledge of Facts. 
Party claiming estoppel cannot rely on 
representations or acts if they are contrary to his 
knowledge of truth or if he had means by which 
with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the 
truth. 
[7] Insurance <®=>3087 
217 — 
217XXVI Estoppel and Waiver of Insurer's 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No 
Defenses 
217k3087 Reliance or Prejudice, Necessity Of. 
(Formerly 217k377(l)) 
Employee, who could have easily learned from 
booklets given to employer for distribution to its 
employees that she was not eligible for coverage 
under group life policy, did not reasonably rely on 
coverage so as to estop insurer from denying 
coverage. 
[8] Insurance <®=>3093 
217 — 
217XXVI Estoppel and Waiver of Insurer's 
Defenses 
217k3093 Acts and Conduct of Insurer or Agents 
in General. 
(Formerly 217k388(3)) 
Insurer which contracted with employer to extend 
insurance coverage to active employees only, and 
which took steps to ensure that employer and its 
employees were aware of terms of policy by 
publishing and distributing booklet limiting coverage 
to active employees, was not estopped from denying 
life coverage for employee who was not full-time 
active employee at time policy went into effect; 
allowing estoppel would unjustifiably extend 
coverage to risk insurer did not contract to cover. 
[9] Insurance <@=>3114 
217 — 
217XXVI Estoppel and Waiver of Insurer's 
Defenses 
217k3105 Claims Process and Settlement 
217k3114 Payment of Loss. 
(Formerly 217k399) 
Insurer which underwrote group medical and life 
coverage for full-time active employees was not 
estopped from denying life coverage for disabled 
employee who was not eligible to be insured merely 
because insurer had mistakenly paid medical claims 
submitted by the employee; it would be patently 
unfair to permit employer to unilaterally determine 
which employees were active or full-time merely by 
keeping them on the payroll. 
*1127 Clark W. Sessions (argued), Cynthia K. 
Cassell, Campbell, Maack & Sessions, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant Great-West Life 
Assur. Co. 
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James M. Park (argued), Michael W. Park, Park, 
Braithwaite & Eves, Cedar City, for plaintiff and 
appellee Ward Perkins. 
Jathan W. Janove (argued), Robert K. Heineman, 
Van Wagoner & Stevens, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant Lincoln Nat. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and RUSSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Great-West Life Assurance Company (Great-
West), appeals from an order denying its motion for 
summary judgment and granting summary judgment 
in favor of Mr. Perkins. Great-West also appeals 
the dismissal of its cross-claim against Lincoln 
National Life Insurance Company (Lincoln 
National). 
FACTS 
The material facts in the case between Mr. Perkins 
and Great-West are undisputed. Mr. Perkins' wife 
was employed as a nurse for Southwest Health 
Management, Inc. (Southwest) for approximately 
sixteen and a half years, beginning on January 1, 
1970. On June 4, 1986, she became disabled and 
was unable to work for an indefinite period of time. 
While away from work, she was paid sick leave and 
accrued vacation time. Throughout her absence, 
Southwest considered her a full-time employee, and 
she was kept on their records as such until her death 
in April 1987. 
Prior to July 1, 1986, Southwest provided group 
medical and life insurance to its employees through 
Lincoln National. Effective July 1, 1986, Great-
West underwrote the group health and life insurance 
policy for Southwest. (FN1) Great-West published 
a booklet, entitled EDGE Booklet, which contained a 
description of eligibility requirements, benefits, and 
exclusions under the policy. According to the 
uncontroverted affidavit of John Kingsbury, an 
associate manager of life benefits at Great-West, 
copies of the booklet were given to Southwest to 
distribute to its employees. (FN2) 
Mrs. Perkins submitted a standard application card 
to Great-West and applied for group health and life 
insurance coverage. The card was dated June 30, 
1986. The application provided a space for the 
employer to enter the date of full-time employment, 
which was recorded as January 1, 1970. During the 
next nine months, Mr. and Mrs. Perkins submitted 
seven health insurance benefit claim forms to Great-
West. The claims were paid in the total amount of 
$8,703.40. 
Shortly after Mrs. Perkins* death in April 1987, 
Southwest submitted a life claim report *1128 to 
Great-West on behalf of Mr. Perkins, who was the 
beneficiary of the policy. On the life claim report, 
Southwest reported that Mrs. Perkins' last day 
actively at work was June 3, 1986. Great-West 
subsequently denied Mr. Perkins' claim on the basis 
that his wife was never eligible for its insurance 
coverage. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Mr. Perkins brought suit against Great-West and 
Lincoln National to recover the insurance proceeds 
on his wife's life insurance policy. Great-West filed 
a counterclaim and a cross-claim for the medical 
benefits paid to Mrs. Perkins. Mr. Perkins and 
Great-West each filed a motion for summary 
judgment. Great-West also filed a motion for 
summary judgment on its cross-claim against 
Lincoln National. 
The trial court granted Mr. Perkins' motion for 
summary judgment against Great-West, and he was 
awarded the face amount of the insurance policy 
plus interest from the date of Mrs. Perkins' death. 
The trial court also: (1) denied Great-West's motion 
for summary judgment against Mr. Perkins; (2) 
dismissed Great-West's cross-claim against Lincoln 
National as moot, since Mrs. Perkins was insured by 
Great-West; and (3) determined that Great-West's 
failure to pay Mr. Perkins' life insurance claim was 
an act of bad faith. 
ISSUES 
Great-West claims that the trial court erred in: (1) 
granting Mr. Perkins' motion for summary 
judgment; (2) denying Great-West's motion for 
summary judgment on its counterclaim; (3) 
dismissing Great-West's cross-claim and motion for 
summary judgment against Lincoln National; and 
(4) finding that Great-West's denial of life insurance 
benefits to Mr. Perkins was in bad faith. (FN3) 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
"Summary judgment is proper only when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power 
and Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not 
resolve factual issues, a challenge to summary 
judgment presents for review only questions of law. 
We review those conclusions for correctness, 
according no particular deference to the trial court." 
Id. The appellate court considers the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the losing party and affirms " 
'only where it appears that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material issues of fact, or where, even 
according to the facts as contended by the losing 
party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.' " D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (quoting Themy v. 
Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 
1979)). 
COVERAGE UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY 
Great-West contends that the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment to Mr. Perkins because 
the insurance policy was clear and unambiguous in 
limiting coverage to active, full-time employees, and 
that since Mrs. Perkins was not an active, full-time 
employee at any time from the effective date of the 
policy, July 1, 1986, to the date of her death, she 
was not covered. 
[1] "[I]n interpreting a contract, we first look to 
the four corners of the agreement to determine the 
intent of the parties." Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 
(Utah 1989). " 'If a policy of insurance is clear and 
unambiguous, the words are to be taken and 
understood in their plain, ordinary and popular 
sense, as an average or reasonable person with 
ordinary understanding would construe them.' " 
Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Ins. Soc'y, 111 P.2d 
*1129 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Clark 
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 204 Kan. 487, 464 P.2d 253, 
257 (1970)). "[I]f an insurance policy is ambiguous 
or uncertain, so that it is fairly susceptible to 
different interpretations, any doubt should be 
resolved in favor of insurance coverage." American 
Casualty Co. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd., 568 P.2d 
731, 734 (Utah 1977) (citations omitted); see also 
Chacon v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 
748 (Colo. 1990). We must, therefore, determine if 
the trial court was correct in ruling as a matter of 
law that Mrs. Perkins was insured by Great-West. 
The group policy provisions pertaining to coverage 
and benefits are set forth in Great-West's EDGE 
Booklet. This booklet serves as the Certificate of 
Insurance for those individual employees who are 
enrolled in the group policy, but only if: (1) the 
employee is eligible to be insured; (2) becomes 
insured; (3) stays insured; and (4) a coverage 
validation insert bearing the employee's name is 
included in the pocket at the front of the booklet. 
(FN4) 
The EDGE Booklet states that employees are 
eligible for coverage if they: (1) are residents of the 
United States or Canada; (2) are permanent, full-
time and full pay employees; and (3) work the 
minimum number of hours per week. (FN5) An 
employee must work a minimum of 32 hours per 
week to qualify as a permanent, full-time and full 
pay employee, and the work must be performed at a 
location other than the employee's home. (FN6) 
Under the policy, an "employee" is defined as "a 
person in the service of an employer." (FN7) 
"Service" for an active employee is defined as 
"employment, on an active, permanent, full-time 
and full pay basis, for the minimum number of 
hours at a place other than the employee's 
residence." (FN8) 
The EDGE Booklet further states that the effective 
date of the group policy is July 1, 1986, and that an 
active employee's coverage will begin on the 
effective date if the employee has completed more 
than 90 days continuous service. However, if an 
employee is not at work on the effective date, 
coverage begins on the date the employee returns to 
work. (FN9) 
Shortly after Mrs. Perkins' death, Southwest 
submitted a Life Claim Report to Great-West which 
stated that her last day of active employment was 
June 3, 1986. Great-West immediately denied the 
claim stating that Mrs. Perkins was not eligible for 
coverage according to the terms of the group 
insurance policy contained in the EDGE Booklet. 
[2] The uncontroverted evidence indicates that, 
according to the terms of Great-West's policy, Mrs. 
Perkins terminated active employment before the 
policy became effective and she never returned to 
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work at any time thereafter. The contractual 
provisions in Great-West's policy clearly and 
unambiguously limit coverage to active employees, 
who are at work on or after the effective date of the 
policy. The fact that she was considered a full-time 
employee by Southwest does not bring her within 
the definition of employee contained in the insurance 
policy. Since Mrs. Perkins was not an active 
employee on the effective date of the Great-West 
policy, or any time thereafter, she was not insured 
under that policy. 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
Alternatively, Mr. Perkins claims that since Great-
West accepted and retained premiums paid on his 
wife's behalf, and continued paying health benefits, 
it should be estopped from denying his claim for life 
insurance proceeds. 
[3] Equitable estoppel is defined as "conduct by 
one party which leads another party in reliance 
thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in 
detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to 
repudiate *1130 his conduct." United Am. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 
161 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). We must 
therefore decide whether Great-West's conduct was 
such that it should be estopped from denying Mr. 
Perkins' claim for life insurance proceeds. 
Great-West argues that estoppel does not apply 
because: (1) when it paid the health benefits, it was 
relying on the misrepresentation that Mrs. Perkins 
was an eligible employee; (2) Mrs. Perkins' 
reliance on Great-West's conduct was not reasonable 
in light of the express provisions contained in the 
EDGE Booklet; and (3) estoppel cannot be used to 
extend coverage to risks not covered by the express 
terms of the policy. As to all three arguments, we 
agree. 
Great-West's Reliance on Representations that Mrs. 
Perkins 
was an Eligible Employee 
[4] A misrepresentation by an insurance applicant 
of a material fact which is relied on by the insurer 
permits the insurer to void the policy. Major Oil 
Corp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 457 F.2d 
596, 602 (10th Cir.1972) (applying Utah law). 
However, "[a]n insurance company cannot escape 
liability on a policy if it is established that there 
should have been no actual reliance on the 
applicant's misrepresentation, concealment, or 
omission." Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 763 P.2d 
761, 770 (Utah 1988) (citing Major Oil Corp., 457 
F.2d at 602). 
[5] Effective July 1, 1986, Southwest entered into 
an insurance contract with Great-West to provide 
group health and life insurance for Southwest's 
employees. In order to be insured, each individual 
employee was required to submit an application. 
Mrs. Perkins' application stated that her date of full-
time employment was January 1, 1970, and that she 
was a full-time employee. Relying on this 
information, Great-West paid seven health benefit 
claims submitted by the Perkins. According to the 
terms of the Great-West's policy, however, Mrs. 
Perkins would not have been classified as an 
"employee," and should not have been enrolled, 
inasmuch as she was not a full-time, full pay 
employee working a minimum of 32 hours per 
week. Great-West discovered that Mrs. Perkins was 
not eligible to be insured when Southwest submitted 
a Life Claim Form, which stated that Mrs. Perkins' 
last day of active employment was June 3, 1986. 
After learning of Mrs. Perkins' employment status, 
Great-West immediately denied the life insurance 
claims and refunded all premiums previously paid 
on Mrs. Perkins' behalf. 
"It would be unjust to both the employee and the 
insurance carrier if the law were that when the 
insurance carrier once undertakes to provide medical 
or other care for an injured workman it has lost all 
right to afterwards defend against what it believes to 
be an unjust or illegal claim." Larson v. Wycoff 
Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Utah 1981) (quoting 
Harding v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 83 Utah 
376, 381, 28 P.2d 182, 184 (1934)). Great-West 
has a right to deny claims it deems to be illegal or 
unjust, even after paying them. There is nothing to 
indicate that Great-West was unreasonable in relying 
on the representations regarding Mrs. Perkins' 
employment status, and it should not be estopped 
from denying Mr. Perkins' life insurance claim 
simply because it paid previous health benefit claims 
in reliance on false information. 
Lack of Reasonable Reliance 
[6] [7] "A party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on 
representations or acts if they are contrary to his 
knowledge of the truth or if he had the means by 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
814 P.2d 1125, Perkins v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., (Utah App. 1991) Page 6 
which with reasonable diligence he could ascertain 
the truth." Larson v. Wycqff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 
1155 (Utah 1981) (citing Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 
Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970)). Mrs. Perkins 
had the means by which she could have ascertained 
the contents of Great-West's policy. Southwest had 
received booklets which clearly delineated the terms 
of the policy. The booklets were given to Southwest 
for distribution to its employees. With reasonable 
diligence, Mrs. Perkins could have easily learned 
that she was not eligible for coverage under *1131. 
Great-West's insurance policy. Given Mrs. Perkins' 
failure to learn the terms of her insurance policy, 
her reliance thereon was not reasonable. 
Extension of Coverage 
[8] The great majority of states dealing with the 
doctrine of estoppel have held that it cannot be used 
to bring risks which were not covered by the terms 
of the policy within coverage of the policy. See, 
e.g., Farmers Ins. Co. v. Zumstein, 138 Ariz. 469, 
675 P.2d 729 (Ariz.App. 1983); Topeka Tent and 
Awning Co. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 13 Kan.App.2d 
553, 774 P.2d 984 (1989); Boyer Metal Fab, Inc. 
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 90 Or.App. 103, 750 
P.2d 1195, review denied, 305 Or. 672, 757 P.2d 
422 (1988); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Albany County Dist. No. I, 763 P.2d 1255 
(Wyo.1988). Under group insurance plans, 
insurance companies rely heavily on the assumption 
that active employees are insurable risks, and for 
this reason limiting provisions are included in their 
policies. See 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and 
Practice § 44 (1981). The terms of Great-West's 
policy expressly limited coverage to active 
employees, and "[i]t does not seem unreasonable 
that there be some rules as to eligibility so that 
coverage would be only upon the regular employees 
of the work force...." Marriot v. Pacific Nat'I Life 
Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981, 983 
(1970). Great-West's policy clearly did not extend 
coverage to disabled employees. Great-West 
contracted with Southwest to extend insurance 
coverage to active employees only, and it took steps 
to ensure that Southwest and its employees were 
aware of the terms of the policy by publishing and 
distributing a booklet which described the rules and 
benefits of the policy. Allowing estoppel in this 
case would unjustifiably extend coverage to risks 
which Great-West did not contract to cover. 
Express Eligibility Limitation Language 
[9] Additionally, if we estop Great-West from 
denying coverage, we would encourage companies 
to enroll all employees without regard to their 
eligibility or to the express terms included in 
insurance policies. The actual terms of the policies 
which limit coverage to active employees would be 
meaningless. Here, Southwest could unilaterally 
determine which employees were active or full-time, 
merely by keeping them on the payroll. Endorsing 
such an approach would be patently unfair, and we 
decline to do so. 
For the above reasons Great-West cannot be 
estopped from denying coverage simply because 
they mistakenly paid claims submitted by an 
ineligible employee. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order granting Mr. Perkins' 
motion for summary judgment and denying Great-
West's motion for summary judgment was in error, 
and the same is reversed and remanded with 
instructions to enter summary judgment for Great-
West. The trial court's finding that Great-West 
acted in bad faith is likewise reversed. 
Furthermore, the dismissal of Great-West's cross-
claim against Lincoln National and its corresponding 
motion for summary judgment was also in error and 
is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
Additionally, Mr. Perkins' action against Lincoln 
National, which was not addressed in the trial 
court's order, must also be considered on remand. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
(FN1.) The parties dispute who actually paid the 
premiums. Mr. Perkins alleges that his wife paid 
the premiums to Great-West, however, there is no 
evidence in the record to support this allegation. 
To the contrary, the uncontroverted evidence 
shows that Great-West's policy was non-
contributory, meaning that the employer paid the 
entire premium. An affidavit submitted by Great-
West also indicates that the premiums paid by 
Southwest on Mrs. Perkins' behalf were returned 
to Southwest. This is not a material dispute 
because the relevant provisions in the written 
policy remain the same no matter who pays the 
premiums. 
(FN2.) Great-West thereby fulfilled its duty as to 
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delivery of the booklets to Southwest's employees. 
When a policy of group insurance has been issued 
and the insurer has provided the employer with 
certificates of insurance and copies of the 
insurance policy for distribution to employees, the 
insurer does not have a duty to personally see that 
each employee actually receives his or her copy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-311(l)(c) (1991) states: 
The certificate shall be provided in a manner 
reasonably calculated to bring it to the attention of 
the certificate holder. The insurer ... may deliver 
or mail them in bulk to the policyholder to transmit 
to the certificate holders. An affidavit by the 
insurer that it has mailed the certificate in the usual 
course of business creates a rebuttable presumption 
that it has done so. 
Since neither Mr. Perkins nor Lincoln National has 
offered any evidence to oppose Great-West's 
affidavit, we must assume that the booklets were 
delivered as required. 
*1131_ (FN3.) All parties conceded at oral 
argument that the trial court erred in finding that 
Great-West's actions were in bad faith. Since we 
reverse the trial court's ruling herein, it is readily 
apparent that Great-West's denial of benefits was 
not in bad faith. Therefore, we also reverse the 
trial court's ruling that Great-West's actions were 
in bad faith. 
(FM.) EDGE Booklet at I. 
(FN5.) Id. at 17. 
(FN6.)/d. a t l . 
(FN7.) Id. at 12. 
(FN8.) Id. 
(FN9.) Id. a t l . 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., fka 
Professional Therapy, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah general 
partnership; Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation; and Thomas D. 
Rosenberg, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah professional corporation, general 
partners, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 940417-CA. 
Dec. 21, 1995. 
Physical therapy corporation brought action against 
defendant partnership of physicians for failure to pay 
amounts allegedly due upon subsequent "sale" of 
sports medicine business, as provided for in 
agreement terminating professional services 
contract. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., granted summary 
judgment for defendant, and denied plaintiff's 
"motion to reconsider." Plaintiff appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Davis, Associate P.J., held that: 
(1) plaintiff's substantive motion for new trial tolled 
period for filing appeal; (2) new joint venture 
which acquired business was "third party" for 
purposes of agreement; and (3) defendant obtained 
consideration for sale of business' assets. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, J., concurred and dissented, and filed 
opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error <s^>934(l) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k934 Judgment 
30k934(l) In General. 
In determining propriety of grant of summary 
judgment, facts are viewed in light most favorable to 
position of losing party. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
56(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
[2] Appeal and Error <®^842(2) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(2) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
Trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for 
correctness. 
[3] Motions <@=>39 
267 — 
267k39 Reargument or Rehearing. 
Rules of civil procedure do not provide for 
"motion for reconsideration" of trial court's ruling; 
however, motions so entitled could be considered if 
they could have properly been brought under some 
rule and were merely incorrectly titled. 
[4] Appeal and Error <®^345.1 
30 — 
30VII Transfer of Cause 
30VII(A) Time of Taking Proceedings 
30k343 Commencement of Period of Limitation 
30k345.1 Motion for New Trial. 
[See headnote text below] 
[4] New Trial <S^ 124(1) 
275 — 
275III Proceedings to Procure New Trial 
275k 124 Requisites of Motion in General 
275kl24(l) In General. 
Although plaintiff in breach of contract action 
improperly entitled motion as "motion for 
reconsideration," after adverse decision on summary 
judgment, motion was in essence motion for new 
trial, and therefore filing motion tolled period for 
filing appeal; trial judge ruled on the motion as if it 
were motion for new trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
59(a). 
[5] Joint Adventures <&* i . i 
224 — 
224kl.l Nature of Relation in General. 
Like partnerships, joint ventures are distinct and 
separate legal entities. U.C.A.1953, 48-1-3.1(1, 2). 
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[6] Contracts <@=^ 202(1) 
95 — 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(C) Subject-Matter 
95k202 Trade and Business 
95k202(l) In General. 
Even though defendant partnership was member of 
new joint venture, new joint venture was separate 
legal entity and as such was "third party" for 
purposes of defendant partnership's obligation to pay 
upon subsequent sale of sports medicine business to 
"third party," under agreement terminating 
professional services contract between plaintiff 
physical therapy corporation and defendant 
partnership of physicians. 
[7] Contracts <@^202(1) 
95 — 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(C) Subject-Matter 
95k202 Trade and Business 
95k202(l) In General. 
Defendant partnership of physicians received 
consideration for sale of assets of sports medicine 
business, for purposes of obligation to pay former 
business associate upon subsequent sale of business, 
where defendant partnership was paid for one half of 
assets and received one half interest in new joint 
venture which assumed complete management 
control of business. 
*267 John C. Green and Kim M. Luhn, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant. 
Mark O. Morris and Jeffrey T. Sivertsen, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before DAVIS, BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ. 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports 
Rehabilitation, Inc. (Rehabilitation) challenges the 
trial court's order granting summary judgment to 
appellees, Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine 
(Physicians), a general partnership; and its general 
partners, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., a Utah 
professional corporation (Paulos); and Thomas D. 
Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., a Utah professional 
corporation (Rosenberg). We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 N 
v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, Page 2 
Rehabilitation and Physicians formerly worked 
together providing medical and physical therapy 
services at the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center 
(Center) located at 670 East 3900 South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, under the terms of a professional 
services agreement. On May 22, 1989, these parties 
entered into a termination agreement and purchase 
agreement (Agreement) which terminated the 
parties' professional services contract. Paragraph 
eleven of this Agreement stated: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within two 
(2) years from the date of this Agreement, 
Physicians sells the Center to any third party, 
Rehabilitation shall be entitled to one-third ( 1/3) 
of that portion of the purchase price which is 
attributed to good will. 'Sale' shall be defined as a 
transfer wherein the purchaser acquires and pays 
consideration for all of the following: The 
Center's lease on the Leased Premises, ownership 
of the name 'Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center,' 
all of the equipment and other assets located at the 
Center, the Center's patients and accounts 
receivable, and whereby the purchaser assumes 
complete operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same 
name at the same location. 
On May 24, 1990, Physicians entered into an asset 
purchase agreement with IHC Hospitals (IHC) 
pursuant to which Physicians sold IHC an undivided 
one-half interest in the Center. Physicians and IHC 
then formed a joint venture called "Sports Medicine 
West" and transferred their respective one-half 
interests thereto. 
The joint venture continued to do business at the 
Center's location and it temporarily retained 
Physicians as its agent to manage and operate the 
business. At some point in time, Sports Medicine 
West changed the Center's name from "Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center" to "Sports Medicine 
West." The parties dispute precisely when Sports 
Medicine West changed the Center's name, however 
it is undisputed that the name was not changed until 
at least one year before the action in this case was 
filed, approximately October 1990. 
On October 4, 1991, Rehabilitation filed a 
complaint for declaratory relief, alleging that the 
transactions between IHC and Physicians constituted 
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a "sale" under paragraph eleven of the Agreement. 
Physicians filed a motion for summary judgment on 
June 15, 1993, and Rehabilitation filed a counter-
motion for summary judgment shortly thereafter. 
After hearing oral argument on the motions, the 
trial court permitted further briefing on the parties' 
interpretations of the meaning of "sale" as defined 
by the Agreement. On November 15, 1993, the 
court heard additional oral argument on the subject 
and ruled that to constitute a sale, the transaction 
"must include all of the following ... items [from 
paragraph eleven]. And from those items, it must 
... [include] all of the equipment and assets, and 
they [the purchaser] must have complete operational 
control." The court ruled that the transfer of one-
half of the interest in the Center to IHC *268 was 
not a sale and rejected Rehabilitation's argument that 
the transfer of all assets to the joint venture was a 
"sale." Therefore, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Physicians on November 15, 
1993. 
Rehabilitation filed a "motion for reconsideration" 
of the trial court's ruling on November 29, 1993. 
The trial court heard the motion on January 28, 
1994, and again ruled in favor of Physicians. An 
order to this effect was entered on March 14, 1994. 
On April 11, 1994, Rehabilitation filed this appeal. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] There are essentially two issues presented on 
appeal. The first issue concerns the timeliness of 
Rehabilitation's appeal. "[I]t is axiomatic in this 
jurisdiction that failure to timely perfect an appeal is 
a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the 
appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 1984). The second 
issue presented is whether the trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment to Physicians based 
upon its conclusion that the transaction between IHC 
and Physicians was not a "sale" within the meaning 
of paragraph eleven of the Agreement. Summary 
judgment is appropriate in a case where the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, 
show there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Warburton v. 
Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 
779, 781 (Utah App. 1995). In determining the 
propriety of a grant of summary judgment, we view 
the facts in the light most favorable to the position of 
the losing party. Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781. We 
review the trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Timeliness of the Appeal 
[3] Physicians argues that Rehabilitation's motion 
for reconsideration did not toll the running of the 
time in which to appeal, and hence Rehabilitation's 
appeal was untimely. (FN1) It is by now well 
established that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not provide for a "motion for reconsideration" of 
a trial court's ruling. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. 
Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n. 4 (Utah 1994); 
accord Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 
1061, 1064 (Utah 1991). Nonetheless, we have 
"reviewed motions so entitled if they could have 
properly been brought under some rule and were 
merely incorrectly titled." Shields, 882 P.2d at 653 
n. 4; see also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 
P.2d 1306, 1310 n. 2 (Utah App. 1994) (noting that 
"the substance, not caption, of a motion is 
dispositive in determining the character of the 
motion"). 
[4] In this case, Rehabilitation captioned its motion 
as a motion for reconsideration. However, our 
review indicates that the substance of the motion 
was essentially identical to a motion for new trial 
under Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Specifically, Rehabilitation argued that 
the trial court made several errors of law which are 
grounds for relief under Rule 59(a)(7). In addition, 
by conducting a hearing and reaffirming its legal 
conclusions, the trial court ruled upon the motion as 
if it were a motion for a new trial. Therefore, as in 
Watkiss & Campbell, 
[u]nder the facts of this case, the incorrect title 
placed upon the pleading was not a bar to 
defendant's case. Indeed, the record reflects that 
the judge ruled on the motion as if it were a 
motion for a new trial. Because the court treated 
the motion to reconsider as a motion for a new 
trial, we conclude that the filing of the motion 
tolled the time in which to file an appeal. 
Id. at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted). 
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We conclude that Rehabilitation's motion to 
reconsider is substantively a motion for a *269 
new trial, and as such it tolled the time for filing an 
appeal. Rehabilitation's appeal was thus timely. 
(FN2) 
2. Summary Judgment 
The trial court granted Physicians's motion for 
summary judgment on the basis that a "sale" to a 
"third" party within the meaning of paragraph 
eleven of the Agreement had not occurred. The 
court stated it was "unpersuaded" by Rehabilitation's 
argument that all of the assets were transferred to 
the new joint venture, Sports Medicine West. Thus, 
the only transfer considered by the court was the 
transfer of one-half of the interest in the Center to 
IHC. Because a transfer of less than "all" of the 
interest in the Center does not trigger the "sale" 
definition in paragraph eleven, the court granted 
summary judgment to Physicians. 
The trial court's rationale for rejecting 
Rehabilitation's argument that all of the assets were 
transferred to the joint venture, Sports Medicine 
West, is unclear. Physicians claims, however, that 
because it is a co-owner of Sports Medicine West, 
the joint venture cannot be a "third party" within the 
meaning of paragraph eleven. We disagree. 
[5] A joint venture is defined as "an association of 
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a 
single business enterprise." Utah Code Ann. § 
48-1-3.1(1) (1994). Joint ventures are subject to the 
same rules as partnerships. Id. § 48-1-3.1(2); 
Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 n. 1 (Utah 
1984); Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah 
App. 1990). Based upon the statutes governing 
partnerships, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
partnerships are distinct and separate legal entities. 
See Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 161 P.2d 499, 
501 (Utah 1988) (noting several sections of the 
Uniform Partnership Act treating partnership as a 
separate legal entity); Walllnv. Co. v. Garden Gate 
Distrib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah 1979) 
(noting partnership is legal entity distinct from 
partners). Because these statutes apply equally to 
joint ventures, it follows that joint ventures are also 
distinct and separate legal entities. See Sine, 767 
P.2d at 501 (concluding that joint ventures have 
capacity to sue in their own names, relying on 
authority treating partnerships as distinct entities). 
[6] We therefore conclude that, under Utah law, 
joint ventures are separate legal entities. Our 
conclusion is consistent with rulings in several other 
jurisdictions. See Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. 
Kandik Constr., Inc., 795 P.2d 793, 802 (Alaska 
1990) (inferentially holding that joint venture is a 
separate legal entity), vacated in part on other 
grounds, 823 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1991); First State 
Serv. Corp. v. Hector's Concrete Constr., Inc., 168 
Ariz. 442, 814 P.2d 783, 783 (App. 1991) (joint 
venture is a separate legal entity); C.H. Leavell & 
Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 450 P.2d 211, 214 (Okla.1968) 
(same); Lawler v. Dallas Statler-Hilton Joint 
Venture, 793 S.W.2d 27, 33 (Tex.Ct.App. 1990) 
(same). (FN3) But see Lewis v. Gardner Eng'g 
Corp., 254 Ark. 17, 491 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1973) 
(joint venture not a separate legal entity); Elting 
Ctr. Corp. v. Diversified Title Corp., 306 So.2d 
542, 543 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1974) (same), cert, 
denied, 321 So.2d 554 (Fla.1975). As a separate 
legal entity, Sports Medicine West is a "third party" 
within the meaning of paragraph eleven. 
[7] In addition, Physicians was paid by IHC for an 
undivided one-half interest in its assets, and it 
received a one-half interest in the joint venture for 
the other one-half of the assets. Therefore, the 
paragraph eleven requirement that consideration be 
paid for the assets was also satisfied. Sports 
Medicine West also has complete operational control 
of the Center as evidenced by the terms of the 
*270. Management Agreement stating that Sports 
Medicine West had complete "day-to day" 
operational control of the rehabilitation business. 
Finally, according to the parties, the only 
remaining issue is whether the joint venture 
continued operating the business under the name 
"Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center." The trial 
court did not reach this issue, (FN4) notwithstanding 
disputed, material facts, having resolved the matter 
on the issue of sale of assets. Because of the 
existence of disputed material facts, the issue of 
whether the joint venture continued to operate the 
business under the same name is remanded to the 
trial court for determination. 
CONCLUSION 
The joint venture Sports Medicine West is a 
distinct and separate legal entity from Physicians, 
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and from Paulos and Rosenberg, the general 
partners of Physicians. As such, it is a "third 
person" within the meaning of paragraph eleven. In 
addition, consideration was paid for the assets and 
Sports Medicine West assumed full operational 
control of the Center. Thus, we reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment to Physicians 
based upon the finding that only one-half of the 
assets were transferred to IHC. It appears that 
material issues of fact exist regarding the question of 
whether Sports Medicine West continued to operate 
the Center under the same name. We therefore 
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring and dissenting): 
I concur in holding that this appeal was timely 
filed. I dissent, however, from the reversal of the 
summary judgment. 
As to the timeliness of the appeal, I agree that 
Rehabilitation's "motion for reconsideration" was 
essentially a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. See 
State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App.) 
(holding substance of post-judgment motion 
controls, not caption), cert, denied 883 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1994). We have previously held that a motion 
for a new trial may properly be filed following entry 
of a summary judgment. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Ultrasystems W. Constrs., Inc., 767 P.2d 
125, 127 (Utah App. 1988). Our rules explicitly 
provide that "the time for appeal for all parties shall 
run from the entry of the order denying a new trial." 
Utah R.App.P. 4(b). The filing of a motion under 
Rule 59 therefore tolls the time for filing a notice of 
appeal. 
On the merits, I disagree with the main opinion's 
analysis and result. The contract between the 
parties provides that Physicians will share the sale 
proceeds attributable to "good will" only when 
Physicians sell the entire Center to a third party. In 
the transaction involving IHC, Physicians clearly 
retained an ownership interest in the Center. 
The fact that the Center is now operated as a joint 
venture does not lead to the result reached by the 
main opinion. The joint venture statute provides 
that the only way Physicians can participate in a 
joint venture is if it is a co-owner. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-1-3.1(1) (1995) ("[a] joint venture is an 
association of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners of a single business enterprise.") 
(emphasis added). Since Physicians indisputably 
remains a co-owner of the Center, it has not sold it 
as contemplated by paragraph eleven of the parties' 
agreement. 
I would therefore affirm the summary judgment. 
(FN1.) We have considered Physicians's other 
arguments on this issue, including the contentions 
that Rehabilitation simply filed a motion for 
clarification and that there is some significance to 
be attached to the timing of the entry of the 
summary judgment order, and reject them as being 
without merit. See State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 
303 (Utah 1992); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 
888-89 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 858, 
116 S.Ct. 163, 133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995). 
(FN2.) Notwithstanding our conclusion, we are not 
approving the use of pleadings identified as 
something not provided for in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Such a practice could seriously 
compromise the position of a litigant where a 
"motion for reconsideration," for example, was 
not substantively a motion enumerated under Rule 
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or 
where other litigants or third parties acted or failed 
to act in reliance only on the name of the pleading 
possibly obtained from a docket entry. 
*270_ (FN3.) Louisiana has not adopted the 
Uniform Partnership Act, but also considers joint 
ventures to be separate legal entities. West 
Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd. v. Gulf States Utils. 
Co., 486 So.2d 808, 811 (La.Ct.App. 1986). 
(FN4.) The trial court also did not reach the 
subsidiary issue of whether to strike the affidavits 
submitted by Rehabilitation. We note however, 
that even if the trial court had struck 
Rehabilitation's affidavits, the affidavit submitted 
by Physicians establishes nonetheless that the name 
of the business remained unchanged for several 
months. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Harold SEVY and Winona Sevy, Plaintiffs and 
Petitioners, 
v. 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF SOUTHERN 
UTAH, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 930484. 
Sept. 6, 1995. 
Vendors brought action alleging that title company 
was negligent in not protecting their security interest 
in water stock. The Sixth District Court, Garfield 
County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered judgment for 
vendors, and title company appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 857 P.2d 958, reversed. Certiorari was 
granted, 870 P.2d 957. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that: (1) doctrine of issue preclusion 
was applicable to require parties to abide by Court 
of Appeals' decision in prior case that vendors had 
to take possession of water stock certificate to 
perfect their security interest; (2) trial court's 
conclusion that vendors neither knew nor should 
have known of title company's negligence until after 
limitations period had run was not contrary to great 
weight of evidence; (3) exceptional circumstances 
allowed discovery rule to toll statute of limitations 
for bringing negligence claim against title company 
until after purchasers' creditor brought action 
against vendors for declaration that creditor held 
perfected security interest in water stock free from 
any claims of vendors; and (4) issue as to whether 
vendors were entitled to attorney fees under 
Consumer Sales Practices Act was not properly 
before Court. 
Court of Appeals vacated in part. 
Zimmerman, C.J., and Stewart, Associate C.J., 
concurred in the result. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Judgment <®=>540 
228 — 
228XIII Merger and Bar of Causes of Action and 
Defenses 
228XIII(A) Judgments Operative as Bar 
228k540 Nature and Requisites of Former 
Recovery as Bar in General. 
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[See headnote text below] 
[1] Judgment <@=>634 
228 — 
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General 
228k634 Nature and Requisites of Former 
Adjudication as Ground of Estoppel in 
General. 
Doctrine of res judicata embodies two separate 
theories called issue preclusion and claim 
preclusion. 
[2] Judgment <®^>634 
228 — 
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General 
228k634 Nature and Requisites of Former 
Adjudication as Ground of Estoppel in 
General. 
Issue preclusion, sometimes referred to as 
collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating 
issues resolved in prior related action. 
[3] Judgment <@ >^634 
228 — 
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General 
228k634 Nature and Requisites of Former 
Adjudication as Ground of Estoppel in 
General. 
Party seeking to invoke doctrine of issue 
preclusion must satisfy four requirements: party 
must show that issue challenged in case at hand is 
identical to issue decided in previous action; issue 
in previous action must have been decided in final 
judgment on merits; issue in previous action must 
have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated; 
and opposing party in action at hand must have been 
either party or privy to previous action. 
[4] Judgment <@=>642 
228 — 
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General 
228k635 Courts or Other Tribunals Rendering 
Judgment 
228k642 Appellate Courts. 
Prior decision of Court of Appeals, that vendors 
had to take possession of water stock certificate to 
perfect their security interest, was applicable, under 
doctrine of issue preclusion, in vendors' subsequent 
action alleging that title company was negligent in 
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not protecting security interest in stock, despite 
subsequent Supreme Court decision in another case 
finding that recordation of trust deed is sufficient to 
perfect security interest in water stock, where issues 
in prior case and present case were identical, Court 
of Appeals' decision was final judgment on merits, 
parties adequately litigated issue in prior case, and 
vendors and title company were both losing parties 
in prior case. 
[5] Judgment <S=>715(1) 
228 — 
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(C) Matters Concluded 
228k715 Identity of Issues, in General 
228k715(l) In General. 
Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of same issue 
even if same claims for relief in two actions are 
different. 
[6] Judgment <®=>642 
228 — 
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General 
228k635 Courts or Other Tribunals Rendering 
Judgment 
228k642 Appellate Courts. 
Court of Appeals' decision was final judgment on 
merits, for purpose of doctrine of issue preclusion, 
where judgment was not further appealed or 
remanded, nor was it determined on basis of 
unrelated procedural issue, but, rather, Court 
examined substantive arguments and based its 
decision on related case law. 
[7] Judgment <®=>652 
228 — 
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
228XIV(A) Judgments Conclusive in General 
228k652 Judgment by Default. 
Issue was properly litigated in prior case, for 
purposes of doctrine of issue preclusion, even 
though defendant allowed default to be entered in 
action and other parties did not demand that 
defendant appear and defend action. 
[8] Limitation of Actions <S=>43 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(A) Accrual of Right of Action or Defense 
241k43 Causes of Action in General. 
General rule regarding statutes of limitations is 
that limitations period begins to run when last event 
necessary to complete cause of action occurs. 
[9] Appeal and Error <©=> 1008.1(8.1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court 
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General 
30kl008.1 In General 
30kl008.1(8) Particular Cases and Questions 
30kl008.1(8.1) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[9] Limitation of Actions <S=> 199(1) 
241 — 
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review 
241kl99 Questions for Jury 
241kl99(l) In General. 
Issue of when claimant discovered or should have 
discovered facts forming basis of cause of action is 
question of fact in determining applicability of 
discovery rule for tolling commencement of 
limitations period, and fact finder's conclusion 
cannot be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly 
erroneous. 
[10] Limitation of Actions <©=* 199(1) 
241 — 
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review 
241kl99 Questions for Jury 
241kl99(l) In General. 
Whether discovery rule tolled limitations period 
for vendors to bring action alleging that title 
company was negligent in not protecting security 
interest in water stock did not become issue of law 
simply because some "undisputed facts" indicated 
that vendors should have become aware of their 
injury at closing, given vendors' factual 
presentations to the contrary and parties' serious 
dispute in the matter; rather, case involved "classic 
factual dispute" that should be resolved by finder of 
fact. 
[11] Appeal and Error <©=> 1094(5) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(L) Decisions of *629 Intermediate 
Courts 
30kl093 Review of Questions of Fact 
30kl094 In General 
30kl094(5) Review on Appeal from Decision 
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Reversing Trial Court or Referee. 
Supreme Court could find that Court of Appeals 
correctly decided that trial court clearly erred in 
ruling on applicability of discovery rule to toll 
statute of limitations only if that ruling contradicted 
great weight of evidence or if Supreme Court was 
left with definite and firm conviction that mistake 
had been made. 
[12] Limitation of Actions <@=>197(2) 
241 — 
241V Pleading, Evidence, Trial, and Review 
241kl94 Evidence 
241kl97 Weight and Sufficiency 
241kl97(2) Ignorance, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment of Cause of Action. 
Trial court's conclusion that vendors should not 
have known of title company's negligence in not 
protecting their security interest in water stock at 
time of closing was not contrary to great weight of 
evidence, for purpose of determining whether 
limitations period for bringing negligence action had 
been tolled under discovery rule. U.C.A.1953, 
78-12-25(3). 
[13] Limitation of Actions <®=>95(1) 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(l) In General; What Constitutes 
Discovery. 
[See headnote text below] 
[13] Limitation of Actions <©=> 104(1) 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
241kl04 Concealment of Cause of Action 
241kl04(l) In General. 
Discovery rule for tolling limitations period applies 
in three situations: (1) where it is mandated by 
statute; (2) where defendant concealed facts or 
misled claimant, and as result, claimant did not 
become aware of cause of action until after 
limitation period had run; and (3) exceptional 
circumstances where application of general rule 
would be irrational or unjust. 
[14] Limitation of Actions <®=>95(1) 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(l) In General; What Constitutes 
Discovery. 
Balancing test for determining whether exceptional 
circumstances exist that warrant application of 
discovery rule to toll limitations period weighs 
hardship imposed on claimant by application of 
statute of limitations against any prejudice to 
defendant resulting from passage of time. 
[15] Limitation of Actions <@=>95(1) 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
24lk95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(l) In General; What Constitutes 
Discovery. 
Some factors that Supreme Court considers in 
applying balancing test for determining whether 
exceptional circumstances exist so as to trigger 
discovery rule for tolling limitations period include 
whether defendant's problems caused by passage of 
time are greater than plaintiff's problems, whether 
defendant performed technical service that plaintiff 
cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate, 
and whether claimant has aged to point that 
witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be 
found, and parties cannot remember basic events. 
[16] Limitation of Actions <@=*95(8) 
241 — 
24III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of 
Action 
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(8) Title to or Interest in Property. 
Exceptional circumstances allowed discovery rule 
to toll statute of limitations for vendors to bring 
action, which alleged that title company was 
negligent in not protecting their security interest in 
water stock, until purchasers' creditor brought 
action against vendors for declaration that creditor 
had perfected security interest in water stock free 
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from claims by vendors. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25(3). 
[17] Certiorari <@=>42(1) 
73 — 
7311 Proceedings and Determination 
73k42 Petition or Other Application 
73k42(l) Formal Requisites and Necessity in 
General. 
Issue as to whether vendors were entitled to 
attorney fees against title company under Consumer 
Sales Practices Act was not properly before 
Supreme Court, where vendors failed to request 
review of Court of Appeals' decision overturning 
trial court's award of fees in their petition for writ 
of certiorari; rather, questions presented in petition 
all dealt strictly with application of discovery rule 
for tolling limitations period. U.C.A.1953, 13-11-1 
to 13-11-23; Rules App. Proc, Rule 49. 
[18] Certiorari <@^42(1) 
73 — 
7311 Proceedings and Determination 
73k42 Petition or Other Application 
73k42(l) Formal Requisites and Necessity in 
General. 
Appellate procedural rule stating that although 
statement of issues presented in petition for writ of 
certiorari will be deemed to comprise every 
subsidiary question fairly included therein, only 
questions set forth in petition or fairly included 
therein will be considered by Supreme Court, should 
be construed broadly to avoid rigid exclusion of 
reviewable issues, however peripheral. Rules 
App.Proc, Rule 49. 
*631 Robert F. Orton and Mark F. Bell, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Bruce A. Maak, Jeffrey J. Hunt, Salt Lake City, 
and J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar City, for defendant. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
HOWE, Justice: 
We granted certiorari to review the court of 
appeals' decision that the statute of limitations bars 
plaintiffs Harold and Winona Sevy's negligence 
action against defendant Security Title Company of 
Southern Utah. The decision reversed the trial 
court's judgment awarding the Sevys damages 
against Security Title for negligently failing to 
protect their security interest in water shares. Sevy 
v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). 
In 1981, the Sevys sold Kyle and Cindy Stewart 
approximately thirteen acres of farmland in Garfield 
County, Utah, along with thirty-nine shares of Long 
Canal Company stock that provided irrigation water 
to the land. The purchase price was $25,000 for the 
land and the water shares, with a down payment of 
$5,000 and the balance payable in annual 
installments. Both parties intended that the Sevys 
would convey title to the land and the water shares 
to the Stewarts and the Stewarts would give the 
Sevys a lien on the land and the water shares to 
secure the balance of the unpaid purchase price. 
The parties engaged Security Title to prepare the 
documents of sale, transfer, and security. It 
prepared a warranty deed to convey the land and the 
water shares from the Sevys to the Stewarts, a 
promissory note in the amount of $20,000 from the 
Stewarts to the Sevys, and a deed of trust with 
assignment of rents (the trust deed) against the land 
and the water shares to secure the promissory note. 
According to industry practice at the time, it should 
have perfected the security interest in the water 
shares by recording the trust deed at the county 
recorder's office and delivering a certificate for 
thirty-nine shares of water stock to the Sevys. 
Although it recorded the trust deed, it mistakenly 
delivered the certificate to the Stewarts rather than 
to the Sevys. 
After it closed the transaction, the Stewarts 
borrowed money from the Lockhart Company and 
delivered the certificate to it to secure the loan. 
Lockhart accepted the certificate and filed a 
financing statement to secure its interest in the water 
shares with the Utah State Division of Corporations 
and Commercial Code. The Stewarts eventually 
defaulted on their loan, and Lockhart assigned all of 
its rights against the Stewarts to Associates Financial 
Services of Utah, Inc. 
After defaulting, the Stewarts petitioned for 
bankruptcy, and the trustee abandoned any interest 
in the thirty-nine shares of water stock. Seeking to 
foreclose on its security interest in the shares, 
Associates filed a lawsuit against the Sevys and 
Security Title in district court, asking the court to 
declare it the holder of a valid, perfected security 
interest in the shares, free from any claims by the 
Sevys or Security Title. Security Title made no 
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appearance in the action, and the court entered a 
default judgment against it. The court also granted 
Associates' motion for *632 summary judgment 
against the Sevys. The Sevys appealed, and we 
poured the case over to the court of appeals. That 
court affirmed the judgment, holding that water 
stock is a "certified security" under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-105(l)(i) and that the Sevys must have 
taken possession of the stock certificate to perfect 
their security interest. Associates Fin. Servs. v. 
Sevy, 776 P.2d 650, 652 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
Meanwhile, the Stewarts defaulted on their 
promissory note to the Sevys. The Sevys took 
possession of the farm and brought this action 
against Security Title for negligently failing to 
protect their security interest in the water shares. 
The district court, noting that the statute of 
limitations for negligence actions is only four years, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3), found that more 
than eight years had passed since Security Title had 
closed the transaction between the Sevys and the 
Stewarts. However, the court held that the 
discovery rule applied to toll the statute of 
limitations until the Sevys discovered that Associates 
claimed a security interest in the shares. The court 
further held that Security Title had breached its duty 
to the Sevys and awarded them damages. Security 
Title appealed to the court of appeals, which 
reversed the judgment. We granted the Sevys' 
petition for a writ of certiorari. Sevy v. Security 
Title, 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994). 
About three months before hearing oral arguments 
for this case, we decided Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Cahoon & Maxfield Irrigation Co., 879 P.2d 248 
(Utah 1994). In Cahoon, this court disavowed 
Associates Financial and held that water stock is not 
a certified security but an interest in real property. 
Id. at 252. Therefore, recording a trust deed is 
sufficient to perfect a security interest, and Security 
Title arguably could not be liable to the Sevys for 
negligence because it had properly recorded that 
document. After hearing oral arguments, we asked 
the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing 
the issue of whether Cahoon or Associates Financial 
should govern this case. 
I. RES JUDICATA 
[1] The Sevys contend that this court is precluded 
from applying the decision in Cahoon to this case 
because the doctrine of res judicata requires the 
parties to abide by the court of appeals' decision in 
Associates Financial. The doctrine of res judicata 
embodies two separate theories called issue 
preclusion and claim preclusion. Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). We will 
begin by analyzing the relationship between this case 
and Associates Financial under the theory of issue 
preclusion. 
[2] [3] Issue preclusion, sometimes referred to as 
collateral estoppel, prevents the parties from 
relitigating issues resolved in a prior related action. 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 
1993). The party seeking to invoke this doctrine 
must satisfy four requirements. First, the party 
must show that the issue challenged in the case at 
hand is identical to the issue decided in the previous 
action. Second, the issue in the previous action 
must have been decided in a final judgment on the 
merits. Third, the issue in the previous action must 
have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated. 
Fourth, the opposing party in the action at hand 
must have been either a party or privy to the 
previous action. Id. 
[4] We find that the first requirement is met 
because the issues in this case and in Associates 
Financial are identical. The issue which the district 
court and the court of appeals addressed in 
Associates Financial was whether the Sevys had a 
perfected security interest in the water stock that 
was superior to that of Stewarts' creditors. 
Associates Fin. Servs., 776 P.2d at 651. The issue 
presented here, which is whether in this action this 
court should apply the court of appeals' resolution of 
that issue or the resolution advanced in Cahoon, is 
essentially the same. 
[5] Security Title argues that the first requirement 
is not met because the remedy sought in Associates 
Financial is different from the remedy sought in this 
case. It points out that in Associates Financial, 
Associates pleaded for authorization to foreclose on 
the water shares without interference from the Sevys 
or from Security Title. In this case, the Sevys are 
pleading for damages *633 from Security Title for 
negligently failing to perfect their security interest. 
Although we acknowledge this difference, it does 
not prevent the application of issue preclusion. It is 
well settled that issue preclusion prevents relitigation 
of the same issue even if the claims for relief in the 
two actions are different. Penrod v. Nu Creation 
Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). In 
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support of its assertion to the contrary, Security 
Title cites Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 
1983), in which this court referred to the theory of 
claim preclusion under the general term of res 
judicata and explained that the relitigation of claims 
is precluded only when both suits involve the same 
cause of action. Id. at 1340 (citing Searle Bros. v. 
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)). Security 
Title fails to notice, however, that we later clarified 
that the separate theory of issue preclusion, or 
collateral estoppel, often "arises from a [different 
cause of action and prevents parties or their privies 
from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit 
that were fully litigated in the first suit." Id. 
Therefore, Schaer does not support Security Title's 
argument. 
[6] In examining the second requirement of issue 
preclusion, we find that the court of appeals' 
decision in Associates Financial was a final 
judgment on the merits. The judgment was not 
further appealed or remanded, nor was it determined 
on the basis of an unrelated procedural issue. See 
Robinson v. Myers, 599 P.2d 513, 515 (Utah 1979) 
(explaining that a judgment based on a procedural 
issue does not constitute a judgment on the merits). 
Rather, the court of appeals examined the 
substantive arguments and based its decision on 
related case law. 
[7] Third, the issue of whether the Sevys had a 
superior security interest in the water shares was 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated in Associates 
Financial. Security Title argues that the issue was 
not properly litigated because it allowed its default 
to be entered in the action and the Sevys did not 
demand that it appear and defend the action. 
However, Security Title's failure to defend its 
position in Associates Financial bears no relationship 
to whether the issue was competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated by the Sevys and Associates 
Financial. We find nothing in the record or in the 
Associates Financial decision which indicates that 
the parties did not adequately litigate the issue. 
Thus, we reject Security Title's argument. 
Finally, we find that the fourth requirement is met 
because the Sevys and Security Title were both 
losing parties in Associates Financial. See 
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 
1983) (implying that issue preclusion is applicable 
only if it is being evoked against a party who lost in 
the prior action). Because the Sevys have 
demonstrated that all four elements of issue 
preclusion are met in this case, we find that the 
ruling of Associates Financial, not Cahoon, applies 
to this case. Thus, we need not examine whether 
the elements of claim preclusion are met. 
Security Title argues that this court should apply 
Cahoon rather than Associates Financial to this case 
because judicial decisions are generally applied both 
prospectively and retrospectively. Heslop v. Bank 
of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992); Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). It points out 
that the only exception to this rule is if "there has 
been justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law 
or ... retroactive operation of the new law may 
otherwise create an undue burden." Van Dyke v. 
Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1991). 
However, we need not examine whether Cahoon 
applies under the general rules of retroactive 
application because, as we have just explained, the 
theory of issue preclusion applies to bind these 
parties to the decision of Associates Financial. 
Having determined that this case is governed by 
the court of appeals' decision in Associates 
Financial, we turn to the issues originally presented 
for review. The first issue is whether the discovery 
rule tolls the statute of limitations to the time when 
the Sevys first learned of Associates' claim of a 
security interest in the water shares. The second is 
whether the Sevys are entitled to attorney fees under 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. We 
address each of these issues separately. 
*634 II. DISCOVERY RULE 
The Sevys contend that the court of appeals erred 
in overturning the trial court's conclusion that the 
discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations until 
Associates brought its action against them and 
Security Title. Security Title counters that the 
discovery rule should not apply because the Sevys 
should have known of its failure to perfect their 
security interest in the water shares. It further 
asserts that by the time the Sevys filed this action, 
key witnesses no longer recalled critical facts of the 
transaction and essential documents, including the 
Stewarts' loan file, were lost. 
[8] As Security Title points out, "[Statutes of 
limitations 'are designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims 
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has 
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been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared.' " Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 
86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Order ofR.R. Telegraphers 
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788, 792 
(1944)). The general rule regarding statutes of 
limitations is that the limitation period begins to run 
when the last event necessary to complete the cause 
of action occurs. Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 
668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). Under that rule, 
" 'mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of 
action does not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations.' " Id. (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). 
The discovery rule is an exception to the general 
rule, and it delays the running of the limitation 
period " 'until the discovery of facts forming the 
basis for the cause of action.' " Warren v. Provo 
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) 
(quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). 
A. Knowledge of Negligence 
The first step in determining whether the discovery 
rule applies is to examine whether the Sevys made 
the threshold showing that they did not know, nor 
should have known, of Security Title's negligence at 
the time of the closing. See id. ("[A]n initial 
showing must be made that plaintiff did not know of 
and could not reasonably have known of the 
existence of the cause of action in time to file a 
claim within the limitation period."). The Sevys 
assert that this issue is a question of fact and that the 
court of appeals failed to meet the "clearly 
erroneous" standard in overturning the trial court's 
conclusion that they neither knew nor should have 
known of the negligence. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
Security Title counters that the court of appeals did 
not need to meet the clearly erroneous standard 
because this issue could have been decided as a 
question of law. It points out that it presented some 
pertinent facts that were undisputed by the Sevys 
and argues that because these facts clearly show that 
the Sevys discovered or reasonably should have 
discovered the negligent conduct at closing, the issue 
may be decided as a matter of law. In support of 
this argument, Security Title cites Love v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange, 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1142, 
271 Cal.Rptr. 246, 248 (1990); Reider v. Dawson, 
856 P.2d 31, 33 (Colo.Ct.App. 1992), aff'd, 872 
P.2d 212 (1994); Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434, 438, 
660 P.2d 46, 50 (1982); Witherspoon v. Guilford, 
203 Mich.App. 240, 243, 511 N.W.2d 720, 722, 
appeal denied, 525 N.W.2d 451 (1994); Holman v. 
Hansen, 237 Mont. 198, 773 P.2d 1200, 1203 
(1989); Grubb Properties, Inc. v. Simms Investment 
Co., 101 N.C.App. 498, 501, 400 S.E.2d 85, 88 
(1991); Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129; and Klinger v. 
Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990). 
[9][10] We hold that the issue of when a claimant 
discovered or should have discovered the facts 
forming the basis of a cause of action is a question 
of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be 
overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. 
Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 
1993); Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199, 202, 
436 P.2d 435, 437 (1968). We cannot accept 
Security Title's assertion that this issue becomes an 
issue of law simply because some "undisputed facts" 
indicate that the Sevys should have become aware of 
their injury at closing, despite the Sevys' factual 
presentations to the contrary and the parties' serious 
dispute in the matter. As this court stated in 
Andreini, 860 P.2d at 919, "This is a classic factual 
dispute that should be resolved by the finder of 
fact." 
*635 Further, we are not persuaded by the cases 
cited by Security Title in support of its argument. 
We acknowledge that two Utah cases support the 
principle that trial courts may, as a matter of law, 
determine whether particular actions or omissions 
are crucial to the application of the discovery rule to 
particular causes of action. See Warren, 838 P.2d at 
1129 (requiring one injured in airplane crash to take 
reasonable steps to determine whether municipality 
was complying with its flying regulations); Klinger, 
791 P.2d at 872 (explaining that the requirement that 
claimants use due diligence to discover facts 
underlying the cause of action does not require 
property owners to assume that survey is 
inaccurate). However, we are not asked to make 
such a determination in this case, and this principle 
is irrelevant to the issue at hand. Most of the other 
cases cited by Security Title hold that the question of 
when a plaintiff should have discovered a cause of 
action is a question of law only when no issues of 
material fact exist. Love, 111 Cal.Rptr. at 248; 
Reis, 660 P.2d at 50; Witherspoon, 511 N.W.2d at 
722; Grubb, 400 S.E.2d at 88. However, in the 
instant case, issues of material fact exist. Both 
parties made extensive presentations of facts tending 
to support their respective conclusions about when 
the Sevys should have discovered Security Title's 
negligence, and we cannot say that these parties do 
not dispute this issue. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
902 P.2d 629, Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, (Utah 1995) Page 8 
[11] Next, we examine whether the court of 
appeals correctly decided that the trial court's ruling 
on this issue was clearly erroneous. We can make 
this finding only if the ruling contradicts the great 
weight of evidence or if court reviewing the 
evidence is left with "a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 
143 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Although the court 
of appeals appears to have used the clearly 
erroneous standard in its review, we cannot agree 
with its reversal of the trial court's conclusion. 
[12] The court of appeals held that although the 
Sevys did not have actual knowledge of Security 
Title's negligence until Associates commenced its 
action, they should have known of the negligence at 
the time of the closing. Sevy, 857 P.2d at 963. 
The court ruled that the trial court's conclusion to 
the contrary was clearly erroneous. Id. In support 
of its holding, the court of appeals cited the 
following facts: 
Mr. Sevy knew the water stock had been 
transferred to the Stewarts' name.... Mr. Sevy 
knew or should have known there was no ongoing 
escrow at Security Title because there was no 
document reflecting any ongoing escrow given to 
him at closing.... Mr. Sevy testified that he knew 
he did not receive the certificate representing the 
39 shares of water stock, which had been 
transferred into the Stewarts' name. Nothing 
prevented the Sevys from asking Security Title 
about the 39 share water stock certificate and how 
Security Title was protecting their interest in those 
water shares. In addition, as an officer of the 
Long Canal Company for more than forty years, 
Mr. Sevy knew the water stock certificate was 
valuable and transferable. In fact, Mr. Sevy kept 
his own certificate in a safe deposit box. 
Id. 
We conclude that these facts do not support the 
holding that the trial court's conclusion is contrary 
to the great weight of evidence. The trial court 
relied upon a body of facts equal in weight to those 
relied upon by the court of appeals. The trial court 
cited those facts as follows: 
Members of the general public rely generally on 
title insurance companies to properly prepare 
documents and conduct real estate transactions and 
closings and further rely on what they are told by 
title companies with respect to real estate 
transactions.... 
[Harold] Sevy relied on Security Title to protect 
him by providing in said transaction a good and 
valid first lien in his favor against the real property 
and shares of water stock being sold and 
transferred to Stewart.... 
Harold Sevy[ ] is a farmer, does not have a 
formal education, and relied on Security Title to 
prepare proper documents and secure his first lien 
against the real property and water stock. Said 
Plaintiff had, prior to said transaction, been an 
*636 officer of The Long Canal Company, but 
had no knowledge regarding how to transfer shares 
and how to perfect security interests therein.... 
Winona Sevy[ ] did nothing more in this 
transaction than sign documents as requested by 
her husband, Harold Sevy. 
Moreover, the trust deed indicated that both the 
land and the water shares were secured, and Mr. 
Sevy testified that he thought the recording secured 
them. Further, he had successfully relied upon the 
expertise of Russell Dalton, Manager of Security 
Title, in the past. We cannot find that these facts 
are so insignificant that they give rise to a "definite 
and firm conviction" of error. See Walker, 743 
P.2d at 193. Therefore, we vacate the court of 
appeals' ruling on this issue and affirm the trial 
court's conclusion that the Sevys neither knew nor 
should have known of Security Title's negligence 
until after the limitation period had run. 
B. Exceptional Circumstances 
[13] Having made this determination, we must 
examine whether the circumstances of this case 
trigger the application of the discovery rule. The 
discovery rule applies in three situations: (1) where 
it is mandated by statute, (2) where the defendant 
concealed the facts or misled the claimant and, as a 
result, the claimant did not become aware of the 
cause of action until after the limitation period had 
run, and (3) exceptional circumstances where the 
application of the general rule would be "irrational 
or unjust." Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129. 
[14] [15] The Sevys argue that exceptional 
circumstances exist in this case. "The ultimate 
determination of whether a case presents exceptional 
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circumstances that render the application of a statute 
of limitations irrational or unjust" is a balancing test. 
Id. The balancing test weighs the hardship imposed 
on the claimant by the application of the statute of 
limitations against any prejudice to the defendant 
resulting from the passage of time. Myers, 635 
P.2d at 87. Some factors this court considers in 
applying this test include whether the defendant's 
problems caused by the passage of time are greater 
than the plaintiff's, whether the defendant performed 
a technical service that the plaintiff cannot 
reasonably have been expected to evaluate, and 
whether the claim has aged to the point that 
witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be 
found, and the parties cannot remember basic 
events. See Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872; Myers, 635 
P.2d at 87. 
[16] We hold that exceptional circumstances in this 
case support the application of the discovery rule. 
As the Sevys point out, the task of perfecting a 
security interest requires technical knowledge not 
possessed by people in general, and the nature of 
this task is such that a negligent failure to perform it 
properly may not be discovered until years later. In 
Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872, we relied in part upon a 
similar argument to allow the discovery rule to toll 
the statute of limitations. In that case, buyers of 
real property brought an action against a surveyor 
who had negligently surveyed their property. We 
noted that because surveying requires technical 
knowledge and yields intangible results, the buyers 
had "no reason to suspect that the survey was 
inaccurate." Id. We also noted that the surveyor's 
difficulties in litigating the action were that "no 
survey records or notes [were] available after 
fourteen years and, presumably, the memories of the 
members of the survey party [had] dimmed.... 
[However, the] signor on the survey certificate 
[was] responsible for its content, [was] still actively 
engaged in the practice of surveying, and [was] 
available for testimony." Id. After contrasting the 
prejudice to the buyers with the hardship to the 
surveyor, we concluded that the evidence was "not 
so stale or remote as to outweigh the prejudice to" 
the vendors in having their claim barred by the 
statute of limitations. Id. 
Security Title's difficulties in litigating this action 
are not greater than those of the surveyors in 
Klinger. Security Title asserts that records and 
files have been lost and that Russell Dalton, 
manager of Security Title, has no recollection of the 
transaction. However, the critical documents are 
still available, *637 (FN1) and Dalton is still with 
the company and available for testimony. 
Therefore, Security Title's difficulties in litigating 
this action do not outweigh the prejudice inflicted on 
the Sevys by the statute of limitations, which would 
credit them with the ability to detect latent flaws in a 
technical procedure of which they had no basis of 
understanding. 
Security Title argues that the same facts relied 
upon by the court of appeals in ruling that the Sevys 
knew or should have known of Security Title's 
negligence also support a finding that exceptional 
circumstances do not exist in this case. However, 
those facts do not undermine the reasoning outlined 
above. They do not reveal any additional difficulties 
faced by Security Title, nor do they show that the 
Sevys had technical knowledge of how to perfect 
security interests, either by virtue of Harold Sevy's 
position as an officer of the Long Canal Company or 
by virtue of his experience as a farmer. Thus, we 
vacate the court of appeals' ruling and affirm the 
trial court's ruling that exceptional circumstances in 
this case allowed the discovery rule to toll the statute 
of limitations until Associates brought their action 
against the Sevys. (FN2) 
III. ATTORNEY FEES 
[17] The Sevys contend that the court of appeals 
erred in overturning the trial court's ruling that they 
were entitled to attorney fees under the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
13-11-1 to -23, for bringing this action. Security 
Title counters that this issue is not properly before 
this court because the Sevys failed to request review 
of this ruling in their petition for a writ of certiorari. 
We agree. 
[18] Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure states that although the statement of issues 
presented in a petition for a writ of certiorari "will 
be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question 
fairly included therein [,] [o]nly the questions set 
forth in the petition or fairly included therein will be 
considered by the Supreme Court." We believe 
that this rule should be construed broadly to avoid 
the rigid exclusion of reviewable issues, however 
peripheral. However, in this case, this rule cannot 
be stretched to include the issue of attorney fees. 
The Sevys presented the following four questions 
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for review in their petition: 
1. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in 
reversing the trial court and concluding, as a 
matter of law, that Petitioners' claim is time-
barred because they could and should have 
reasonably discovered, before 1987, that the 
Respondent had failed to protect their security 
interest; 
2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in 
failing and refusing to apply the discovery rule to 
toll the four year statute of limitations where 
Petitioners did not know and should not reasonably 
have known of Respondent's professional 
negligence and misconduct and suffered no 
damages until a time which was less than four 
years before they filed suit; 
3. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals erred in 
concluding that the trial court's findings were 
clearly erroneous and/or in failing to remand this 
case to the trial court for a determination of when 
Petitioners should have discovered Respondents' 
professional negligence and misconduct; 
4. Whether the issues presented are sufficient to 
invoke this Court's judicial discretion and justify 
review by writ of certiorari under Rule 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
These four questions all deal strictly with the 
application of the discovery rule. Therefore, the 
issue of attorney fees is not before us. 
The court of appeals* decision is vacated, except 
for the denial of attorney fees as discussed above. 
The judgment of the trial court is reinstated except 
for the award of attorney fees in bringing this 
action. 
*638. RUSSON, J., and WILLIAM B. 
BOHLING, District Judge, concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and STEWART, Associate 
C.J., concur in the result. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself, does 
not participate herein; WILLIAM B. BOHLING, 
District Judge, sat. 
(FN1.) The documents still available include the 
trust deed, the warranty deed, the note secured by 
the trust deed, and the water stock certificate. 
(FN2.) The Sevys filed this action on December 27, 
1989, about two and a half years after Associates 
filed suit against them. Thus, the action was 
commenced within the four-year statute of 
limitations once it began to run. 
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*1044 747 P.2d 1044 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Howard C. SHARP, Max W. Steele and Steven W. 
Bergstedt, 
Trustees of the Bryner Clinic Employees Profit 
Sharing and Pension Trust, Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
F. Tempel RIEKHOF, AFCO Development 
Corporation, Frank K. 
Stuart, Trustee, David S. Taylor, McKean 
Construction 
Company, Max A. Barnett, Elsie J. Barnett, Vernon 
O. 
Anderson, Maxine D. Anderson, Troy Auer Kehl, 
Edward F. 
Kehl, Sally Ann Kehl, Executone Mountainwest, 
Inc., United 
Bank, John Does I through X, and Any And All 
Other Persons 
Who May Claim Any Interest in the Subject of This 
Action, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 20117. 
Dec. 7, 1987. 
Trustees of trusts to which real property was 
purportedly deeded brought quiet title action to 
remove potential cloud on title against, inter alia, 
creditor which had obtained judgment against 
transferor of property. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., granted 
summary judgment for trustees, and creditor 
appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) trusts 
were property interests which could not hold 
property, and (2) deed to named grantee, combined 
trusts, named nonentity as grantee, and accordingly 
conveyed no interest whatever. 
Summary judgment vacated; case remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Deeds <@=>13 
120 — 
1201 Requisites and Validity 
1201(A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyances in 
General 
120kl0 Parties 
120kl3 Capacity to Take. 
Grantee of deed must be natural or artificial person 
capable of taking and holding title to property, and if 
no such person exists, attempted conveyances are 
deemed mere nullities. 
[2] Trusts <S=> 134 
390 -— 
390II Construction and Operation 
39011(B) Estate or Interest of Trustee and of 
Cestui Que Trust 
390kl33 Extent of Estate or Interest of Trustee 
390kl34 In General. 
Trusts are property interests which cannot hold 
property. 
[3] Deeds <©=> 13 
120 — 
1201 Requisites and Validity 
1201(A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyances in 
General 
120kl0 Parties 
120kl3 Capacity to Take. 
Attempted conveyance of land to nonexisting entity 
is void. 
[4]Deeds<@^13 
120 — 
1201 Requisites and Validity 
1201(A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyances in 
General 
120kl0 Parties 
120kl3 Capacity to Take. 
Real property deed to named grantee, combined 
trusts, named nonentity as grantee, and accordingly 
conveyed no interest whatever; naming of nonentity 
as grantee was material defect in deed. 
*1045 Richard D. Lamborn, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and appellants. 
Bruce J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and 
respondents. 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment and 
order quieting title to real property in respondents. 
The underlying facts of this case are undisputed. 
On October 2, 1979, AFCO Development 
Corporation deeded real property in Salt Lake 
County to the "Bryner Clinic Employees' Profit 
Sharing and Pension Trusts." As consideration for 
the deed, respondents paid AFCO $100,000. The 
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deed was recorded on October 4, 1979. On 
December 18, 1981, appellant obtained a judgment 
against AFCO. To remove the potential cloud on 
their title, respondents initiated this action in 1983. 
(FN1) Appellant answered alleging, inter alia, that 
the 1979 deed is a nullity since a trust was named as 
grantee and a trust is not capable of taking and 
holding title to property. 
Respondents filed a motion for summary 
judgment, urging that they were entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Based upon various documents 
(including an affidavit) and memoranda on file, the 
trial court found as follows: the "Bryner Clinic 
Employees Profit Sharing Plan" was organized in 
1968, and the "Bryner Clinic, Inc. Employees 
Pension Trust" was organized in 1977; Howard C. 
Sharp, Max W. Steele, and Steven W. Bergstedt are 
the trustees for both entities; and the deed to 
"Bryner Clinic Employees' Profit Sharing and 
Pension Trusts" was considered by respondents to be 
jointly owned by the two entities for which they 
served as trustees. The court concluded that the 
actual name of the grantee, if incorrect, was not a 
material defect as to invalidate the deed since 
"[sufficient extrinsic evidence exists to allow proper 
identification of the intended grantee." The court 
thereupon granted respondents' motion for summary 
judgment, quieting title to "Howard C. Sharp, Max 
W. Steele and Steven W. Bergstedt, Trustees of the 
Bryner Clinic Employees Profit Sharing Plan" and 
"Howard C. Sharp, Max W. Steele and Steven W. 
Bergstedt, Trustees of the Bryner Clinic, Inc. 
Employees Pension Trust" as tenants in common. 
Appellant's judgment was held not to have attached 
to the property since the deed was recorded more 
than two years prior to the date of judgment and 
because at the time the judgment was entered, 
AFCO had no interest in the property. On appeal, 
appellant *1046. requests that this Court reverse 
and hold that the 1979 deed is a nullity conveying no 
priority to respondents. 
[1][2] Appellant argues that the grantee of a deed 
must be a natural or artificial person capable of 
taking and holding title to property, Burns v. 
Grable, 138 Cal.App.2d 280, 291 P.2d 969 (1956), 
and that if no such person exists, attempted 
conveyances are deemed "mere nullities." Nilson v. 
Hamilton, 53 Utah 594, 174 P. 624 (1918). He 
claims that trusts are property interests which cannot 
hold property. We agree and vacate the summary 
judgment. 
[3] [4] An attempted conveyance of land to a 
nonexisting entity is void. See Nilson v. Hamilton, 
53 Utah at 600, 174 P. at 626, where we held that a 
deed which named a deceased person or his estate as 
a grantee was void because neither the estate nor the 
deceased person was a legal entity. See also Rixford 
v. Zeigler, 150 Cal. 435, 88 P. 1092, 1093 (1907), 
where it is said: 
[A] deed of conveyance is void unless the grantee 
named is capable of taking and holding the 
property named in the deed; and the general rule 
also is that to make a deed effective the grantee 
must be a person, either natural or artificial, 
capable of taking and holding the property. 
Since the deed here named a nonentity as the 
grantee, we cannot agree with the trial court that the 
deed did not contain "a material defect." The deed 
conveyed no interest whatever. 
Respondents, in their amended complaint, sought 
as alternative relief reformation of the deed so as to 
substitute the trustees as the grantees of the deed. 
However, the trial court did not reach the claim for 
reformation or make any ruling thereon since it 
incorrectly concluded that the naming of the trust as 
the grantee was not a material defect. Because the 
grantee was a nonentity, the defect was material. 
The summary judgment quieting title in 
respondents is vacated, and the case is remanded to 
the trial court for a determination of respondents' 
claim for reformation, subject to any defenses 
appellant may raise thereto. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself, does 
not participate herein. 
(FN1.) Other judgment creditors of AFCO were 
also joined as party-defendants. All of the other 
defendants have either executed a disclaimer of 
interest in the property or have defaulted by failing 
to answer the complaint. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
WALL INVESTMENT COMPANY, a limited 
partnership, with Gordon 
Goodsell, general partner, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
GARDEN GATE DISTRIBUTING, INC., Dennis 
Vanderlinden, and 
Steven Vanderlinden, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 15766. 
March 26, 1979. 
General partnership brought action for conversion 
when judgment creditor, having obtained money 
judgment against mortgagor, proceeded under writ 
of execution to seize mortgagor's inventory which 
was then subject of a "chattel mortgage" in favor of 
mortgagee. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Dean E. Conder, J., entered judgment in 
favor of plaintiff, and judgment creditor and others 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that: 
(1) judgment creditor failed to meet burden of 
showing invalidity of recorded financial statement 
due to insufficient address; (2) limited partnership 
could bring suit; (3) partnership's early failure to 
comply with assumed name statute did not disqualify 
it as plaintiff in suit, and (4) evidence supported 
findings that seized inventory had value equal to 
award. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Secured Transactions <®=>93 
349A — 
349AII Perfection of Security Interest 
349Ak92 Financing Statement 
349Ak93 Addresses. 
Fact that chattel mortgage in favor of general 
partnership was a post office box did not mean that 
mortgage was defective as a financing statement as a 
matter of law so that it would not perfect a security 
interest. 
[2] Secured Transactions <@==>101 
349A — 
349AII Perfection of Security Interest 
349Akl01 Evidence. 
It is burden of party asserting invalidity of 
recorded financial statement to perfect security 
interest to prove insufficiency of address as a matter 
of fact. 
[3] Secured Transactions <@^101 
349A — 
349All Perfection of Security Interest 
349Akl01 Evidence. 
Judgment creditor claiming invalidity of chattel 
mortgage on inventory which creditor seized did not 
satisfy its burden of proving that mortgage was 
defective due to insufficient address for mortgagee 
as judgment creditor failed even to attempt 
communication with mortgagee by mail. 
[4] Secured Transactions <®^93 
349A — 
349All Perfection of Security Interest 
349Ak92 Financing Statement 
349Ak93 Addresses. 
An address on chattel mortgage is sufficient if it 
would enable a prudent person using reasonable care 
to locate the secured party. 
[5] Partnership <®=>375 
289 — 
289VIII Limited Partnership 
289k375 Actions by or Against Firms or 
Partners. 
A limited partnership, as an entity distinct from its 
partners, can bring suit in its own name without 
identifying its partners. U.C.A.1953, 48-2-26. 
[6] Partnership <@=>375 
289 — 
289VIII Limited Partnership 
289k375 Actions by or Against Firms or 
Partners. 
Limited partnership's early failure to comply with 
assumed name statute would not disqualify it as a 
plaintiff in action for conversion where partnership 
had filed shortly after seizure complained of and 
before complaint in matter was filed. U.C.A.1953, 
42-2-5. 
[7] Secured Transactions <@=* 171 
349A — 
349AIV Rights and Liabilities of Parties 
349Akl71 Actions. 
Evidence, in action for conversion, supported 
finding that inventory wrongfully seized had value in 
excess of $13,914.62, which amount would be 
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awarded to plaintiff. 
*543 Rodney S. Page of Hess, Palmer, Van 
Wagenen & Page, Clearfield, for defendants and 
appellants. 
Barrie G. McKay, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
This action for conversion arose when appellant 
Garden Gate Distributing, Inc. ("Garden"), having 
obtained a money judgment against one Donald L. 
Zimmerman, a dealer in floor coverings and other 
home furnishings, proceeded under writ of execution 
on February 6, 1976, to seize Zimmerman's floor 
covering inventory. The seized inventory was then 
the subject of a "chattel mortgage" in favor of 
respondent Wall Investment Company ("Wallco"). 
The mortgage had been filed with the Secretary of 
State in compliance with the Uniform Commercial 
Code. ([FN1]) 
On the date of the mortgage and until after the 
inventory seizure, Wallco was a general partnership 
which had failed to file an assumed name certificate 
as our statute ([FN2]) requires. Shortly after the 
seizure and before the complaint in this matter was 
filed, Wallco became a limited partnership by filing 
a Certificate of Limited Partnership with the Utah 
County Clerk. Thereafter, Wallco filed an assumed 
name certificate with the Secretary of State. 
When Wallco sued Garden for wrongful taking of 
the Zimmerman inventory, Garden raised as 
primary defenses (1) that the mortgage was defective 
as a financing statement and therefore failed to 
perfect a security interest in that it gave an 
insufficient address for Wallco, and (2) that the 
plaintiffs, identified in the complaint as "Wall 
Investment Company, a limited partnership, with 
Gordon Goodsell, general partner," was without 
standing to maintain the suit. After non-jury trial, 
the trial court resolved the issues associated with 
those defenses in favor of Wallco, found the seized 
inventory to have had a value in excess of 
$13,914.62 (the amount remaining to be paid under 
the notes secured by the mortgage) and entered 
judgment for Wallco in that amount. 
On appeal, Garden asserts that the trial court ruled 
erroneously on the primary defense issues and 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No 
further asserts that the evidence does not support the 
finding that *544 the seized inventory had a value 
as high as the damage award. 
[1][2][3][4] The claimed defect in the mortgage is 
that it provided an insufficient address for Wallco. 
The address on the mortgage instrument is a post 
office box. It is not disputed that the identified box 
was, at all relevant times, maintained by a general 
partner of Wallco. A post office box address is not 
insufficient as a matter of law, ([FN3]) and it was 
Garden's burden, as the party asserting the invalidity 
of the recorded financial statement, to prove the 
insufficiency of the address as a matter of fact. 
Garden, having failed even to attempt 
communication with Wallco by mail, could not 
satisfy that burden. An address is sufficient if it 
would enable a prudent person using reasonable care 
to locate the secured party. 
In challenging Wallco's standing to sue, Garden 
raises no issue about the limited partnership's 
ownership of the property interest which was 
originally conveyed by the chattel mortgage to 
Wallco as a general partnership. Garden's 
contention is that a partnership, general or limited, 
is not a legal entity distinct from its partners and 
cannot maintain an action in its own name. 
At common law, a partnership was not recognized 
as a distinct legal entity. The, partners were 
required to join as plaintiffs in actions to enforce 
partnership rights. ([FN4]) In Hamner v. 
Ballantyne, ([FN5]) this Court concluded that a 
partnership was a legal entity distinct from its 
partners and affirmed an award against a partnership 
in its partnership name. The common law rule has 
been criticized as a "useless relic of strict procedural 
rules with nothing, apparently, to justify its 
continued existence," ([FN6]) and modern tendency 
is to depart from it. ([FN7]) 
[5] We need not decide, for the purposes of this 
appeal, whether a general partnership can sue in its 
own name. The plaintiff here is a limited 
partnership, not a general one. Limited partnerships 
were unknown to the common law and are, like 
corporations, creatures of statute. ([FN8]) The 
quasi-corporate aspects of a limited partnership and 
the quasi-shareholder status of a limited partner are 
obvious. The same reasoning and policy 
considerations which justify recognition of 
corporations as proper parties plaintiff apply as well 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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to limited partnerships. ([FN9]) Moreover, there is 
a specific legislative recognition that a limited 
partnership, as an entity distinct from its partners, 
can bring suit. By statute ([FN10]) it is provided 
that "a contributor . . . is not a proper party to 
proceedings by . . . a partnership." A limited 
partnership may sue in its own name without 
identifying its partners; their names and addresses 
are a matter of public record or the partnership has 
not been validly constituted. 
[6] Wallco's early failure to comply with the 
assumed name statute does not disqualify it as a 
plaintiff in this suit. The only sanction associated 
with non-compliance is denial of the non-complying 
entity's access to the courts, and that sanction is 
removed on compliance. ([FN 11]) 
[7] Appellant contends that the evidence will not 
support the findings that the seized inventory had 
value equal to the award. While there were 
conflicting value *545. opinions and conflicting 
testimony about the quantity of property seized, 
there is certainly credible and competent evidence 
which supports the finding. We do not, in such 
circumstances, substitute our judgment for that of 
the trial court. ([FN12]) 
The judgment is therefore affirmed. Costs to 
Wallco. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
(FN1.) U.C.A., 1953, 70A-9-401. 
(FN2.)U.C.A., 1953,42-2-5. 
(FN3.) Silver v. Gulf City Body and Trailer 
Works, 432 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1972). 
(FN4.) 60 Am.Jur.2d Partnership, Sec. 322 et seq. 
(FN5.) 16 Utah 436, 52 P. 770 (1898). 
(FN6.) Eleventh Annual Report of New York 
Judicial Council, 1945. 
(FN7.) Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat. Bank, 76 
N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966). 
(FN8.) Ruzicka v. Rager, 305 N.Y. 191, 111 
N.E.2d 878 (1953); See 39 A.L.R.2d 288. 
(FN9.) Ibid, and see 60 Am.Jur.2d Partnership, 
Sec. 390. No. 15766. 
(FN10.) U.C.A., 1953, 48-2-26. 
(FN11.) Piatt v. Locke, 11 Utah 2d 273, 358 P.2d 
95 (1961). 
(FN12.) Fisher v. Taylor, Utah, 572 P.2d 393 
(1977); Griffeth v. Zumbrennen, Utah, 577 P.2d 
129 (1978). 
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§ 1 3 DEEDS 23 Am Jur 2d 
to land.71 However, except where the statutory mode is declared to be 
exclusive,72 the efficacy of common-law conveyances and deeds operating by 
force of the Statute of Uses is not destroyed.73 
§ 14. Quitclaim; release. 
The modern quitclaim deed74 is lineally descended from a release,75 the 
styling, whether "quitclaim" or "release," being derived from the operative 
words, "remise, release and forever quitclaim."76 But while formerly a release 
was appropriate and effective to convey title only where the release was in 
rightful occupation of the land,77 this restriction no longer holds good,78 
especially in view of statutes enacted to facilitate the transfer of title to lands.79 
§15. Confirmation deed. 
A confirmation deed is somewhat similar to a release in that it confirms the 
grantee in his estate free from any claim by the grantor, and thus may operate 
to enlarge the grantee's estate or interest.80 A mistake in describing the land 
may be corrected by a confirming deed in which the land intended to be 
conveyed is correctly described.81 A mistake in the omission of parties may also 
be corrected by a deed of correction to effectuate the intention of the parties.82 
Thus, the purpose of a correction deed is to admit mutual error and change 
the original instrument to conform to the true intent of the parties.83 On the 
71. Chalker v Chalker, 1 Conn 79; Doe ex 
dem. McConnel v Reed, 5 III 117; Seeck v 
Jakel, 71 Or 35, 141 P 211. 
72. Morris v Lessee of Harmer's Heirs, 32 US 
554, 8 L Ed 781 (referring to Ohio statutes). 
73. Evenson v Webster, 3 SD 382, 53 NW 
747. 
74. § 338. 
75. Smith v Pendell, 19 Conn 107; Snow v 
Lake's Admr., 20 Fla 656; Doe ex dem. Mc-
Connel v Reed, 5 111 117; Rowe v Beckett, 30 
Ind 154; Thornton v Mulquinne, 12 Iowa 549; 
Hunt v Hunt, 31 Mass 374; McQuiddv Printing 
Co. v Hirsig, 23 Tenn App 434, 134 SW2d 
197; Cook v Smith, 107 Tex 119, 174 SW 
1094. 
As to what passes by quitclaim, see § 339. 
As to after-acquired title passing under quit-
claim, see §§ 352 et seq. 
Practice Aids.—Quitclaim deed executed 
pursuant to arbitration award. 3 AM JUR LEGAL 
FORMS 2d, BOUNDARIES § 44:122. 
Release and quitclaim by heir of interest in 
cemetery lot. 4 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, CEME-
TERIES § 54:102. 
76. Van Rensselaer v Kearney, 52 US 297, 13 
L Ed 703; Smith v Pendell, 19 Conn 107; Doe 
ex dem. McConnel v Reed, 5 111 117; Rowe v 
Beckett, 30 Ind 154; Rolette County Bank v 
Hanlyn, 48 ND 72, 183 NW 260. 
Practice Aids.—Quitclaim deeds. 7 AM JUR 
LEGAL FORMS 2d, DEEDS, §§ 87:31 et seq. 
As to statutory and commonly used quitclaim 
deeds in particular jurisdictions, see 7 AM JUR 
LEGAL FORMS 2d, DEEDS §§ 87:51 et seq. 
77. Where a quitclaim recited a lease, it was 
held that when the quitclaim had become an 
ancient deed the existence of the lease would 
be presumed. Crane v Lessee of Morris, 31 US 
598, 8 L Ed 514. 
In some jurisdictions a mere release has 
been construed as a conveyance of the relea-
sor's right, title, and interest in order to avoid 
invalidity by reason of the ancient rule that a 
release was operative only where the releasee 
had an estate or interest in possession. Thorn-
ton v Mulquinne, 12 Iowa 549; Hunt v Hunt, 
31 Mass 374; Pray v Pierce, 7 Mass 381. 
78. Jackson ex dem. Bradstreet v Huntington, 
30 US 402, 8 L Ed 170 (holding that a release 
to the disseisor by the disseisee is as good a 
conveyance as can be executed); Thornton v 
Mulquinne, 12 Iowa 549; Pray v Pierce, 7 Mass 
381. 
79. Doe ex dem. McConnel v Reed, 5 111 117. 
80. Knight v Dyer, 57 Me 174; Chess v Chess 
(Pa) 1 Penr & W 32. 
Practice Aids.—Confirmation deed—ratifica-
tion of prior deed executed by agent. 7 AM JUR 
LEGAL FORMS 2d, DEEDS § 87:42. 
—ratification of deed executed under possi-
ble disability. 7 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, 
DEEDS §87:43. 
81. § 333. 
82. Cox v Tanner, 229 SC 568, 93 SE2d 905. 
83. Neblett v Placid Oil Co. (La App) 257 So 
2d 167, cert den 260 La 1121, 258 So 2d 376. 
Practice Aids.—Confirmation deed—correc-
tion of mistakes in prior deed. 7 AM JUR LEGAL 
FORMS 2d, DEEDS § 87:44. 
88 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23AmJur2d DEEDS § 1 7 
other hand, a deed which does not of itself purport to convey the land will not 
operate to confirm the estate of a grantee who has no estate or whose deed is 
void.84 
§ 16. Endorsement of a previous deed. 
The endorsement over of a deed, while sometimes given effect as a convey-
ance, at least where it otherwise satisfied the minimum requirements for a 
deed,85 appears to have generally fallen into disuse as a method of conveying 
land.86 
HI. FORMAL REQUISITES AS TO CONTENT AND WORDING [§§ 17-25] 
§ 17. Generally. 
A deed must be drawn in such language as to indicate who is granting the 
property, to whom it is granted, and what the property is,87 and it is usual for 
the conveyancer to set forth what the deed is intended to express in some 
formal manner.88 
Generally speaking, when it is agreed between two parties that a deed shall 
be given, nothing more can be exacted than an instrument sufficient to pass 
the estate of the party who is to give the deed.89 It is not, however, essential to 
the validity of an instrument as a deed, or to make it operative to pass title to 
land, that it follow any exact or prescribed form of words, provided the 
intention to convey is expressed.90 An instrument is sufficient as a deed if it 
makes known the transaction between the parties and is executed according to 
the statutory requirements of the law where the land is situated.91 No matter 
how ungrammatical and untechnical the words of a deed may be, it is 
operative to pass title if it sufficiently and legally declares the grantor's 
intention92 and contains some apt words importing a grant.93 The tendency has 
84. Chess v Chess (Pa) 1 Penr 8c W 32. But 
see Boyd Lumber Co. v Mills, 146 Ga 794, 92 
SE 534, stating that a void deed may be ratified 
by a subsequent writing. 
85. See, for example, New Home Bldg. Sup-
ply Co. v Nations, 259 NC 681, 131 SE2d 425, 
wherein a dated, signed and sealed endorse-
ment on the back of a deed to the effect that 
"I , A. E. Lundy do hereby transfer this deed in 
its entirety to New Home Building Supply 
Company Incorporated, with the exception of 
pulp wood," was held to be a valid deed. 
86. In strict law an endorsement of words 
purporting only to assign rights in and to "the 
within deed" is inoperative for want of words 
to convey the property. Bentley's Heirs v De-
forest, 2 Ohio 221. 
87. Duffield v Duffield, 268 111 29, 108 NE 
673. 
"A deed consists of the names of the parties, 
the consideration for which the land was sold, 
the description of the subject granted, the 
quantity of interest conveyed, and lastly, the 
conditions, reservations, and covenants, if there 
be any." Evenson v Webster, 3 SD 382, 53 NW 
747. 
As to designation of parties, see §§ 33 et seq. 
Practice Aids.—Form drafting guides and 
checklists of matters to be considered in draft-
ing a deed. 7 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d, DEEDS, 
§§87:13,87:14. 
88. Deslauriers v Senesac, 331 111 437, 163 NE 
327 (superseded by statute on another matter 
as stated in Minonk State Bank v Grassman, 
103 III App 3d 1106, 59 111 Dec 802, 432 NE2d 
386), Duffield v Duffield, 268 111 29, 108 NE 
673. 
As to the form of deed to which the pur-
chaser is entitled under his contract, see 77 Am 
J u r 2d, VENDOR AND PURCHASER § 276. 
89. Ketchum v Evertson, 13 Johns (NY) 359. 
90. Cross v Weare Com. Co., 153 III 499, 38 
NE 1038; Meairs v Kruckenberg, 171 Kan 450, 
233 P2d 472, 31 ALR2d 525. 
T h e words "bargain and sale" are not neces-
sary to constitute a deed of bargain and sale, in 
order to pass a fee simple. Riggs v New Castle, 
229 Pa 490, 78 A 1037. 
As to endorsement as a deed or method of 
conveyancing, see § 16. 
9 1 . Sterling v Park, 129 Ga 309, 58 SE 828. 
92. Sprague v Edwards, 48 Cal 239; Doe ex 
dem. Cobb v Hines, 44 NC 343. 
93 . Webb v Mullins, 78 Ala 111. 
89 
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§383 PARTNERSHIP 5 9 A A m J u r 2 d 
14 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Partnership §§ 194:228, 194:261, 194:262, 194:263, 
194:264, 194:691-194:713, 194:851, 194:875-194:883, 194:911-194:919, 194:931, 
194:932 
Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Federal Tax Guide, H1f 161-D-5 et seq., 161-D-31, 161-D-32, 
161-D-35, 161-D-36, 162-E-5, 162-E-6, 162-E-15 to 162-E-19, 162-E-21, 162-E-22, 
162-E-31 to 162-E-33, 162-E-37, 170-C-25, 171-C-131 
1. IN GENERAL [§§ 383, 384] 
§383- Generally 
The Uniform Partnership Act15 provides that the property rights of a partner 
are: (1) his right in specific partnership property; (2) his interest in the 
partnership; and (3) his right to participate in the management.16 These rights 
constitute three distinct interests arising from a partnership.17 
§ 384. Tenancy in partnership 
The Uniform Partnership Act18 creates a form of property co-ownership 
called a tenancy in partnership.19 This estate is an intangible interest in the 
nature of personal property, even if land is one of the partnership's assets.20 It 
is not equivalent to a tenancy in common but converts to that form once the 
partnership winds up or terminates.21 In contrast to the full possessory rights 
of a tenant in common, the rights of a tenant in partnership are quite limited 
and dependent on the consent of all partners.22 
Under a tenancy in partnership, the partnership, rather than the partners, 
owns the firm property, as is apparent from the Act's recognition that all 
property brought into the partnership, and property acquired with partnership 
funds, is partnership property.23 It removes the necessity of holding title in the 
name of the several partners, as required for a joint tenancy or a tenancy in 
common, and their attendant limitations.24 
The tenancy created by the Uniform Act has been described as a drastic 
change in the law of partnership,25 but prior law long held that the joint effects 
of a partnership belong to the firm, not to the partners,28 and that a partner 
has no individual property in any specific assets of the firm.27 
21. Re Minton Group, Inc. (SD NY) 46 BR 
222, 12 BCD 811, 11 CBC2d 1442, CCH 
15. UPA § 24. 
16. Backowski v Solecki, 112 Mich App 401, 
316 NW2d 434; Wilzig v Sisselman, 182 NJ 
Super 519, 442 A2d 1021, later proceeding 
209 NJ Super 25, 506 A2d 1238, certif den 104 
NJ 417, 517 A2d 415 (right to participate in 
management as fundamental and a part of 
partner's property); Simmons v Quick-Stop 
Food Mart, Inc., 307 NC 33, 296 SE2d 275. 
17. Stilgenbaur v United States (CA9 Cal) 115 
F2d 283, 40-2 USTC 1f 9771, 25 AFTR 966. 
18. UPA § 25. 
19. Nationwide Resources Corp. v Massabni 
(App) 134 Ariz 557, 658 P2d 210, later pro-
ceeding (App) 143 Ariz 460, 694 P2d 290; 
Omnicon, Inc. v King (Tenn) 688 SW2d 818. 
20. § 385. 
434 
Bankr L Rptr H 70*236. 
22. Re Minton Group, Inc. (SD NY) 46 BR 
222, 12 BCD 811, 11 CBC2d 1442, CCH 
Bankr L Rptr f 70236. 
23. UPA § 8(1), discussed in § 329. 
24. Kentucky Block Cannel Coal Co. v Seweli (CA6 Ky) 249 F 840, 1 ALR 556; Lueth v 
Goodknecht, 345 111 197, 177 NE 690, 79 ALR 
780; Curtis v Reilly, 188 Iowa 1217, 177 NW 
535. 
25. Williams v Dovell, 202 Md 351, 96 A2d 484. 
26. Commissioner v Shapiro (CA6) 125 F2d 
532, 42-1 USTC 119260, 28 AFTR 1079, 144 
ALR 349; State v Elsbury, 63 Nev 463, 175 P2d 
430, 169 ALR 364; Egan v American State 
Bank (Tex Civ App) 67 SW2d 1081, writ ref. 
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§41 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 
A deed ordinarily states the consideration,1 
and the expression of a valuable consideration 
is essential to a deed of bargain and sale.2 
However, a conveyance may be operative and 
of binding effect even though the consideration 
is not expressed therein,3 and a bargain and 
sale deed is good, although it does not express 
that the consideration money has been paid.4 
The amount of the consideration of the 
conveyance need not be stated in the convey-
ance in order to make it a valid one and pass 
the title;5 nor does a false statement of the 
consideration operate as a nullification,6 and 
this is also true of an intentional concealment 
or misrepresentation of the consideration.7 
§ 42 Operative w o r d s 
A conveyance must contain operative 
words of grant, but such words need not be 
in any particular clause, nor need technical 
words be used. 
[Section 41] 
1I1L—Leonard v. Springer, 98 111. App. 530, 1900 WL 
3966 (1st Dist. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 197 111. 532, 
64 N.E. 299 (1902). 
Not voluntary conveyance 
Conveyance expressing as consideration money or 
thing of value, no matter how small, cannot be held as 
matter of law to be voluntary conveyance. 
Ga.—Hollomon v. Board of Ed. of Stewart County, 
168 Ga. 359, 147 S.E. 882 (1929). 
2Ala.—Crosby v. Baldwin County, 227 Ala. 122, 148 
So. 814 (1933). 
Recital of five dollars consideration sufficient 
Mo.—Key v. Kilburn, 228 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1950). 
3Cal.—Pomper v. Behnke, 97 Cal. App. 628, 276 P. 
122 (3d Dist. 1929). 
S.C.—Knighton v. Des Portes Mercantile Co., 119 
S.C. 340, 112 S.E. 343 (1922). 
Tenn.—Thornton v. Thornton, 39 Tenn. App. 225, 
282 S.W.2d 361 (1955). 
Executory contract 
Rule of necessity to express some consideration in 
conveyance of real estate applies only to executory 
contracts. 
Ohio—Vale v. Stephens, 25 Ohio App. 523, 5 Ohio L. 
Abs. 578, 159 N.E. 114 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1927). 
4N.C—Brocket v. Foscue, 8 N.C. 64, 1 Hawks 64, 
1820 WL 157 (1820). 
5U.S.—McLellan v. Penick, 289 F. 366 (CCA. 5th Cir. 
1923). 
6Pa.—Dohan v. Yearicks, 253 Pa. 403, 98 A. 611 (1916). 
Research References 
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It is, as a general rule, necessary that a 
deed contain operative words of grant,1 which 
may be in either the past or the present tense.2 
In the absence of words of conveyance therein, 
the deed does not pass title.3 The thing and 
the estate granted may be granted either by 
words contained in the premises or in the 
habendum and tenendum,4 and, although 
there are no words of grant in the premises, 
yet if from the other operative words of the 
deed the intent to pass title is manifest, the 
deed is sufficient.5 
While technical words need not be used,6 
certain technical words are generally used to 
pass the interest intended to be conveyed, al-
though other equivalent words may be suf-
W.Va.—Stephenson v. Kuntz, 131 W. Va. 599, 49 
S.E.2d 235 (1948). 
7S.C—Knighton v. Des Portes Mercantile Co., 119 
S.C. 340, 112 S.E. 343 (1922). 
[Section 42] 
1Ark.—Davis v. Griffin, 298 Ark. 633, 770 S.W.2d 137 
(1989). 
Va.—Lim v. Choi, 256 Va. 167, 501 S.E.2d 141 (1998). 
Intent disclosed by language 
In order to pass title to an estate by deed, there must 
be operative words which manifest intent to transfer the 
property described in the instrument, and the intent must 
be disclosed by language of the deed and not by the mere 
act of the parties. 
W.Va.—Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 134 W. Va. 
900, 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950). 
Proper and sufficient words 
To enable a deed to operate as an effectual convey-
ance, there should be proper and sufficient words mani-
festing an intention to transfer an estate. 
W.Va.—Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 134 W. Va. 
900, 62 S.E.2d 337 (1950). 
2Iowa—Pierson v. Armstrong, 1 Iowa 282, 1 Clarke 
282, 1855 WL 177 (1855). 
Mich.—Stamp v. Steele, 209 Mich. 205, 176 N.W. 464 
(1920). 
3Ala.—Lilly v. Earl, 463 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1984). 
4Ind.—Kenworthy v. Tullis, 3 Ind. 96, 1851 WL 2920 
(1851). 
5Mass.—Bridge v. Wellington, 1 Mass. 219, 1804 WL 
698 (1804). 
6Va.—Lim v. Choi, 256 Va. 167, 501 S.E.2d 141 (1998). 
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ficient.7 As long as creditors and bona fide 
purchasers are not defrauded, any words 
signifying an intention to sell or give land will 
pass the title.8 If a specific purpose is intended, 
comprehending a beneficial use and enjoy-
ment; words which describe that purpose will 
be sufficient.9 The word "sell," while it is more 
apt to describe the passing of the title to per-
sonalty than to realty, may be used to indicate 
an intent to convey the property named 
whether it is real or personal.10 Where the 
purpose of the transaction is stated, the word 
will ordinarily have no more effect on the title 
than is necessary to accomplish the purpose.11 
§ 43 Correction of deed by 
subsequent ins trument 
Except where the grantor has divested 
himself or herself of title, a deed may be cor-
rected by a subsequent instrument in the 
absence of fraud or the intervention of the 
7Cal.—Olson v. Cornwell, 134 Cal. App. 419, 25 P.2d 
879 (1st Dist. 1933). 
Use of either "grant" or "convey" 
Either the word "grant" or the word "convey" is suf-
ficient as operative word in deed to pass title to present 
estate. 
Okla.—Higgins v. Oklahoma City, 1937 OK 721, 191 
Okla. 16, 127 P.2d 845 (1937). 
Omission of "grant" 
The word "grant" may be omitted, and other words 
plainly manifesting the intent of the grantor that his 
estate should pass by the deed may be substituted. 
U.S.—Kaleialii v. Sullivan, 242 F. 446 (CCA. 9th 
Cir. 1917). 
Quitclaim deeds 
(1) The mere declaration of the grantor that he or she 
makes a quitclaim deed to the grantee, accompanied by a 
description of the land, is not enough. 
111.—Legout v. Price, 318 111. 425, 149 N.E. 427 (1925). 
(2) A quitclaim deed reciting that for and in consider-
ation of one dollar cash in hand paid, receipt of which 
was acknowledged, and other valuable considerations, not 
mentioned, grantors quitclaimed to grantees their right, 
title, and interest in realty, was not insuiRcient because it 
did not contain the words "grant, bargain and sell." 
Ark.—Penney v. Long, 210 Ark. 702, 197 S.W.2d 470 
(1946). 
8Colo.—Scott v. Brown, 71 Colo. 275, 206 P. 572 (1922). 
IU.—Legout v. Price, 318 111. 425,149 N.E. 427 (1925). 
Mo.—Monroe v. Lyons, 339 Mo. 515, 98 S.W.2d 544 
(1936). 
9Mass.—Johnson v. Rayner, 72 Mass. 107, 6 Gray 107, 
1856 WL 5616 (1856). 
rights of third persons, where the first 
instrument could have been reformed in 
equity. 
Research References 
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Where there is no fraud and the rights of 
third persons have not intervened, and equity 
could have reformed the deed, it may be 
amended by a subsequent instrument so as to 
effectuate the intention of the parties.1 This 
rule applies to a mistake in the description,2 
or to omission of conditions by mutual mis-
take,3 or to a deed executed and antedated to 
replace a destroyed instrument, even though 
done without the grantee's knowledge.4 The 
grantor may be compelled to execute the new 
deed,5 and the grantee may be compelled to 
10U.S.—Taylor v. Burns, 203 U.S. 120, 27 S. Ct. 40, 51 
L. Ed. 116 (1906). 
11U.S.—Taylor v. Burns, 203 U.S. 120, 27 S. Ct. 40, 51 
L. Ed. 116 (1906). 
[Section 43] 
1Vt.—Lakeview Farm, Inc. v. Enman, 166 Vt. 158, 689 
A.2d 1089 (1997). 
Purpose of reformation deed 
A "correction deed," or "reformation deed" does now 
perfectly what was formerly done imperfectly. 
Ark.—Mason v. Jarrett, 218 Ark. 147, 234 S.W.2d 
771 (1950). 
2Ark.—Lathrop v. Sandlin, 223 Ark. 774, 268 S.W.2d 
606 (1954). 
Colo.—Munro v. Eshe, 113 Colo. 19, 156 P.2d 700 
(1944). 
N.J.—Joffe v. Gliksman, 139 N.J. Eq. 369, 51 A.2d 
467 (Ch. 1947). 
Blanket deed 
Even if specific deed contained insufficient descrip-
tion of land conveyed, blanket deed conveying all land 
within state belonging to grantor would suffice to cure 
any uncertainty of description in the specific deed. 
Tex.—Chandler v. Kountze, 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 
Civ. App. Galveston 1939), writ refused. 
3Cal.—Cornbleth v. Allen, 80 Cal. App. 459, 251 P. 87 
(1st Dist. 1926). 
4Mass.—Marsh v. Austin, 83 Mass. 235, 1 Allen 235, 
1861 WL 4441 (1861). 
5Tenn.—Dykes v. Hamilton County, 183 Tenn. 71, 191 
S.W.2d 155 (1945). 
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§43 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 
receive it.6 The subsequent deed will operate 
as a confirmation7 or as a deed of bargain and 
sale.8 New consideration is not necessary as 
against the vendor.9 However, the instrument 
must be a present conveyance of the property 
involved, sufficient of itself to convey title.10 
Such new deed may constitute a single 
instrument and operate as a destruction of 
the original conveyance by consent.11 As 
against third persons an alleged defective 
deed can be cured only by a bill in equity, and 
not by a confirmation assuming to relate back 
to the original deed.12 If, however, a corrected 
deed is made pursuant to a decree, and no new 
rights are thereby affected, it relates back to 
6Ind.—Leslie v. Slusher, 15 Ind. 166, 1860 WL 4212 
(1860). 
7Minn.—Greve v. Coffin, 14 Minn. 345, 14 Gil. 263, 
1869 WL 2319 (1869). 
8Ky.—Fauntleroy's Heirs v. Dunn, 42 Ky. 594, 3 B. 
Mon. 594, 1843 WL 3496 (1843). 
9Ala.—Hyatt v. Ogletree, 31 Ala. App. 8, 12 So. 2d 397 
(1942). 
Ky.—East Jellico Coal Co. v. Jones, 141 Ky. 306, 132 
S.W. 411 (1910). 
Failure of consideration 
A conveyance to grantors administratrix was not 
required to be set aside because agreement in accordance 
with and in consideration of which conveyance was alleg-
edly executed was void, where grantee and his wife who 
joined in conveyance did not own property conveyed, but 
simply executed deed to clear the record, by deeding to 
the grantor's estate the same property they had conveyed 
to grantor during his lifetime. 
Wash.—Findley v. Findley, 193 Wash. 41, 74 P.2d 
490 (1937). 
10Tex.—Blankenship v. Mott, 104 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 
Civ. App. Beaumont 1937), writ dismissed. 
11Ky.—Reid v. Reid, 230 Ky. 835, 20 S.W.2d 1015 
(1929). 
Mo.—City of St. Joseph ex rel. Forsee v. Baker, 86 
Mo. App. 310, 1900 WL 3082 (1900). 
Conclusiveness 
Where grantee obtains deed of correction, placing 
limits to grant which had previously been omitted, last 
description is conclusive. 
N.Y.—People v. Tompkins- Kiel Marble Co., 269 N.Y. 
77, 199 N.E. 10 (1935). 
12U.S.—Johnston v. Jones, 66 U.S. 209, 17 L. Ed. 117 
(1861). 
Kan.—Kirkpatrick v. Ault, 177 Kan. 552, 280 P.2d 
637 (1955). 
the date of the first conveyance.13 Where the 
grantor has divested himself or herself of title, 
although by mistake he or she has not con-
veyed the title in the way in which he or she 
intended, he or she may not by a subsequent 
conveyance correct the mistake, there being 
no title remaining to convey.14 Also, where 
title to the land passes under an instrument, 
the subsequent execution of an additional 
conveyance does not preclude the grantee from 
asserting rights under the original instru-
ment.15 
A void deed cannot be confirmed by a subse-
quent conveyance so as to give it an operative 
Ky.—Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hoskins, 273 Ky. 
563, 117 S.W.2d 180 (1937). 
Construction 
Where purchaser's deed to tract which was fully 
described purported to except land subsequently in 
dispute in purchaser's proceeding against grantor's suc-
cessor, to settle disputed boundary, but the disputed land 
was not in fact excepted because its description was insuf-
ficient, and the purchaser claimed the disputed land for 
more than ten years under adverse possession, a deed of 
correction executed to the purchaser soon after the 
purchase which, strictly construed, might not embrace 
the land, would be construed in a manner which would 
not deprive the purchaser of the disputed land which was 
located between the purchaser's dwelling and the public 
road. 
Ala.—Lauderdale v. Bailey, 236 Ala. 487, 183 So. 648 
(1938). 
13Ind.—Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Beck, 152 
Ind. 421, 53 N.E. 439 (1899). 
14Kan.—Kirkpatrick v. Ault, 177 Kan. 552, 280 P.2d 
637 (1955). 
Ky.—Reid v. Reid, 230 Ky. 835, 20 S.W.2d 1015 
(1929). 
Miss.—Herod v. Robinson, 149 Miss. 354, 115 So. 40 
(1927). 
Additional servitudes 
Where the grantors have previously parted with their 
title, they cannot impose additional servitudes by a cor-
rection deed. 
Mass.—Regan v. Boston Gaslight Co., 137 Mass. 37, 
1884 WL 10534 (1884). 
15Ala.—Bethea v. McCullough, 195 Ala. 480, 70 So. 680 
(1915). 
No new or after-acquired title 
Ark.—Mason v. Jarrett, 218 Ark. 147, 234 S.W.2d 
771 (1950). 
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effect of its own,16 but an intended confirma-
tion may operate as a new conveyance.17 Thus, 
a subsequent deed will not operate as a 
confirmation of a deed which is void for uncer-
tainty,18 or for want of delivery,19 or through 
mistake in reciting the grantee's name.20 Even 
where the first deed is absolutely void for 
defective description, a second deed to one who 
has acquired an equitable title by payment of 
a consideration, containing a sufficient de-
scription of the land, perfects the equitable 
title into a legal title, and is binding on the 
grantor and all holding under the grantor with 
notice of the equity.21 
Redelivery. 
Where a deed has been returned to the 
grantor for the purpose of correction of a 
mistake in the description, it must be redeliv-
ered after correction.22 
16Mass.—Scaplen v. Blanchard, 187 Mass. 73, 72 N.E. 
346 (1904). 
17Cal.—Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609, 1867 WL 914 
(1867). 
Tex.—Montgomery v. Hornberger, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 
28, 40 S.W. 628 (1897), writ refused. 
18Md.—Blessing v. House's Lessee, 3 G. & J. 290, 1831 
WL 2009 (Md. 1831). 
19Cal.—Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609, 1867 WL 914 
(1867). 
20Cal.—Barr v. Schroeder, 32 Cal. 609, 1867 WL 914 
(1867). 
21Ala.—Gantt v. Phillips, 262 Ala. 184, 77 So. 2d 916 
(1954). 
Tex.—Polk v. Carey, 247 S.W. 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 
Beaumont 1922), writ dismissed w.o.j., (Mar. 28, 1923). 
22Mo.—Williams v. Husky, 192 Mo. 533, 90 S.W. 425 
(1905). 
[Section 44] 
1Ga.—Milner v. Bivens, 255 Ga. 49, 335 S.E.2d 288 
(1985). 
2Ky.—Shaver v. EUis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S.W.2d 949 
(1928). 
W.Va.—Blake v. Hedrick, 94 W. Va. 761, 120 S.E. 
906 (1923). 
Disclaimer 
i . A disclaimer under seal, attached to a deed, suf-
* ficiently indicates that the person so disclaiming joins in 
.> the conveyance. 
9 f, 
*'> 
i 
2. Designation and Description 
of Parties 
a. Grantors 
§ 4 4 General ly 
A conveyance must sufficiently identify 
the grantor, although not necessarily by 
name or in any particular clause. 
Research References 
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It is essential that the deed sufficiently des-
ignate the grantor.1 If, however, the identity 
of the grantor is certain from a consideration 
of the entire instrument, it is sufficient,2 al-
though he or she is not named in the pre-
mises,3 or in the granting clause.4 For ex-
ample, the identity of the grantor may be 
rendered certain by the manner in which the 
deed is executed, although the name does not 
appear in the body of the instrument.5 
Where the naming of a grantor in a deed is 
ambiguous, the execution may evidence the 
real intention.6 Further, it is not essential that 
Ga.—Caraker v. Brown, 152 Ga. 677, 111 S.E. 51 
(1922). 
3Ky.—Shaver v. Ellis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S.W.2d 949 
(1928). 
Ohio—Carr's Lessee v. LeHugh, 2 West. L.J. 68, 1 
Ohio Dec. Rep. 84, 1844 WL 3183 (Ohio 1844). 
4Ky.—Shaver v. Ellis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S.W.2d 949 
(1928). 
N.C.—Berry v. Richmond Cedar Works, 184 N.C. 
187, 113 S.E. 772 (1922). 
W.Va.—Blake v. Hedrick, 94 W. Va. 761, 120 S.E. 
906 (1923). 
Conveyance by attorney for owner 
A deed, signed in name of owner of land conveyed as 
grantor by his or her attorney in fact is properly exe-
cuted, but granting clause reciting that such attorney in 
fact, not owner acting by such attorney, grants and 
conveys, does not pass legal title, but equitable title. 
Ala.—Jones v. Mitchell, 258 Ala. 651, 64 So. 2d 816 
(1953). 
5Ala.—Sherrod v. King, 226 Ala. 522, 147 So. 600 
(1933). 
Use of pronoun 
Use of pronoun "we" in a deed is sufficient as to each 
grantor whose name is appended to the deed. 
Ala.—St. Clair Springs Hotel Co. v. Balcomb, 215 
Ala. 12, 108 So. 858 (1926). 
6Minn.—Shillock v. Gilbert, 23 Minn. 386, 1877 WL 
3878 (1877). 
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§ 9 ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER 31 C> 
former case, but also from litigating what might 
have been litigated therein.72 
A party is not estopped to deny any fact which 
may be recited in a legislative act.73 
Identity of issues. 
It is essential to an estoppel by record that there 
be identity of issues, and this requires that the 
issue raised in the second suit, on which the ev» 
tial force of the former judgment is to be dire 
must be identical with the issue, or one off 
issues, raised and determined in the first ac' 
III. ESTOPPEL BY DEED 
A. IN GENERAL 
§ 10. Definition, Nature, and Essentials Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes: 
Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes a party from P a ^ V *> * ^ f ^ d } ^ P 1 ™ fr°m a sse r t ing* 
denying the truth of his deed. It may be invoked only in a suit on a g a i n s t t h e Other and his pr iv ies a n y r i g h t Or tiflg 
the deed or concerning a right arising out of it. in derogation of the deed, or from denying * ' 
truth of anv material fact asserted in it.75 In or 
Library References . i * j •> , , , ., 
that a deed may give rise to an estoppel, it mu 
Estoppel e=»i2,20-22,22(2,3), 26. contain representations or covenants.76 In adcfe 
tion, an estoppel by deed may be invoked only in IL 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
 s u j t o n ^ ^eed o r concerning a right arising out of 
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following Preface. t h e d e e d ; 77 t h e r e can b e n o es toppe l by deed 
Fia.—City of Anna Maria v. Miller, 91 So.2d 333. 
Kan.—Woods v. Duval, 99 P.2d 804, 151 Kan. 472. 
N.C.—Hardy v. Mayo, 31 S.E.2d 748, 224 N.C 558. 
72. Wis.—Great Lakes Trucking Co., Inc. v. Black, App., 477 N.W.2d 
65, 165 Wis.2d 162. 
73. Ga.—Thornton v. Lane, 11 Ga. 459. 
74. Va.—Gilmer v. Brown, 44 S.E.2d 16, 186 Va. 630. 
Wis.—Great Lakes Trucking Co., Inc. v. Black, App., 477 N.W.2d 65, 
165 Wis.2d 162. 
Matters concluded by judgment under doctrine of res judicata see 
C.J.S. Judgments § 719. 
75. U.S.—Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., D.C.Pa., 
499 F.Supp. 53. 
Fla.—Leffler v. Smith, App., 388 So.2d 261, review denied 397 So.2d 
778. 
Ky.—Hunts Branch Coal Co., Inc. v. Canada, 599 S.W.2d 154. 
Mass.—Frawley v. Forrest, 38 N.E.2d 631, 310 Mass. 446, 38 A.L.R. 
999. 
Mich.—Haab v. Moorman, 50 N.W.2d 856, 332 Mich. 126. 
Minn.—Raines v. Village of Alden, 90 N.W.2d 906, 252 Minn. 530. 
Mont.—Norman v. State, 597 P.2d 715, 182 Mont. 439. 
N.Y.—Kraker v. Roll, 2 Dept., 474 N.Y.S.2d 527, 100 A.D.2d 424. 
Ohio—37 Robinwood Associates v. Health Industries, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 
1019, 47 Ohio AppJd 156, jurisdictional motion overruled 534 
N.E.2d 89, 39 Ohio St.3d 706. 
Okl.—Wood v. Sympson, 833 P.2d 1239. 
S.C.—Hipps v. Hipps, App., 343 S.E.2d 669, 288 S.C 564. 
Tenn.—Denny v. Wilson County, 281 S.W.2d 671, 198 Tenn. 677. 
Tex.—Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., App.-Corpus Christi, 769 
S.W.2d 625, affirmed 813 S.W.2d 483, rehearing overruled. 
W.Va.—Wellman v. Tomblin, 84 S.E.2d 617, 140 W.Va. 342. 
Wyo.—Body v. McDonald, 334 P.2d 513, 79 Wyo. 371. 
-Si*. 
352 
Factors considered 
N.D.—McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370. 
Necessity for interest in land 
(1) Estoppel by deed presupposes that some interest in land edssT 
by sanction of law. **"^ 
Ohio—Cleveland Boat Service v. City of Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 42I/<', 
102 Ohio App. 255, 73 Ohio Law Abs. 557, 2 0.0.2d 292, affirmed; 
136 N.E.2d 274, 165 Ohio St. 429, 6 O.O. 85. 
(2) Void deed as basis of estoppel see infra § 43. 
Title cannot be created or acquired by estoppel 
U.S.—Butler v. Bazemore, C.A.La., 303 F.2d 188, on remand 227. 
F.Supp. 221. 
La.—Gibson v. Pickens, 175 So. 600, 187 La. 860. 
Necessity for factual assertion or admission 
(1) To constitute estoppel by deed, a distinct and precise assertioft 
or admission of fact is necessary, so that such estoppel can arise onlf
 r 
where parry has conveyed precise or definite legal estate or right hj[ 
solemn assurance which he will not be permitted to vary or deaj^ 
Miss.—Cook v. Farley, 15 So.2d 352, 195 Miss. 638. 
(2) Estoppel to deny truth of recitals in deeds see infra § 31-40 
76. U.S.—Matter of Ellison Associates, Bkrtcy.N.Y., 13 B.R. 661.1J 
affirmed 63 B.R. 756. 
N.Y.—Petition of Testan, 281 N.Y.S. 96, 156 Misc. 449. 
Okl.—Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 206 Okl. 233. 
77. Del.—John Deere Plow Co. of Baltimore v. Pierce Hardware C<*+ 
36 A.2d 369, 3 Terry 479, 42 Del. 479. 
Ga.—Hughes v. Cobb, 23 S.E.2d 701, 195 Ga. 213. 
Mass.—Robert v. O'Connell, 169 N.E. 487, 269 Mass. 532. 
Ohio—Cleveland Boat Service v. City of Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 42U 
102 Ohio App. 255, 73 Ohio Law Abs. 557, 2 0.0.2d 292, affirmed,. 
136 N.E.2d 274, 165 Ohio St. 429, 6 O.O. 85. 
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IC. J-P^ E S T O P P E L AND WAIVER § 10 
ere there is no deed;78 and it cannot be invoked 
an action or proceeding in which the form.of the 
iment is immaterial and the true nature of the 
action can be shown by parol.79 
Estoppel by deed promotes the judicious policy 
^making certain formal documents final and con-
nive evidence of their contents,80 and is applied 
order to avoid circuity of action,81 and to compel 
/parties to fulfill their contracts.82 
While the doctrine has been held to stem from 
e common-law rule of implied warranties,83 it has 
|o been held that, fundamentally, the doctrine is 
"table in nature,84 and that it was engrafted on 
- law for the purpose of preventing wrongs rath-
Jthan to promote them.85 Estoppel by deed 
tects an unwitting grantee who takes a convey-
ce in reliance upon the good title of the grantor 
!en in fact the grantor does not possess legal title 
the property purportedly being conveyed.86 
wledge. 
Where the true state of title to realty is a matter 
public record, the requirement that the party 
seeking estoppel must not only lack knowledge 
regarding true state of title, but be destitute of 
means of acquiring such knowledge, is not applica-
ble.87 
Inducing reliance. 
Estoppel by deed requires words or conduct 
which induce another to act in reliance thereon88 
and to change position.89 
Change of position necessary. 
It has been held that an estoppel by deed is not 
created or enforceable unless there has been a 
change in the situation of one of the parties, in 
reliance on the deed,90 and that the party asserting 
the estoppel must show that he was induced to 
change his course or position by reason of state-
ments or representations in the deed so that he will 
suffer damage or disadvantage if such statements 
or representations are altered.91 
Estoppel in pais distinguished. 
Estoppel by deed is distinguishable from estop-
pel in pais,92 in that it appears from the face of the 
—Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 206 Okl. 233. 
I in deed as not working estoppel in collateral action see infra 
Mass.—Ecclesiastes 3:1, Inc. v. Cambridge Sav. Bank, 407 N.E.2d 
18,10 MassApp.Ct. 377. 
Or.—Kohler v. Gilbert, 339 P.2d 1102, 216 Or. 483. 
TN.D.—McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370. 
N.Y.—Petition of Testan, 281 N.Y.S. 96, 156 Misc. 449. 
%-McLaughIin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370. 
>7-Body v. McDonald, 334 P.2d 513, 79 Wyo. 371. 
_ Md.—Potomac Dredging Co. v. Smoot, 69 A. 507, 108 Md. 54. 
\—Body v. McDonald, 334 P.2d 513, 79 Wyo. 371. 
Tr U.S.—Robben v. Obering, C.A.I11., 279 F.2d 381. 
'Wyo.—Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565, 
;Wyo.341. 
Wyo.—Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565, 
Wyo. 341. 
Ability to induce reliance not shown 
Estoppel by deed was inapplicable to prevent grantor from claiming 
southern boundary to her property which was different from that 
described in 1961 deed to state where grantor was not in position to 
induce reliance by subsequent purchaser of adjoining property on 
description in deed by which grantor conveyed strip of land to state. 
N.H.—Kirkpatrick v. Jones, 446 A.2d 80, 122 N.H. 438. 
89. N.H.—Kirkpatrick v. Jones, 446 A.2d 80,122 N.H. 438. 
90. Okl.—Skelly Oil Co. v. Butner, 205 P.2d 1153, 201 Okl. 372. 
Wyo.—Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 168 P.2d 565, 62 
Wyo. 341. 
91. Ala.—Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So.2d 1047. 
La.—Funderburk v. Magnolia Sugar Co-op., App., 8 So.2d 374. 
Detrimental reliance 
U.S.—Shell Oil Co. v. Trailer & Truck Repair Co., Inc., C.A.3(NJ.), 
828 F.2d 205. 
- Cal.—Schwenn v. Kaye, 2 Dist., 202 Cal.Rptr. 374, 155 C.A.3d Reliance shown 
McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370. 
Public record as means 
•rOflbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144. 
Wyo.—Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, 604 P.2d 1359. 
lof words 
grantor's 1961 deed conveyed strip of land, but did not 
to set southern boundary on grantor's property, words used 
"Jpt have "induced" subsequent purchaser of adjoining property 
^reliance on them and did not estop grantor from asserting 
^thern boundary of her property was different from that de-
ll? 1961 deed. 
Patrick v. Jones, 446 A.2d 80, 122 N.H. 438. 
353 
Vendee's acceptance of deed and his concurrent promise to pay for 
property constitute a reliance on statements in deed which is sufficient 
to form basis to estop vendor to claim against vendee or his privies 
anything contradictory to any material fact which he has either stated 
or failed to declare in document. 
La.—Hodges v. Longbell Petroleum Co., 121 So.2d 831, 240 La. 198. 
92. U.S.—Territory of Alaska ex rel. Commissioner of Veterans' 
Affairs v. Guerin, D.C., 140 F.Supp. 440,16 Alaska 238. 
La.—Harper v. Learned, 6 So.2d 326,199 La. 398. 
N.Y.—Kraker v. Roll, 2 Dept., 474 N.Y.S.2d 527, 100 A.D.2d 424. 
Ohio—Hempy v. Brooke, 184 N.E.2d 686, 115 Ohio App. 246, 20 
0.0.2d 321. 
Okl.—Born v. Bentley, 246 P.2d 738, 207 Okl. 21. 
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§ 10 ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER 
-ii-OJ^ 
deed,93 and it does not require all of the elements of 
an estoppel in pais.94 
The operation of an estoppel by deed is different 
in scope from the operation of an estoppel in pais,95 
and, unlike estoppels in pais, a technical estoppel 
by deed may conclude a party without reference to 
the moral qualities of his conduct.96 
"Estoppel by warranty." 
"Estoppel by warranty" is a species of estoppel 
by deed.97 It is an estoppel based on the principle 
of giving effect to the manifest intention of the 
grantor appearing on the deed, as to the lands or 
estate to be conveyed, and of preventing the grant-
or from derogating from or destroying his own 
grant by any subsequent act.98 
Mutuality. 
It is usual to say that an estoppel by deed must 
be mutual, otherwise it will not operate as a bar, 
and that unless both parties are bound neither will 
be concluded;99 but exceptions and limitations to 
this statement will appear in succeeding sections. 
§ 11. Estoppel against Estoppel 
An estoppel against an estoppel sets the matter at la. 
so, the setting up of an estoppel by deed may be prevented' 
offset by another such estoppel, or a different form of estopa 
against the party seeking to set it up. 
Library References 
Estoppel <s=>33. 
An estoppel against an estoppel sets the matter* 
at large,1 the two estoppels destroying or neutralize 
ing each other.2 Thus no one can set up an estop? 
pel by deed against the estoppel arising from his 
own grant;3 and if both parties claim under the 
same person and one is estopped by one deed and 
the other is estopped by another deed, both made 
by that person, one estoppel offsets the other, and 
the rights of the parties are to be adjusted withou 
regard to any estoppel.4 
The setting up of an estoppel by deed may be 
prevented by an estoppel in pais5 or by an estopp 
by contract,6 as against the grantee; and an estop-
pel by the covenants of a deed is overcome by the 
Tex.—Rutherford v. McGee, Civ.App., 241 S.W. 629. 
Utah—Dowse v. Kammerman, 246 P.2d 881, 122 Utah 85. 
"Estoppel in pais" defined see infra § 58. 
93. Okl.—Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 206 Okl. 
233. 
Tex.—Rutherford v. McGee, Civ.App., 241 S.W. 629. 
94. U.S.—Territory of Alaska ex rel. Commissioner of Veterans' 
Affairs v. Guerin, D.C., 140 F.Supp. 440, 16 Alaska 238. 
Ohio—Hempy v. Brooke, 184 N.E.2d 686, 115 Ohio App. 246, 2 
0.0.2d321. 
Okl.—Born v. Bentley, 246 P.2d 738, 207 Okl. 21. 
95. Ohio—Hempy v. Brooke, 184 N.E.2d 686, 115 Ohio App. 246, 2 
0.0.2d 321. 
96. Ind.—McAdams v. Bailey, 82 N.E. 1057, 169 Ind. 518. 
Okl.—Equitable Royalty Corp. v. Hullet, 243 P.2d 986, 206 Okl. 233. 
97. U.S.—Jordan v. Marks, D.C.La., 55 RSupp. 204, affirmed 147 
F.2d 800. 
La.—Lewis v. King, 103 So. 19, 157 La. 718. 
98. U.S.—Jordan v. Marks, D.C.La., 55 F.Supp. 204, affirmed 147 
F.2d 800. 
La.—Gaines v. Crichton, 174 So. 666, 187 La. 345. 
N.J.—Condit v. Bigalow, 54 A. 160, 64 N.J.Eq. 504. 
Tenn.—Denny v. Wilson County, 281 S.W.2d 671, 198 Tenn. 677. 
Tex.—Lowry v. Carter, 102 S.W. 930, 46 Tex.Civ.App. 488, error 
refused. 
99. Ga.—Cook v. Flanders, 138 S.E. 218, 164 Ga. 279. 
Neb.—Department of Banking v. McMullen, 278 N.W. 551, 134 Neb. 
338. 
N.Y.—Liberty Bank of Buffalo v. High Park Development Co., 236 
N.Y.S. 194, 134 Misc. 733, affirmed 234 N.Y.S. 832, 227 A.D. 647. 
Tex.—Cone v. Cone, Civ.App., 266 S.W.2d 480, error denied 266 
S.W.2d 860, 153 Tex. 149. 
Persons for and against whom estoppel by deed arises see infra §§ 4S4 
54. 
1. Ark.—Jennings v. Russell, 189 S.W.2d 656, 209 Ark. 71. 
Cal.—Yuba River Sand Co. v. City of MarysviUe, 177 P.2d 642. 
C.A.2d421. 
Kan.—Linville v. Nance Development Co., 304 P.2d 453, 180 Kan. 379.^  
W.Va.—Rust v. Commercial Coal & Coke Co., 115 S.E. 406, 92 W.VJL 
457. 
2. Mich.—Shean v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 248 N.W. 892,' 
Mich. 535. *"' 
Minn.—Hampshire Arms Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Mercurv & Indemnij 
Co., 9 N.W.2d 413, 215 Minn. 60. 
Miss.—Hopkins v. Hopkins, 165 So. 414, 278 Miss. 643. 
Neb.—Lippincott v. Lippincott, 3 N.W.2d 207, 141 Neb. 186, 
A.L.R. 901. 
3. U.S.—City of Hoboken v. Pennsylvania R. Co., N.J., 8 S.O. 
124 U.S. 656, 31 L.Ed. 543. 
Matter of Ellison Associates, Bkrtcy.N.Y., 13 B.R. 661, 
63 B.R. 756. 
4. N.H.—Carpenter v. Thompson, 3 N.H. 204. 
Wash.—Schmidt v. Olympia Light & Power Co., 90 P. 212, 46 Wc 
360. 
Wyo.—Sharpies Corp. v. Sinclair Wyoming Oil Co., 168 P.2d 5d£ 
Wyo. 341. 
5. Ark.—Jennings v. Russell, 189 S.W.2d 656, 209 Ark. 71. 
La.—Gaines v. Tidwell, 2 La.App. 12. 
Pa.—Grange Trust Co. v. Shade, 156 A. 620, 102 Pa.Super. 122. 
Estoppel in pais or equitable estoppel generally see infra § 58 c^ 
6. La.—Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So.2d 831, 240, 
Vt.—Smith v. Vermont Marble Co., 133 A. 355, 99 Vt. 384. 
198. 
Estoppel by simple contract generally see infra § 55-57. 
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Statutes of Central Importance to This Appeal 
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(5) take charge of and safely keep the seal of the county 
clerk, and keep such other records and perform such other 
duties as may be prescribed by law. 1993 
17-20-5. Report of election and appointment of offic-
ers. 
Every county clerk shall within ten days after the issuance 
by him 0? any certificate of election of elective county officers, 
excepting justices of the peace and constables, and after the 
issuance by him of any certificate of appointment made to fill 
vacancies in elective county offices, excepting justices of the 
peace and constables, prepare and forward to the lieutenant 
governor a certified report on forms furnished by the lieuten-
ant governor of every such certificate issued as aforesaid. 
Every such report shall show the name of the county, the name 
of the county office to which the person was elected or 
appointed, the date of the election or appointment of such 
person, the date of the expiration of the term for which the 
person was elected or appointed, the date of the certificate of 
election or appointment, and the date of the qualification of 
the person so elected or appointed. i9S4 
CHAPTER 21 
RECORDER 
Section 
17-21-1. Recorder — Document custody responsibility. 
17-21-2. Seal. 
17-21-3. Methods of recordation authorized. 
17-21-4. Certified copies. 
17-21-5. Receipts for documents received for record. 
17-21-6. General duties — Records and indexes. 
17-21-7, 17-21-8. Repealed. 
17-21-9. Indexing of deeds and other instruments. 
17-21-10. Judgments affecting real estate. 
17-21-11. Notice imparted by recording. 
17-21-12. Endorsements required on documents — Ap-
pendages in documents to be recorded. 
17-21-13. Endorsement of book and page and entry number 
in which recorded — Return of instrument, 
paper or notice. 
17-21-14. Military records — Evidence. 
17-21-15. Repealed. 
17-21-16. Acknowledgments and administrations of oaths. 
17-21-17. Prohibited acts. 
17-21-18. Fees must be paid in advance. 
17-21-19. Records open to inspection — Copies. 
17-21-20. Filing requires recordation — Exception. 
17-21-21. Ownership plats. 
17-21-22. Annual revision — Reporting changes in owner-
ship to county assessors — Costs, how borne. 
17-21-23. Assessor to return for revision. 
17-21-24. Repealed. 
17-21-25. Names of persons signing to be typed or printed 
on instruments presented for filing. 
17-21-1. Recorder — Document custody responsibility. 
The recorder has custody of, and must keep, all books, 
records, maps, and papers required by law to be kept or 
recorded in the office. 1993 
17-21-2. Seal. 
The county recorder shall have a seal, to be furnished by the 
county legislative body, the impression of which shall contain 
the following words: "State of Utah, County Recorder," to-
gether with the name of the county in which the same is to be 
used. 1993 
17-21-3. Methods of recordation authorized. 
The recorder must, on the payment of the fees for the 1 
record in books provided for the purpose in a fair hand orl 
means of a typewriter, camera, microfilm, computer or otl 
methods all papers, documents, records and other writj 
required or permitted by law to be recorded. 
17-21-4. Certified copies. 
The county recorder is authorized to make and furnish^ 
interested persons certified photographic copies of any oft 
records in his office upon payment of fees and charges 1 
vided therefor. Certified copies of such records may be j 
plied to officers of the county for their official use without t 
payment of any fee. 
17-21-5. Receipts for documents received for recordT| 
On the filing of any instrument in writing for record in t 
recorder's office the recorder shall when requested give to t 
person leaving the same to be recorded a receipt therefor. 
17-21-6. General duties — Records and indexes. 
Every recorder must keep: 
(1) An entry record, in which the recorder shall ii 
diately upon receipt of any instrument to be recordecL| 
enter in the order of its reception or entry, as the case may j 
be, the names of the parties thereto, its date, the hour, thei 
day of the month and the year of filing any such statement 
and a brief description of the premises, endorsing upon 
each instrument a number corresponding with the nuib^ 
ber of such entry. >-•-*»& 
(2) A grantors' index, in which shall be indexed afll 
deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or | 
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which j 
shall show the number of the instrument, the name \ 
each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of thei 
grantee, date of instrument, time of filing, kind of instru-j 
ment, consideration, the book and page and entry number^ 
in which it is recorded, and a brief description of the! 
premises. 
(3) A grantees' index, in which shall be indexed all] 
deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or^ s 
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which * 
shall show the number of the instrument, the name of, 
each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the J 
grantor, date of the instrument, time of filing, kind .of 
instrument, consideration, the book and page and entr/| 
number in which it is recorded, and a brief description <" 
the premises. <?2 
(4) A mortgagors' index, in which shall be entered allj 
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all other instruments 1 
in the nature of an encumbrance upon real estate, which 1 
shall show the number of the instrument, name of each j 
mortgagor, debtor or person charged with the encuin-j 
brance in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagee^ J 
lien holder, creditor or claimant, date of instrument, time j 
of filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the book ; 
and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a j 
brief description of the property charged. 
(5) A mortgagees' index, in which shall be entered allj 
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all other instruments < 
in the nature of an encumbrance upon real estate, which J 
shall show the number of the instrument, name of eachl 
mortgagee, lien holder, creditor or claimant, in alphabets} 
cal order, the name of the mortgagor or person charged j 
with the encumbrance, date of instrument, time of filing^ 
nature of instrument, consideration, the book and page '^ 
and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief j 
description of the property charged. 
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Section 
17-21-12. 
17-21-13. 
17-21-14. 
17-21-15. 
17-21-16. 
17-21-17. 
17-21-18. 
17-21-19. 
17-21-20. 
17-21-21. 
17-21-22. 
17-21-23. 
17-21-24. 
17-21-25. 
Recording procedures — Endorsements of entry 
number required on documents. 
Endorsement of book and page — Return of 
instrument. 
Military records — Evidence. 
Repealed. 
Acknowledgments and administrations of oaths. 
Prohibited acts. 
Fees must be paid in advance. 
Records open to inspection — Copies. 
Recording required — Recorder may require tax 
serial number. 
Ownership plats — Use of geographic informa-
tion systems or computer systems. 
Annual revision — Reporting changes in owner-
ship to county assessors — Use of geographic 
information systems or computer systems — 
Return of plat books. 
Assessor to return for revision: 
Repealed. 
Names of persons signing to be typed or printed 
on instruments presented for recording. 
17-21-1. Recorder — Document custody responsibility. 
The recorder has custody of, and shall keep, all books, 
records, maps, and papers required by law. 1999 
17-21-2. Sea l . 
The county recorder shall have a seal, to be furnished by the 
county legislative body, the impression of which shall contain 
the following words: "State of Utah, County Recorder," to-
gether with the name of the county in which the same is to be 
Used. 1993 
17-21-3. Original documents or copies of original 
documents to be kept by the county. 
After accepting a document for recording, receiving the fees 
for recording it, and completing recording procedures, the 
recorder shall, only if required by statute, keep the original 
document or a copy of the original document as a public record 
in a form sufficient to meet the requirements of this chapter. 
1999 
17-21-4. Certified copies. 
(1) The county recorder may make and furnish certified 
photographic copies of any of the records in the office to an 
interested person who pays the applicable fees and charges. 
(2) The county recorder shall supply certified copies of any 
of the records to the county officer for the officer's official use 
without the payment of any fee. 1999 
17-21-5. R e c e i p t s for record ing of instruments . 
Upon recording an instrument, the recorder shall, if re-
quested, give a receipt to a person presenting an instrument 
for recording. 1999 
17-21-6. General dut ies — Records and indexes . 
(1) Every recorder shall: 
(a) keep an entry record, in which the recorder shall, 
upon acceptance of any instrument, enter the instrument 
.•: in the order of its reception, the names of the parties to 
the instrument, its date, the hour, the day of the month 
and the year of recording, and a brief description, and 
endorse upon each instrument a number corresponding 
with the number of the entry; 
(b) keep a grantors' index, in which the recorder shall 
index deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or 
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which 
shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name 
of each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of the 
grantee, the date of the instrument, the time of recording, 
the kind of instrument , the book and page, and a brief 
description; ' •••''•'* • >; 
(c) keep a grantees' index, in which the recorder shall 
index deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or 
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which 
shall show the entry number of the instrument, the name 
of each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the 
grantor, the date of the instrument, the time of recording, 
the kind of instrument, the book and page, and a brief 
description;
 i 
(d) keep a mortgagors' index, in which the recorder 
' shall enter all mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and other 
instruments in the nature of an encumbrance upon real 
estate, which shall show the entry number of the instru-
ment, the name of each mortgagor, debtor, or person 
charged with the encumbrance in alphabetical order, the 
name of the mortgagee, lien holder, creditor, or claimant, 
the date of the instrument, the time of recording, the 
instrument, consideration, the book and page, and a brief 
description; 
(e) keep a mortgagees' index, in which the recorder 
shall enter all mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and other 
instruments in the nature of an encumbrance upon real 
estate, which shall show the entry number of the instru-
ment, the name of each mortgagee, lien holder, creditor, or 
claimant, in alphabetical order, the name of the mort-
gagor or person charged with the encumbrance, the date 
of the instrument, the time of recording, the kind of 
instrument, the consideration, the book and page, and a 
brief description; 
(f) keep a tract index, which shall show by description 
every instrument recorded, the date and the kind of 
instrument, the time of recording, and the book and page 
and entry number; 
(g) keep an index of recorded maps, plats, and subdivi-
sions; 
(h) keep an index of powers of attorney, labeled "powers 
of attorney," showing: "the date of recording," "the book," 
"the page," and "the entry number"; 
(i) keep a miscellaneous index, in which the recorder 
shall enter all instruments of a miscellaneous character 
not otherwise provided for in this section, showing: "the 
date of recording," "the book," "the page," "the entry 
number," "the kind of instrument," "from," "to," and "the 
parties"; 
(j) keep an index of judgments, labeled " judgments," 
each page divided into columns headed, respectively, 
"judgment debtors," "judgment creditors," "amount of 
judgment," "when recorded," and "when satisfied"; and 
(k) keep a general recording index in which the re-
corder shall index all executions and writs of attachment, 
and any other instruments not required by law to be 
spread upon the records, and in separate columns the 
recorder shall enter the names of the plaintiffs in the 
execution and the names of the defendants in the execu-
* tion. 
(2) The recorder shall alphabetically arrange the indexes 
required by this section and keep a reverse index. 
(3) The tract index required by Subsection (l)(f) shall be 
kept so that it shows a true chain of title to each tract or 
parcel, together with their encumbrances, according to the 
records of the office. 
(4) Nothing in this section prevents the recorder from using 
a single name index if that index includes all of the indexes 
required by this section.
 s 199* 
17-21-7,17-21-8. Repealed. 1963,1997 
17-21-9. Indexing of deeds and other instruments. 
Deeds and other instruments affecting real estate made by 
a United States marshal, a sheriff, master in chancery, special 
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17-20-5 COUNTIES 
(5) take charge of and safely keep the seal of the county 
clerk, and keep such other records and perform such other 
duties as may be prescribed by law. 1993 
17-20-5. Report of election and appointment of offic-
ers. 
Every county clerk shall within ten days after the issuance 
by him oifany certificate of election of elective county officers, 
excepting justices of the peace and constables, and after the 
issuance by him of any certificate of appointment made to fill 
vacancies in elective county offices, excepting justices of the 
peace and constables, prepare and forward to the lieutenant 
governor a certified report on forms furnished by the lieuten-
ant governor of every such certificate issued as aforesaid. 
Every such report shall show the name of the county, the name 
of the county office to which the person was elected or 
appointed, the date of the election or appointment of such 
person, the date of the expiration of the term for which the 
person was elected or appointed, the date of the certificate of 
election or appointment, and the date of the qualification of 
the person so elected or appointed. 1984 
CHAPTER 21 
RECORDER 
Section 
17-21-1. Recorder — Document custody responsibility. 
17-21-2. Seal. 
17-21-3. Methods of recordation authorized. 
17-21-4. Certified copies. 
17-21-5. Receipts for documents received for record. 
17-21-6. General duties — Records and indexes. 
17-21-7, 17-21-8. Repealed. 
17-21-9. Indexing of deeds and other instruments. 
17-21-10. Judgments affecting real estate. 
17-21-11. Notice imparted by recording. 
17-21-12. Endorsements required on documents — Ap-
pendages in documents to be recorded. 
17-21-13. Endorsement of book and page and entry number 
in which recorded — Return of instrument, 
paper or notice. 
17-21-14. Military records — Evidence. 
17-21-15. Repealed. 
17-21-16. Acknowledgments and administrations of oaths. 
17-21-17. Prohibited acts. 
17-21-18. Fees must be paid in advance. 
17-21-19. Records open to inspection — Copies. 
17-21-20. Filing requires recordation — Exception. 
17-21-21. Ownership plats. 
17-21-22. Annual revision — Reporting changes in owner-
ship to county assessors — Costs, how borne. 
17-21-23. Assessor to return for revision. 
17-21-24. Repealed. 
17-21-25. Names of persons signing to be typed or printed 
on instruments presented for filing. 
17-21-1. Recorder — Document custody responsibility. 
The recorder has custody of, and mus t keep, all books, 
records, maps, and papers required by law to be kept or 
recorded in the office. 1993 
17-21-2. Seal. 
The county recorder shall have a seal, to be furnished by the 
county legislative body, the impression of which shall contain 
the following words: "State of Utah, County Recorder," to-
gether with the name of the county in which the same is to be 
u s e d . 1993 
17-21-3. Methods of recordation authorized. . vf§ 
The recorder must, on the payment of the fees for the sairil? 
record in books provided for the purpose in a fair hand orW 
means of a typewriter, camera, microfilm, computer or othZ 
methods all papers, documents, records and other writim* 
required or permitted by law to be recorded.
 l9^ 
17-21-4. Certified copies. **i' 
The county recorder is authorized to make and furnish to 
interested persons certified photographic copies of any of th*: 
records in his office upon payment of fees and charges pro-
vided therefor. Certified copies of such records may be sup. 
plied to officers of the county for their official use without the*' 
payment of any fee. 1^ 
17-21-5. Receipts for documents received for record. " 
On the filing of any instrument in writing for record in the 
recorder's office the recorder shall when requested give to the 
person leaving the same to be recorded a receipt therefor. S 
195J 
-
 r 
17-21-6. General duties — Records and indexes. 
Every recorder must keep: 
(1) An entry record, in which the recorder shall imme-
diately upon receipt of any instrument to be recorded, 
enter in the order of its reception or entry, as the case may 
be, the names of the parties thereto, its date, the hour, the? 
day of the month and the year of filing any such statement 
and a brief description of the premises, endorsing upon 
each instrument a number corresponding with the num-
ber of such entry. 
(2) A grantors' index, in which shall be indexed all 
deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or 
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which 
shall show the number of the instrument, the name of 
each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of the 
grantee, date of instrument, time of filing, kind of instru-
ment, consideration, the book and page and entry number 
in which it is recorded, and a brief description of the 
premises. 
(3) A grantees' index, in which shall be indexed all 
deeds and final judgments or decrees partitioning or 
affecting the title to or possession of real property, which 
shall show the number of the instrument, the name of 
each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the 
grantor, date of the instrument, time of filing, kind of 
instrument, consideration, the book and page and entry 
number in which it is recorded, and a brief description of 
the premises. 
(4) A mortgagors' index, in which shall be entered all , 
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all other instruments 
in the nature of an encumbrance upon real estate, which 
shall show the number of the instrument, name of each ' 
mortgagor, debtor or person charged with the encum-
brance in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagee, 
lien holder, creditor or claimant, date of instrument, time ; 
of filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the book , 
and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a 
brief description of the property charged. 
(5) A mortgagees' index, in which shall be entered all 
mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and all other instruments 
in the nature of an encumbrance upon real estate, which -
shall show the number of the instrument, name of each 
mortgagee, lien holder, creditor or claimant, in alphabeti-
cal order, the name of the mortgagor or person charged *», 
with the encumbrance, date of instrument, time of filing* 
nature of instrument, consideration, the book and page , 
and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief > 
description of the property charged. 
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(6) An abstract record, which shall show by tracts or 
parcels every conveyance or encumbrance, or other in-
strument recorded, the date and character of the instru-
ment, time of filing the same, and the book and page and 
i entry number where the same is recorded, which record 
shall be so kept as to show a true chain of title to each 
tract or parcel and the encumbrances thereon as shown by 
the records of the office. .: 
(7) An index to recorded maps, plats, and subdivisions. 
(8) An index of powers of attorney, labeled "powers of 
attorney,* each page divided into seven columns, namely: 
Mate of filing," *l>ook," "page,* and "entry number," "from," 
"to," "revoked." 
(9) A miscellaneous index, in which shall be entered all 
instruments of a miscellaneous character not otherwise 
provided for in this section, each page divided into eight 
columns, namely: "date of filing," "book," "page," and 
"entry number," "instrument," "from," "to," "remarks." 
(10) An index of transcripts of judgments, labeled 
"transcripts of judgments," each page divided into seven 
columns headed, respectively, "judgment debtors," "judg-
ment creditors," "amount of judgment," "where recovered," 
"when recovered," "when transcript filed," "when judg-
ment satisfied." 
(11) A general filing index in which shall be indexed all 
executions and writs of attachment, and any other instru-
ments not required by law to be spread upon the records, 
and in separate columns he must enter the names of the 
plaintiffs in the execution, the defendants in the execu-
tion, the purchaser at the sale and the date of the sale, 
and the filing number of the documents. 
The indexes provided for in Subdivisions (8) to (11) shall 
be alphabetically arranged, and in each case a reverse 
index shall be kept. 
(12) Nothing in this section shall preclude the use of a 
single name index by the recorder if such index includes 
. and references all of the above indexes. 1983 
17-21-7,17-21-8. Repealed. 1963,1997 
17-21-9. Indexing of deeds and other instruments. 
fc Deeds and other instruments affecting real estate made by 
a United States marshal, a sheriff, master in chancery, special 
commissioner, executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or 
other person acting in behalf of another, shall be indexed in 
the name of the person whose land is sold or affected as 
grantor, and a note shall be made in the index indicating in 
: what capacity the deed was made. 1953 
17-21-10. J u d g m e n t s affecting real e s t a t e . 
i* The recorder must, when filed with him for t ha t purpose, 
h record in the record of deeds certified copies of final judgments 
^ or decrees partitioning or affecting the title or possession of 
real property any par t of which is situate in the county of 
which he is recorder. 1953 
17-21-11. Notice imparted by recording. 
**» Every such certified copy from the time of filing the same 
with the recorder for record imparts notice to all persons of the 
contents thereof, and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and 
lien holders purchase and take with the same notice and effect 
as if such copy were a duly recorded deed, grant or transfer. 
.*
 c
' '
:
*-'
:::
 1953 
: 17-21-12. Endorsements required on documents — Ap-
\.:, pendages in documents to be recorded. 
•*" When any instrument, paper or notice authorized by law to 
be filed
 o r recorded is deposited in the recorder's office for j ^ .record the recorder must endorse upon the same its proper 
number, the time when it was received, noting the year, 
month, day, hour and minute of its reception and the amount 
of fees for recording, and must record the same without delay, 
together with the acknowledgments, proofs and certificates 
written upon or annexed to the same, with the plats, surveys, 
schedules and other papers thereto annexed, in the order 
received, and must note on the instrument for record the exact 
time of its reception. 1967 
17-21-13. Endorsement of book and page and entry 
number in which recorded — Return of in-
strument, paper or notice. 
The recorder must also endorse upon each instrument, 
paper or notice the book and page and entry number in which 
it is recorded, and must thereafter return it. 1982 
17-21-14. Military records — Evidence. 
The county recorder upon presentation shall record in a 
book kept for that purpose, free of charge, honorable dis-
charges from the military, naval or marine service of the 
United States, and any and all orders, citations and decora-
tions of honor relating to any person while he was in the 
military, naval or marine service of the United States, and 
shall furnish, free of charge, certified copies of any of the same 
to the person to whom any of them relate and to the father, 
mother, brothers, sisters or any lineal descendant of such 
person. Such certified copies may be read in evidence with the 
same effect as the original in any action or proceeding before 
any court, commission or other tribunal in this state. 1953 
17-21-15. Repealed. 1987 
17-21-16. Acknowledgments and administrations of 
oaths. 
County recorders may take and certify acknowledgments 
and administer oaths. 1953 
17-21-17. Proh ib i t ed acts . 
No recorder to whom any instrument, paper, or notice 
entitled to be recorded is delivered for record may: 
(1) neglect or refuse to record the instrument, paper, or 
notice within a reasonable time after receiving it; 
(2) willfully or negligently record any instrument, pa-
per, or notice falsely or in any manner other than the 
manner required by this chapter; 
(3) neglect or refuse to keep the indices required by this 
chapter in the recorder's office; 
(4) neglect or refuse to make the proper entries in the 
indices required by this chapter; or 
(5) alter, change, obliterate, or insert any new mat ter 
in any instrument , paper, or notice deposited in the 
recorder's office. 1987 
17-21-18. Fees must be paid in advance. 
The recorder shall not record any instrument, or file any 
paper or notice, or furnish any copies, or render any service 
connected with h i s office, until the fees for the same as 
prescribed by law are paid or tendered. 1953 
•17-21-19. Records open to inspection — Copies. 
(1) All books of record, maps, charts, surveys, and other 
papers on file in the recorder's office must be open to public 
inspection free of charge during office hours. 
(2) Any person copying or taking notes from information on 
file in the recorder's office may do so only by pencil, typewriter, 
photocopy, microfilm, or electronic printout. 1987 
17-21-20. F i l ing requires recordation — Except ion . 
All papers, notices and instruments of writing required by 
law to be filed in the office of the county recorder shall be 
recorded unless otherwise provided. 1953 
17-21-21. Ownership plats. 
In all counties the county recorder shall prepare and keep 
present-ownership maps and plats drawn to a convenient 
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intention to make a drive, as provided in this chapter, may 
within 30 days after the posting or the first publication of the 
notice mentioned in Section 47-2-4 file with the county execu-
tive a description of such horses claimed by him, giving the 
marks and brands, if any, which appear thereon, and, if the 
county executive shall take into its possession any horses so 
claimed, it shall by registered letter addressed to the owner or 
claimant of such horses notify him that the same may be 
claimed within ten days from the mailing of such notice; and 
such owner or claimant shall be permitted upon application to 
the county legislative body to take possession of such horses 
upon payment of the expense of caring for the same from the 
date of capture. If any horses are killed by order of the county 
executive under the provisions of this chapter, a description of 
which has been reported by the owner thereof to the county 
legislative body, and ownership of such animals can be satis-
factorily established, such owner shall receive as damage 
therefor a sum not exceeding $10 for each animal; provided, 
that he has paid all taxes assessed against said animal; 
provided further, that payment of such claims may be made 
only from proceeds of sales of captured horses. 1994 
47-2-7. Elimination from private property on request. 
Abandoned horses may be eliminated from privately owned 
land by the county executive in the same manner as from the 
open range when requested so to do by the owner of such land. 
1993 
CHAPTER 3 
SHOOTING RANGES 
Section 
47-3-1. Definition. 
47-3-2. Assumption of risk. 
47-3-3. When nuisance action permitted. 
(ii) does not substantially and adversely affect 
public health or safety; or • • ' •>>-
(b) the range: 
(i) is in compliance with any noise control laws, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations t h a t applied to the 
range and its operation a t the time of establishment, 
construction, or initial operation of the range; and 
(ii) does not substantially and adversely affect 
public health or safety. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, noise generated by a 
shooting range that is operated in accordance with nationally 
recognized standards and operating practices is not a public 
health nuisance. 
(4) For any new subdivision development located in whole 
or in part within 1,000 feet of the boundary of any shooting 
range that was established, constructed, or operated prior to 
the development of the subdivision, the owner of the develop-
ment shall provide on any plat filed with the county recorder 
the following notice: 
"Shooting Range Area 
This property is located in the vicinity of a n established 
shooting range. It can be anticipated tha t customary uses and 
activities at this shooting range will be conducted now and in 
the future. The use and enjoyment of this property is expressly 
conditioned on acceptance of any annoyance or inconvenience 
which may result from these uses and activities." 1998 
TITLE 48 
PARTNERSHIP 
Chapter 
1. General and Limited Liability Partnerships. 
2. Limited Partnership [Repealed]. 
2a. Utah Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 
2b. Utah Limited Liability Company Act. 
47-3-1. Definition. 
As used in this chapter, "shooting range" or "range" means 
an area designed and continuously operated under nationally 
recognized standards and operating practices for the use of 
rifles, shotguns, pistols, silhouettes, skeet, t rap , black powder, 
archery, or any other similar shooting activities. 1998 
47-3-2. Assumption of risk. 
Each person who participates in shooting a t a shooting 
range accepts the associated risks to the extent t he risks are 
obvious and inherent. Those risks include injuries tha t may 
result from noise, discharge of projectile or shot, malfunction 
of shooting equipment not owned by the shooting range, 
natural variations in terra in , surface or subsurface snow or ice 
conditions, bare spots, rocks, trees, and other forms of na tura l 
growth or debris. 1998 
47-3-3. When nuisance action permitted. 
(1) Each state agency or political subdivision shall ensure 
that any of its rules or ordinances that define or prohibit a 
public nuisance exclude from the definition or prohibition any 
shooting range that was established, constructed, or operated 
prior to the implementation of the rule or ordinance regarding 
public nuisance unless that activity or operation substantially 
and adversely affects public health or safety. 
(2) A person who operates or uses a shooting range in this 
state is not subject to civil liability or criminal prosecution for 
noise or noise pollution resulting from the operation or use of 
the range if: 
(a) the range: 
(i) was established, constructed, or operated prior 
to the implementation of any noise ordinances, rules, 
or regulations; and 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
PARTNERSHIPS 
P a r t i 
General Partnership 
Section 
48-1-1. Definition of terms. 
48-1-2. Interpretation of knowledge and notice. 
48-1-3. "Partnership" defined. 
48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined — Application of chapter. 
48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partner-
ship. 
48rl-5. Partnership property. 
48-1-6. Partner agent of partnership as to partnership 
business. 
48-1-7. Conveyance of real property of partnership. 
48-1-8. Partnership bound by admission of partner. 
48-1-9. Partnership charged with knowledge of or notice 
to partner. 
48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act. * 
48-1-11. Partnership bound by partner's breach of trust. 
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability. 
48-1-13. Partner by estoppel. 
48-1-14. Liability of incoming partner. 
48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of partners. 
48-1-16. Partnership books. 
48-1-17. Duty of partners to render information. 
48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. 
48-1-19. Right to an account. 
m 
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Section 
48-1-20. Continuation of partnership beyond fixed term. 
48-1-21. Extent of property rights of a partner. 
48-1-22. Nature of a partner's right in specific partnership 
property. 
48-1-23. Nature of partner's interest in the partnership. 
48-1-24. Assignment of partner's interest. 
48-1-25. Partner's interest subject to charging order. 
48-1-26. "Dissolution" defined. 
48T1-27. Partnership not.terminated by dissolution. 
48-1-28. Causes of dissolution. 
48^1-29. Dissolution by decree of court. 
48-1-30. General effect of dissolution on authority of part-
ner. 
48-1-31. Right of partner to contribution from copartners 
after dissolution. , 
48-1-32. Power of partner to bind partnership to third 
persons after dissolution. 
48-1-33. Effect of dissolution on partner's existing liabil-
ity. • 
48-1-34. Right to wind up. 
48-1-35.
 ; Rights of partners to application of partnership 
property. 
48-1-36. Rights where partnership is dissolved for fraud 
or misrepresentation. 
48-1-37. Rules for distribution. 
48-1-38. Liability of persons continuing the business in 
certain cases. 
48-1-39. Rights of retiring or estate of deceased partner 
when the business is continued. 
48-1-40. Accrual of actions. 
Part 2 
Utah Limited Liability 
Partnership Act 
48-1-41. Title. 
48-1-42. Registration of limited liability partnerships. 
48-1-43. Scope of chapter — Choice of law. 
48-1-44. Foreign limited liability partnerships. 
48-1-45. Name of registered limited liability partnership. 
48-1-46. Professional relationship — Personal liability. 
48-1-47. Regulatory agency or board authority — Prohi-
bitions on individuals apply. 
48-1-48. Limited liability partnerships providing profes-
sional services. 
PARTI 
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 
48-1-1. Definition of terms. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Bankrupt" includes "bankrupt" under the federal 
:
 bankruptcy laws or "insolvent" under any state insolvency 
law. 
(2) "Business" includes every trade, occupation, or pro-
fession. '•" 
(3) "Conveyance" includes every assignment, lease, 
mortgage, or encumbrance. 
(4) "Court" includes every court and judge having ju-
risdiction in the case. 
(5) "Limited liability partnership" means a general 
:
 partnership registered under Section 48-1-42 and comply-
ing with Section 48-1-43. 
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, lim-
ited liability company, limited liability partnership, cor-
poration, or other association. 
(7) "Real property" includes land and any interest or 
estate in land. 1994 
48-1-2. Interpretation of knowledge and notice. 
(1) Within the meaning of this chapter, a person is deemed 
to have knowledge of a fact not only when he has actual 
knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such: 
other facts that to act in disregard of them shows bad faith. 
(2) A person has notice of a fact within the meaning of this 
chapter when the person who claims the benefit of the notice: 
(a) states the fact to such person; or 
(b) delivers through the mail, or by other means of 
communication, a written statement of the fact to such •"' 
person, or to a proper person at his place of business or 'l 
residence. ' • 1953 
48-1-3. "Partnership" denned. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a partnership 
is an association of two or more persons to carry on as 
coowners a business for profit. f^ 
(b) "Partnership" when used in a statute of the state, • 
includes a limited liability partnership registered under k 
Section 48-1-42, unless the context requires otherwise. 
(2) An association formed under any other statute of this 
state, or any statute adopted by authority other than the 
authority of this state, is not a "partnership under this chapter, 
unless such association would have been a partnership in this 
state prior to the adoption of this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall apply to limited partnerships except' 
in so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are 
inconsistent herewith. 1994 
48-1-3.1. Joint venture denned — Application of chap-
ter. * 
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons 
to carry on as co-owners of a single business enterprise. 
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of ' 
joint ventures. 1985 
48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a part-
nership. 
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules 
shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who 
are not partners as to each other are not partners as to 
third persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by en-
tireties, joint property, common property, or part owner-
ship does not of itself establish a partnership, whether 
such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by the •< 
use of the property. . 
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself, 
establish a partnership, whether or not the persons shar- : 
ing them have a joint or common right or interest in any 
. property from which the returns are derived. 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a • 
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the 
business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such 
profits were received in payment: • 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a 
deceased partner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of 
payment vary with the profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will 
of a business or other property by installments or 
otherwise. • • 1953 -
48-1-5. Partnership property. 
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, 
or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise on account 
of the partnership, is partnership property. 
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Unless the contrary intention appears , property acquired 
wi th partnership funds is par tnersh ip property. 
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the par tner-
ship name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the 
par tnership name. 
A conveyance to a par tnersh ip in the par tnersh ip name, 
though without words of inheri tance, passes the ent i re es ta te 
of the grantor, unless a contrary intent appears . 1953 
48-1-6. Partner agent of partnership as to partnership 
business. 
(1) Every par tner is an agent of the par tne r sh ip for the 
purpose of its business, and the act of every par tner , including 
the execution in the par tnersh ip name of any ins t rument for 
apparently carrying on in the usua l way the business of the 
par tnership of which he is a member, binds t he par tnersh ip , 
unless the par tner so acting has in fact no author i ty to act for 
the partnership in the par t icular mat te r and t h e person with 
whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact t h a t he h a s no 
such authority. 
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the 
carrying on of the business of the partnership in the usual way 
does not bind the partnership, unless authorized by the other 
partners. 
(3) Unless authorized by the other par tners or unless they 
have abandoned the business, one or more but less t han all of 
the partners have no authori ty to: 
(a) Assign the par tnersh ip property in t ru s t for credi-
tors or on the assignee's promise to pay the debts of t he 
partnership. 
(b) Dispose of the good will of the business . 
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to 
carry on the ordinary business of the par tnersh ip . 
(d) Confess a judgment . 
(e) Submit a par tnersh ip claim or liability to arbi t ra-
tion or reference. 
(4) No act of a par tner in contravention of a restriction on 
authority shall bind the par tnersh ip to persons having knowl-
edge of the restriction. 1953 
48-1-7. Conveyance of real property of partnership. 
Where title to real property is in the partnership name, any 
partner may convey title to such property by a conveyance 
executed in the partnership name; but the partnership may 
recover such property, unless the partner 's act binds the 
partnership under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), or 
unless such property has been conveyed by the grantee or a 
person claiming through such grantee to a holder for value 
without knowledge that the partner in making the conveyance 
has exceeded his authority. 
Where title to real property is in the name of the partner-
ship a conveyance executed by a partner in his own name 
passes the equitable interest of the partnership, provided the 
act is one within the authority of the par tner under the 
provisions of Section 48-1-6(1). 
Where title to real property is in the name of one or more but 
not all of the partners, and the record does not disclose the 
right of the partnership, the partners in whose name the title 
stands may convey title to such property, but the partnership 
may recover such property, if the partners ' act does not bind 
the partnership under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), 
unless the purchaser or his assignee is a holder for value 
without knowledge. 
Where the title to real property is in the name of one or more 
or all of the partners, or in a third person in trust for the 
partnership, a conveyance executed by a partner in the 
partnership name, or in his own name, passes the equitable 
interest of the partnership, provided the act is one within the 
authority of the par tner under the provisions of Section 
48-1-6(1). 
Where the title to real property is in the names of all the 
partners a conveyance executed by all the partners passes all 
their rights in such property. 1953 
48-1-8. Partnership bound by admission of partner. 
An admission or representat ion made by any par tne r con-
cerning par tnersh ip affairs within the scope of his authori ty as 
conferred by this chapter is evidence against the par tnership . 
1953 
48-1-9. Partnership charged with knowledge of or no-
tice to partner. 
Notice to any partner of any mat ter relating to partnership 
affairs, and the knowledge of the partner acting in the 
particular matter, acquired while a partner or then present to 
his mind, and the knowledge of any other partner who 
reasonably could and should have communicated it to the 
acting partner, operates as notice to or knowledge of the 
partnership, except in the case of a fraud on the partnership 
committed by or with the consent of tha t partner. 1953 
48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act. 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any par tner acting 
in the ordinary course of t he business of the par tnersh ip or 
wi th the author i ty of his copartners loss or injury is caused to 
any person, not being a pa r tne r in the partnership, or any 
penal ty is incurred, the par tnersh ip is liable therefor to the 
same extent as the par tner so acting or omitting to act. 1953 
48-1-11. Partnership bound by partner's breach of 
trust. 
The par tnersh ip is bound to make good the loss: 
(1) where one pa r tne r act ing within the scope of his 
apparen t authori ty receives money or property of a third 
person and misapplies it; and, 
(2) where the par tnersh ip in the course of its business 
receives money or property of a third person and the 
money or property so received is misapplied by any 
pa r tne r while it is in the custody of the par tnership . 
1953 
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), all pa r tne rs are 
liable: 
(a) jointly and severally for everything chargeable to 
the par tnersh ip under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
(b) jointly for all other debts and obligations of the 
par tnersh ip , except a pa r tne r may enter into a separate 
obligation to perform a par tnersh ip contract. 
(2) (a) A partner in a limited liability partnership is not 
liable, directly or indirectly, including by way of indemni-
fication, contribution or otherwise, for a debt, obligation, 
or liability chargeable to the partnership arising from 
negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct committed while 
the partnership is registered as a limited liability part-
nership and in the course of the partnership business by 
another partner, or an employee, agent, or representative 
of the limited liability partnership. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a partner in a 
limited liability partnership is liable for his own negli-
gence, wrongful acts, or misconduct. 19S4 
48-1-13. Partner by estoppel. 
(1) When a person by words spoken or written or by conduct 
represents himself, or consents to another's representing him, 
to anyone as a partner, in an existing partnership or with one 
or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such 
person to whom such representation has been made who has 
on the faith of such representation given credit to the actual or 
apparent partnership, and, if he has made such representa-
tion or consented to its being made in a public manner, he is 
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liable to such person, whether the representation has or has 
not been made or communicated to such person so giving 
credit by, or with the knowledge of, the apparent partner 
making the representation or consenting to its being made. 
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as 
if he were an actual member of the partnership. 
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable 
jointly with the other persons, if any, so consenting to the 
contract or representation as to incur liability; otherwise, 
separately. 
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a 
partner in an existing partnership, or with one or more 
persons not actual par tners , he is an agent of the persons 
consenting to such representation to bind them to the same 
extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner in 
fact, wi th respect to persons who rely upon the representation. 
Where all the members of an existing partnership consent to 
the representation, a par tnership act or obligation results; but 
in all other cases it is the joint act or obligation of the person 
acting and the persons consenting to the representation. 1953 
48-1-14. Liabil i ty of i n c o m i n g partner. 
A person admitted as a par tner into an existing partnership 
is liable for all the obligations of the partnership arising before 
his admission as if he had been a partner when such obliga-
tions were incurred, except t ha t his liability shall be satisfied 
only out of partnership property. 1953 
48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of part-
ners. 
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the 
partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement 
between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each par tner shall be repaid his contributions, 
whether by way of capital or advances to the partnership 
property, and share equally in the profits and surplus 
remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, 
a re satisfied; and, except as provided in Subsection 48-1-
12(2), must contribute towards the losses, whether of 
capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership accord-
ing to his share in the profits. 
(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in 
respect of payments made and personal liabilities reason-
ably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct 
of i ts business, or for the preservation of its business or 
property. 
(3) A par tner who in aid of the partnership makes any 
payment or advance beyond the amount of capital which 
he agreed to contribute shall be paid interest from the 
date of the payment or advance. 
(4) A par tner shall receive interest on the capital con-
tr ibuted by him only from the date when repayment 
should be made. 
(5) All par tners have equal rights in the management 
and conduct of the partnership business. 
(6) No par tner is entitled to remuneration for acting in 
the par tnership business, except that a surviving partner 
is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in 
winding up the par tnership affairs. 
~ (7) No person can become a member of a partnership 
without the consent of all the partners. 
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters con-
_ nected with the partnership business may be decided by a 
majority of the partners; but no act in contravention of 
any agreement between the partners may be done right-
fully without the consent of all the partners. 1994 
48-1-16. Par tnersh ip books . 
The par tnership books shall be kept, subject to any agree-
ment between the par tners , a t the principal place of business 
of the partnership, and every partner shall at all t imes have 
access to and may inspect and copy any of them. 1953 
48-1-17. Duty of partners to render information. 
Par tners shall render on demand true and full information 
of all things affecting the partnership to any partner, or the 
legal representatives of any deceased partner, or partner 
under legal disability. 1953 
48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. 
Every par tner must account to the partnership for any 
benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits, derived by him 
without the consent of the other partners from any transaction 
connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the 
par tnership or from any use by him of its property. 
This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased 
par tner engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the part-
nership as the personal representatives of the last surviving 
partner. 1953 
48-1-19. Right to an account. 
Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to 
partnership affairs: 
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership 
business or possession of its property by his copartners. 
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agree-
ment . 
(3) As provided by Section 48-1-18. 
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and 
reasonable. 1953 
48-1-20. Continuation of partnership beyond fixed 
term. 
When a partnership for a fixed term or particular undertak-
ing is continued after the termination of such term or particu-
lar under taking without any express agreement, the rights 
and duties of the partners remain the same as they were at 
such termination so far as is consistent with a partnership a t 
will. 
A continuation of the business by the partners, or such of 
them as habitually acted therein during the term, without any 
set t lement or liquidation of the partnership affairs, is pr ima 
facie evidence of a continuation of the partnership. 1953 
48-1-21. Extent of property r ights of a partner. 
The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights in specific 
par tnership property, (2) his interest in the partnership and 
(3) his r ight to participate in the management. 1953 
48-1-22. Nature of a partner's r ight in specific partner-
ship property. 
(1) A par tner is co-owner with his partners of specific 
par tnership property holding as a tenant in partnership. 
(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that: 
(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this chapter 
and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal 
r ight with his partners to possess specific partnership 
property for partnership purposes; but he has no right to 
possess such property for any other purpose without the 
consent of his partners. 
(b) A partner 's right in specific partnership property is 
not assignable, except in connection with the assignment 
of r ights of all the partners in the same property. 
(c) A partner 's right in specific partnership property is 
not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim 
against the partnership. When partnership property is 
at tached for a partnership debt, the partners, or any of 
them, or the representative of a deceased partner, cannot 
claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws. 
(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific 
par tnership property vests in the surviving partner or 
par tners , except where the deceased was the last surviv-
ing partner, when his right in such property vests in his 
legal representatives. Such surviving partner or partners , 
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or the legal representatives of the last surviving partner, 
has no right to possess the partnership property for any 
: but a partnership purpose. 
(e) A partner 's r ight in specific partnership property is 
, not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, 
heirs or next of kin. 1953 
48-1-23. Nature of partner's interest in the partner-
ship. 
A partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the 
profits and surplus, and the same is personal property. 1953 
48-1-24. Assignment of partner's interest.. 
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership 
does not of itself dissolve the partnership, or, as against the 
other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the as-
signee during the continuance of the partnership to interfere 
in the management or administration of the partnership 
business or affairs, or to require any information or account of 
partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership books; 
but it merely entitles the assignee to receive in accordance 
with his contract the profits to which the assigning partner 
would otherwise be entitled. 
In case of a dissolution of a partnership, the assignee is 
entitled to receive his assignor's interest, and may require an 
account from the date only of the last account agreed to by all 
the partners. 1953 
48-1-25. Partner's interest subject to charging order. 
(1) On due application to a competent court by any judg-
ment creditor of a partner the court which entered the 
judgment, order or decree, or any other court, may charge the 
interest of the debtor partner with payment of the unsatisfied 
amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon and may 
then or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits and 
of any other money due or to fall due to him in respect of the 
partnership, and make all other orders, directions, accounts 
and inquiries which the debtor partner might have made or 
which the circumstances of the case may require. 
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time 
before foreclosure, or, in case of a sale being directed by the 
court, may be purchased without thereby causing a dissolu-
tion: 
(a) with separate property, by any one or more of the 
partners; or, 
(b) with partnership property, by any one or more of the 
partners with the consent of all the partners whose 
interests are not so charged or sold. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be held to deprive a 
par tner of his right, if any, under the exemption laws as 
regards his interest in the partnership. . 1953 
48-1-26. "Dissolution" denned. 
The dissolution of a par tnership is the change in the relation 
of the par tners caused by any par tner ceasing to be associated 
in the carrying on, as distinguished from the winding up, of 
the business. 1953 
48-1-27. Partnership not terminated by dissolution. 
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but contin-
ues until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed. 
1953 
48-1-28. Causes of dissolution. 
Dissolution is caused: 
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the 
partners: 
(a) By the termination of the definite term or 
particular undertaking specified in the agreement. 
(b) By the express will of any partner when no 
definite term or particular undertaking is specified. 
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have 
not assigned their interests, or suffered them to be 
charged for their separate debts, either before or after 
the termination of any specified term or particular 
undertaking. 
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the busi-
ness bona fide in accordance with such a power 
conferred by the agreement between the partners. 
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the 
partners, where the circumstances do hot permit a disso-
lution under any other provision of this section, by the 
express will of any partner at any time. 
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the 
business of the partnership to be carried on or for the 
members to carry it on in partnership. 
(4) By the death of any partner. 
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partner-
ship. 
(6) By decree of court under Section 48-1-29. 1953 
48-1-29. Dissolution by decree of court. 
(1) On application by or for a partner the court shall decree 
a dissolution whenever: 
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial 
proceeding or is shown to be of unsound mind. 
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of 
performing his part of the partnership contract. 
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends 
to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business. 
(d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach 
of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts 
himself in matters relating to the partnership business 
that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business in partnership with him. 
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried 
on at a loss. 
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable. 
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's 
interest under Section 48-1-24 or 48-1-25: 
(a) After the termination of the specified term or par-
ticular undertaking. 
(b) At any t ime, if the partnership was a partnership at 
will, when the interest was assigned or when the charging 
order was issued. 1953 
48-1-30. General effect of dissolution on authority of 
partner. 
Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership 
affairs or to complete transactions begun but not then fin-
ished, dissolution terminates all authority of any partner to 
act for the partnership. 
(1) With respect to the partners: 
(a) when the dissolution is not by the act, bank-
ruptcy or death of a partner; or 
(b) when the dissolution is by such act, bankruptcy 
-or death of a partner in cases where Section 48-1-31 
so requires. 
(2) With respect to persons not partners as declared in 
Section 48-1-32. 1953 
48-1-31. R i g h t of par tner to contribution from copart-
ners after dissolution. 
Where the dissolution is caused by the act, death, or 
bankruptcy of a partner each partner is liable to his copart-
ners for his share of any liability created by any partner acting 
for the partnership as if the partnership had not been dis-
solved unless: 
(1) the dissolution being by act of any partner, the 
partner acting for the partnership had knowledge of the 
dissolution; 
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(2) the dissolution being by the death or bankruptcy of 
a partner, the partner acting for the partnership had 
knowledge or notice of the death or bankruptcy; or 
(3) the liability is for a debt, obligation, or liability for 
which the partner is not liable under Subsection 48-1-
12(2). 1994 
48-1-32. Power of partner to bind partnership to third 
persons after dissolution. 
(1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership, 
except as provided in paragraph (3): 
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership 
affairs or completing transactions unfinished at dissolu-
tion. 
(b) By any transaction which would bind the partner-
ship, if dissolution had not taken place, provided the other 
, party to the transaction: 
(i) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to 
dissolution and had no knowledge or notice of the 
dissolution; or 
(ii) Though he had not so extended credit, had 
nevertheless known of the partnership prior to disso-
lution, and, having no knowledge or notice of disso-
lution, the fact of dissolution had not been advertised 
in a newspaper of general circulation in the place (or 
in each place, if more than one) at which the partner-
ship business was regularly carried on. 
(2) The liability of a partner under paragraph (1Kb) shall be 
satisfied out of partnership assets alone when such partner 
had been prior to dissolution: 
(a) unknown as a partner to the person with whom the 
contract is made; and, 
(b) so far unknown and inactive in partnership affairs 
that the business reputation of the partnership could not 
be said to have been in any degree due to his connection 
with it. 
(3) The partnership is in no case bound by any act of a 
partner after dissolution: 
(a) where the partnership is dissolved because it is 
unlawful to carry on the business, unless the act is 
appropriate for winding up partnership affairs; or, 
(b) where the partner has become bankrupt; or, 
.. (c) where the partner has no authority to wind up 
partnership affairs; except by a transaction with one who: 
(i) Had extended credit to the partnership prior to 
dissolution and had no knowledge or notice of his 
want of authority; or 
• ' (ii) Had not extended credit to the partnership 
prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or 
notice of his want of authority, the fact of his want of 
authority has not been advertised in the manner 
provided for advertising the fact of dissolution in 
paragraph (D(bXii). 
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability under 
Section 48-1-13 of any person who after dissolution represents 
himself or consents to another 's representing him as a partner 
in a partnership engaged in carrying on business. 1953 
48-1-33. Effect of dissolution on partner's existing li-
ability. 
(1) The dissolution of a partnership does not of itself dis-
charge the existing liability of any partner. 
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon 
dissolution of the partnership by an agreement to that effect 
between himself, the partnership creditor and the person or 
partnership continuing the business; and such agreement may 
be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor 
having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or part-
nership continuing the business. 
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obliga-
tions of a dissolved partnership, the partners whose obliga-
tions have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability 
to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agree-
ment, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time 
of payment of such obligations. 
(4) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be 
liable for those obligations of the partnership incurred while 
he was a partner and for which the partner was liable under 
Section 48-1-12, but subject to the prior payment of his 
separate debts. 1994 
48-1-34. Right to w i n d u p . 
Unless otherwise agreed, the partners who have not wrong-
fully dissolved the par tnership or the legal representatives of 
the last surviving partner, not bankrupt, has the right to wind 
up the partnership affairs; provided, however, tha t any part-
ner, his legal representatives or his assignee upon cause 
shown may obtain a winding up by the court. 1953 
48-1-35. Rights of partners to application of partner-
ship property. 
(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, except in con-
travention of the partnership agreement, each partner, as 
against his copartners and all persons claiming through them 
in respect of their interests in the partnership, unless other-
wise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to 
discharge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash 
the net amount owing to the respective partners. But if 
dissolution is caused by expulsion of a partner, bona fide under 
the partnership agreement, and if the expelled partner is 
discharged from all partnership liabilities either by payment 
or agreement under Section 48-1-33(2), he shall receive in 
cash only the net amount due him from the partnership. 
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the 
partnership agreement the rights of the partners shall be as 
follows: 
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution 
wrongfully shall have: 
(i) All the rights specified in paragraph (1) of this 
section; and 
(ii) The right as against each partner who has 
caused the dissolution wrongfully to damages for 
breach of the agreement. 
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution 
wrongfully, if they all desire to continue the business in 
the same name, either by themselves or jointly with 
others, may do so during the agreed term for the partner-
ship, and for that purpose may possess the partnership 
property; provided, they pay to any partner who has; 
caused the dissolution wrongfully the value of his interest * 
in the partnership at the dissolution, less any damages; 
recoverable under clause (2)(a)(ii) of this section or secure 
the payment by bond approved by the court, and in like . 
manner indemnify him against all present or future 
. partnership liabilities. 
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrong-
fully shall have: .-:- ; v 
(i) If the business is not continued under the pro-
visions of paragraph (2Xb), all the rights of a partner : 
under paragraph (1), subject to clause (2)(aXii) of this 
section. 
(ii) If the business is continued under paragraph 
(2Kb) of this section, the right as against his copart-
ners, and all claiming through them, in respect of 
their interests in the partnership, to have the value of 
his interest in the partnership, less any damages 
caused to his copartners by the dissolution, ascer-
tained and paid to him in cash, or the payment 
secured by bond approved by the court, and to be 
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released from all existing liabilities of the partner- (b) those owing to partnership creditors; and 
ship; but in ascertaining the value of the partner 's (c) those owing to partners by way of contribution, 
interest the value of the good will of the business 1994 
shall not be considered. 1953 
48-1-36. Rights where partnership is dissolved for 
fraud or misrepresentation. 
Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of 
the fraud or misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto, 
the party entitled to rescind is, without prejudice to any other 
right, entitled: 
(1) to a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of 
the partnership property, after satisfying the partnership 
liabilities to third persons, for any sum of money paid by 
him for the purchase of an interest in the partnership and 
for any capital or advances contributed by him; and, 
(2) to stand, after all liabilities to third persons have 
been satisfied, in the place of the creditors of the partner-
ship for any payments made by him in respect of the 
partnership liabilities; and, 
(3) to be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud 
or making the representation against all debts and liabili-
ties of the partnership. 1953 
48-1-37. Rules for distribution. 
In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution 
the following rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement 
to the contrary: 
(1) The assets of the partnership are: 
(a) partnership property; and 
(b) contributions of the partners specified in Sub-
section (4). 
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order 
of payment, as follows: 
(a) those owing to creditors other than partners; 
(b) those owing to partners other than for capital 
and profits; 
(c) those owing to partners in respect of capital; 
and 
(d) those owing to partners in respect of profits. 
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of their 
declaration in Subsection (1) to the satisfaction of the 
liabilities. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 48-1-12(2), the 
partners shall contribute as provided by Subsection 48-1-
15(1) the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if 
any, but not all, of the partners are insolvent, or, not being 
subject to process, refuse to contribute, the other partners 
shall contribute their share of the liabilities, and in the 
relative proportions in which they share the profits the 
additional amount necessary to pay the liabilities. 
(5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or any 
person appointed by the court, shall have the right to 
enforce the contributions specified in Subsection (4). 
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have 
the right to enforce the contributions specified in Subsec-
tion (4) to the extent of the amount that he has paid in 
excess of his share of the liability. 
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall 
be liable for the contributions specified in Subsection (4). 
(8) When partnership property and the individual 
properties of the partners are in the possession of a court 
for distribution, partnership creditors shall have priority 
on partnership property and separate creditors on indi-
vidual property, saving the rights of lien or secured 
creditors as heretofore. 
(9) When a partner has become bankrupt or his estate 
is insolvent, the claims against his separate property 
shall rank in the following order: 
(a) those owing to separate creditors; 
48-1-38. Liability of persons continuing the business 
in certain cases. 
(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing 
partnership, or when any partner retires and assigns (or the 
representatives of a deceased partner assign) his rights in 
partnership property to two or more of the partners, or to one 
or more of the partners and one or more third persons, if the 
business is continued without liquidation of the partnership 
affairs, creditors of the first, or dissolved, partnership are also 
creditors of the partnership so continuing the business. 
(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the 
representatives of a deceased partner assign) their rights in 
partnership property to the remaining partner, who continues 
the business without liquidation of partnership affairs either 
alone or with others, creditors of the dissolved partnership are 
also creditors of the person or partnership so continuing the 
business. 
(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the 
dissolved partnership is continued, as set forth in paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of this section, with the consent of the retired 
partner or the representatives of the deceased partner, but 
without any assignment of his right in partnership property, 
rights of creditors of the dissolved partnership and of creditors 
of the person or partnership continuing the business shall be 
as if such assignment had been made. 
(4) When all the partners or their representatives assign 
their rights in partnership property to one or more third 
persons who promise to pay the debts and who continue the 
business of the dissolved partnership, creditors of the dis-
solved partnership are also creditors of the person or partner-
ship continuing the business. 
(5) When any partner wrongfully causes a dissolution and 
the remaining partners continue the business under the 
provisions of Section 48-l-35(2)(b), either alone or with others 
and without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of 
the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or 
partnership continuing the business. 
(6) When a partner is expelled and the remaining partners 
continue the business, either alone or with others, without 
liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the dis-
solved partnership are also creditors of the person or partner-
ship continuing the business. 
(7) The liability of a third person becoming a partner in the 
partnership continuing the business under this section, to the 
creditors of the dissolved partnership shall be satisfied out of 
partnership property only. 
(8) When the business of a partnership after dissolution is 
continued under any conditions set forth in this section, the 
creditors of the dissolved partnership, as against the separate 
creditors of the retiring or deceased partner or the represen-
tatives of the deceased partner, have a prior right to any claim 
of the retired partner or the representatives of the deceased 
partner against the person or partnership continuing the 
business on account of the retired or deceased partner's 
interest in the dissolved partnership, or on account of any 
consideration promised for such interest, or for his right in 
partnership property. 
(9) Nothing in this section shall be held to modify any right 
of creditors to set aside any assignment on the ground of 
fraud. 
(10) The use by the person or partnership continuing the 
business of the par tnership name, or the name of a deceased 
partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual 
property of the deceased par tner liable for any debts con-
tracted by such person or partnership. 1953 
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48-1-39. Rights of retiring or estate of deceased part-
ner when the business is continued. 
When any partner retires or dies and the business is 
continued under any of the conditions set forth in Section 
48-1-38(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), or Section 48-l-35(2)(b) without any 
settlement of accounts as between h im or his estate and the 
person or partnership continuing the business, unless other-
wise agreed, he or his legal representatives as against such 
persons or partnership may have the value of his interest a t 
the date of dissolution ascertained, and shall receive as an 
ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his interest 
in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, a t his option or 
at the option of his legal representatives, in lieu of interest, 
the profits attributable to the use of his right in the property 
of the dissolved partnership; provided, tha t the creditors of the 
dissolved partnership as against the separate creditors or the 
representative of the retired or deceased partner shall have 
priority on any claim arising under th is section, as provided by 
Section 48-1-38(8). 1953 
48-1-40. Accrual of act ions . 
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any 
partner or his legal representative as against the winding-up 
partners or the surviving par tners or the person or partner-
ship continuing the business, a t t he date of dissolution in the 
absence of any agreement to the contrary. 1953 
PART 2 
UTAH LIMITED LIABILITY 
PARTNERSHIP ACT 
48-1-41. Title. 
Sections 48-1-41 through 48-1-48 are known as the "Utah 
Limited Liability Partnership Act." 1994 
48-1-42. Registrat ion of l imi ted l iabil ity partnerships . 
(1) (a) A partnership shall register with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code by filing an applica-
tion or a renewal statement: 
(i) to become and to continue as a limited liability 
partnership; or 
(ii) to do business in this state as a foreign limited 
liability partnership, 
(b) The application or renewal statement shall include: 
(i) the name of the limited liability partnership; 
(ii) the address of its principal office; 
(iii) if the principal office of the limited liability 
partnership is not located in this state, the address of 
a registered office and the name and address of a 
registered agent for service of process in this state; 
(iv) the number of partners; 
(v) a brief statement of the business in which the 
limited liability partnership engages; 
(vi) a brief statement that the partnership is ap-
plying for, or seeking to renew its status as a limited 
liability partnership; and 
(vii) if a foreign limited liability partnership, an 
original certificate of fact or good standing from the 
office of the secretary of state or other responsible 
authority of the state in which the limited liability 
partnership is formed. 
(2) The application or renewal statement required by Sub-
section (1) shall be executed by a majority in voting interest of 
the partners or by one or more partners authorized by the 
partnership to execute an application or renewal statement. 
(3) The application or renewal statement shall be accompa-
nied by a filing fee established under Section 63-38-3.2. 
(4) The division shall register as a limited liability partner-
ship any partnership that submits a completed application 
with the required fee. 
(5) (a) The registration expires one year after the date an 
application is filed unless the registration is voluntarily 
withdrawn by filing with the division a written with-
drawal notice executed by a majority in voting interest of 
the partners or by one or more partners authorized to 
execute a withdrawal notice. 
(b) Registration of a partnership as a limited liability 
partnership shall be renewed if no earlier than 60 days 
before the date the registration expires and no later than 
the date of expiration, the limited liability partnership 
files with the division a renewal statement. 
(c) The division shall renew the registration as a lim-
ited liability partnership of any limited liability partner-
ship that timely submits a completed renewal statement 
with the required fee. 
(d) If a renewal statement is timely filed, the registra-
tion is effective for one year after the date the registration 
would have expired but for the filing or the renewal 
statement. 
(6) The status of a partnership as a limited liability part-
nership is not affected by changes in the information stated in 
the application or renewal statement which take place after 
the filing of an application or a renewal statement. 
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admin-
istrative Rulemaking Act, the division may issue rules provid-
ing for the form content and submittal of applications for 
registration or of renewal s ta tements . 1996 
48-1-43. Scope of chapter — Choice of law. 
(1) A partnership, including a limited liability partnership 
may conduct its business, carry on its operations, and exercise 
the powers granted by this chapter within and without the 
state. 
(2) (a) It is the intent of the Legislature that the legal 
existence of limited liability partnerships formed in this 
state and registered under Section 48-1-42 be recognized 
outside the boundaries of this state and that the laws of 
this state governing the limited liability partnership 
transacting business outside this state be granted the 
protection of full faith and credit under the Constitution 
of the United States. 
(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the internal 
affairs of a limited liability partnerships formed in this 
state and registered under Section 48-1-42 be subject to 
and governed by the laws of this state, including the 
provisions providing for liability of partners for debts, 
obligations, and liabilities chargeable to partnerships. 
1994 
48-1-44. Foreign limited liability partnerships. 
(1) Subject to any statute regulating a specific type of 
business, a limited liability partnership registered and exist-
ing under the laws of another state, may do business in this 
state if it registers with the division, in accordance with 
Section 48-1-42. 
(2) The internal affairs of a limited liability partnership 
registered and existing under the laws of another jurisdiction, 
including the provisions providing for the liability of partners 
for debts, obligations of and liabilities chargeable to partner-
ships, shall be subject to and governed by the laws of the state 
where the partnership is formed. 1996 
48-1-45. Name of registered limited liability partner-
ship. 
The name of a limited liability partnership shall contain the 
words "limited liability partnership" or the abbreviations 
"LL.?." or "LLP* as the last words or letters of its name. 
1994 
48-1-46. Professional relationship — Personal liability. 
(1) Sections 48-1-41 through 48-1-48 do not alter any law 
applicable to the relationship between a person rendering 
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Utah Code § 57-1-10 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this 
document.) 
Current through End of 2000 General Sess. 
§57-1-10. After-acquired title passes 
If any person shall hereafter convey any real 
estate by conveyance purporting to convey the 
same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the 
time of such conveyance have the legal estate in 
such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the 
same, the legal estate subsequently acquired 
shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, 
successors or assigns, and such conveyance 
shall be as valid as if such legal estate had been 
in the grantor at the time of the conveyance. 
WESTS UTAH CODE 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS 57-3-2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Disqualification of office taking acknowl-
S S S S ^ ^ o f f l S T S K acknowledg- * a S S ^ n t is taken before officer 
ment disqualified to act, certificate is ineffectual. 
Cited. ' Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 
Acknowledgment by mortgagee. (19ol). 
An acknowledgment taken by mortgagee
 C i t e d i n G ^ a l G\aSs Corp. v. Mast Constr. 
himself as a notary public is void, and renders
 c ? 6 6 p M 4 2 9 ( U t a h a A 1 9 8 g ) 
mortgage unrecordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68 ' ™ 
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments C.J.S. — 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgments § 8. 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 123. Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment ©=» 1-4. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and 
Recording Laws § 77. 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Change in interest rate — 
Validity of document — Notice of unnamed inter-
ests — Conveyance by grantee. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner 
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified dopy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each^financing state-
ment complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall, 
from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to 
all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in^the interest 
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underly-
ing secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the 
document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to 
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the 
document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration, 
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any 
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any 
other person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to 
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he 
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this 
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest 
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2000; ment designated the existing language as Sub-
CL. 1917, § 4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, section (1) and divided the formerly undivided 
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159, language into two sentences; in Subsection (1), 
§ 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14; 1989, ch. 88, § 8. deleted "the provisions of' before "Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- 70A-9-402" in the first sentence and made 
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57-3-2 REAL ESTATE 
minor phraseology changes throughout the 
subsection; and added Subsection (2). 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, 
added Subsections (3) to (5) and rewrote Sub-
sections (1) and (2), as last amended by Laws 
1985, ch. 159, § 7, to such an extent that a 
detailed comparison is impracticable. 
ANALYSIS 
Actual notice. 
—Duty to inquire. 
Admissibility of record in evidence. 
Effect of failure to record. 
Effect of recordation. 
—Cancellation on grounds of mistake. 
—Contradiction by parol evidence. 
—Equities of adverse claimants. 
—Evidence of facts therein. 
—Presumption of delivery. 
—Running of statute of limitations. 
Improper or defective recordation. 
—Forged deed. 
—Lack of constructive notice. 
Mortgages. 
Necessity for recordation. 
—Actual notice. 
Obligation of grantor. 
Priorities. 
—Chronology of recordation. 
—Lien for materials. 
—Mortgages. 
—Overlapping conveyances. 
Recordation as notice. 
—Time from which notice imparted. 
"Recorded." 
Cited. 
Actual notice. 
—Duty to inquire. 
Mortgage broker, acting on behalf of a bona 
fide purchaser, inquired with sufficient dili-
gence where he had a title search performed 
and personally contacted the secured party, 
who confirmed what the title search and other 
verbal and documentary evidence had told 
him. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
Where defendant-lender's appraiser expected 
to find, and did find, persons occupying the 
premises as tenants, and there was nothing 
about the property to alert defendant as to 
plaintiffs interest in it, the appraiser did not 
have a duty to inquire as to the identity of the 
landlord or ask to see a copy of the lease or 
rental agreement. Stumph v. Church, 740 P.2d 
820 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Admissibility of record in evidence. 
Record of patent is admissible in evidence 
The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989, 
inserted "each copy of a notice of location com-
plying with Section 40-1-4" in Subsection (1) 
and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Judgment record, re-
cording of, § 17-21-11. 
when record shows that patent was duly exe-
cuted and verified as provided by law. Tate v. 
Rose, 35 Utah 229, 99 P. 1003 (1909). 
Effect of failure to record. 
Where a prior deed was not recorded until 
three years after the purchasers' assignments 
of their equitable interests in the property 
were executed and recorded, the assignee had 
no constructive notice of the deed, and the as-
signee's lien was therefore superior to a bank's 
subsequent trust deed received from the pur-
chasers. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v. 
Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987). 
Effect of recordation. 
—Cancellation on grounds of mistake. 
In action to cancel recorded one-page war-
ranty deed on grounds of mistake, trial court 
properly granted purchasers' motion for sum-
mary judgment on counterclaim to quiet title 
where circumstances constituting alleged mis-
take were not pleaded with particularity; 
plaintiffs did not allege any conduct by pur-
chasers preventing vendors from ascertaining 
contents of deed; and purchasers had been in 
actual possession of property in question dur-
ing entire period of 21 years since conveyance. 
McKellar v. McKellar, 23 Utah 2d 106, 458 
P.2d 867 (1969). 
—Contradiction by parol evidence. 
Marginal entry, whereby mortgage was dis-
charged of record and secured indebtedness 
was declared "fully paid," was not of such for-
mal and solemn character as to be beyond 
power of contradiction by parol evidence on 
point that, at time it was made, indebtedness 
actually had not been "fully paid." Thompson 
v. Avery, 11 Utah 214, 39 P. 829 (1895). 
—Equities of adverse claimants. 
Where purchasers of real estate had such no-
tice of adverse claims of plaintiffs as would put 
reasonable person upon inquiry to ascertain 
what interest was, they took subject to any eq-
uities or interest that plaintiffs had in prem-
ises, though such interest was not recorded as 
required by this section. Gappmayer v. 
Wilkenson, 53 Utah 236, 177 P. 763 (1919). 
—Evidence of facts therein. 
The record is only the prima facie evidence of 
the facts therein stated. Tarpey v. Desert Salt 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Utah Code § 57-3-102 
WESTS UTAH CODE 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 3. RECORDING OF 
DOCUMENTS 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Current through End of 2000 General Sess. 
§ 57-3-102. Record imparts notice-Change 
in interest rate—Validity of document-
Notice of unnamed interests-Conveyance 
by grantee 
< Text of section effective until July 1, 
2001 > 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, 
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this 
title, each original document or certified copy of 
a document complying with Section 57-4a-3, 
whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 
40-1-4, and each financing statement complying 
with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not 
acknowledged shall, from the time of recording 
with the appropriate county recorder, impart 
notice to all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as 
security, a change in the interest rate in 
accordance with the terms of an agreement 
pertaining to the underlying secured obligation 
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of 
the document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a 
document with respect to the parties to the 
document and all other persons who have notice 
of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites 
only a nominal consideration, names the grantee 
as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust 
without naming beneficiaries or stating the 
terms of the trust does not charge any third 
person with notice of any interest of the grantor 
or of the interest of any other person not named 
in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may 
convey the interest granted to him free and clear 
of all claims not disclosed in the document in 
which he appears as grantee or in any other 
document recorded in accordance with this title 
that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, 
specifies the interest claimed, and describes the 
real property subject to the interest. 
Amended by Laws 1989, c. 88. Renumbered from § 57-3-2 
by Laws 1998, c. 61, § 2, effi July 1, 1998. Amended by 
Laws 1998, c. 85, § 4, effi May 4, 1998. 
< For text of section effective July 1, 
2001, see §57-3-102, post > 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 57-3-102 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 3. RECORDING OF 
DOCUMENTS 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Current through End of 2000 General Sess. 
§ 57-3-102. Record imparts notice-Change 
in interest rate—Validity of document-
Notice of unnamed interests-Conveyance 
by grantee. 
< Text of section effective July 1, 2001 > 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, 
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this 
title, each original document or certified copy of 
a document complying with Section 57-4a-3, 
whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a 
notice of location complying with Section 
40-1-4, and each financing statement complying 
with Section 70A-9a-502, whether or not 
acknowledged shall, from the time of recording 
with the appropriate county recorder, impart 
notice to all persons of their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as 
security, a change in the interest rate in 
accordance with the terms of an agreement 
pertaining to the underlying secured obligation 
does not affect the notice or alter the priority of 
the document provided under Subsection (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a 
document with respect to the parties to the 
document and all other persons who have notice 
of the document. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites 
only a nominal consideration, names the grantee 
as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust 
without naming beneficiaries or stating the 
terms of the trust does not charge any third 
person with notice of any interest of the grantor 
or of the interest of any other person not named 
in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may 
convey the interest granted to him free and clear 
of all claims not disclosed in the document in 
which he appears as grantee or in any other 
document recorded in accordance with this title 
that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, 
specifies the interest claimed, and describes the 
real property subject to the interest. 
Amended by Laws 1989, c. 88. Renumbered from § 57-3-2 
by Laws 1998, c. 61, § 2, eff July 1, 1998. Amended by 
Laws 1998, c. 85, § 4, eff May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 
252, §11, eff July 1,2001. 
< For text effective until July 1, 2001, 
see §57-3-102, ante > 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love 
and Irene C. Love 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 3 1999 
SALT LAKE CCU 
By. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE, IRENE C. LOVE, 
CONMART, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE, 
Counterclaimants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG; 
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a 
partnership; SMITH HALANDER SMITH 
ORDER GRANTING LOVES' 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
Judge Judith S. Atherton 
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AND ASSOCIATES, a partnership; 
MINSON-HALANDER, INC., a Utah 
corporation; H. FRED SMITH; RONALD 
W. SMITH; DALE N. MINSON; ROBERT 
S. HALANDER; and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Defendants. 
This matter came before the court for hearing on March 1, 1999 at 3:00 p.m. on 
cross motions for partial summary judgment filed by defendants William S. Love and 
Irene C. Love ("Loves") and plaintiff Arnold Industries, Inc. ("Arnold"). Arnold was 
represented by Sherman C. Young. Loves were represented by Ronald G. Russell. L. 
Benson Mabey appeared for third-party defendants Western Management, Smith 
Halander Smith and Associates, Minson-Halander, Inc., H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, 
Dale N. Minson, and Robert S. Halander. Kevan F. Smith appeared for Salt Lake County. 
The motions for partial summary judgment are directed at the issue of whether an 
easement for ingress and egress over plaintiff's property (the "Arnold Property") exists for 
the benefit of defendants' property (the "Love Property"). The court concludes that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
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Western Management conveyed the Love Property, including the right-of-way, to 
William J. Lowenberg by the Warranty Deed recorded February 3, 1982 as Entry No. 
3645188 (the "1982 Warranty Deed"). At the time Western Management granted the 
1982 Warranty Deed, title to the Arnold Property was not vested in Western 
Management. Later in 1982, the then owners of the Arnold Property, H. Fred Smith, 
Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, and Robert S. Halander, conveyed the Arnold 
Property to Western Management by a Quit-Claim Deed recorded October 29, 1982 as 
Entry No. 3724987, thereby vesting title to the Arnold Property in Western Management. 
On January 23, 1991, a Corrective Warranty Deed describing the Love Property, 
including the easement over the Arnold Property, was recorded as Entry No. 5015202 
(the "Corrective Warranty Deed"). Among other things, the Corrective Warranty Deed 
states that it was entered to correct certain mistakes in the legal description contained in 
the 1982 Warranty Deed including to limit the easement over the Arnold Property in 
favor of the Love Property "to appropriate ingress and egress over the access ways as the 
same existed or may be improved or modified." All of the parties holding an interest of 
record in both the Arnold Property and the Love Property as of January 23, 1991 
executed the Corrective Warranty Deed. A Quiet Title Decree recorded February 21, 
1991 as Entry No. 5030026 recognizes William J. Lowenberg as the owner of the Love 
Property together with easements over the Arnold Property. All of the owners of record 
of both the Arnold Property and the Love Property were parties in the action in which 
3 
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the Quiet Title Decree was entered. William J. Lowenberg conveyed the Love Property 
and easements over the Arnold Property to William S. Love and Irene C. Love pursuant 
to the Warranty Deed recorded January 19, 1995 as Entry No. 6006715. 
Based on the record, the court concludes that the easement was created by the 
1982 Warranty Deed as corrected by the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. Although 
Western Management was not the owner of the Arnold Property at the time that the 
1982 Warranty Deed was recorded, the after-acquired title doctrine or estoppel by deed 
apply in this case because both Western Management and the individual partners of 
Western Management subsequently came into title to the Arnold Property. The court 
rejects plaintiff's argument that a "counter-estoppel" would apply for the reasons argued 
by Loves. 
In addition, the court concludes that the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed would 
be effective to create the easement as of 1991. Title to the Arnold Property was vested 
in the partners of Western Management and each of those partners executed the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed. Under Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-7, "where title to real 
property is in the names of all the partners, a conveyance executed by all the partners 
passes all their rights in such property." The effect of the 1991 Corrective Warranty 
Deed is confirmed and judicially recognized by the contemporaneous Quiet Title Decree 
that was entered in an action in which the Western Management partners were all party 
defendants. 
4 
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The court also rejects Arnold's contention that it was a bona fide purchaser 
without actual or constructive notice of the easement. The 1982 Warranty Deed, the 
1991 Corrective Warranty Deed, and the 1991 Quiet Title Decree were properly 
recorded and were indexed in the tract index of the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. 
Those documents were indexed to the correct quarter of Section 21, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 East, where these properties are located. The record is sufficient to impart 
notice where the recorder indicated the metes and bounds description of the Love 
Property and "See Document for Additional Description" on the index. 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in the memoranda filed by 
Loves, the court concludes that Loves are entitled to the entry of a judgment declaring 
that the Love Property is benefitted by and the Arnold Property is burdened by a 
right-of-way for ingress and egress as described in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Loves' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED and Arnold's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
DATED this / 3 day of fj S>AA $ 1999. 
BY THE COU&^ 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Sherma/i C. Young, Esq. of 
IVIE'&YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaif 
RonafdyG. Russell, Esq. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love 
and Irene C. Love 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the I o "day of March, 1999 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER GRANTING LOVES' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
L. Benson Mabey, Esq. 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Sherman C. Young, Esq. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
Post Office Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603-0657 
Blake T. Heiner, Esq. 
330 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kevan F. Smith, Esq. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE 
2001 South State Street, No. S 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Ronald C. Russell, Esq. 
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Third Judicial District 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
* • - * / • » 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE, et al., 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
CASE NO. 960906947 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
On June 30,2000, defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before the above entitled Court, the 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding. Defendants were represented by Ronald Russell and 
Kevan Smith and plaintiffs were represented by Sherman Young. Following the conclusion of the 
hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement. 
At the hearing and in its supporting memorandum, defendants argue that plaintiff failed to 
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and its notice of claim provisions, UCA 
§63-30-11 and §63-30-13, which operate as a one year statute of limitation in cases brought against 
a governmental entity. Specifically, a party must file a notice of claim within one year from the date 
on which the claim arose. In response, plaintiff contends that the discovery rule applies because 
exceptional circumstances existed which made discovery of the claim before the expiration of the 
limitation period impossible. 
In order to prove exceptional circumstances, a party must first prove that" the plaintiff did 
not know of and could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in time to 
file a claim within the limitation period." Warren vProvo City Corporation, 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 
(1992). In this case plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden. 
The corrective warranty deed on plaintiffs property was recorded and indexed, but not 
abstracted, on January 23,1991. Plaintiffs purchased the property on July 15,1993. On April 12, 
1996, defendants claimed an easement over plaintiffs property. Consequently, on May 23, 1996 
plaintiffs counsel conducted an evaluation of the claimed easement and of the corrective warranty 
deed which purported to create the easement. On July 2, 1997 plaintiff conducted a detailed 
examination of the records at which time plaintiff claims it first discovered the County's failure to 
properly abstract the corrective warranty deed. Accordingly, plaintiff sent notice of claim, which 
was received by the County on August 4,1997. 
Plaintiff argues that because it did not know of its claim against the County until July 2, 
1997, its August 4, 1997 notice of claim is timely. Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that 
plaintiff either knew of or reasonably should have known of the warranty deed on April 12,1996 or, 
at the latest, on May 23,1996. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court finds plaintiffs arguments unpersuasive. On April 12,1996 defendants claimed 
an easement over plaintiffs property. Upon learning of this claim, plaintiffs counsel evaluated the 
claim and the corrective warranty deed as reflected in a May 23, 1996 correspondence between 
counsel. The combination of these two events, indicates to this Court that at that time plaintiff had 
reasonable grounds to question the existence of an easement and either should have, or did, 
investigate the matter further. Consequently, plaintiffs notice of claim filed on August 4,1997 is 
untimely. 
Accordingly, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not shown that it did not know or could not 
have reasonably known about the cause of action against defendant within the statutory period. 
Therefore, the Court having reviewed the legal memoranda, affidavits and exhibits submitted by the 
parties, and being fully advised, concludes that defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
Dated this 2b day of July, 2000. 
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Ronald C . Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love 
and Irene C. Love 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE, IRENE C. LOVE, 
CONMART, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE, 
Counterclaimants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG; 
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a 
partnership; SMITH HALANDER SMITH 
ORDER 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
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AND ASSOCIATES, a partnership; ) 
MINSON-HALANDER, INC, a Utah ) 
corporation; H. FRED SMITH; RONALD ) 
W. SMITH; DALE N. MINSON; ROBERT ) 
S. HALANDER; and JOHN DOES 1-10, ) 
) 
Counterclaim and ) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
This matter came before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, or in the 
Alternative, to Compel Discovery. Based on the record herein, the court having issued 
its Minute Entry dated November 21, 2000, the court having issued its Minute Entry 
dated January 5, 2001 denying plaintiffs motion to reconsider, and for good cause 
appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Supplemental 
Affidavit of Ronald W. Smith or in the alternative, to Compel Discovery from Defendants 
Ronald W. Smith, H. Fred Smith, Dale N. Minson and Robert S. Halander is denied and 
plaintiffs motion to reconsider the same is denied. 
DATED this (f day of January, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
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APPR 
Sherman C. Young, Esq. of 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Ronald (J. Russell, Est]/of V 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love and 
Irene C. Love 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the IP day of January, 2001 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
L. Benson Mabey, Esq. 
MABEY & COOMBS 
124 South 600 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Sherman C. Young, Esq. 
IVIE & YOUNG 
226 West 2230 North 
Post Office Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603-0657 
Blake T. Heiner, Esq. 
330 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kevan F. Smith, Esq. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2001 South State Street, No. S-3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Ronal 
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants William S. Love 
and Irene C. Love 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE, IRENE C. LOVE, 
CONMART, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants. 
WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE, 
Counterclaimants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG; 
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
Final Judgment @J 
Q c n o n c n i - j ir»7mi->7 
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partnership; SMITH HALANDER SMITH 
AND ASSOCIATES, a partnership; 
MINSON-HALANDER, INC, a Utah 
corporation; H. FRED SMITH; RONALD 
W. SMITH; DALE N. MINSON; ROBERT 
S. HALANDER; and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Counterclaim and 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The court having previously entered its "Order Granting Loves' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" dated 
April 13, 1999, and its "Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" dated July 25, 2000, and 
the parties having stipulated to the dismissal of the remaining claims not adjudicated by 
those two orders, and for good cause appearing, the court hereby enters this Final 
Judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. For the reasons set forth in the court's "Order on Defendant [Salt Lake 
County's] Motion to Dismiss" dated July 25, 2000, plaintiff's fifth and sixth claims for relief 
set forth in its Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. For the reasons set forth in the court's "Order Granting Loves' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" 
dated April 13, 1999, plaintiff's first, second and third causes of action set forth in its 
2 
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Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice; Judgment is entered in favor of 
defendants William S. Love and Irene C. Love and against plaintiff on Count I of said 
defendants' Counterclaim; and the court hereby declares and decrees that said defendants 
are owners and holders of certain easements and right-of-ways appurtenant to the "Love 
Property" (as defined below) and that burden the "Arnold Industries Property" (as defined 
below), which easements and right-of-ways are more particularly described as follows: 
A RIGHT OF WAY as was obtained by Grantor pursuant to that 
Corrective Warranty Deed entered into between Western 
Management, a partnership, as grantor, and conveyed and 
warranted to William J. Lowenberg, as grantee, and dated January 
22, 1991, and recorded January 23, 1991, in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office as Entry No. 5015202, in Book 6284, at Page 
1366-1372. The property, subject to the right of way is described 
as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the North line of 
• . 2300 South Street, said point being North 
00o02'35" East, 1083.00 feet and West 
2726.812 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey 
Monument at the center of Section 22, Township 
1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 104.00 feet; 
thence North 16°02'36" West 67.00 feet; thence 
North 73°57,24" East 82.00 feet; thence North 
16°02,36" West 522.935 feet to the South line 
of the "FM ramp of 1-215; thence South 
58° 19-02" West 192.072 feet along said South 
line; thence South 53°28'29" West 159.555 feet 
along said South line; thence South 16°02'36" 
East 526.912 feet to the North line of said 2300 
South Street; thence Northeasterly 61.922 feet 
around a 221.143 foot radius curve to the right 
3 
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(chord bears North 81 °58'42" East 61.72 feet); 
thence East 169.16 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
TOGETHER WITH A perpetual easement for the purpose of 
providing access to and from a loading dock, as disclosed in that 
certain Grant of Easement recorded April 08, 1980 as Entry No. 
3421031, in Book 5084, at Page 322 and affecting the following 
described property: 
BEGINNING at a point which is North 0°02'35" 
East 1083.00 feet, West 2666.520 feet and North 
191.074 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey 
Monument at the center of Section 22, Township 
1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence South 73057'24" West 5.30 
feet to the West side of a concrete retaining wall; 
thence North 00o02,39" West along said wall 
4.68 feet; thence North 89°57'21" East 4.17 feet; 
thence South 16°02'36" East 3.35 feet to the 
point of BEGINNING. 
The "Love Property" is located in Salt Lake County, Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point on the North line of 2300 South Street, said 
point being North 0°02'35" East 1083.00 feet and West 2556.812 
feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the Center of 
Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence North 848.434 feet to the South 
. right of way line of the 1-215 "F" ramp exit; thence Southwesterly 
69.833 feet along said South right of way line, around a 1146.23 
foot radius curve to the left (chord bears South 59°46'53" West 
69.822 feet); thence South 58°19'02" West along said South right 
of way line 227.853 feet; thence South 16°02'36" East 522.935 
feet; thence South 73°57'24" West 82.0 feet; thence South 
16°02'36" East 67.0 feet; thence South 104.00 feet to the North 
4 
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line of said 2300 South Street; thence East along said North line 
170.00 feet to the point of BEGINNING. 
The "Arnold Industries Property" is located in Salt Lake County, Utah and is more 
particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point on the North line of 2300 South Street, said 
point being North 0°02'35" East 1083.00 feet and due West 
2726.812 feet from the Salt Lake County Survey Monument at the 
center of Section 22, Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; and running thence North 104.00 feet; thence 
North 16°02'36" West 67.00 feet; thence North 73°57,24" East 
82.00 feet; thence North 16°02,36" West 522.935 feet to the 
South line of the "F" Ramp of 1-215; thence South 58°19'02" West 
192.072 feet along said South line; thence South 53°28'29" West 
159.555 feet along said South line; thence South 16°02,36" East 
526.912 feet to the North line of said 2300 South Street; thence 
Northeasterly 61.922 feet around a 221.143 foot radius curve to 
the right (chord bears North 81 °58,42" East 61.72 feet); thence 
East 169.16 feet to the point of beginning. 
3. For the reasons set forth in the court's "Order Granting Loves' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" 
dated April 13, 1999, Judgment is granted in favor of defendants Will iam S. Love and Irene 
C. Love on Count IV of their Counterclaim and plaintiff Arnold Industries, Inc. and its 
grantees, successors, and assigns are hereby enjoined and restrained from taking any action 
to inhibit or preclude Loves, their tenants, and invitees from using the Love Easements. 
4. All other claims, counterclaims and third-party claims are dismissed without 
prejudice. 
5 
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DATED this \> day of 
Honorable Step 
District CourftJu 
"[\oO°{«Wl 
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LUNDBERG'TMEADERS 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
May 23,1996 
VIA FAX 524-1099 
Geoffrey W. Mangum 
PRINCE, YEA^FES & GELDZAHLER -
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Claim of Easement by William Love 
Dear Geoff: 
Since our telephone conversation last week, 1 have received and reviewed copies of the 
relevant documents. My conclusion is that Mr. Love does not have a valid easement across the 
property owned by my client, Arnold Industries, Inc. 
Throughout this letter I will refer to my client's parcel as the "Arnold Parcel" and to Mr. 
Love's parcel as the "Love Parcel." 
It is my understanding thai Mr. Love bases his claim on a "Corrective Warranty Deed" from 
Western Management, William J. Lowenberg, and Smith, Halander, Smith and Associates, as 
grantors, in favor of William J. Lowenberg, as grantee. The Corrective Warranty Deed was signed 
on January 22, 1991 and recorded on January 23,1991, as Entry No. 5015202. Tne Corrective • 
Warranty Deed purports to give an easement over all of the Arnold Parcel except for "existing 
buildings, landscaping areas, and other improved areas not necessary or suitable for or incidental to 
Granteefs use for access to his adjoining property..," 
Insofar as the Corrective Warranty Deed purports to grant an easement over the Arnold 
Parcel, it is subject to the following flaws: 
(1) At the time that the Corrective Warranty Deed was signed and recorded, record title 
to the Arnold Parcel was not vested in any of the grantors who signed the deed, but was 
vested in HH. Fred Smith, Robert S. Halander, Dale N. Minson and Ronald W. Smith," as 
individuals. These individuals obtained title by a Quit Claim Deed dated February 23,1987 
and recorded March 13,1987 as Entry No. 4416765. They retained record title until March 
8, 1991, when a Quit Claim Deed in favor of Conmart, Inc. was recorded (Entry No. 
5036257.) 
FXHilT_J„ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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May 23,1996 
Page 2 
(2) Although record title to the Arnold Parcel remained vested in H. Fred Smith, Robert 
S. Haiander, Dale N. Minson and Ronald W. Smith until March 8,1991, actual ownership 
of the Arnold Parcel was conveyed to Conmart, Inc. almost two months prior to the date of 
the Corrective Warranty Deed. The conveyance to Conmarc was made by the Quit Claim 
Deed described above which was dated November 28,1990 and recorded March 8,1991, as 
Entry No. 5036257. It is true that this Quit Claim Deed was recorded after the Corrective 
Warranty Deed, but there is strong evidence that Mr. Lowenberg, the grantee under the 
Corrective Warranty Deed, knew or should have known about Conmart's interest when he 
accepted the Corrective Warranty Deed. Conmart's Quit Claim Deed states that it was 
recorded nai the request of L. Benson Mabey." Mr. Mabey was the attorney for Lowenberg 
• • • in a quiet title action involving the Love Parcel. The quiet title action commenced in 1987 
and was concluded in January, 1991, at the same time that the Corrective Warranty Deed was 
recorded. Based on these facts, 1 have no doubt that Mr. Lowenberg had notice of Conmart's 
interest and cannot claim priority over Conmart. 
(3) It is my understanding that GSA, which is the present occupant of the Arnold Parcel, 
has been there for at least ten years. This is substantiated by several recorded instruments, 
dating back to 1985, which refer to the Arnold Parcel as the HThe GSA Property." Although 
GSA was in possession of the Arnold Parcel at the time that the Corrective Warranty Deed 
was signed, no consent to the easement was obtained from GSA. In the absence of such 
consent, any easement which your client might claim would be subject to the GSA Lease and 
would not become effective until the end of the lease term and all renewals. 
I am enclosing a copy of a letter delivered to me today by Vince Rampton. As you can see, 
he has instructed me to seek a temporary restraining order immediately, unless Mr. Love agrees to 
stop his vehicular traffic across the Arnold Parcel pending final resolution of this matter. 
Please call me as soon as you have reviewed this letter so that we can try to work out a 
temporary resolution and avoid litigation. 
Very truly yours, 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
cc: Vince Rampton 
Sharon Jones 
Blake Heiner 
enc. 
\ 
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l\\C OFFICES OF 
LUNDBERG & MEA.DERS 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
May 29,1996 
VIA FAX 524-1099 
Geoffrey W. Mangum 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake CityTtJtah 84111 
Re: Arnold Industries, Inc. — Bill Love Easement Claim 
Dear Geoff: 
I met yesterday afternoon with Sharyn Jones and Vince Rampton at the Arnold Industries 
property. I informed them that Bill Love has made phone calls to both tenants in the south building 
asking them to route all semi-trucks through 2200 West. Thank you for your help with this. 
Sharyn was able to provide more information about the exact nature of the problem. There 
has been an increase in traffic since the owner of the adjoining parcel placed concrete park stops and 
barrels across his property to block access several months ago. Vehicles which previously accessed 
your client's south building from the east began accessing it via the GSA parking lot. The large 
semi-trucks cause shaking in the GSA building, but the smaller pickup trucks also present a problem 
and pose a danger because they tend to speed across the parking lot to access the west loading dock 
of the building. Arnold Industries was able to temporarily reduce the problem during the winter 
months by piling snow on the parking lot in such a way as to discourage access to the west loading 
dock. Now that the winter is over and the parking lot is clear again, the problem has increased. I 
suspect there may also be a seasonal increase in traffic due to the nature of the tenant's business. 
In light of this additional information, Arnold Industries is hereby requesting that Mr. Love's 
tenants not use the west loading dock at all unless and until Mr. Love establishes the validity of his 
claimed easement. 
Very truly yours, 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
cc: Sharyn Jones, via fax 
Vince Rampton, via fax 
Blake Heiner, via fax 
Arlen Taylor, via fax 
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William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
Lundberg & Meaders 
. 660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: William S. & Irene C. Love — Right-of-Way Affecting 
Property in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 
Dear Bill: 
Reference is made to your letter of May 23, 1996 to Geoffrey W. Mangum, counsel 
to William S. and Irene C. Love (the "Loves"), regarding the status of a certain right-of-way 
(the "Right-of-Way") across property owned by your client Arnold Industries, Inc. We 
represent the Loves in connection with the matter. 
In the following discussion I use the term "Parcel 1" to refer to the parcel of realty 
that is owned in fee by the Loves and the term "Parcel 2" to refer to the property owned by 
your client and affected by the Right-of-Way. 
1. Effect of Invalidity of 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. In your letter 
of May 23, you contend that the Right-of-Way is invalid, due to the asserted invalidity, on 
several different grounds, of a Corrective Warranty Deed that was given in 1991 and that 
described the Right-of-Way (this Deed, dated January 22, 1991, and recorded on January 23, 
1991 as Entry No. 5015202 in Book 6284 at Page 1366, is referred to below as the "1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed"). The assumption seems to be that ineffectiveness of the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed results in Parcel 2 not being burdened by the Right-of-Way. Our 
review of the documents indicates that the assumption is incorrect. 
The 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed refers to and purports to revise in certain 
respects a Warranty Deed given in 1982 by Western Management, as Grantor, to William J. 
Lowenberg, as Grantee (this Deed, dated January 27, 1982, and recorded on February 3, 
1982, as Entry No. 3645188 in Book 5337 at Page 1149, is referred to below as the "1982 
r vis in IT 
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Warranty Deed"). (Lowenberg is the predecessor 'in title to 'the Loves, as regards both 
Parcel 1 and the Right-of-Way.) A copy of the 1982 Warranty Deed is enclosed for your 
information. By its terms, the 1982 Warranty Deed conveyed to Lowenberg all but a small 
part of Parcel 1, together with a Right-of-Way burdening Parcel 2 and the small part of 
Parcel 1 ndt"conveyed to Lowenbergln fee. The legal description of the Parcel 1 property 
appearing in the 1982 Warranty Deed differs from the Parcel 1 legal description contained in 
the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed in that the 1982 description does not include a small 
triangular piece on the West and also in that several of the perimeter dimensions vary slightly . 
from the corresponding dimensions appearing in the 1991 legal description. The legal 
description of the Parcel 2 property appearing as part of the Right-of-Way description in the 
1982 Warranty Deed differs in the following four respects from the Right-of-Way description 
contained in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed: 
(a) The point of beginning is. described b\ reissue u a. lii/^ji-iu iii La-
ment; 
(b) Tne 1982 description includes in the property burdened by the Right-of-
Way not just Parcel 2, but also the small triangular piece that the 1982 Warranty 
Deed leaves out of the Parcel 1 legal description; 
(C) Midway through the description of Parcel 2 in the 1982 Warranty 
Deed, the course "North 58°19'Q2" East 225.832 feet" appears, as regards pan of the 
Parcel 2 boundary that coincides with the South line of the 1-215 interchange - the 
course is in error, and should instead be South 58° 19'02" West 225.832 feet, as it is 
given in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed; and 
(d) At the end of the Parcel 2 description in the 1982 Warranty Deed the 
radius of a curve is erroneously given as 22.1143 feet, instead of 221.143 feet (as it 
is given in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed), in describing a boundary line that is 
coincident with the North line of 2300 South Street 
Recitals in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed indicate that its purpose was 
twofold: (i) To correct the legal description contained in the 1982 Warranty Deed; and (ii) 
To remedy a failure of the 1982 Warranty Deed to limit the coverage of the Right-of-Way as 
regards Parcel 2, by making the Right-of-Way apply only to access ways located on Parcel 2 
— rather than the Right-of-Way being applicable to the entirety of Parcel 2. (At least as 
regards this second objective, the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed was intended to benefit 
only the owner of Parcel 2, rather than the owner of Parcel 1. Your client might consider 
where it would stand regarding the coverage of the Right-of-Way if it were to succeed in its 
effort to invalidate the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed.) 
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Assuming for purposes of argument that the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed 
was invalid, as you contend, the result would merely be to leave the 1982 Warranty Deed in 
effect and unchanged, and would not necessarily invalidate the Right-of-Way. It is therefore 
necessary to consider what we have if left only with the 1982 Warranty Deed. 
2. Description Errors in 1982 Warranty Deed. The 1982 Warranty Deed 
created a Right-of-Way over the entirety of Parcel 2 for the benefit of essentially (but not 
quite) all of Parcel 1, unless deficiencies in the Parcel 2 description as contained in that Deed . 
dictate another result. 
Discussed below are the four differences between the description of Parcel 2 
that was used in describing the Right-of-Way in the 1982 Warranty Deed and the Parcel 2 
Right-of-Way description as contained in the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed: 
(a) The point of beginning of Parcel 2 is described in the 1982 Warranty 
Deed by reference to a different monument than the one used in the 1991 Corrective 
Warranty Deed. However, the two approaches describe the same or essentially the 
same point of beginning. This difference in the descriptions therefore is not material. 
(b) The 1982 description of the property burdened by the Right-of-Way 
included, in addition to Parcel 2, a small triangular piece of Parcel 1. By subsequent 
conveyances, fee title to that triangular piece came to be owned by the same party as 
was originally the holder of the Right-of-Way affecting it, and merger of the estates -. 
therefore resulted in termination of the Right-of-Way insofar as it burdened the 
triangular piece. Again, therefore, the difference in descriptions is not materials. 
(c) The course "North 58°19'02" East 225.832 feet" as used in the 1982 
description should instead have been given as South 58°19/02w West 225.832 feet. 
The fact that a 180° error was made in the bearing is obvious when one runs the 1982 
description, particularly since the correct bearing was contained in the Warranty Deed 
via which the Right-of-Way had originally been granted to Western Management, the 
grantor under the 1982 Warranty Deed. (A copy of that Warranty Deed, dated 
August 3, 1979, and recorded on August 6, 1979, as Entry No. 3318105 in Book 
4916 at Page 962, is enclosed for your information.) Moreover, the boundary of 
Parcel 2 that is intended to be described by the erroneous course is also stated in the 
Parcel 2 description to be the South line of 1-215, making even more apparent that the 
course given was in error. In any event, under well-established principles for 
interpreting legal descriptions, the reference to the street line controls over the 
inconsistent bearing given in the metes and bounds description. In addition, the 
Right-of-Way — which was originally created (through use of the correct bearing) by 
\ i - % 
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the 1979 Deed — was an appurtenance of the Parcel 1 property conveyed by the 1982 
Warranty Deed, and the Right-of-Way therefore automatically passed with the 
conveyance of the Parcel 1 property, irrespective of the bearing error that was made 
in the Parcel 2 description as contained in the 1982 Warranty Deed. Finally, the 
1991~Corrective Warranty Deed — even if assumed not to be effective to actually 
correct the mis-description contained in the 1982 Warranty Deed, served the purpose 
of putting Arnold Industries (which acquired its interest in Parcel 2 18 months after 
recordation of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed) on notice that the 1982 Right-of-
Way description was flawed and as to what the intended description was. Any one of 
the foregoing factors alone results in the erroneous bearing in the 1982 Warranty 
Deed not being fatal, but instead being required to be read in a manner consistent 
with the facts and with w h^at was obviously intended. 
(d) The same kind of considerations as those noted in the preceding 
Paragraph (c) are present as regards the incorrect curve radius of 22.11-3 feet (rather 
than 221.1^3 feet) given at the end of the Parcel 2 description in the 1982 Warranty 
Deed, where a boundary line coincident with the North line of 2300 South Street is 
described. (As regards this description error, however, we concede that it was also 
present in the description contained in the 1979 Warranty Deed referred to in 
Paragraph (c).) For most of the same reasons as are noted in Paragraph (c), the error 
was not fatal, and is instead reauired to be read in a wav consistent with the facts and 
with what was intended. 
For the reasons given above, it is clear that the 1982 Warranty Deed effec-
tively described the Right-of-Way and conveyed it to the Loves' predecessor in title, 
notwithstanding the errors that were part of the Parcel 2 description contained in that Deed. 
3. Priority Over GSA Lease. As pan of your argument that the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed did not establish the Right-of-Way as an enforceable burden 
against Parcel 2, your assert in your letter that the General Services Administration (the 
BGSAn) has been a tenant of Parcel 2 since 1985 and was in possession when the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed was given. You in effect seem to be asserting that even if the 
Right-of-Way is enforceable against Arnold Industries, it is not effective as against the tenant 
GSA, since GSA's interest in Parcel 2 predates the Right-of-Way. As is discussed above, 
the Right-of-Way did not originate with the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. Rather, it 
originated with the 1979 Warranty Deed and was described and conveyed by the 1982 
Warranty Deed. The Right-of-Way therefore predated the GSA's interests in Parcel 2, and is 
just as enforceable against the GSA as it is against the fee owner of Parcel 2. 
\ » ^ -
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4. Effectiveness of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. The considera-
tions noted above demonstrate that the Right-of-Way is valid and effective, whether or not 
the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed was valid. It therefore seems unnecessary to examine 
the question of validity of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. Sufnce at this point to say 
that various" considerations indicate tfiai the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed was indeed 
valid, notwithstanding the factors relied upon in your letter in arriving at a contrary conclu-
sion. 
We would suggest that your client reconsider its position on the Right-of-Way, since 
there seems to be no doubt that the Right-of-Way burdens its property. Please let me know, 
however, if our analysis of the matter is somehow flawed. 
Sincerelv. 
Charles L. MaaK. 
CLM:jxnh 
Enclosures 
cc: William S. & Irene C. Love [Via Both Telefax, to 415-949-0251, and 
First Class Mail] 
Geoffrey W. Mangum, Esq. [Via Both Telefax, to 524-1098, and First Class Mail] 
\ 
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June 26,1996 
VIA FAX 532-7750 
Charles L. Maak, Esq. 
Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee 
185 South Staje, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake Cit>\ Utah 84111. 
Re: William S. & Irene C. Love - Right of Way Claim 
Dear Chuck: 
I am writing in response to your letter of June 19, 1996. As I understand that letter, the 
principal argument is that if the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed is invalid your clients will rely 
instead on the 1982 Warranty Deed for their right of way. The 1982 Warranty Deed purports to 
affect almost all of my client's parcel (the nWest Parcel") without limiting the right of way to access 
ways. 
I did not address the validity of the 1982 Warranty Deed in my letter of May 23,1996 to 
Geoff Mangum, because I understood that Mr. and Mrs. Love were basing their claim solely on the 
1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. It is my view, however, that the 1982 Warranty Deed adds nothing 
to your clients' position. This view is based on the chain of title of the West Parcel. I will first 
outline my understanding of the chain of title for this parcel for the relevant period of time, then 
explain my conclusions. 
Chain of Title of West Parcel: 
The following is based on information provided to me by Metro National Title. I realize that 
there are some small discrepancies between the boundaries of the West Parcel as described in some 
of these conveyances and as it presently exists, but I don't think any of the discrepancies are relevant 
to the present dispute, so I have not bothered to note them in this chain. 
1. On October 24,1975, both the West Parcel and the parcel now owned by William S. and 
Irene C. Love (hereinafter the "East Parcel") were conveyed by Warranty Deed from 
Research Industries Corporation, as Grantor, to Plan-Tech Corp., as Grantee. This deed was 
recorded on October 28,1975, as Entry No. 2755041, Book 4009, Page 249. This is the 
common source for both of our client's titles. 
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2, On October 14,1975, Plan-Tech Corp., as Grantor, conveyed by Warranty Deed to Minson-
Halander, a Utah corporation, as Grantee, the East Parcel and a portion of the West Parcel. 
This deed was recorded on October 28,1975, as Entry No. 2755042, Book 4009, Page 250. 
3. On October 14,1975, Plan-Tech Corp., as Grantor, conveyed by Warranty Deed to Marcon 
Investment, as Grantee, the remainder of the West Parcel which was not included in the 
conveyance to Minson-Halander, described in paragraph 2 above. This deed was recorded 
on November 18,1975, as Entry No. 2761314, Book 4029, Page 329. 
4. On August 10,1976, Minson-Halander, as Grantor, conveyed by Warranty Deed to Carrera 
Corporation, as Grantee, the portion of the West Parcel then owned by Minson-Halander. 
This deed was recorded on August 13,1976, as Entry No. 2845258, Book 4301, Page 102. 
5. On August 10,1976, Marcon Investment, as Grantor, conveyed by Warranty Deed to Carrera 
Corporation, as Grantee, the portion of the West Parcel then owned by Marcon Investment. 
This deed was recorded on August 13,1976, as Entry No. 2845259, Book 4301, Page 104. 
After this conveyance, the entire West Parcel was owned by Carrera Corporation. 
6. On October 30, 1981, Carrera Corporation, as Grantor, conveyed the West Parcel by Quit 
Claim Deed to H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson & Robert S. Halander, as 
Grantees. This deed was recorded on November 24, 1981, as Entry No. 3625996, Book 
5316, Page 554. 
7. On November 5, 1981, H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, Robert S. 
Halander, and Western Management, as Grantors, conveyed the West Parcel by Quit Claim '* 
Deed to Carrera Corporation, as Grantee. This deed was recorded on December 28,1981, 
as Entry No. 3634711, Book 5326, Page 47. It is important to note that Western 
Management was a grantor in this deed. I do not believe that there were any easements in 
favor of the East Parcel at the time this deed was signed and delivered, but even if there were 
they would have been extinguished by this deed (since Western Management was the owner 
at that time of the East Parcel.) 
8. On October 29,1982, Carrera Corporation, as Grantor, conveyed the West Parcel by Quit 
Claim Deed to H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, Robert S. Halander, as 
Grantees. This deed was recorded on October 29,1982, as Entry No. 3724986, Book 5416, 
Page 2273. 
Conclusions Based on Chain of Title: 
Based on the foregoing, it appears that when, in January, 1982, Western Management signed 
and recorded the 1982 Warranty Deed purporting to create a right of way in favor of William J. 
% % 
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Lowenberg, Western Management did not own the West Parcel. Instead, the West Parcel was owned 
by Carrera Corporation. Accordingly, the 1982 Warranty Deed did not create any easement rights 
in the West Parcel. 
In your letter, you also maintain that the claimed easement over the West Parcel predates the 
GSA Lease, because it was first created^in the 1979 Warranty Deed from Minson Halander, Inc. to 
Western Management (Entry No. 3318105.) This 1979 Warranty Deed suffers from the same 
problem as the 1982 Warranty Deed - the grantor, Minson Halander, Inc. had no interest in the 
parcel which the easement was intended to burden. Again, the West Parcel was owned by Carrera 
Corporation at the time that Minson Halander, Inc. purported to create the easement. 
The above analysis is entirely dependent, of course, on the accuracy of the title information. 
Please let me know if you believe that my information is incorrect. Incidentally, I do not know 
exactly when the GSA Lease became effective. It may have been long before 1985. I do know that 
it was in effect by 1985 at the latest, based on references in the recorded documents. 
You mentioned in your letter that you disagree with my analysis of the validity of the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed. Since I am not convinced bv vour reliance on the 1979 Warranty Deed 
* mm * 
and the 1982 Warranty Deed, 1 would appreciate a further explanation of your views on the 1991 
Corrective Warranty Deed. 
Very truly yours, 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
cc: Vince Rampton 
Sharyn Jones 
Blake Heiner 
Geoff Mangum 
Arlen Taylor 
» 
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William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
Lundberg & Meaders 
'.. 660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: William S. & Irene C. Love - Right-of-Way Affecting 
Property in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 
Dear Bill: 
This is in response to your letter to me of June 26, 1996. 
You assert that when Western Management signed the 1982 Warranty Deed in favor 
of William J. Lowenberg, it did not own the West Parcel ("Parcel 2," in the nomenclature 
used in my letter to you of June 19, 1996). You therefore conclude that the 1982 Warranty 
Deed did not create any easement rights in the West Parcel (Parcel 2). 
Even if one assumes, as I shall do for purposes of argument, that at the time (in 
January, 1982) Western Management signed the 1982 Warranty Deed it did not hold title 
either to the West Parcel/Parcel 2 or to a Right-of-Way burdening Parcel 2, the 1982 
Warranty Deed still had the effect of creating the Right-of-Way which burdens Parcel 2. On 
October 29, 1982 — a number of months after Western Management purported by the 1982 
Warranty Deed to convey the Right-of-Way to William J. Lowenberg - the then-owners of 
Parcel 2 (H. Fred Smith, Ronald W. Smith, Dale N. Minson, and Robert S. Halander) 
conveyed Parcel 2 to Western Management by Quit-Claim Deed (recorded on October 29, 
1982, as Entry No. 3724987 in Book 5416 at Page 2274). The chain of title information 
contained in your letter of June 26 does not refer to this Quit-Claim Deed. Since the 1982 
deed by which Western Management purported to convey the Right-of-Way in Parcel 2 to 
Lowenberg had been a Warranty Deed, the doctrine of after-acquired title resulted in the 
Right-of-Way being conveyed to Lowenberg thereafter — when Western Management itself 
received title to Parcel 2 later in 1982. Consequently, it would appear that the 1982 
Warranty Deed was effective to create and transfer the Right-of-Way to Lowenberg, whether 
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or not Western Management lacked title at the time the 1982 Warranty Deed was signed. 
Because the foregoing considerations appear to demonstrate that the Right-of-Way is 
valid and effective irrespective of the validity of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed, it once 
again seems unnecessary to go to the trouble of examining the question of effectiveness of 
the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed, 
This letter, like my first one to you, is written to call to your attention considerations 
that seemingly should result in a resolution of the matter. As I'm sure you appreciate, 
neither this nor my prior letter necessarily deals with all potentially relevant theories or facts 
bearing on questions related to the Right-of-Way's validity, is exhaustive in its discussion of 
other considerations bearing on the Right-of-Way, or is intended to waive any rights. 
Please let me know what your client's position on the Right-of-Way is in view of the 
considerations discussed above. 
Sincerely, 
Charles L. Maak 
CLM:jmh 
cc: William S. & Irene C. Love [Via Both Telefax, to 415-949-0251, and 
First Class Mail] 
Geoffrey W. Mangum, Esq. [Via Both Telefax, to 524-1098, and First Class Mail] 
i . . 1 
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July 16,1996 
Charles L. Maak . 
Kimball,J£arr, Waddoups, Brownjk Gee 
185 South State St., Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Re: William S. & Irene C. Love - Right of Way Claim 
Dear Chuck: 
I am writing in response to your letter of July 5,1996. I apologize for the delay in 
responding, but I was out of town last week. 
Your letter refers to the doctrine of after-acquired title. It is my opinion that this 
doctrine has no application to the creation or perfection of an easement The doctrine is 
codified, in Utah, in section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code (1953): 
After-acquired title passes. If any person shall hereafter convey any 
real estate bv conveyance purporting to convev the same in fee simple 
absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the legal estate in 
such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate 
subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, 
successors or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal 
estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The statute clearly applies only to conveyances of fee simple title. I am not aware of 
any court cases in Utah or elsewhere where the doctrine of after-acquired title has been 
applied to perfect an easement, as opposed to an estate in land. 
My client, Arnold Industries, Inc., has an unbroken chain of title to the West Parcel 
which contains no mention whatever of an easement benefitting the East Parcel. The deeds 
which your clients rely upon for their claimed easement were all signed by entities which did 
not hold record title to the West Parcel. Furthermore, the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed 
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was not signed by GSA, which has been in actual possession of the West Parcel since at least 
1985. Under these circumstances, I do not believe that your clients hold a valid easement. 
Very truly yours, 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
cc: VinceRampton 
Sharyn Jones 
Blake Heiner 
Geoff Mangum 
Arlen Taylor 
Robert Burton 
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William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
Lundberg & Meaders 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: William S. & Irene C. Love - Right-of-Way Affecting 
Property in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 
Dear Bill: 
I too was out of town for a week, and as a result am somewhat tardy in responding to 
your letter of July 16, 1996. 
Your position that the after-acquired title doctrine does not apply to the creation of an 
easement appears to be unsound, for the reasons noted below. 
Section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code admittedly speaks in terms of the conveyance of a 
fee simple absolute. The statute thus deals with the factual situation that undoubtedly is most 
frequently present in instances where a grantor purports to convey real property that he does 
not own. The fact that the statute does not deal with all possible cases hardly means that the 
principle underlying it cannot be applied in other contexts. 
As you're doubtless aware, the after-acquired title doctrine is merely another name 
for the principle of estoppel by deed, which holds that a grantor who executes a deed 
purporting to convey land to which he has no title or as to which his title is defective at the 
time of the conveyance will not be permitted, when he later acquires the title he previously 
lacked, to claim in opposition to his earlier deed as against his grantee or his grantee's 
successor. See 23 Am Jr. 2d, Deeds § 341. The basis for the estoppel against the grantor 
typically is an express or implied warranty, covenant, or assurance, given by him to his 
grantee, to the effect that the grantor in fact had the interest he was purporting to convey. 
Id., §§ 341, 348, & 351. Thus, a quitclaim deed, without more, usually cannot be made the 
basis for an estoppel by deed, since in a quitclaim conveyance the grantor does not purport to 
have any particular interest — indeed any interest at all — in the land involved. Id. at § 352. •.. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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action, since if the grantor after conveying with a warranty of title asserts an after-acquired 
title against his grantee, the grantor will be liable in damages to the grantee. Id. at § 348. 
As^you know, Section 57-1-12 of our Code specifies the warranties and covenants that 
are provided to the grantee when a warranty deed is used. Those warranties and covenants 
are the basis of applying an estoppel by deed against a grantor who purports to convey 
something he does not own at the time of the conveyance. The rationale for the estoppel is 
exactly the same whether the purported conveyance is of a fee simple absolute, an easement, 
or anything else. It is clear that Section 57-1-10 of our Code was not intended to completely 
supplant the general principle of estoppel by deed, but merely to codify the principle in its 
most commonly encountered context. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
applying Utah law viewed the predecessor of Section 57-1-10 and the common law principle 
of estoppel by deed as coexisting and as each yielding the same result. See Wall v. Utah 
Coppe/Co., 277 F. 55, 58-59 (8th Cir. 1921). See also: 23 Am. Jr. 2d, Deeds § 347; Cox 
v. Ney, 580 P.2d 1085, 1086-87 (Utah 1978) (where the court based its holding on § 57-1-12 
as well as § 57-1-10, and gave as a reason for its decision the avoidance of circuity of action 
rationale referred to above). 
It is clear that in Utah the after-acquired title doctrine applies to easements just as it 
does to fee estates. Consequently, if Western Management when it gave the 1982 Warranty 
Deed lacked the interest in the West Parcel/Parcel 2 necessary to create the Right-of-Way, 
then the Right-of-Way burdening Parcel 2 was created but a few months later, when Western 
Management received title to Parcel 2. 
It still appears to me that the Right-of-Way is valid and effective irrespective of the 
validity of the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed. 
Charles L. Maak 
CLM:jmh 
cc: William S. & Irene C. Love [Via Both Telefax, to 415-949-0251, and 
First Class Mail] 
Geoffrey W. Mangum, Esq. [Via Both Telefax, to 524-1098, and First Class Mail] 
\u jm 
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August 15,1996 
VIA FAX 532-7750 
Charles L. Maak 
Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee 
185 South State St., Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Re: William S. & Irene C. Love — Right of Way Claim 
Dear Chuck: 
In my previous letters, I have stated that the property owned by my client Arnold Industries, 
Inc. has been leased to the U.S. Government (GSA) since at least 1985. I did not know until this 
week how long that lease has actually been in effect. I have now learned that the lease was entered 
into between Plan Tech Corporation and GSA in the Spring of 1977. Enclosed with this letter are 
copies of the original lease (which, unfortunately, is not dated), two early amendments, dated April 
22,1977 and May 12,1977, and the most recent amendment provided to me, dated December 16, 
1993. You will note that each enclosed document refers to the original lease, Lease No. GS-08B-
10728. I have not enclosed the entire lease file because it is quite voluminous, but the file includes 
66 "Supplemental Agreements" and a steady stream of correspondence showing that my client's-
premises have been continuously occupied by GSA under this particular Lease from 1977 to the 
present. 
Since the documents your clients rely on to claim their easement are not signed by GSA it 
seems to me that any right your clients could assert must be subject to the rights of GSA and that no 
easement claimed by your client can become effective as long as GSA remains in possession as 
lessee. 
In response to your letter of July 29,1996, the broad common law doctrine of after-acquired 
tide described in your letter may be the law in some states, but it is inconsistent with any reasonable 
interpretation of section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code. If, as you argue, Utah common law already 
recognizes the doctrine of after-acquired title for all types of conveyances, why did the Legislature 
adopt a statute on the subject at all? Then, having decided to adopt a statute, why did the Legislature 
single out conveyances "purporting to convey [property] in fee simple absolute?" Your 
interpretation of Utah's common law makes this phrase in the statute ineffective and meaningless. 
VUIDIT /) 
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Furthermore, the avoidance of circuity rationale mentioned in your letter does not apply to 
a grant of an easemenL The warranties described in section 57-1-12 do not apply to appurtenances 
(such as easements.) The section provides, in pan: 
.^  _^Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises therein 
named, together with all the appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto 
belonging, with covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, 
that he is lawfully seised of the premises: that he has good right to convey the same: 
that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession thereof: 
that the premises are free from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his heirs and 
personal representatives will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever.... (emphasis 
added.) 
Section 57-1-12 draws a clear distinction between the premises conveyed in fee simple in a warranty 
deed and the appurtenances belonging to those premises. Each warranty described in section 57-1-
12 is made applicable specifically to the premises, rather than the appurtenances. In fact, at least one 
of the warranties, the warranty of seisin, cannot possibly apply to an appurtenance such as an 
easement, because one can only be seised of a freehold estate. Section 57-1-12 therefore cannot be 
relied on to imply warranties with respect to grants of easements. 
This would seem to be particularly true where, as in this case, the description of the easement 
is preceded by the words "subject to." Tnese words indicate that the described easement is excepted 
from any warranties that might otherwise be stated or implied in the deed. 
In conclusion, since there is no warranty as to the easement, there is no circuity which would 
be avoided by application in this case of the doctrine of after-acquired title. 
Very truly yours, 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
enc. 
cc: Vince Rampton 
Trinidee Hall 
Blake Heiner 
Randall Call 
Arlen Tavlor 
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'• r~ « • • • • * U.S. GOYERKMENT 
LEASE FOR REAL PROPERTY 
v ' : . - • • <•, C5-05B-10723 
T l l l b 1.1 AaK. made and vmered into this da te hv and between 
7LAN TSCH. C3BPC2ATIGH 
h^oxc address is 1612 Eas t 3300 South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , BT 84106 
and wlu>*e interest in the property hereinafter described Is that of 
hctcinafier railed the Lessor, and the U N I T E D STATES O F AMERICA* hereinafter tailed the Government: 
^TTNIiS 5 ETH: The parties hereto for the consideration? hereinafter mentioned, covenant and aprcc as follows: 
I. The Le*x»r hereby leasee to the Government the followmj: described premises: 
106,500 ne t unable sqii&re f e e t of o f f i c e aird laboratory space i s a 
nevly cons truc ted b u i l d i ^ *£ 22^2 ¥ e s t 2300 South, S a l t Like C i t y , 
Utah, . 
mbc usee for such purposes a s determined by Gerseral S e r r i c e s Acz±n i s t ra t i ec« 
2. TO HAVE A N D T O H O L D the said premise* with their aprnjrtenam.es for the term beginning on 
Date to be e s t a b l i a h e d by 10 years front 
Ss s? l eaenta l . JL&:TTV.at throuch .. .* .stablisb^.. .date subject to termination 
and rrae* «d r i chu a* may be hereinafter set forth. 
* The C'/ovcfTunent shaii pav the Lessor annual rent of S. T V 7 2 . « . S ~ Q . V Q 0 . . . . . 
at the rate of 5 3 9 * 4 . 0 5 . - 0 0 TH:r OCHth. _ | n arrears. 
Rent f.»r a l«a»vr periled shall he prorated. Rent ihetkv shall W made pavable to: P i * * 1 ~ « o h C o r p • , 1 6 1 2 X a S t 
3300 South, S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84106 
fer^Trg the reneve 1 period 
1. The Government may terminate thi* leave at am t:mer*v ejvir.s at lease 7® da\s* notice in wri t inc 
ti» the Lo+*»r and n*» rental *hall a n rue after the cftcttivc d«*u ««f u-rntination. Said n m u e shall he umtputed nimnwrn* 
in:; iviui the Ja\ af fer the date of mail ing. 
V Thiv leave mav be renewed at the »iptit«n of the Government. I»ir the followinc terms and ac the following rentals: 
For tvo (2) f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d s a t aa asnual r e n t a l c f $ 4 9 5 , 2 2 5 . 0 0 , 
P'.tii***! "...ii.v he civ^rn in wrii ini : ««• the Le>*«>r at leavt ^ w daw Sefore the em! of the original leave tvrm 
• •< .rv. •wr-v^oi ' v r r v t1! —trrr •:•?!< zad \»indui»»n\ of this Ua*»- vhall remain the vame dur in- anv renewal term. 
V. .1 •• u *!tall JH loinrnitci! %••—•m-ru Inc ^»th the vLav after iric date «»| mailing. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6. The Le*>or *hal! furni>h i»» the Cw^crnmcs t . i \ part wf :*w; retuai v4»n>»4cT-axion, the following: 
a . S e r v i c e s , u t i l i t i e s and a t l n r e n a s e c l a accordance v i t h Schedule C axad 
Attxchaean Ho. 1 
. On- s i t e parking for 40 v i s i t o r and o f f i c i a l v e h i c l e s 
?. The folIo«»-iflg are attached and made a part hereof: 
* • The General Provisions and Instructions (Scaccard Form 2-A. J S s y . 1 2 7 . 9 . edi i ion) . St A n t a c h n e n t 5 o . 1 
b. S7C So. 76-38 and Addr-vhm* Xc. 1 and 2 
c. ?ag& 3 
8. m e following c h a n g o **erc made in tht* ieasr p r W to its execution: 
a. The vcrda "during the renewal period** vere added ro Paragraph 4, 
h. Paragraphs 9 and 10 vere added to this Lease. 
IN ^ l iXZSS ^'Kr-fvEOr, :he parties hereto h.i\c hereunto suhscribed their name* 4* of the date tifM »h"% 
written. 
•as£c* > FUR TSCS C02K&AT105 
t* mcstKZ or. 
(UlttUXtoftt 
* N « < • . ' « - * • • * * 
tS*g»*t*»*rt 
~\*t^, STiTt - C-* c---**^ , LXh*~£^L S « J L V . L U ^ AKHKISTEAT1CK PUBLIC BUILDIKS SEIVTCZ 
A c q u i s i t i o n ^rency 
:?act ^aru ieer :? : ? i \ ; 5 - c r » 
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C£X£ftJLi. SEl-.^CSS AO*!~ . *ST*ATX>* 
SUPPLEMENTAL L£AS£ AG3EEMEHT 
NO. 1 5 - 2 4 - 7 7 
TO V.LAS4. H O . 
C S 083-10723 
• (.11 0 / r « a » i S 4 1 
22L2 Vesc 2300 Scruth 
S a l t L*ka C i t y , U t x h 
THTS AGRtZ^ENT. mcee end entered m s tnis bc:e by end between 
CAZ2X2A CC*?CSJLTI0H , A UTAH CCEPCEATIOtf
 f SUCCESSORS IS ThTrSZST TO PLA.K T2CH CORP. 
1612 S a s c 2200 S o u t h S t r a e t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84106 «ncse occrrss is 
herencfter ceiled r.e Lessar, end the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, hereinafter ceiled the Government: 
WHEREAS. tfcepcrces hereto desre to onend t ie cheve Lecse. 
NCW THEREFORE, these pcr-es br the c m si deletion a hereinafter mentioned covenant one cere- thct tie s a d 
Lees* :s actendec. effective _ J A p r i l 2 2 . 1977
 z s faiiews: 
Paragraph 6 is revised as follows* Sub Paragraph ,fc" i addedt 
"c* A* parr of the rental consideration and upon acceptance cf the 
building, the lessor ahall be reimbursed by lus? Suez payment in 
the aacunt of $126,337«30 for the cost of providing and install* 
ins special pluabing, electrical, EVAC, and filtering syacacjs 
recuirad for the specixl purpose and laboratory space included 
under the lease• This payeaent represents the fully depreciated 
value of the soecial installations and the Governaent retxina 
no interest in the special fee *m€"ll.*T* es 
AI! other terms end conditions of the le-ese shell rerr.sa in force end effect. 
IN VITNES3 Wr.£?.Z0F. the pcrties subscribed their ncrr>es cr f the above date. 
L W O K . CA23X IICS
 f A iTIAH CORPORATION 
rZJJ' 
r J&1»& &5>£p ^ 
»UNl7£0 STATES Q * A * l R t C A ' GZh~&3AI» S>£.^Yiu£^ A U A i . 1 i i Z a A j L i U A t r\J.S-.LU au jL^J-LT*^ ^^JLt^uJL" 
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ruio-jc lutuotMC^ savvies 
SJPPLE*EMTM. LEAS£ ACXEEMEMT 
:. ...vf. SL- •»*»"•f: t.2 »::::si Picr*:rjl 
NO. 
zrrc 
5-24-77 
TO l O * t « 0 . 
C S O8B-1072S 
2212 V c i : 2300 S o u t h 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
THIS AGREEMENT, rncce cr.d emerec ;.n:c rus oc;e cy enc betvem 
CXSSZZA CCRPOKATICS, A UTAH CCRPOSATIOH 
1612 2Ust 3300 South S t r e e t 
^ : u o d c t i s :s 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84106 
hereincfler = i l ed r.e Lessor, cr.d the UNITED STATES CF AMERICA, hereinafter ctiied the Government: 
WHEREAS. the pcrtles hereto desire to amend the chev* Lecse. 
NOW TKnrETOPE. these pomes br the cor. si derations hereincite: mentioned covencr.t end ccree thct tie scid 
Lees* i s extended, effective - ¥ s v 1 2 . 1977 , cs fallows: 
Paragraphs 1 , 2 , 3 , and 5 a r e changed a s f o l l o v s : , 
" 1 . The L e s s o r h e r e b y l e a s e s t o t h e G c v e m a e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d p r e m i s e s : 
1 0 9 , 0 0 0 n e t u s a b l e s q u a r e f e e t o f o f f i c e , l a b o r a t o r y , and s p e c i a l purpose s p a c e 
c o a p r i s i n g a l l o f a c v o - s t o r y b u i l d i n g a t 2212 V e s t 2 3 0 0 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , 
U t a h , t o be u s e d f o r such p u r p o s e s a s de termined b y G e n e r a l S e r r i c a s Adain i s tra -^ 
t i o u . 1 ' 
" 2 . TU EAVZ AKD TC HOLD t h e s a i d p r n i s e s w i t h t h e i r aypurranancaa • f or t h e term 
b e g i n n i n g on May 1 2 , 1 5 7 7 , through >iay 1 1 , 1 9 8 7 . sub j e e r t o t e r m i n a t i o n and 
r a n e v a i r i g h t s a s » e y be h e r e i n a r r e r s e t f c r t i u " 
" 3 . t h e Government s h a l l pay t h e L e s s o r annual r e n r o f $ 4 5 7 , 2 3 0 * 0 0 a t t h e r a t a o f 
$ 4 0 , 6 0 2 * 5 0 p e r sacnth i n a r r e a r s * Xent f o r a l e s s e r p e r i o d s h a l l be p r o r a t e d * -
£ent c h e c k s s h a l l be aade p a y a b l e t o : C a n era C o r p o r a t i o n , A Utah C o r p o r a t i o n , 
1612 l a s t 2 3 0 0 S o u t h , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 0 6 * " 
J M 5 . T h i s l e a s e » e y be r c n e v e d a t t h e o p t i o n o f t h e Government , f o r t h e f o l l c v i n g 
t e m i s and a t t h e f o l l c v i n g r e n n a l s : ?or aro ( 2 ) f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d s a t an 
annual r e n t a l o f $ 5 0 6 , 3 5 0 * 0 0 , p r o v i d e d a o t i c e be g i ^ e n i n w r i t i n g t o the ' 
L e s s o r a t l e a s t 90 d a y s b e f o r e t h e esid o f t h e o r i g i n a l l e a s e t a r n or any 
renewal t e r m ; a l l onher t e r n s and c o n d i t i o n s o f t h i s l e a s e s h a l l r e o a i n t h e 
s a a e d u r i n g any r e n e w a l t e r n . S a i d n o t i c e s h a l l be cszsoutad cocsaencing 
v i t h t h e day a f t e r t h e d a t e o f v e i l i n g , " 
j All other terms end conditions of tne lecse shcil rem cm in force end effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the ocrties subsenbed their ncmes cs of the cbove dcte. 
(Uffiexm 7*±4j 
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Supplemental Agreement Number 66 
Lease Number: GS-Q5H-1G72S 
Dace: December IS, 129 3 
address of Premises: Aerial Photography Tleld Cffice 
2222 West 2200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119-2020 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this date by and between 
C3 Commercial 
(Attn: Lauren Sunt, Heal Estate Manager) 
Prccertv Management Services 
whose address is: 17G~ South Main Street, Suite 120C 
Salt Lake City, Utah £4101-1605 
hereinafter called the Lesser and the United States of America, 
hereinafter called the Government: 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to amend the above lease. To 
provide all materials and labor to make alterations at the Aerial 
Photography Eield Cffice. 
NOW THEREFORE, these parties for the consideration hereinafter 
mentioned covenant and agree that the said lease is amended as 
follows: 
A- The Lessor agrees tc provide all materials and labor required 
to make the following repairs in room 50 and 10a in the Color 
Section of the Photograpnic Branch: 
1. Remove and replace damaged concrete around the trenches. 
2. Remove and replace damaged ceramic tile. 
3. Remove and replace damaged wallbcard. 
4. Install masonite wainscot four feet high on walls. 
5. Remove and replace vinyl base and VCT tile. 
H- Upon completion of all work and final acceptance fcv the Con-
tracting Officer, the Government shall pay to the Lessor $2,841.6 = 
under Purchase Order He. 43S44740013S which will be issued as the 
—-*.•_*_* ^ui;-^;n. nrv—-**m- --.- rhis crQiec-. All invoices 
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Supplemental Agreement Number 
Lease Number: G3-C-83-1Q72S 
Daze: December 16
 / 1S93 
order number. Wcrx will be ccmplered within sixty (50) cays cf the 
issue cf'^ b.a purchase crier unless a written request for an 
extension has been received and approved by tie Contracting 
Cffiner. 
C- Tie Lessor agrees t o cont inue to provide a"* ^ s e r v i c e s and 
u t i l i t i e s t o t h e e n t i r e l e a s e d f a c i l i t y in accordance w i t h t h e 
requirements c f t h e l e a s e c o n t r a c t as amended. A l l requirements c f 
rhe Lesser under the terms c f t h e l e a s e and supplemental amendments 
remain i n e f f e c t * 
Lessor: C3 Ccmmarcna-L 
Lauren "Hunt rleal E s t a t e Manacer 
17 (T South Main S t r s e i r S u i t e 1200 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 54101-1305 
UNITED STATES CI AMZ2ZCA G2NESAL SS5VIC2S ADMINTSTPATICK 
Publ ic B u i l d i n c Real Zs^arrs D i v i s i o n Sea l tv , Branch 1 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & G E E 
A ^ K O r t S S l O N A k CORPORATION 
O A U A. K t M t A U MClOl E.C- LE!T«EAO S U I T E 1300 ° r COUNSEL 
CLAtTOW 4. **«« JOHN M. BUMKC
 c o u T W CTATE STREET C H * " U U U * * * * * 
S > m c W A O O O U R S S T C ^ C N E.w. H * u t ! " S O U T H S T A T E S T R E E T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
KlCMAKO C IMOWN DANIEL A. J C N S t N * * O S T O F r i C E B O X MO>© 
O A V I O E. CCC , " , A N c - W-OVO S A L T L A K E C I T Y . U T A H © * l * 7 - O O l » 
SCOTT W. LOVCLtSS DAVID r. CRASTREE * A W I ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * T» w ~ " *» 
PATRICIA w. CMWSTtNSCN C*CCO»T «, MCSS T E L E P H O N E (QOl) S 3 2 - T B * 0 SRECJAL COUNSEL 
DAVtO «C «COO T t « * T E. WELCH •.*-««.- .* #««,\ - n ^ . - r ^ ^ O STANWCY D. NEELEMAN 
RO»E«T a. LOCMMEAO jtrrncr j . HUNT T E L E C O P Y * (BOI) 332-77SO 
CART A. DODOE RAUL C ORECKSCL 
ROBERT S. CLAR* CLAT w. STUCKI 
AUAN R. ANDERSEN T M O M A S R. LEE 
KENT H. C O L U N f O. MATTMtw OO^NY 
MICHAEL M. LATER JONATHAN o. MArtN AncmcTOT 1QQ6 
CAROLTN t . MCMUCM ^MARK A, WACNCR ^ I \ U & U 3 l - / , A ^ ^ V J 
STEVEN J . CHRISTIANSEN J A R O A R E T Z.. W I U S O N *" 
SCOTT r. YOUNG RORERT A. MCCONNtLU 
VICTOR A, TAYWOR »CNTt£Y J . T O U TJ„„A T\*K~~~^A 
ROHAUD c. RUSSELL o. CRA.C ^ W Y n a n a Del ivered 
ROGER D. MEHRIKSEW JACK M. MORGAN 
MATTHEW S, OURRANT CODY WINCHESTER TIELO 
BRIAN J . ROM"lELL ERIC W. REARSON 
GWEGOKT O. RHILLIRS 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
Lundberg & Meaders 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: William S. & Irene C. Love - Right-of-Way Affecting 
Property in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 
Dear Bill: 
I've received and considered your letter of August 15, 1996. 
In order to assess your assertion that the GSA Lease has priority over the Right-of-
Way held by the Loves, we need to consider all of the documents related to that Lease. I'd 
therefore appreciate your supplying me with a complete copy of the GSA Lease (you 
included only the first page with your letter of August 15) and with complete copies of all 
documents that have in any way amended, modified, or supplemented the Lease, including 
all of the 66 or more "Supplemental Agreements" that apparently have been executed to date 
and any correspondence that may have amended or supplemented the Lease. 
Your position regarding the effect of Section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code on the 
common law doctrine of estoppel by deed is not persuasive. In talcing that position you 
appear to ignore all of the authority to the contrary which was cited in my letter of July 29. 
Moreover, limiting applicability of the doctrine.exclusively to cases where a fee simple estate 
is conveyed produces results that are completely inconsistent with the rationale for the 
doctrine. It admittedly might have been tidier if the Legislature in Section 57-1-10 had 
codified the overall doctrine of estoppel by deed, rather than doing so for just the most fre-
quently encoimtered circumstance (purported conveyances in fee simple). However, the fact 
that the statute did not occupy the entire area it potentially could have does not dictate the 
conclusion that the general concept of estoppel by deed was thereby made inapplicable in this 
state. This is particularly so when one considers the absurd results that would follow from 
such a conclusion. 
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Your reading of the language of Section 57-1-12 is overly narrow. As used in the 
statute, the term "premises" is obviously intended to mean the property described as being 
conveyed, whether that property be a fee simple estate in land or both such an estate and 
whatever appurtenances accompany it. This is the way our Supreme Court in the case of 
George v. Robinson, 63 Pac. 819 (Utah 1901), construed similar language contained in a 
warranty deed (where the court held that warranties provided for in the deed there at issue 
would not extend to water rights unless they were appunenances of the premises conveyed by 
the deed). The more restrictive reading you suggest would mean that warranties of title 
could never apply to anything but a fee simple estate. I know of no policy that would be 
served by such a state of affairs. 
In any event, however, the estoppel by deed doctrine as applied to the Right-of-Way 
does not rise or fall with Section 57-1-12. The doctrine is applied even though a warranty of 
title is not given, in instances where the deed involved reflected an intention to convey a 
particular estate. See 23 Am, Jur. 2d Deeds, §§ 351, 352. That was clearly the case as 
regards the 1982 Warranty Deed's treatment of the Right-of-Way described as being 
conveyed. 
The 1982 Warranty Deed conveyed the Loves' Parcel of property "subject to and 
together with" the Right-of-Way. The "subject to" language may have been used because of 
the Grantor's belief (or fear) that the Right-of-Way burdened not just adjacent property, but 
also a portion of the land being conveyed in fee. Whatever the reason for inclusion of the 
"subject to" part of the clause, however, it is the fee parcel that is indicated to be "subject 
to" the Right-of-Way. The "subject to" language is obviously not intended to limit the 
Grantor's warranties of title as they pertained to the Right-of-Way. If that had been 
intended, the "subject to" language would have had to follow, not precede, the description of 
the Right-of-Way and would also have had mention whatever it was to which the Right-of-
Way was to be subject. 
It seems to me that the conclusion must still be that the 1982 Warranty Deed 
effectively created the Right-of-Way. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & G E E 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
August 27, 1996 
Page 3 
I shall look forward to receiving the GSA Lease materials. 
Since 
Charles L. Maak 
CLM:jmh 
cc: William S. & Irene C. Love [Via Both Telefax, to 415-949-0251, and 
First Class Mail] 
J. Randall Call, Esq. [Via Both Telefax, to 524-1098, and First Class Mail] 
% 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
October 14, 1996 
VIA FAX 532-7750 
Ronald G. Russell 
Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown_& Gee 
185 South State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Arnold Industries, Inc. v. William S. Love, et al. 
Dear Ron: 
I received a telephone message from you last Friday indicating that Arnold Industries1 
temporary fence may be encroaching into your client's property. This was not our intention. 
The fence was intended to be entirely within Arnold Industries1 property. I would like to 
meet with you at the property within the next few days to look at the fence and at your survey 
in order to understand the problem. I have asked Mary Sharp, Arnold Industries1 
representative, to come. We are available to do this Tuesday afternoon after 3 p.m. or 
anytime on Wednesday. Please let me know if you can meet with us then or if you are 
available on another day. 
It has been about ten days now since I delivered the Complaint and an Acceptance of 
Service for this case to your office. Before doing this, I received verbal confirmation from 
Chuck Maak that your office would accept service, but I have not yet received the signed 
Acceptance. If you are authorized to accept service, please date and sign the Acceptance and 
return it to me right away. If you are not authorized, please let me know so that I can arrange 
personal service on Mr. and Mrs. Love. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Very truly yours, 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
cc: Ted Phelps 
Mary Sharp 1^ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Law Offices of 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
A Professional Corporation 
FAX COVER SHEET 
Fax#: 
Date: 
To: 
From: 
Re: 
pr^ -1150 
m # of pages: .v 
MESSAGE: 
The information contained in this transmission is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the recipient! 
named above. This message may be an attorney-client communication and, as such, is privileged and confidential. If] 
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October 17, 1996 
HAND-DELIVERED 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al. 
Civil No. 960906947 
Dear Bill: 
I am enclosing a copy of the survey that I reviewed with you at the property on 
October 15, 1996. As was evident, the fence erected last week by Arnold Industries 
encroaches on the property owned by my clients, William and Irene Love. We demand that 
such encroachment be removed immediately. 
As you know, it is our position that a right-of-way exists in favor of the Love 
property that burdens Arnold Industries9 property. We have previously advised you of the 
deeds of record establishing the right-of-way. Arnold Industries' erection of a fence directly 
violates the right of the Loves and their tenants to utilize the right-of-way and has caused and 
will continue to cause significant damages to the Loves and their tenants. 
In the above-referenced action, Arnold Industries has sought a determination from the 
court regarding the Loves' right-of-way. The Loves will certainly file an answer and a 
counterclaim seeking a similar detenxiination from the court. It is unfortunate that your 
client chose to erect the fence and block the right-of-way prior to the court's adjudication. 
Obviously, we view your client's actions to be inappropriate and a demonstration of bad 
faith, particularly in light of the fact that the parties had previously been discussing ways to 
define and limit the right-of-way to better suit the needs of Arnold Industries and its tenant. 
On behalf of the Loves, we demand that Arnold Industries immediately remove the 
* fence and restore the right-of-way to its prior condition. In the event the fence is not 
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October 17, 1996 
removed immediately, the Loves will seek appropriate legal redress, including recovery of all 
damages caused by Arnold Industries' wrongful interference with the right-of-way. 
RGR/wvk 
Enclosure 
c: William S. and Irene C. Love 
Stephen G. Stoker, Esq. 
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October 31, 1996 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Post Office Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290 
Re: Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al. 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
Home Office Claim No. 96-0020 
Local Claim No. 96-13-18 
Dear Bill: 
Enclosed please find an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and 
discovery requests we have filed in the above-referenced case. Because the GSA apparently 
claims an interest in the Arnold Industries property and you have asserted that its interest is 
not subject to my clients' easements, I have joined the GSA as a third-party defendant in the 
lawsuit. I expect that the joinder of the GSA may cause some concerns to your client. 
Consequently, before I serve my pleading on the GSA, I wanted to once again broach the 
topic of settlement. 
If Arnold Industries has interest in discussing the resolution of this matter along the 
lines that were being discussed before you filed the lawsuit, please let me know right away. 
We are confident that we can establish the existence and validity of the Loves' right-of-way, 
but we still view the best long-term solution to be a negotiated resolution. If you would like 
to continue settlement discussions, please give me a. 
RGR/wvk 
Enclosures 
c: William S. and Irene C. Love 
Blake T. Heiner, Esq. 
Charles L. Maak, Of Counsel VUIBIT IfL. 
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IN »CP»WT s c r c i T O : 
Salt Lake City 
January 10, 1997 
VIA TELEFAX 
WilHaft^ A. Meaders, Jr. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East; #305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
Ronald G. Russell 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADD0UPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State, #1300 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: William Love - GSA Building Lease Easement 
Gentlemen: 
I contacted both of you on January 9, 1997 concerning a possible meeting at the GSA 
building in Salt Lake City during the following week, to confirm the location and course of 
the proposed easement in favor of William Love. In discussing the matter with each of you, 
I find that Friday, January 17, 1997 at 10:00 is the most available time. If this creates a 
problem, for either of you, please let me know. If I have heard nothing by Tuesday of next 
week, I will assume that the time and date arc acceptable. I will be present with Peter 
Arnold. 
By this letter I would again request that Mr. Meaders make the surveyor available at 
the meeting, in order to explain the survey and answer questions, Arnold Commercial 
Properties will cover his costs. 
Rampton 
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January 29, 1997 
VIA TELECOPY 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Post Office Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290 
Re: Arnold Industries, Inc. v. William S. Love, et al. 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
Dear Bill: 
As I indicated in our telephone conversation, I have discussed with Mr. Love the 
topics addressed at our on-site settlement meeting. Mr. Love would prefer to review and 
analyze a specific settlement proposal from Arnold Industries before scheduling another 
meeting. 
While we remain hopeful that settlement discussions will result in the resolution of the 
matter, we need to keep the lawsuit moving forward. Accordingly, I would request that you 
provide me with responses to the outstanding discovery requests and copies of the documents 
that we have requested within the next ten (10) days. 
Please call me if you have any questions or if you would like to discuss this matter. 
sincerely, 
RGR/wvk 
c: William S. Love 
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IN REPLY RETER TO: 
Salt Lake City 
February 3, 1997 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, #305 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
Ronald G. Russell 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADD0UPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State, #1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: William Love - GSA Building Lease Easement 
Gentlemen: 
Enclosed please find a survey of the GSA building showing a proposed easement and 
barrier which will permit access to and from Mr. Love's loading dock across my client's 
property. Please let me know as soon as possible if the enclosed drawing ijy acceptable. 
Cordially 
Enclosure 
\ \u> 
202753.1 
-ifiuniT 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[ \ 
l l i « - n 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
LAW OFFICES OF 
K I M B A L L , P A R R , W A D D O U P S , B R O W N & G E E 
A PROrtSSlONAL CORPORATION 
DALE A. KIMBALL GREGORY O. R M I U L « R S SU ITE 1300 ° r COUNSEL 
CLAYTON J . RARR HCIOI E.G. UCITMCAO , B S O u T „ S T A T E S T « E E T CHARLES L. M M K 
CLA«K W A O D O U * » S JOHN M. BURKE BRUCE A. MAAK 
R I C H A R O C. B R O W N S T E R H E N E.w. M A L E P O S T O F F I C E B O X UOlS 
DAVID E. GEE DANIEL A. J E N S E N 
SCO"T W. LOVELESS BRIAN G. LLOYD 
PATRICIA w. C H R I S T E N S E N GREGORY M. H E S S T E L E P H O N E (80t) 532>7B^O 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84I47-OOI9 
ROBERT B. L O C H M E A D TERRY E. WELCH 
GARY A. DODGE J E r r R E Y j . H U N T T E L E C O P I E R (BOl) 5 3 2 - 7 7 S O 
ROBERT S. CLARK RAUL C. DRECKSEL 
ALAN R.ANDERSEN T M O M A S R. LEE 
KENT H. COLLINS O. MATTHEW DORNY 
MICHAEL M. LATER JONATHAN O. HATEN 
CAROLYN B. M C H U G H M A R K A . WAGNER 
STEVEN J . CHRISTIANSEN MARGARET E. WILSON 
SCOTT T. YOUNG ROBERT A . MCCONNELL 
VICTOR A. TAYLOR BENTUEY j . TOLK 
RONALD G. RUSSELL D. C » A I G P A R R Y 
ROGER D. HENRIKSEN JACK M. MORGAN 
MATTHEW B. DURRANT . .^ERlC W. PEARSON 
BRtAN J . ROMRIELL * BRYAN T. ALLEN 
March 6, 1997 
HAND-DELIVERED 
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Post Office Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Re: Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al. 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
Dear Vince and Bill: 
As I have discussed with each of you, we have been waiting for Bingham 
Engineering to complete its work before responding to Arnold Industries' offer of settlement. 
Based on Bingham Engineering's review, the property exchange contemplated by the drawing 
prepared by Robert Jones of Bush & Gudgell would not provide sufficient clearance to enable 
large trucks to access the Loves' property. Moreover, Mr. Jones1 proposal would require 
that access to the Love property be restricted to a narrow strip located too close to the 
building located at the south end of the property. Such an approach to settlement is very 
different from the concept of our original proposal which would have a shared entrance with 
a designated lane for trucks to access the rear portion of the Love property. Accordingly, 
we must reject your most recent offer of settlement. 
I am enclosing herewith a map prepared by Bingham Engineering that we would 
propose as a basis for settlement consistent with what we now understand to be Arnold 
Industries' objectives. The arrangement shown on the Bingham Engineering map was 
dictated by the following considerations: (1) it provides a barrier between the properties as 
\w 
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requested by Arnold Industries; (2) Bingham Engineering indicates that a width of 24 feet is 
needed to accommodate large trucks; and (3) space must be left along the side of the building 
on the south end of the Love property (indicated on the map as a 12' buffer) to protect the 
building, the gas meter, and the tenant's quiet enjoyment. Given the GSA's insistence that 
large trucks-be kept far away from-its building, it is certainly reasonable for some 
accommodation to be made for the tenants of the Love property. 
This proposal represents a substantial concession by the Loves. The Loves hold an 
easement that entitles them to access their property over the entire Arnold parcel. The 
buildings were originally designed and laid out to share common access as is apparent from 
the location of loading docks. This shared access has functioned without any complaint for 
many years. By agreeing to a new access configuration, the Loves would be giving up 
substantial rights that will adversely impact the use and value of their property. 
The Loves' offer to settle this matter would still be conditioned upon a payment of 
$75,000 for the reasons stated in my letter of November 22, 1996. In addition, settlement 
would be subject to our review and approval of a detailed plan for the proposed barrier, 
Arnold's agreement to construct and maintain the barrier at its own expense, the preparation 
of appropriate legal descriptions, and mutually acceptable documentation including mutual 
releases and other provisions. 
Please call me if you would like to discuss tKi^matter. 
Enclosure 
c: William S. and Irene C. Love 
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ST. GEORGE OFFICE 
THE TABERNACLE TOWER BLOG. 
249 EAST TABERNACLE 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH ©-4770-297© 
TELEPHONE (SOI) e28-!627 
FAX (801) 628-5225 
IN R E P L Y R t r c R T O : 
Salt Lake City 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, Ste 305 
P.O. Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290 
Ronald G. Russell 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADD0UPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State, Ste. 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Re: William Love Easement Case 
Gentlemen: 
This is to follow up generally on the status of the above matter. 
As you are aware, Peter Arnold is very anxious to get this matter concluded. We 
have discussed various options for relocating the boundary line between the two properties in 
such a manner as to give Mr. Love access to his loading docks, while still preserving the 
integrity of the GSA Building's parking structure. 
In my last communication with Bill Meaders, I was told that Mr. Love feels it is 
important to locate the boundary line as indicated on the Bingham Engineering drawing 
previously sent to us; however, he would be willing to move the central barrier between the 
properties further back (so as to divide the GSA Building's parking area from his property, 
but leave the drive area without a central median). By copy of this letter, I am passing this 
proposal on to Peter Arnold, asking for his input. 
My concern is that we seem to be exchanging alternatives over an extended period of 
time, with no consensus being reached as to the resolution of the problem. As you are both 
aware, Peter Arnold is in the process of refinancing the GSA Building, a process which 
needs to close by March 31, 1997. If the loan cannot be closed because of an outstanding 
easement dispute, damages would be significant. 
rvnioiT ;-7 
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Whatever resolution is reached, it needs to be reached promptly. Continued delay 
past the end of March could create a problem which none of us wishes to deal with. 
If you have any questions, please call me. 
Cordiallyf 
A 
C. RAMPTON 
VCRxh 
cc: Peter G. Arnold 
208797.1 
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A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
March 24,1997 
HAND DELIVERED 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. 
Kimball, Parr, Waddoups, Brown & Gee 
185 South-State, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Arnold Industries, Inc. v. William S. Love, et al. 
Dear Ron and Vince: 
I have enclosed a new drawing prepared by Bob Jones. The drawing generally follows the 
proposal contained in Ron Russell's letter of March 6,1997, but the barrier between the parcels has 
been moved 8 feet to the east. In Ron's letter, he proposed a 12 foot buffer, plus a 24 foot access 
lane. The enclosed drawing provides a 4 foot buffer for the gas meter and a 24 foot access lane. In 
other words there is a clearance of 28 feet around the south building on the Love property. This 
should be more than adequate to allow large trucks to access the rear portion of the Love property. 
Obviously, there are still many issues to be worked out if the parties are going to settle this 
case. In particular, we are far apart on the dollars to be paid. But I would like to see first if we can 
agree conceptually on a proposed location of the boundary between the parcels. If we can't agree 
on the boundary, then there can be no settlement. If we can agree on a proposed boundary 
(contingent on working out the other issues), then it makes sense to continue settlement discussions. 
Ron, please let me know as soon as possible whether or not this drawing is acceptable to Mr. 
Love. 
Very truly yours, 
William A. Meaders, Jr. 
cc: Peter Arnold 
Arlen Taylor 
enc. 
EXHIBIT I t 
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PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SUITE 1300 
185 SOUTH STATE STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX MOI9 
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H BAIA7-0019 
TELEPHONE (800 S32-78<0 
TELECOPIER (BOl) 532-7750 
OF COUNSEL 
CHARLES L. MAAK 
BRUCE A MAAK 
BRENT M. STEVENSON 
April 15, 1997 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Post Office Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Re: Arnold Industries. Inc. v. 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
William S. Love, et al. 
Dear Bill: 
As I indicated in our telephone conversation, Mr. Love is not willing to agree to your 
client's most recent proposal which would reduce the entrance drive by another eight feet. 
Mr. Love remains willing to settle on the terms stated in my letter to you dated March 6, 
1997. 
It is our intention to move forward with the litigation and to serve the Third-Party 
Complaint on the various third-party defendants. Ifvour client wants to settle this case on 
the terms that we have previously offered, please Jetme know righpiway. 
RGR/wvk 
iG. Russell 
c: William S. and Irene C. Love 
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OF COUNSEL 
CHARLES L MAAK 
B R U C E A MAAK 
BRENT M. STEVENSON 
April 29, 1997 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Post Office Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Re: Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al. 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
Dear Bill: 
For my calendaring purposes, I am writing to confirm that you gave me a two week 
extension to respond to the plaintiffs discovery requests in the above-referenced case. 
Accordingly, I will provide you with our responses on or before May 12, 1997. If your 
client is still interested in settling the case pursuant to oar proposal, please let me know. 
RGR/wvk 
c: William S. and Irene C. Love 
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July 3, 1997 
William A. Meaders, Jr., Esq. 
LUNDBERG & MEADERS 
660 South 200 East, Suite 305 
Post Office Box 1290 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Re: Arnold Industries. Inc. v. William S. Love, et al. 
Civil No. 960906947PR 
Dear Bill and Vince: 
On March 6, 1997,1 forwarded to you a specific offer for settlement of the 
above-referenced case. Bill wrote back on March 24, 1997 with a new drawing prepared by 
Bob Jones that would place the barrier closer to the Love property. As reflected by my 
leuer dated April 15, 1997 to Bill, the Loves were not willing to agree to a further reduction 
of the entrance drive, but remained willing to settle on the basis outlined in my letter of 
March 6, 1997. 
Because you have not responded to my letter of April 15, 1997, we must assume that 
our settlement offer has been rejected. Accordingly, we have gone ahead and caused the 
Third-Party Complaint to be served on the various third-party defendants and it is our 
intention to proceed as quickly as possible to obtain an adjudication regarding the easement. 
If there is any further interest in discussing the settlement proposal contained in my letter of 
March 6, 1997, please let me know immediately. Once the third-parties have been joined 
and our clients have invested additional time and money in pursuing the lawsuit, it will only 
become more difficult to reach a settlement. 
vy.*~?-. rVUlBlT 3) 
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July 3, 1997 
If you would like to discuss this matter, pleiSfc give me a call 
Sincerely, 
• JV 
R^halp G. Rus: 
RGR/wvk 
c: William S. and Irene C. Love 
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24 Oct 75 
28 Oct 75 
Research Industries 
WD 4009/249 
Y 
Plan-Tech Corp. 
Arnold Industries Property 
14 Oct 75 
18 Nov 75 
14 Oct 75 
28 Oct 75 
Love Property 
WD 4C09/250 
"A" 
Marcon Investment 
a Partnership 
10 Aug 76 
13 Aug 76 
Y 
Carrera Corporation 
a Utah Corporation 
Minson-Halander 
A Utah Corporation 
IOAug76 
13 Aug 76 
Carrera Corporation 
a Utah Corporation 
Smith. Smith. Minson 
& Halander 
30Oct8l 
I 8 N O V 8 I 
QCD53I4/5I7 
"wild" "K" 
Western Management 
a Utah general 
partnership 
30 Oct 81 
24 Nov 81 
QCD53I6/554 
T 
Western Management 
a Utah general — 
partnership 
. Fred Smith, Ronald W.Smith. Dale N. 
Minson, & Roberts. Halander 
5Nov8 l 
8Dec8l 
Carrera Corporation 
a Utah Corporation 
29 Oct 82 
29 Oct 82 QCD 5416/2273 
H. Fred Smith. Robert W. Smith. Dale N. 
Minson & Robert S. Halander 
29 Oct 82 
29 Oct 82 QCD 5416/2274 
Western Management 
a Utzh general partnership 
25 May 84 
31 May 84 
SPW 5560/2059 
No "subject to" 
Smith. Halander, Smith and 
20Jun84 
31 Oct 79 
9 Nov 79 
3 Aug 79 
6 Aug 79 
Western Management 
A partnership 
WD 4983/881 
"C" 
Western Management^ 
a partnerhsip " ^ 
27 Jan 82 
1 Feb 82 
William J. Lowcnberg 
<\%1 
Kay L Walker & Lawrence A. McBictt 
22 Feb 85 
12 Mar 85 QCD 5636/614 
•Q-
Smitft. Halander. Smith and 
I8jun84 
20Jun84 
Kay L Walker & Lawrence A. McEilictt 
22 Feb 85 
12 Mar 85 QCD 5636/614 
"Q" 
Smith, Halander. Smith & Assoc 
a Utah general partnership .< | m 
Walker, McEliott. Wilkinson & Assoc 
a Missouri general partnership (1/2) ~ 
QCD 5888/1248 
"R-
l5Apr87 
I3jun87 
H. Fred Smith. Robert S. Halander,& Ronald 
W.Smith and Dale N. Minson 
SWD 
5930/347 
28 Nov 90 
8Mar91 
QCD 6296/1450 
Conmart, Inc. a 
Utah corporation 
15 Jul 93 
22 Jul 93 
Arnold Industries Inc. a Utah Corporator 
22Jan9l 
23Jan91 
Corrective Warranty 
Deed 
6284/1366 
WD 
7089/835 
William & Irene Love 
IOApr95 
6 Feb 97 
6 Feb 97 
2212 West L L C . a Delaware 
Umited Liability Co. 
QCD 7130/1455 
"G" 
William & Irene Love Trustees 
3 Apr 97 
3 Apr 97 
GSA2222West,LLC.,a 
Delaware Umited Liability Co. 
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